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[2] Eminent Domain 148
Supreme Court of Utah.
John M. BAGFORD and Fae H. Bagford, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
EPHRAIM CITY, a municipal corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 940155.
Oct. 11, 1995.
Private garbage hauler brought action claiming that
city ordinance providing for municipal garbage collection and requiring all residents to pay fee regardless of whether they were using city-selected contractor's services effected taking for which compensation was due under Utah Constitution. The
Sixth District Court, Sanpete County, Don V.
Tibbs, J., found that hauler's loss of business did
not rise to level of protected property interest, and
hauler appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, Associate C.J., held that: (1) hauler's oral agreements
with its customers were not protectable property interests, and (2) ordinance did not have effect of precluding hauler from providing garbage collection
services so as to constitute taking.
Affirmed.
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Private garbage hauler's oral agreements with customers were not protectable property interests within meaning of takings provision of Utah Constitution, and hauler thus did not have takings claim
premised on city ordinance requiring residents to
pay fee for city's garbage collection whether or not
they were using city-selected contractor; agreements were simply offers to collect garbage that
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148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.3 k. Municipal Corporations and
Local Government in General; Annexation of Territory. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1.1))
Although private company may possess franchise to
provide garbage collection services within service
area, no taking occurs if government operates competing service within that service area; if agency
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to offer its services, there is no compensable taking.
[15] Eminent Domain 148
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148k2.4 k. Taxes, Licenses, Assessments,
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another hauler from providing services so as to give
rise to compensable taking under Utah Constitution.
Const. Art. 1, § 22; Ephraim City, Utah, Ordinance
No. 10-412.
[16] Eminent Domain 148
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148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.2 k. Particular Acts and Regulations. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1.1))
Private business' competitive disadvantage in competing with municipality does not result in taking of
private business property.
*1096 Marcus Taylor, Richfield, for plaintiffs.
Jody K. Burnett, Salt Lake City, for Ephraim City.
David L. Church, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah
League of Cities & Towns.
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs John M. Bagford and Fae H. Bagford,
proprietors of a garbage collection business, appeal
a district court judgment holding that an Ephraim
City garbage collection ordinance does not result in
a taking of the Bagfords' private garbage collection
business. The ordinance provides for municipal
garbage collection and requires all city residents to
pay a fee for the city's garbage collection, whether
or not the residents are using the city's facilities.
The Bagfords assert that the district court erred in
ruling that their loss of business from residential
customers in Ephraim City because of competition
with the city was not property within the meaning
of article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution. We
affirm.
The Bagfords own and operate Sanpete Valley Disposal and Landfill, a garbage collection and disposal business located in Sanpete County, Utah. From
1984 until August or September 1989, the Bagfords
provided garbage collection services to residential
and commercial customers in Ephraim City and

other municipalities and unincorporated areas in
Sanpete County. The Bagfords competed with other
garbage collection businesses in Sanpete County.
The Bagfords used informal, oral agreements with
customers pursuant to which the Bagfords provided
their garbage collection services. They offered
garbage collection to their customers on a weekly
basis, fifty-two weeks each year, and charged their
customers for each pickup the customers actually
required. If a customer did not require weekly
pickup or left town for vacation or an extended
period of time and did not use the Bagfords' services, the customer was not required to pay. *1097
Whenever the residents put the garbage out, the
Bagfords picked it up.
In 1989, Ephraim City decided to develop a municipal garbage collection system to bring the city into compliance with federal and state health and
safety regulations. Ephraim City formed a citizens
ad hoc committee to study the issue and eventually
accepted the committee's recommendation to contract with a private company to provide regular
garbage collection services for residents within the
city.
In May and June 1989, Ephraim City accepted bids
for garbage collection services and subsequently
awarded a residential service contract to the successful bidder. The Bagfords were among several
competitors that bid unsuccessfully for the contract.
In October 1989, Ephraim City adopted Ordinance
10-412, which provides:
All residences to include trailers, one, two, three,
and multiple family dwellings, who are charged
residential electrical service rates, will have
garbage collection as arranged by Ephraim City.
Ephraim City, Utah, Rev.Ordinances ch. 10-400,
part 10-412. At the time the ordinance was enacted,
the Bagfords provided garbage collection services
to 176 residential customers in Ephraim City and to
a number of commercial enterprises. The latter
were not affected by Ephraim's change in policy.
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Ephraim City also adopted monthly garbage collection charges to be assessed against each residence.
The charges are included on the monthly billing for
municipal electrical services sent to each residence
and must be paid even if the resident does not use
the garbage collection services provided by the city.
As a result, the Bagfords' 176 residential customers
terminated their agreements with the Bagfords and
began using the garbage collection services
provided by Ephraim City to avoid having to pay
double for garbage collection. The Bagfords continue to provide weekly garbage collection services to
approximately thirty-two commercial customers.
The Bagfords then brought this action for inverse
condemnation against Ephraim City, alleging that
the enactment and implementation of the ordinance
resulted in a taking of property within the meaning
of article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution and
asserting that they were entitled to damages for that
FN1
taking.
Following a bench trial, the district
court ruled that the Bagfords had failed to establish
the elements of a taking because the loss of business from the city's competition did not rise to the
level of a protected property interest within the
meaning of article I, section 22 and because Ephraim City did not directly prohibit the Bagfords
from competing for the business of Ephraim City
residents.
FN1. The Bagfords initially brought their
claim under article I, section 22 of the
Utah Constitution and under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. Ephraim City removed
the action to the United States District
Court, District of Utah, and then moved to
dismiss the claims under the United States
Constitution for failure to satisfy ripeness
and finality requirements. The parties stipulated to dismissal of the federal claims
without prejudice and to a remand of the
claims under the Utah Constitution to the
state district court. The Bagfords' claims
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
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ments to the United States Constitution are
not before us.
[1] On appeal, the Bagfords claim that the district
court erred in ruling that their oral agreements were
not private property within the meaning of article I,
section 22 and that no taking had occurred with respect to their residential garbage collection business
in Ephraim City. These issues present questions of
law which we review for correctness, granting no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Reliance Ins. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858 P.2d 1363,
1366 (Utah 1993); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave.
Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993).
[2] Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution
provides, “Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation.” This provision is broader in its language than
the similar provision in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. To recover under article
I, section 22, a claimant must possess a protectable
interest in property that is taken or damaged for a
public use. See *1098Farmers New World Life
Ins. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243-44
(Utah 1990); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795
P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990). In Colman, we observed:
Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a property owner can do with and on the owner's property.
Those regulations may have a significant impact on
the utility or value of property, yet they generally
do not require compensation under article I, section
22. Only when a governmental action rises to the
level of a taking or damage under article I, section
22 is the State required to pay compensation.
Id. at 627.
The Bagfords assert that article I, section 22 makes
no distinction between personal and real property,
that a “taking” of both tangible and intangible property interests is compensable under that provision,
and that the law recognizes that both the power of
eminent domain and an action for inverse condem-
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nation extend to personal, intangible, and incorporeal property rights such as contracts. The city and
the amicus argue that the only property that is protected by article I, section 22 is real property or
rights associated with real property.
[3][4][5] While contract rights are also a form of
“private property,” not all contract rights rise to the
level of a property interest cognizable under article
I, section 22. Article I, section 22 also protects all
types of private property that are protected by the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
This Court has stated, “ ‘The kinds of property subject to the [eminent domain] right ... [are] practically unlimited.’ ”
Farmers, 803 P.2d at 1244
(quoting Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 546,
200 P. 510, 512 (1921)). Under general principles
of eminent domain, property is not limited to land
or improvements thereon, id., but “ ‘[e]very species
of property which the public needs may require, ...
[including] legal and equitable rights of every description-[is] liable to be thus appropriated.’ ”
Lund, 58 Utah at 552, 200 P. at 512 (quoting
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 646 (6th ed.)).
The United States Supreme Court has also long
held that the term “property” in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause includes not only real property, but also incorporeal rights such as franchises.
In West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507,
533-34, 12 L.Ed. 535 (1848), the Court stated:
A distinction has been attempted, in argument,
between the power of a government to appropriate
for public uses property which is corporeal, ... and
the like power in the government to resume or extinguish a franchise. The distinction thus attempted
we regard as a refinement which has no foundation
in reason.... A franchise is property and nothing
more; it is incorporeal property....
A century after West River Bridge Co., the Court
reaffirmed the principle that the intangible character of property alone does not preclude compensation for it. The Court held in Kimball Laundry Co.
v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 11, 15-16, 69 S.Ct.
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1434, 1442-43, 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1948), that a governmental taking of a laundry's intangible “trade
routes,” meaning customer lists and continued patronage, required just compensation. And in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04,
104 S.Ct. 2862, 2872-73, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984),
the Court held that trade secrets are a form of intangible property protected by the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
Respected treatises also make clear that for purposes of eminent domain, the term “property” is not
limited to real property. “The power of eminent domain extends to real estate, improvements on land,
all kinds of personal property, and even intangible
or incorporeal rights.” 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 56 (1992). Thus, “[i]ntangible property,
such as choses in action, patent rights, franchises,
charters or any other form of contract, are within
the scope of [eminent domain] ... as fully as land or
other tangible property.” 1 Julius L. Sackman &
Patrick J. Rohan, Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain § 2.1 [2] (rev. 3d ed. 1995).
[6] Some kinds of contractual rights may also be
“property” that can be “taken” for a public use. In
Long Island Water Supply Co. v. City of Brooklyn,
166 U.S. 685, 690, 17 S.Ct. 718, 720, 41 L.Ed.
1165 (1897), the Court held that “a contract is property, and like any other property, may be taken under *1099 condemnation proceedings for public
use. Its condemnation is of course subject to the
rule of just compensation.” (Citations omitted.)
And in City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 400, 32 S.Ct. 267, 268, 56
L.Ed. 481 (1912), the Court reiterated that “[e]very
contract, whether between the state and an individual, or between individuals only, is subject to
this general law [of eminent domain].” See also
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct.
840, 843, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934) (valid contracts are
property for purposes of Takings Clause). See generally29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 56 (1992); 26
Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 81 (1966).
However, to create a protectable property interest, a

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

904 P.2d 1095
904 P.2d 1095
(Cite as: 904 P.2d 1095)

contract must establish rights more substantial in
nature than a mere unilateral expectation of continued rights or benefits. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S.
at 1005, 104 S.Ct. at 2873; State v. Valentine, 10
Utah 2d 132, 136, 349 P.2d 321, 323 (1960); State
v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 31, 38, 286 P.2d 785, 789-90
(1955).
[7][8][9][10] Absent an exclusive franchise or the
equivalent thereof, no vested, legally enforceable
interest arises, and consequently, there is no property that can provide the basis for compensation in
an inverse condemnation proceeding. See State v.
Gray, 81 N.M. 399, 467 P.2d 725, 728 (1970). In a
similar vein, a mere expectation of a renewal of a
lease is not a legal right that constitutes property
subject to a “taking.” And tenancies that are terminable at will do not establish a property interest
subject to a “taking” that requires compensation.
Petry v. City & County of Denver, 123 Colo. 509,
233 P.2d 867, 870 (1951); Miller v. Department of
Highways, 487 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Ky.Ct.App.1972);
Hanna v. Hampden County, 250 Mass. 107, 145
N.E. 258, 259 (1924). Thus, a contract that is terminable at the will of either party does not by itself
give rise to a protectable property interest because
the mere expectation of benefits under such a contract does not give the promisor a legally enforceable right against a promisee to provide future service and therefore does not by itself provide a basis
for compensation for loss of future business.
[11] The Bagfords contend that their oral agreements with their customers were protectable property interests within the meaning of article I, section 22. However, the Bagfords' agreements with
their customers were simply offers to collect
garbage that the customers could accept or reject
each week. Because the agreements were terminable at will by either the Bagfords or their customers, the Bagfords possessed no enforceable, legally
binding rights until they had collected garbage from
their customers, and then the only enforceable right
the Bagfords possessed was the right to compensation for the services already rendered. The Bagfords
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had no legal right to perform garbage collection
services indefinitely. The expectation that they
could continue to collect their customers' garbage
was not a contract right cognizable under article I,
section 22.
We recognize that the Bagfords no doubt invested
capital to acquire the necessary equipment to carry
on their garbage collection business for Ephraim
City residents and suffered revenue losses caused
by Ephraim City's change of policy. Nevertheless,
the Takings Clause does not insure businesses
against all losses caused by competition or by the
effect of governmental regulations.
The Bagfords buttress their claim that they had a
property interest that was “taken” by Ephraim City
by asserting that their “contracts” and “business relationships with their customers” were like a property interest created by a franchise granted by the
city to collect garbage. Relying on inverse condemnation cases involving the taking of franchise
rights, the Bagfords argue that they have a legal
right to compete for residential customers within
Ephraim City and that because an Ephraim City ordinance in effect precludes them from continuing to
provide services to those customers, their business
has been taken.
The argument is based on a misconception as to the
nature of the relationship between Ephraim City
and the Bagfords. The city has not granted the Bagfords a franchise that establishes either an exclusive
or even a nonexclusive right to collect garbage
from the residents of the city. The Bagfords
possess*1100 no certificate of public convenience
and necessity and no contract with, or license from,
Ephraim City granting them a right to collect residential garbage within the city. Their business in
Ephraim City was based only on the expectation of
being able to continue doing business there, not on
a legal right to do so. It follows that their investment of money in the expectation that they would
be able to continue their business in Ephraim City
indefinitely is not a protectable property interest.
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[12][13][14] Even if it could be said that the Bagfords had a franchise of some sort, they clearly did
not have an exclusive franchise. A nonexclusive
franchise does not protect a franchise holder from
losses caused by competition. In Williams v. Public
Service Commission, 754 P.2d 41, 54 (Utah 1988),
we held that a nonexclusive certificate to operate a
one-way paging service did not guarantee the recipient of the certificate a right to operate in a protected market and was not, therefore, property for purposes of the Takings Clause. Furthermore, competition by a governmental agency that causes a private
business financial losses is not a “taking” of property. Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U.S. 22,
26 S.Ct. 224, 50 L.Ed. 353 (1906); Las Vegas Valley Water Dist. v. Michelas, 77 Nev. 171, 360 P.2d
1041 (1961). Thus, although a private company
may possess a franchise to provide garbage collection services within a service area, no taking occurs
if the government operates a competing service
within that service area. “It is generally accepted
that a governmental agency is not precluded from
competing with its franchisee despite the fact that
the franchise is diminished or destroyed by such
competition.” Stillings v. City of Winston-Salem,
311 N.C. 689, 319 S.E.2d 233, 238 (1984). If the
governmental agency does not prohibit the private
company from continuing to offer its services, there
is no compensable taking. See, e.g., Laidlaw
Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 168 Ariz. 563,
815 P.2d 932, 936 (Ct.App.1991); Calcasieu Sanitation Serv., Inc. v. City of Lake Charles, 118 So.2d
179, 181 (La.Ct.App.1960); Hudgins v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 885 S.W.2d 74, 77
(Tenn.Ct.App.1994).
[15] The Bagfords contend that Ephraim City prohibited them from providing garbage collection services by passing Ordinance 10-412. That ordinance
had the effect, as the trial court found,
of forcing residents to use the monthly collection
services and facilities of Ephraim City because otherwise they would have to pay two different people;
and they would have to pay for the services because
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of the Ordinance, in order to get electrical power,
and because there would not be a place to take the
garbage anywhere else since they could no longer
burn it in Ephraim City.
In its conclusions of law, the trial court stated,
“Ephraim City did not prohibit any competing
activity or take any other governmental action
rising to the level of a taking under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.”
The Bagfords contend that the effect of the ordinance was to prohibit them from engaging in their
business in Ephraim City since the residents would
not pay twice for the same service. By requiring the
residents to pay the city, whether or not they used
the city's garbage collection service, the city in effect precluded residents from doing business with
the Bagfords.
[16] It is clearly correct that the Bagfords were put
at a severe, if not fatal, competitive disadvantage by
the ordinance. A private business's competitive disadvantage in competing with a municipality does
not, however, result in a taking of the private business property. In Laidlaw Waste Systems v.
Phoenix, 168 Ariz. 563, 815 P.2d 932 (Ct.App.
(1991), an Arizona appellate court decided an issue
almost squarely on point with the instant case. In
Laidlaw, trash collection companies that had been
providing private trash collection services to residents in an area that the city had annexed found
themselves unable to compete with the city and
abandoned their services in the area, thereby losing
their clients, contract rights with those clients, and
the good will and going concern value of that share
of their business. The city provided comparable residential trash collection services, which the *1101
residents were required to subsidize through taxes
and sanitation fees, whether or not they utilized
these services. The court held that the city's actions
did not amount to a compensable taking but were
“appropriately described as competition with the
companies, although on unequal terms.” Id. 815
P.2d at 935; see also Calcasieu Sanitation Serv.,
Inc. v. City of Lake Charles, 118 So.2d 179
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(La.Ct.App.1960) (private trash haulers' contract
rights to provide garbage collection service subject
to city's authority to provide such service at lesser
cost in annexed areas). That principle was followed
in Stillings v. City of Winston-Salem, 311 N.C. 689,
319 S.E.2d 233 (1984), even though the trash collection company whose business was damaged had
an exclusive private franchise in the area in which
the municipality commenced competition upon annexation of the territory. See also City of Estacada
v. American Sanitary Serv., Inc., 41 Or.App. 537,
599 P.2d 1185 (1979). But see Coeur d'Alene
Garbage Serv. v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 114 Idaho
588, 759 P.2d 879 (1988).
In sum, the Bagfords have failed to demonstrate
that they have a protectable property interest in
their business in Ephraim City under article I, section 22 and therefore have failed to establish the
elements of a “taking.”
Affirmed.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and HOWE, DURHAM and
RUSSON, JJ., concur.
Utah,1995.
Bagford v. Ephraim City
904 P.2d 1095
END OF DOCUMENT

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 9

Page 1
114 P.3d 580, 527 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2005 UT 32
(Cite as: 114 P.3d 580)

Supreme Court of Utah.
Christine BAKER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary Baker, for herself and the other heirs of Gary
Baker, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Gregory P. STEVENS, M.D.; Richard M. Rosenthal, M.D.; and IHC Health Center-Holladay, Defendants and
Appellants.
No. 20030434.
May 31, 2005.
Background: Widow brought wrongful death action against doctor who treated husband, and doctor moved to
compel arbitration. The Fourth District Court, Provo County, Claudia Laycock, J., found that claim was not subject to arbitration. Doctor appealed. While arbitration claim was being appealed, doctor moved for and was granted summary judgment on the wrongful death claim. Widow filed a suggestion of mootness.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Parrish, J., held that:
(1) appeal of decision denying arbitration was not moot, and
(2) doctor waived his claimed right to arbitrate by filing summary judgment motion.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error 30

781(1)

30 Appeal and Error
30XIII Dismissal, Withdrawal, or Abandonment
30k779 Grounds for Dismissal
30k781 Want of Actual Controversy
30k781(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
An appeal is moot if during the pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect.
[2] Appeal and Error 30

843(1)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k843 Matters Not Necessary to Decision on Review
30k843(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court does not address moot claims on appeal.
[3] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

213(1)
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25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement, and Contest
25Tk204 Remedies and Proceedings for Enforcement in General
25Tk213 Review
25Tk213(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.30 Arbitration)
Appeal of decision denying doctor's motion to compel arbitration of widow's wrongful death claim was not moot
after doctor obtained summary judgment on the wrongful death claim in his favor, where the time for appealing
the summary judgment had not expired, and in the event widow successfully challenged summary judgment on
appeal, doctor would presumably still seek to compel arbitration.
[4] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

182(2)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement, and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(2) k. Suing or Participating in Suit. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.3(2) Arbitration)
Doctor waived his claimed right to arbitrate widow's wrongful death claim by seeking summary judgment of
claim while appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion to compel arbitration was still pending; doctor's filing
of summary judgment motion qualified as substantial participation in the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.
[5] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

182(1)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement, and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.3(1) Arbitration)
A waiver of the right to arbitrate must be intentional and may be inferred only if the facts demonstrate that the
party seeking to enforce arbitration intended to disregard its right to arbitrate.
[6] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

182(2)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement, and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(2) k. Suing or Participating in Suit. Most Cited Cases
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(Formerly 33k23.3(2) Arbitration)
The two-part test for determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate by participating in litigation of
issues subject to arbitration requires: (1) that the party seeking arbitration must have substantially participated in
the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and (2) that the party's participation
in the litigation must have resulted in prejudice to the opposing party.
[7] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

182(2)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement, and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(2) k. Suing or Participating in Suit. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.3(2) Arbitration)
To evaluate whether the party asserting the right to arbitrate has clearly manifested an intent to waive its right to
arbitration, courts look at the actions of the party seeking arbitration, and determine whether those actions evidence an intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation.
[8] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

213(5)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement, and Contest
25Tk204 Remedies and Proceedings for Enforcement in General
25Tk213 Review
25Tk213(5) k. Scope and Standards of Review. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.25 Arbitration)
The finding of the existence of substantial participation and the finding of the existence of prejudice for purposes of determining if a party has waived the right to arbitrate based on participation in the litigation are factual
in nature and therefore should be reviewed as factual determinations.
*581 Craig M. Snyder, Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, for plaintiff.
Larry R. White, Paul D. Van Komen, Brian P. Miller, Kenneth L. Reich, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
Douglas G. Mortensen, Salt Lake City, and Ned Miltenberg, Washington, D.C., for amicus Utah Trial Lawyers
Ass'n.
Elliott J. Williams, Kurt M. Frankenburg, Carolyn S. Jensen, R. Chet Loftis, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah
Medical Ass'n.
PARRISH, Justice:
¶ 1 Christine Baker (“Christine”) sued doctors Richard Rosenthal and Gregory Stevens (the “doctors”), along
with the IHC Health Center in Holladay (“IHC”) where Dr. Stevens works, to recover damages for the wrongful
death of her husband, Gary Baker (“Gary”). Before his death, Gary had entered into an arbitration agreement
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(the “agreement”) with Dr. Rosenthal. Relying on that agreement, the doctors and IHC moved the district court
to compel Christine to arbitrate her wrongful death claim. The district court denied that motion, and the doctors
and IHC filed this appeal. While this appeal was pending, however, the parties conducted discovery, and Dr.
Rosenthal successfully sought summary judgment in the district court on Christine's claim against him.
¶ 2 Christine filed a suggestion of mootness, arguing that Dr. Rosenthal's dismissal from the underlying action
rendered this appeal moot. She reasoned that Dr. Rosenthal was no longer a party to the underlying action and
that the remaining defendants' claim to arbitration was based solely on their status as beneficiaries of Dr.
Rosenthal's arbitration*582 agreement with Gary. We conclude that Dr. Rosenthal's summary judgment did not
render this appeal moot, but rather effected a waiver of his right to arbitrate. We therefore affirm the district
court on those grounds.
BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Gary was receiving treatment from Dr. Stevens for a variety of maladies when Dr. Stevens referred Gary to
Dr. Rosenthal. Prior to Gary's treatment, Gary and Dr. Rosenthal entered into the agreement, which required
Gary “to submit to binding arbitration all disputes and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and losses
arising from the medical care” rendered by Dr. Rosenthal. The agreement also purported to “bind all persons
whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care” Dr. Rosenthal provided. Seven days after signing
the agreement, Gary died.
¶ 4 Gary's widow, Christine, acting as the personal representative of Gary's estate, brought a wrongful death action against the doctors. Her complaint alleged that the doctors' malpractice had proximately caused her husband's death. She also sought to recover against IHC under theories of vicarious liability and respondeat superior.
FN1
¶ 5 Relying on Utah Code section 78-31a-4 (2002),
Dr. Rosenthal moved to stay the proceedings and to
compel Christine to arbitrate her wrongful death claim against him pursuant to his agreement with Gary. Though
not parties to the agreement, Dr. Stevens and IHC also moved to compel Christine to arbitrate her claim, relying
on a provision in the agreement allowing “any person or entity that would otherwise be a proper additional party
in a court action and which agrees to be bound by the arbitration decision” to participate in the arbitration.
Christine opposed the motions seeking to compel arbitration, and the district court ruled in her favor, holding
that Christine's wrongful death claim, which was separate from Gary's underlying claim for personal injuries,
was not subject to the arbitration agreement. Although the doctors and IHC appealed the district court's determFN2
ination,
all the parties agreed to pursue discovery while the appeal was pending.
FN1. Effective May 15, 2003, chapter 31a was repealed and replaced with a new chapter 31a. Act of
Mar. 2, 2002, ch. 326, § 33, 2002 Utah Laws 1581; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-101 to -131 (2002). All
references to chapter 31a in this opinion will be to the repealed version, as that was the version in effect
at the time of the relevant events.
FN2. The Utah Medical Association submitted an amicus brief to this court in support of the doctors
and IHC, and the Utah Trial Lawyers Association in turn submitted an amicus brief in support of
Christine.
¶ 6 After oral argument, while the appeal was under advisement, Dr. Rosenthal moved the district court for sum-
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mary judgment on Christine's wrongful death claim. Dr. Rosenthal argued that Christine had failed to produce
expert testimony regarding the professional standard of care to which he should be held. The district court granted Dr. Rosenthal's motion for summary judgment and dismissed him from the underlying case. Christine argues
that Dr. Rosenthal's dismissal renders this appeal moot. Dr. Rosenthal disagrees, arguing that the case is not
moot because “[t]he time for appeal of the ... summary judgment has not run.” Dr. Stevens and IHC initially argued that the appeal was not moot because they were entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement regardless of
whether Dr. Rosenthal remained a party. Subsequently, however, Dr. Stevens and IHC settled with Christine,
and she dismissed her claims against them. Accordingly, we restrict our discussion to Christine's claim against
Dr. Rosenthal.
¶ 7 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(j) (2002). We review the district court's denial
of Dr. Rosenthal's motion to compel arbitration for correctness. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996).
ANALYSIS
¶ 8 Dr. Rosenthal seeks to compel arbitration of Christine's wrongful death claim pursuant to his agreement with
Gary. Christine seeks to avoid application of the agreement, *583 arguing that the agreement is entirely invalid
and, in any event, that it does not apply to her wrongful death claim. She also asserts that the summary judgment
in Dr. Rosenthal's favor rendered this appeal moot. Although we conclude that the summary judgment entered in
favor of Dr. Rosenthal does not render this appeal moot, we hold that Dr. Rosenthal's decision to seek summary
judgment from the district court constituted a waiver of his right to arbitrate.
I. IS THIS APPEAL MOOT?
[1][2] ¶ 9 We first address whether Dr. Rosenthal's summary judgment has rendered this appeal moot. “An appeal is moot if during the pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated,
thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect.” Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 720
(Utah 1996) (internal quotations omitted). We do not address moot claims on appeal. See Black v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 2004 UT 66, ¶ 29, 100 P.3d 1163.
[3] ¶ 10 We conclude that this appeal is not moot. This appeal raised the question of whether Dr. Rosenthal
could compel arbitration of Christine's wrongful death claim; Dr. Rosenthal asserted that he could, while
Christine asserted he could not. That issue still awaits decision. Because the time for appealing the summary
judgment has yet to run, the judgment is not final. In the event that Christine is successful in challenging the
summary judgment on appeal, Dr. Rosenthal will presumably still seek to compel arbitration. Accordingly, this
appeal “has [not] lost its ability to provide judicial relief to the litigants,” Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, ¶ 37,
100 P.3d 1151, and is not, therefore, moot.
II. DOES DR. ROSENTHAL'S DECISION TO SEEK SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE DISTRICT COURT
CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF HIS CLAIMED RIGHT TO ARBITRATE?
[4] ¶ 11 Although Dr. Rosenthal's summary judgment has not rendered this appeal moot, we conclude that Dr.
Rosenthal's decision to seek summary judgment in the district court constituted a waiver of his claimed right to
arbitrate. Our holding in this regard requires us to affirm the district court's denial of Dr. Rosenthal's motion to
compel arbitration, even though the district court has not passed on the waiver issue and the parties have not
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raised that argument either in the district court or before us on appeal. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10,
52 P.3d 1158.
[5] ¶ 12 We have recognized that arbitration has much to recommend it, see Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ¶
17, 99 P.3d 842, and have accordingly noted “a strong presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate,”
Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ¶ 24, 40 P.3d 599. Consequently, a “waiver of the right to
arbitrate must be intentional” and may be inferred “only if the facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce
arbitration intended to disregard its right to arbitrate.” Id.
[6][7] ¶ 13 We have constructed a two-part test for determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate
by participating in litigation of issues subject to arbitration. First, the party seeking arbitration must have
“substantially participated in the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.” Cedar
Surgery Ctr., L.L.C. v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58, ¶ 14, 96 P.3d 911. This prong is designed to “evaluate whether the
party asserting the right to arbitrate has clearly manifested an intent to waive its right to arbitration.” Id. at ¶ 16.
To make that evaluation, courts “look at the actions of the party seeking arbitration, and ... determine ‘whether
those actions evidence an intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation.’ ”
Id. (quoting Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at ¶ 26, 40 P.3d 599). Second, the party's participation in the litigation
must have “resulted in prejudice to the opposing party.” Id. at ¶ 14; see also Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at ¶ ¶
22, 24, 40 P.3d 599; Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ¶ 19, 982 P.2d 572; Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield,
833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992).
*584 [8] ¶ 14 We have noted that “the finding of the existence of substantial participation and the finding of the
existence of prejudice are factual in nature” and therefore “should be reviewed as factual determinations.”
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 360. Accordingly, in a case like this, where the district court has made no findings of fact
on those issues, we ordinarily would remand the case to the district court with instructions to enter such findings. This case is unique, however, because the docket in the district court, as well as Dr. Rosenthal's opposition
to Christine's suggestion of mootness, unequivocally reveal the very fact that we consider fatal to Dr. Rosenthal's efforts to compel arbitration: Dr. Rosenthal sought summary judgment in the district court.
FN3
¶ 15 Given this undisputed fact, we think it evident that Dr. Rosenthal waived his right to arbitrate.
By seeking summary judgment from the district court, Dr. Rosenthal litigated the very issues he originally sought to arbitrate. In short, he proceeded as if he had not even appealed the district court's denial of his motion to compel
arbitration. Dr. Rosenthal would have no reason to seek summary judgment unless he intended it to dispose of
Christine's claim against him. We have no doubt that filing a motion for summary judgment, as Dr. Rosenthal
did, qualifies as substantial participation “in the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate,” Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at ¶ 14, 96 P.3d 911, and that Dr. Rosenthal clearly intended “ ‘to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation,’ ” id. at ¶ 16 (quoting Cent. Fla. Invs.,
2002 UT 3 at ¶ 26, 40 P.3d 599); see also Williams Indus. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 135
(Tex.App.2003) (noting that “moving for summary judgment” is an example of “[s]ubstantially invoking the judicial process”).
FN3. We are cognizant of Dr. Rosenthal's comment, in his opposition to Christine's suggestion of mootness, that the agreement between the parties allowing for discovery also allowed him to seek summary
judgment at the close of discovery. Even if that is true, we do not think Dr. Rosenthal can justify his
conduct simply because it was premised on an agreement with the other parties to the litigation. If the
agreement of the parties indeed allowed Dr. Rosenthal to seek summary judgment from the district
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court, the very agreement itself was “inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.” Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004
UT 58 at ¶ 14, 96 P.3d 911.
¶ 16 Furthermore, it is apparent that Dr. Rosenthal's summary judgment has prejudiced Christine, as it was a moFN4
tion on the merits of the very claim he sought to arbitrate.
See Danny's Constr. Co. v. Birdair, Inc., 136
F.Supp.2d 134, 144 (W.D.N.Y.2000) (noting that “sufficient prejudice exists where a party against whom waiver
is asserted ... makes motions going to the merits of an adversary's claims” (internal quotations omitted)). Though
the summary judgment is not yet final, Christine has, for all intents and purposes, lost her claim against Dr.
Rosenthal. While she may challenge it on appeal, she must incur expenses she would have avoided had Dr.
FN5
Rosenthal confined his efforts to arbitration. She is therefore prejudiced.
Additionally, allowing arbitration
following the filing of a dispositive motion in litigation would give the moving party two bites at the apple. Under these circumstances, we have no difficulty finding prejudice.
FN4. We do not consider whether Dr. Rosenthal's participation in discovery was further evidence of his
waiver. There is some disagreement as to whether participating in discovery rises to the level of prejudice necessary to justify a waiver. Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 n. 17. We need not answer that question
here, though, because Dr. Rosenthal's successful procurement of summary judgment demonstrates sufficient intent and prejudice to constitute a waiver.
FN5. Most of the cases dealing with waiver of the right to arbitrate address situations in which the party
seeking to compel arbitration did so after some delay, thereby giving rise to a claim of prejudice. See
Pledger, 1999 UT 54 at ¶ 22, 982 P.2d 572; Danny's Constr. Co., 136 F.Supp.2d at 143-44. In those
cases, that party allegedly substantially participated in the underlying litigation before seeking arbitration, not after, as Dr. Rosenthal did in this case. However, if the district court finds that the delay in
question constitutes prejudicial, substantial participation in the underlying litigation, we think it makes
no difference that the delay came before or after the motion to compel arbitration, since either situation
is “inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.” Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at ¶ 14, 96 P.3d 911.
¶ 17 We conclude that Dr. Rosenthal waived his right to arbitrate and, along with *585 it, his ability to compel
Christine to arbitrate her claim against him. This conclusion provides an independent basis on which to affirm
the trial court's denial of Dr. Rosenthal's motion to compel arbitration and obviates the need for us to discuss the
parties' remaining claims.
CONCLUSION
¶ 18 We affirm the district court's denial of Dr. Rosenthal's motion to compel Christine to arbitrate her wrongful
death claim on the alternate ground that Dr. Rosenthal waived his right to arbitrate.
¶ 19 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, Justice NEHRING, and Judge DEVER concur in
Justice PARRISH'S opinion.
¶ 20 Having disqualified herself, Chief Justice DURHAM does not participate herein; District Judge L.A. DEVER sat.
Utah,2005.
Baker v. Stevens
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Brooks v. Cigna Property and Cas. Companies
Ill.App. 1 Dist.,1998.
Appellate Court of Illinois,First District, Second
Division.
Eugene BROOKS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CIGNA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY COMPANIES, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 1-97-4260.
Sept. 1, 1998.
Worker who was injured in collision with uninsured
motorist while performing work-related duties notified his employer's insurer of his uninsured motorist (UM) claim, and demanded arbitration. Eleven
years later, with no resolution of claim, worker
filed suit against insurer, and insurer moved to
compel arbitration. The Circuit Court, Cook
County, Richard E. Neville, J., granted motion.
Worker appealed, and the Appellate Court,
Rakowski, J., held that: (1) pendency in Supreme
Court of case involving same statute did not require
stay of appeal; (2) statutory requirement mandating
arbitration of UM claims was binding on worker;
and (3) mandated arbitration of UM claims cannot
be waived or stipulated away by parties.
Affirmed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Insurance 217

3327

217 Insurance
217XXVII Claims and Settlement Practices
217XXVII(B) Claim Procedures
217XXVII(B)7 Arbitration
217k3326 Judicial Review
217k3327 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Pendency in Supreme Court of appeal from determination by Appellate Court that 1996 version of un-
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insured motorist (UM) statute governing compulsory arbitration was unconstitutional did not require
stay of appeal from grant of motion to compel arbitration, which was made pursuant to 1983 version of
statute; Supreme Court's resolution of constitutionality of 1996 version would not affect issues in instant appeal, as relevant provisions of statutes
differed significantly. S.H.A. 215 ILCS 5/143(a).
[2] T

206

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk204 Remedies and Proceedings for
Enforcement in General
25Tk206 k. Nature and Form of Proceeding. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.10 Arbitration)
T

213(3)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk204 Remedies and Proceedings for
Enforcement in General
25Tk213 Review
25Tk213(3) k. Decisions Reviewable; Finality. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.20 Arbitration)
Motion to compel arbitration is in the nature of a
prayer for injunctive relief, and grant or denial of
that motion can be reviewed by appellate court as
an interlocutory appeal. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule
307(a)(1).
[3] T

213(5)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
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25Tk204 Remedies and Proceedings for
Enforcement in General
25Tk213 Review
25Tk213(5) k. Scope and Standards
of Review. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.25 Arbitration)
Standard of review of ruling on motion to compel
arbitration is whether trial court abused its discretion in granting or denying motion.
[4] Appeal and Error 30
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25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(B) Agreements to Arbitrate
25Tk141 k. Persons Affected or Bound.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k7.3 Arbitration)
Nonparty to contract or third-party beneficiary,
cannot be compelled to arbitrate.

874(1)
[8] Insurance 217

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(B) Interlocutory, Collateral, and Supplementary Proceedings and Questions
30k874 On Separate Appeal from Interlocutory Judgment or Order
30k874(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Sole issue before appellate court on interlocutory
appeal is whether sufficient showing was made to
sustain order of trial court.
[5] T

111

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(A) Nature and Form of Proceeding
25Tk111 k. Nature, Purpose, and Right to
Arbitration in General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k1 Arbitration)
Arbitration is designed to speed resolution and determination of disputed issues.
[6] T
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25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(A) Nature and Form of Proceeding
25Tk112 k. Contractual or Consensual
Basis. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k1.1 Arbitration)
Generally, arbitration is a matter of contract, and
party cannot be required to arbitrate any dispute
which he or she has not agreed to arbitrate.
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217 Insurance
217XXVII Claims and Settlement Practices
217XXVII(B) Claim Procedures
217XXVII(B)7 Arbitration
217k3269 k. Compulsory Arbitration.
Most Cited Cases
Uninsured motorist (UM) claim asserted by worker,
who was injured in work-related automobile accident with uninsured motorist, against his employer's automobile insurer, was subject to mandatory
arbitration pursuant to statute; by filing claim for
uninsured benefits, worker voluntarily subjected
himself to statutory mandate that parties to UM
claims must submit to arbitration. S.H.A. 215 ILCS
5/143(a).
[9] Insurance 217
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217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction
217k1849 Existing Law
217k1850 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Statutes that are in force at time insurance policy is
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policy.
[10] Insurance 217
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217k1852 k. Automobile Insurance.
Most Cited Cases
Where statute provides for uninsured motorist
(UM) coverage, statute becomes part of each automobile policy to which statute applies to same effect as if statutory language were written in policy.
[11] Insurance 217

3269

217 Insurance
217XXVII Claims and Settlement Practices
217XXVII(B) Claim Procedures
217XXVII(B)7 Arbitration
217k3269 k. Compulsory Arbitration.
Most Cited Cases
Arbitration under statute requiring that automobile
policies provide for submission of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage disputes to arbitration is binding
on parties. S.H.A. 215 ILCS 5/143(a).
[12] Insurance 217
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217 Insurance
217XXVII Claims and Settlement Practices
217XXVII(B) Claim Procedures
217XXVII(B)7 Arbitration
217k3270 k. Waiver or Estoppel. Most
Cited Cases
Statutorily mandated arbitration of uninsured motorist (UM) claims cannot be waived or stipulated
away by parties. S.H.A. 215 ILCS 5/143(a).
[13] T

182(1)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.3(1) Arbitration)
Unlike contractual arbitration provisions, parties
cannot waive statutorily mandated arbitration ab-
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sent some express statute providing such a remedy.
[14] T
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25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk178 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 33k23 Arbitration)
Unlike common law arbitration, statutory arbitration provisions, instead of being revocable at will
by either party, can be specifically enforced by
either party.
[15] Insurance 217

3270

217 Insurance
217XXVII Claims and Settlement Practices
217XXVII(B) Claim Procedures
217XXVII(B)7 Arbitration
217k3270 k. Waiver or Estoppel. Most
Cited Cases
Conduct of automobile insurer for employer after
employee initially demanded arbitration in connection with employee's uninsured motorist (UM)
claim, even assuming arguendo that mandatory arbitration of UM claims pursuant to statute may be
waived, did not result in waiver or estoppel of right
to arbitration; while insurer had done nothing to
proceed to arbitration over period of several years,
employee had done nothing either, and did not
comply with statutory remedies available to him, or
with statute's provisions when he demanded arbitration. S.H.A. 215 ILCS 5/143(a).
**1053*70***345
E. Bryan Dunigan, Chicago
(Stephen J. Klyczek, of counsel), for appellant.
Debboli, Millman & Spiegel, Chicago (Stephen C.
Debboli, of counsel), for appellee.
Justice RAKOWSKI delivered the opinion of the
court:
While working for Illinois Trailer Equipment Com-
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pany, plaintiff Eugene Brooks was injured by an
uninsured motorist. He notified his employer's insurance carrier, Cigna Property and Casualty Companies (Cigna), of his uninsured motorist claim under section 143a of the Illinois Insurance Code
(Code) (215 ILCS 5/143a (West 1996) (formerly
Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 73, par. 755a)) and demanded
arbitration. Eleven years after the accident with no
resolution of his claim, Brooks filed suit against
Cigna, alleging breach of contract and “vexatious
delay.” Cigna moved to compel arbitration, which
the circuit court granted. Brooks now argues he
cannot be compelled to arbitrate the claim. Because
we conclude that arbitration under the Code is mandatory and cannot be waived, we affirm.
FACTS
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I. MOTION TO STAY APPEAL
Taken with the case is Brooks' motion to stay appeal. Because the constitutionality of section 143a
is presently pending before the Illinois Supreme
Court and the validity of section 143a is key to his
appeal,*71 Brooks contends this appeal must be
stayed until the supreme court resolves the issue.
In Reed v. Farmers Insurance Group, 291
Ill.App.3d 1068, 226 Ill.Dec. 282, 685 N.E.2d 385
(1997), the third district declared section 143a unconstitutional. The supreme court granted leave to
appeal (Reed v. Farmers Insurance Group, 175
Ill.2d 553, 228 Ill.Dec. 725, 689 N.E.2d 1146
(1997)).

Brooks was injured in 1984 when involved in an
automobile accident with Preston Strickland, an uninsured driver. At the time of the accident, Brooks
was driving a truck owned by his employer, Illinois
Trailer Equipment Company. Illinois Trailer Equipment Company had a policy of automobile insurance with Cigna that provided for uninsured motorist benefits. Brooks notified Cigna of his claim. At
some point, Cigna offered to settle. Brooks rejected
the settlement offer and renewed his previous demand for arbitration. His demand went unanswered
and, in 1995, Brooks filed suit. Cigna's motion to
dismiss based on the statute of **1054 ***346 limitations was granted. We reversed that decision in
an unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23
(Brooks v. Cigna Property & Casualty Cos., No.
1-96-2101 (January 23, 1997)), and remanded to
the circuit court for further proceedings. On remand, Cigna filed a motion to compel arbitration
that was granted. The trial court did not address
Brooks' “vexatious delay” count and that count remains pending in the trial court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a). 166
Ill.2d R. 307(a).

[1] After thoroughly reviewing the merits of
Brooks' motion and considering the benefits of
staying this appeal, we deny Brooks' motion to stay.
The statute found unconstitutional in Reed is the
1996 version of the statute, not the 1983 statute that
is relevant to the instant case. The 1996 version
contains different provisions, in particular, the
“escape hatch” provision allowing for review of arbitration awards above minimal financial liability
limits but binding awards below those limits. The
crux of the Reed decision was the inequity and unconscionability of this provision in that it favors insurers because arbitration awards above liability
limits are nonbinding and awards lower than those
limits are binding. See Reed, 291 Ill.App.3d 1068,
226 Ill.Dec. 282, 685 N.E.2d 385. In the instant
case, the relevant version of section 143a contains
no “escape hatch” provision. The statutory language is neutral and there is no differentiation
between awards below the limits and those above
the limits. Based on the difference in the statutory
provisions and because the third district's decision
centered on the offensive nature of the distinction
between high and low awards, we conclude that the
supreme court's resolution of Reed would not affect
the issues before us.

ANALYSIS

Accordingly, we deny Brooks' motion to stay ap-
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peal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[2][3][4] “A motion to compel arbitration is in the
nature of a prayer for injunctive relief, and a denial
[or grant] of that motion can be reviewed by an appellate court as an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1).” Yandell v. Church
Mutual Insurance Co., 274 Ill.App.3d 828, 830,
211 Ill.Dec. 337, 654 N.E.2d 1388 (1995). The
standard is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting or denying the motion to compel.
Yandell, 274 Ill.App.3d at 831, 211 Ill.Dec. 337,
654 N.E.2d 1388. “The sole issue before the appellate court on an interlocutory appeal is whether a
sufficient showing was made to sustain the order of
the trial court.” Yandell, 274 Ill.App.3d at 830, 211
Ill.Dec. 337, 654 N.E.2d 1388.
III. PROPRIETY OF GRANTING MOTION TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION
Brooks first contends that he cannot be compelled
to arbitrate because he is not a party to the arbitration agreement contained in the insurance policy;
he is merely a third-party beneficiary.
[5][6][7] *72 Arbitration was designed to speed the
resolution and determination of disputed issues. M.
Rhodes, 14 Couch on Insurance 2d § 50:305, at 55
(Supp.1998). See also State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill.2d 533, 541, 178 Ill.Dec.
745, 605 N.E.2d 539 (1992) (arbitration provision
added to statute to “expedite the processing of uninsured motorist claims”). Generally, “[a]rbitration is
a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required
to arbitrate any dispute which he or she has not
agreed to arbitrate.” **1055Kennedy v. Commercial
Carriers, Inc., 258 Ill.App.3d 939, 943, 196 Ill.Dec.
894, 630 N.E.2d 1059 (1994). ***347 Similarly, a
nonparty to the contract or a third-party beneficiary
cannot be compelled to arbitrate. See Yandell v.
Church Mutual Insurance Co., 274 Ill.App.3d 828,
833, 211 Ill.Dec. 337, 654 N.E.2d 1388 (1995);
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City of Peru v. Illinois Power Co., 258 Ill.App.3d
309, 312-13, 196 Ill.Dec. 519, 630 N.E.2d 454
(1994); Jacob v. C & M Video, Inc., 248 Ill.App.3d
654, 659, 188 Ill.Dec. 697, 618 N.E.2d 1267
(1993); Property Management, Ltd. v. Howasa,
Inc., 14 Ill.App.3d 536, 540, 302 N.E.2d 754
(1973).
[8][9][10] However, in Illinois, arbitration of uninsured motorist claims is provided for by statute.
Statutes that are in force at the time a policy is issued are controlling. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Baaske, 213 Ill.App.3d 683, 688,
157 Ill.Dec. 239, 572 N.E.2d 308 (1991). Where a
statute provides for uninsured motorist coverage,
the statute becomes a part of each policy to which
the statute applies to the same effect as if the statutory language were written in the policy. 8C J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice
§ 5067.35, at 36 (1981). As such, in the case of arbitration of uninsured motorist claims more is involved than simply a matter of contract rights and
remedies.
[11] Section 143a of the Illinois Insurance Code
states:
“No such policy shall be renewed * * * unless it is
provided therein that any dispute with respect to
such coverage shall be submitted for arbitration to
the American Arbitration Association or for determination in the following manner: Upon the insured requesting arbitration, each party to the dispute shall select an arbitrator * * *. If such arbitrators are not selected within 45 days from such request, either party may request that such arbitration
be submitted to the American Arbitration Association.” Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 73, par. 755a(1).
Arbitration under section 143a is binding on the
parties. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,
213 Ill.App.3d at 688, 157 Ill.Dec. 239, 572 N.E.2d
308. The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted
section 143a to require arbitration of disputes “once
coverage [is] established.' ” Topps v. Unicorn Insurance Co., 271 Ill.App.3d 111, 114, 207 Ill.Dec.
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758, 648 N.E.2d 214 (1995), quoting *73Yapejian,
152 Ill.2d at 541, 178 Ill.Dec. 745, 605 N.E.2d 539.
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted
this section to require that the issues of liability and
damages be submitted to arbitration for resolution
and are not subject to judicial resolution or to judicial review, except under limited circumstances.
Yapejian, 152 Ill.2d at 541-43, 178 Ill.Dec. 745,
605 N.E.2d 539. See also Reed v. Farmers Insurance Group, 291 Ill.App.3d 1068, 1073, 226
Ill.Dec. 282, 685 N.E.2d 385 (1997) (arbitration under section 143a is “compulsory arbitration * * *
mandated by statute”; “section 143a of the Insurance Code * * * requires that all disputes regarding
liability and damages be submitted to arbitration”);
Yandell, 274 Ill.App.3d at 831-32, 211 Ill.Dec. 337,
654 N.E.2d 1388 (“[t]oday [unlike prior to 1978],
by statute, all U[ninsured] M[otorist] claims are
subject to mandatory arbitration”; “[s]ection 143a
of the Illinois Insurance Code [citation] mandates
binding arbitration, even if the policy provides for
nonbinding arbitration”); Topps, 271 Ill.App.3d at
114, 207 Ill.Dec. 758, 648 N.E.2d 214 (the Illinois
Supreme Court has “interpreted section 143a(1) of
the Illinois Insurance Code regarding uninsured
motorist coverage [citation] to require arbitration of
disputes concerning covered claims once coverage
was established' [citation] )”; American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 213 Ill.App.3d at 686, 157
Ill.Dec. 239, 572 N.E.2d 308 (“[u]nder [section
143a], disputes involving uninsured motorist claims
must be submitted for arbitration”). More specifically, in Herriford v. Boyles, 193 Ill.App.3d 947,
140 Ill.Dec. 769, 550 N.E.2d 654 (1990), the court
was called upon to answer the following certified
question: “Does [section 143a] require that an insured submit uninsured motorist claims to arbitration or does the statute merely require that insurance contracts afford the insured the option of arbitration?” Herriford, 193 Ill.App.3d at 949, 140
Ill.Dec. 769, 550 N.E.2d 654. The court concluded
that section 143a “clearly requires mandatory arbitration of all disputed uninsured motorist claims.”
**1056Herriford, 193 Ill.App.3d at 951, 140
Ill.Dec. 769, 550 N.E.2d 654. ***348 Thus, the ar-
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bitration process is compulsory and the statute does
not merely provide for optional arbitration.
Moreover, under provisions such as section 143a,
“[t]he intent and effect of such a statute is to remove from the court and transfer to an arbitration
panel the function of determining * * * all issues as
to coverage.” 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1691, at 675
(1993). “[A]ny statutory provisions concerning the
arbitration proceedings must be followed.” M.
Rhodes, 14 Couch on Insurance 2d § 50:305, at 56
(Supp.1998).
Based on the above, we conclude that arbitration
under section 143a differs from contractual arbitration. The legislature intended that certain issues in
uninsured motorist claims be determined solely
through arbitration. Unlike parties to contractual arbitration provisions or in under insured motorist
claims such as Yandell, the parties in un insured
motorist claims must submit to arbitration.
When Brooks filed his claim for uninsured benefits,
he voluntarily subjected himself to the Code mandates. The Code compels mandatory arbitration of
uninsured motorist claims as to liability and damages; these issues cannot be resolved in the judicial
forum. The circuit court correctly determined that
Brooks' claim was subject to arbitration.
*74 IV. WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL
[12] Notwithstanding that arbitration may be the
proper forum, Brooks contends that Cigna's acts
both before and after the filing of his complaint
constitute waiver and that Cigna should be estopped
from asserting its right to compel arbitration. Specifically, he argues that Cigna never attempted to
assert its right to arbitration prior to Brooks filing
suit and that it postponed Brooks' first request for
arbitration and left unanswered Brooks' second and
third requests for arbitration.
[13] Although Illinois as well as other jurisdictions
have stated that a party may waive the right to arbitration, these cases involve contractual arbitration
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provisions and, thus, rely solely on interpretation of
contract law. Independent research has located no
case addressing the issue of whether statutorily
FN1
mandated arbitration may be waived.
For the
following reasons, we conclude that, unlike contractual*75 arbitration provisions, parties cannot
waive statutorily mandated arbitration absent some
express statutory provision providing such a remedy.
FN1. No other jurisdiction has an uninsured motorist provision like Illinois' nor
are they even comparable. California has
the provision most similar in that it requires arbitration where the parties dispute
the issues. Cal. Ins.Code § 11580.2(f)
(Deering 1997). However, an insured in
California can, by “agreement in writing,”
“delete the provision covering damage
caused by an uninsured motor vehicle
completely.” Cal. Ins.Code § 11580.2(a)(1)
(Deering 1997). In other words, uninsured
motorist coverage is optional and can be
rejected. The same is not true in Illinois.
Each policy of insurance issued or delivered after July 1, 1963, requires that uninsured motorist coverage be included
therein. It cannot be rejected. “On or after
July 1, 1963, no policy * * * shall be renewed or delivered or issued for delivery *
* * unless coverage is provided therein or
supplemental thereto * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from
owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicles * * * because of bodily injury * *
*.” Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 73, par. 755a(1).
Although at one time an insured in Illinois
could reject uninsured motorist coverage,
such right to reject uninsured motorist coverage was deleted by Public Act 86-841,
effective January 1, 1990, and has not been
replaced. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 73, par.
755a(1) (“except that the named insured
shall have the right to reject such coverage
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only on policies delivered, renewed or issued for delivery before July 1, 1967”).
In sum, each policy of insurance in
Illinois must include a minimum amount
of uninsured motorist coverage. Additionally coverage is available in amounts
equal to the insured's bodily injury liability limits, but it is optional “unless specifically rejected by the insured.” 215
ILCS 5/143a-2(1) (West 1996). See also
Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Miller, 190
Ill.App.3d 240, 248, 137 Ill.Dec. 755,
546 N.E.2d 700 (1989) ( “section 143a
requires that an automobile policy must
include uninsured motorist coverage in a
minimum amount of $15,000/$30,000 as
required by the Illinois Vehicle Code
[and] section 143a-2 requires an insurer
to offer, and the insured can accept or reject, additional uninsured motorist coverage up to the maximum liability limits
of the automobile policy.”)
**1057 [14] ***349 First, unlike common law arbitration, statutory arbitration provisions, “instead
of being revocable at will by either party, can now
be specifically enforced by either party.” 4
Am.Jur.2d Alternative Dispute Resolution § 95, at
150 (1995). Moreover, if a provision in the insurance contract provided that arbitration was nonbinding, it would be void. American Family Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Baaske, 213 Ill.App.3d 683, 688,
157 Ill.Dec. 239, 572 N.E.2d 308 (1991) (any provision in conflict with the statute is void). Similarly, if a provision in the insurance contract
provided that arbitration was optional, it would be
void. From this, one can reasonably deduce that arbitration of uninsured motorist claims cannot be
waived.
Uninsured motorist coverage is provided for by
statute and the right to compensation under such a
theory is conditioned upon the parties following the
statutory procedures. In other words, the parties
must proceed to arbitration on the issues of liability
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and damages if they dispute these issues. As such,
we conclude that this is one of those “legal rights
and doctrines which the parties cannot waive or
stipulate away.” See, e.g., Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. National Bank, 109 Ill.App.2d 133,
137, 248 N.E.2d 299 (1969).
[15] Finally, even assuming arguendo that Cigna
could waive the mandatory statutory arbitration, we
conclude that its conduct did not amount to waiver
or estoppel. While it is true that Cigna did nothing
to proceed to arbitration, Brooks did nothing either.
Although Brooks claims to have made three demands for arbitration, the first request was not
made until 1991, some seven years after the accident. Cigna postponed this arbitration, awaiting an
additional witness statement. Brooks provided
Cigna with this statement two months later;
however, the record is devoid of what, if anything,
transpired for some time thereafter. A settlement
offer was made in February of 1994, but Brooks rejected this offer at the end of July of 1994, renewing his demand for arbitration. Again, he did nothing to facilitate arbitration at this time. At no time
did Brooks utilize the statutory remedies available
to him. Nor did he not even comply with the statute
in demanding arbitration. Pursuant to the statute,
after Brooks requested arbitration, he was to appoint an arbitrator. If Cigna did not appoint its arbitrator or if Brooks' and Cigna's appointed arbitrators did not appoint a third arbitrator within 45 days
from Brooks' request for arbitration, then Brooks
could request that arbitration be submitted to the
American Arbitration Association. On none of the
three occasions*76 Brooks demanded arbitration
did he appoint an arbitrator. Further, on none of the
occasions did he, after Cigna's failure to respond,
request that arbitration be submitted to the American Arbitration Association.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of
the circuit court of Cook County granting Cigna's
motion to compel arbitration. Because the trial
court did not rule on Brooks' “vexatious delay”
count, we remand.
Affirmed and remanded.
COUSINS and TULLY, JJ., concur.
Ill.App. 1 Dist.,1998.
Brooks v. Cigna Property & Cas. Companies
299 Ill.App.3d 68, 700 N.E.2d 1052, 233 Ill.Dec.
344
END OF DOCUMENT

Based on the above, we conclude that Cigna could
not waive arbitration under section 143a. Further,
even if Cigna could waive its right to proceed to arbitration, its conduct in this case did not amount to
waiver or estoppel.
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Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
Concerning the Application for Water Rights of the Mount Emmons Mining Company, an affiliate of Climax
Molybdenum Company, in the Slate River, Carbon Creek, and Elk Creek, All Tributaries to the Gunnison River,
in Gunnison County.
MOUNT EMMONS MINING COMPANY, Applicant-Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF CRESTED BUTTE; Western Slope Environmental Council; High Country Citizens' Alliance; Board
of County Commissioners of Gunnison County, Colorado; Rosalie C. Munis; Albert W. Sanderson; William S.
Sanderson; A.B. Herndon, Jr. and June G. Herndon; John Evans and Betty Evans; the Ranches at Ohio Creek,
LLC; Cheri-Colleen Campbell-Raferty; Mary J. Turner; The Colorado Water Conservation Board; Dr. B. Henry
Estess; Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc.; Castle Creek Cattle Corp.; Castleton Ranch Company; Eagle Ridge
Ranch Homeowners Association; Bert A. Guerrieri; Richard E. Guerrieri and Phyllis C. Guerrieri; Wallace A.
Jones and Marry M. Jones; The Ochs Brothers Partnership; Harrison F. Russell and Patricia E. Russell; E. Allan
Stockton and Barbara V. Stockton; John L. Walsh and Agnes Ann Walsh; The City of Gunnison; E.J. Maurer;
The Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County; The United States (Bureau of Land Management and
United States Forest Service); Crested Butte Land Trust; Earl Partch; Francis Partch; Carl E. Silka; Dan Rundell;
Phyllis Rundell; Debe Hancock; Star Mountain Ranch Association, Inc.; and Scott Rennck, Opposers-Appellees,
and
Wayne I. Schieldt, Division Engineer, Water Division No. 4., Appellee pursuant to C.A.R. 1(e).
No. 99SA354.
Jan. 28, 2002.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 2002.
Mining company applied for a conditional water right to a portion of the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance to
which the United States' interest was subordinated in the Gunnison River basin. The District Court, Water Division 4, J. Stephen Patrick, J., denied the application. Company appealed. The Supreme Court, Kourlis, J., held
that the company did not need a contract with the United States' Bureau of Reclamation (BUREC) in order to
show availability and qualify for a conditional decree.
Reversed and remanded.
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405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k140 k. Priorities. Most Cited Cases
A conditional water right serves to hold the place of the appropriator in a “first in time, first in right” system.
West's C.R.S.A. § 37-92-103(6).
[2] Waters and Water Courses 405
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405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
Waters and Water Courses 405
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405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k140 k. Priorities. Most Cited Cases
If the appropriator diligently puts the water to beneficial use, the conditional right can mature into an absolute
water right, with a priority that dates back to the initiation of the conditional right.
[3] Waters and Water Courses 405

135

405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
To establish a conditional water right, an applicant must show in general that a first step toward the appropriation of a certain amount of water has been taken, that the applicant's intent to appropriate is not based upon the
speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights, and that there is a substantial probability that the applicant can and will complete the appropriation with diligence. West's C.R.S.A. § 37-92-305(9)(b).
[4] Waters and Water Courses 405

135

405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
As a prerequisite to receiving a conditional decree, applicants must show water is available that can be diverted.
West's C.R.S.A. § 37-92-305(9)(b).
[5] Waters and Water Courses 405

135

405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
An up-stream, junior, in-basin appropriator did not need a contract with the United States' Bureau of Reclamation (BUREC) in order to show availability and qualify for a conditional decree; the appropriator was invoking
the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance to which the United States' interest was subordinated.
[6] Waters and Water Courses 405

140

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 3
40 P.3d 1255
(Cite as: 40 P.3d 1255)

405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k140 k. Priorities. Most Cited Cases
Water within the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance to which the United States' interest is subordinated is
available to an applicant for the purposes of a conditional decree, provided only that other qualified appropriators have not otherwise exhausted the depletion allowance.
[7] Waters and Water Courses 405

135

405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
Typically, to satisfy the “can and will” test for a conditional right, new appropriators must convince the water
court that their diversion will cause no harm to senior appropriators, i.e., that water is available. West's C.R.S.A.
§ 37-92-305(9)(b).
[8] Waters and Water Courses 405

135

405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
In the Gunnison River basin, to satisfy the water availability test for a conditional decree, a new, in-basin appropriator must only convince the water court that a portion of the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance, to which
the United States' interest is subordinated, remains unused.
*1256 Friedlob Sanderson Paulson & Tourtillott, LLC, Brian M. Nazarenus, Carolyn F. Burr, Denver, CO, Attorneys for Applicant-Appellant.
Laura L. Magner, Crested Butte, CO, Frascona, Joiner, Goodman, and Greenstein, P.C., Joseph Adams Cope,
Boulder, CO, Attorneys for Opposer-Appellee Town of Crested Butte.
Land and Water Fund of the Rockies, Bruce C. Driver, Bart P. Miller, Boulder, CO, Attorneys for OpposersAppellees Western Slope Environmental Resource Council and High Country Citizens' Alliance.
David Baumgarten, Gunnison, CO, Attorney for Opposer-Appellee Board of County Commissioners of Gunnison County, CO.
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Steven O. Sims, First Assistant Attorney General, Linda J. Bassi, Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources and Environment Section, Denver, CO, Attorneys for State and Division Engineer.
No appearance by or on behalf of Rosalie C. Munis; Albert W. Sanderson; William S. Sanderson; A.B. Herndon,
Jr. and June G. Herndon; John Evans and Betty Evans; The Ranches At Ohio Creek, LLC; Cheri-Colleen Campbell-Raferty; Mary J. Turner; The Colorado Water Conservation Board; Dr. B. Henry Estess; Crested Butte
Mountain Resort, Inc.; Castle Creek Cattle Corp.; Castleton Ranch Company; Eagle Ridge Ranch Homeowners
Association; Bert A. Guerrieri; Richard E. Guerrieri and Phyllis C. Guerrieri; Wallace A. Jones and Marry M.
Jones; The Ochs Brothers Partnership; Harrison F. Russell and Patricia E. Russell; E. Allan Stockton and Barbara V. Stockton; John L. Walsh and Agnes Ann Walsh; The City Of Gunnison; E.J. Maurer; The Board Of
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County Commissioners Of Arapahoe County; The United States (Bureau Of Land Management And United
States Forest Service); Crested ButteLand Trust; Earl Partch; Francis Partch; Carl E. Silka; Dan Rundell; Phyllis
Rundell; Debe Hancock; Star Mountain Ranch Association, Inc.; and Scott Rennck.
Justice KOURLIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Mount Emmons Mining Company (Applicant) applied for a conditional water right to operate a molybdenum
mine in Gunnison *1257 County. The water court denied the application, finding that Applicant failed to establish sufficient water availability to support a conditional decree. The water court based its denial upon an earlier
ruling out of the same Water Division that affected the Gunnison River basin. The earlier order found 60,000
acre-feet of water available for in-basin users such as Applicant, but also found that a contract was necessary to
access that water. We now hold that such a user-specific contract is not necessary for Applicant to make the requisite showing of water availability to support the issuance of a conditional decree. Accordingly, we reverse the
water court ruling and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
In 1998, Applicant filed a conditional water right application in connection with its proposed molybdenum mine
near Crested Butte, Colorado. The application contemplated consumptive use of 1,500 acre-feet of water per
year, taken from the Slate River and Carbon Creek, both tributaries of the Gunnison River above the Aspinall
Unit (Unit).
The Unit, originally called the Curecanti Unit, is a series of three Colorado River Storage Project Act reservoirs
located on the main stem of the Gunnison River. The reservoirs, Blue Mesa, Morrow Point, and Crystal, are together capable of storing 1,090,000 acre-feet of water. The decrees for the Unit were made absolute in 1980,
FN1
with 1957 priority dates.
FN1. For a thorough discussion of the Unit, the 1922 Colorado River Compact, and their effect on conditional water rights applications in the Gunnison Basin, see Board of County Commissioners v. Crystal
Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325 (Colo.2000).
The United States Government (acting through the Bureau of Reclamation, “BUREC”) is the holder of the water
rights in the Unit, having received them by grant from the Colorado River Water Conservation District (River
District).
The Aspinall Unit water rights are generally subject to Colorado law and are further specifically subject to a
subordination obligation. The River District assigned the state adjudicated water rights for the Unit to the BUREC on the condition that in-basin projects on the Gunnison and its tributaries above the Unit could deplete at
least 60,000 acre-feet of water. This obligation was an outgrowth of negotiations between the River District, local interests, the United States, and the Colorado Water Conservation Board to accommodate development of water resources in the natural basin of the Gunnison River. The water court has found, and this court has confirmed, that such understanding resulted in a binding, enforceable agreement. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crystal
Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325, 340-41, 346 (Colo.2000) (Arapahoe II ). The effect of the subordination
is to make water available for appropriation that BUREC could otherwise call for the Unit in the exercise of its
absolute water rights.
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Thus, the question before us today is simply whether a junior, up-stream, in-basin appropriator must have a contract with BUREC in order to take advantage of the subordination policy. The water court agreed with the Objectors in this case that, in order to meet the required showing of water availability for issuance of a conditional
decree, Applicant must produce a contract with BUREC that permits Applicant to take advantage of the subordination policy. We disagree.
II.
Colorado cherishes its water as a scarce and valuable resource. State Eng'r v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d
496, 505 (Colo.1993). The State strives to distribute the resource in ways that respect historical uses without
thwarting growth or entrepreneurial development. One of the cornerstones of this state's water policy is that the
resource be administered to maximize its beneficial uses. See § 37-92-102, 10 C.R.S. (2001).
[1][2] An applicant may commence the process of developing a beneficial use by filing for a conditional right,
defined by statute as “a right to perfect a water right with a certain priority upon the completion with reasonable
diligence of the appropriation.” *1258 § 37-92-103(6), 10 C.R.S. (2001). A conditional right is a right that
serves to hold the place of the appropriator in the “first in time, first in right” system in effect in Colorado. If the
appropriator diligently puts the water to beneficial use, the conditional right can mature into an “absolute” water
right, with a priority that dates back to the initiation of the conditional right. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. United
States, 891 P.2d 952, 970 (Colo.1995) (Arapahoe I ).
[3] The elements required to establish a conditional right are:
[A]n applicant must show in general that a “first step” toward the appropriation of a certain amount of water has
been taken, that the applicant's intent to appropriate is not based upon the speculative sale or transfer of the
appropriative rights, and that there is a substantial probability that the applicant can and will complete the appropriation with diligence.
City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 31 (Colo.1996) (emphasis added). The “can and will” reference above is from a 1979 addition to section 37-92-305(9)(b), 10 C.R.S. (2001) (“No claim for a conditional
water right may be recognized ... except to the extent that it is established that the waters can be and will be diverted, stored, or otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled and will be beneficially used....”).
[4] In In re Water Rights of Hines Highlands Ltd. Partnership, 929 P.2d 718 (Colo.1996), the applicant sought a
conditional decree for water rights for a ski area development plan. Id. at 721. The objectors argued that there
was insufficient water available in Maroon Creek to permit the diversions under the proposed junior conditional
rights. Id. at 723. We held that:
Under the can and will statute, the applicant must make a threshold showing of reasonable availability of water to prove that the applicant “can” complete the appropriation....
... The applicant need only prove that there is a substantial probability that the appropriation can and will be
completed, based upon necessarily imperfect predictions of future conditions. This approach to obtaining a
conditional water right decree promotes the development and maximum utilization of Colorado's scarce water
resources.
Id. at 723-24 (citation omitted). Thus, as a prerequisite to receiving a conditional decree, applicants must show
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water is available that can be diverted. See also Arapahoe II, 14 P.3d at 333 (“[A]pplicant must prove ... that the
river contains sufficient unappropriated water for the applicant to complete the appropriation diligently and in a
timely manner.”).
III.
[5] With that precedent in mind, we now turn to the question of whether water is available in the Gunnison River
basin for purposes of Applicant's conditional water right application. All parties agree that Applicant is invoking
the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance. All parties also agree that Applicant is an up-stream, junior, in-basin
appropriator who qualifies under the subordination agreement in which the River District conveyed its rights for
the Unit to the United States. However, the Objectors take the position that Applicant needs a specific contract
with BUREC identifying it as a beneficiary of the subordination agreement.
In order to analyze the respective rights and obligations of the parties to this controversy, we must first define
the nature of the subordination agreement and the depletion allowance. “Subordination” is a real estate concept
defined as “[t]he act or process by which a person's rights or claims are ranked below those of others.” Black's
Law Dictionary 1426 (7th ed.1999). It is most often used in the context of one lien or mortgage holder agreeing
to subordinate its senior interest to the rights of a junior lien or mortgage holder. Subordination, as other courts
have noted, is essentially a matter of status between parties. See Brown v. Boren, 74 Cal.App.4th 1303, 88
Cal.Rptr.2d 758, 765 (1999); see generally In re Am. Sweeteners, Inc., 248 B.R. 271 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.2000). It
establishes priorities between those parties by some means other than the automatic or statutory scheme. Brown,
88 Cal.Rptr.2d at 765.
*1259 We have held previously that BUREC must subordinate its senior rights to at least 60,000 acre-feet of upstream, junior, in-basin depletions for beneficial use, and that there is an agreement to that effect that supercedes
the Unit's water rights. Arapahoe II, 14 P.3d at 340-41. Thus, the agreement establishing the priorities and creating the depletion allowance is the umbrella agreement that was a part of the transfer of the water rights to BUREC.
FN2
Depletion allowance is something of an inapposite term, if given its traditional meaning;
however, here it
clearly refers to the amount of water available for use by upstream, in-basin users who would otherwise be subject to the Unit's call for administration and curtailment. Therefore, the depletion allowance represents the total
amount of water that BUREC agreed could supercede the exercise of its senior rights through the subordination.
FN2. A depletion allowance in the natural resources mineral industry is “[t]he process by which the cost
or other basis of a natural resource (e.g., an oil and gas interest) is recovered upon extraction and sale of
the resource.” Black's Law Dictionary 437 (7th ed.1999).
In the case before us, Judge Steven Patrick relied on Judge Robert Brown's findings in Arapahoe II when he
concluded that potential appropriators, like Applicant, may access the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance for
purposes of a conditional decree only if they possess a contract with BUREC. Because Applicant possessed no
such contract, Judge Patrick denied the application based upon a failure to demonstrate water availability. We
observe, however, that Judge Brown's factual conclusions in Arapahoe II addressed the issue of whether the
Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County could access the depletion allowance for purposes of
showing water availability for the Union Park Project trans-mountain diversion. Judge Brown concluded that Arapahoe County could not make use of the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance for a trans-mountain diversion
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project, and such a limitation on the subordination was not an impermissible selective subordination. We upheld
this conclusion. Arapahoe II, 14 P.3d at 345-46. Judge Brown also concluded that Arapahoe County needed, but
did not have, an agreement with BUREC for its proposed water use and decreed that the depletion allowance did
not make water available for Arapahoe's use in the Union Park project. Although we affirmed Judge Brown's
primary ruling in Arapahoe II, we did not opine on the method of implementation or administration of the
60,000 acre-feet, because the issue was not before us in that case given our ruling on Arapahoe County's legal
impediment as a trans-basin diverter.
In rendering his conclusion, Judge Brown cited extensively from witness testimony of several members of BUREC, the Water Districts involved, as well as the State Engineer's office. He detailed development of the subordination policy. Ultimately, he concluded that it was the intent of the parties (the River District and BUREC) to
condition the grant of water rights for the Unit upon the creation of a 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance, but
that “to implement the subordination (depletion) policy,” the parties contemplated contracts. Thus, according to
Judge Brown in Arapahoe II, the parties intended that contracts be in place to effectuate the depletion. This illustrates one of the problems in using factual findings generated in one case as dispositive in another case. Judge
Brown based his finding that user-specific contracts were necessary primarily on the testimony of Carol DeAngelis. However, Wayne Cook, also from BUREC, refuted her testimony on the necessity of a contract. Both individuals were “knowledgeable BUREC officials.” Judge Brown chose not to give as much credence to Mr.
Cook's testimony because Cook not only testified that no contract was necessary, but also that trans-basin diverters could make use of the depletion allowance-a conclusion Judge Brown found to be refuted by the weight of
the evidence. Thus, although Judge Brown did find that a user-specific contract was necessary, his finding was
in the context of a case involving a trans-basin diverter, where the real issue focused on the in-basin limitations
of the subordination agreement.
[6] In this regard, we disapprove of the use of Judge Brown's findings as determinative*1260 in this case because, here, the conditional water right applicant is an in-basin appropriator. The existence of the subordination
agreement has been firmly recognized in our case law, and this appropriator is within the group of individuals
and entities for whom the depletion was intended from the outset of the Unit's development by the United States.
Our prior cases clearly hold that at least 60,000 acre-feet of water is available for appropriation to in-basin beneFN3
ficiaries such as Applicant.
See Arapahoe II, 14 P.3d at 346. Water within the depletion allowance is, therefore, as a matter of law, available to this applicant for the purposes of a conditional decree-provided only that
other qualified appropriators have not otherwise exhausted the depletion allowance.
FN3. We express no opinion on whether BUREC may require a master agreement that, among other
provisions, might contemplate accounting and reporting requirements relevant to Unit operations and
State Engineer administration in the event Applicant puts the water to beneficial use.
[7][8] Typically, to satisfy the “can and will” test, new appropriators must convince the water court that their diversion will cause no harm to senior appropriators: i.e., that water is available. See Southeastern Colo. Water
Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo.1984); Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d
1139, 1147-49 (Colo.2001). In the Gunnison basin, however, to satisfy the water availability test, a new, inbasin appropriator must only convince the water court that a portion of the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance
remains unused. Because we have already determined that this amount was made available for in-basin users,
the remaining question for the water court is only what amount, if any, of the 60,000 acre-feet remains. This in
turn depends on the exercise of absolute decrees for in-basin, junior uses above the Unit. Arapahoe I, 891 P.2d
at 962. We hold that the absence of a contract between Applicant and BUREC does not preclude satisfaction of
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the “water availability” test of the “can and will” doctrine.
IV.
The trial judge here required Applicant to satisfy an unnecessary prerequisite before it could receive a conditional decree. Without reaching the question of whether some sort of BUREC contract may be required in connection with operation of the applicant's water right, we reverse the water court's denial of Mount Emmons' application and remand this case to the water court to determine whether a sufficient amount of the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance remains unappropriated to satisfy the application for a conditional decree.
Colo.,2002.
Mount Emmons Min. Co. v. Town of Crested Butte
40 P.3d 1255
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
William J. COLMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
UTAH STATE LAND BOARD; Ralph Miles, Director, Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry,
Utah Department of Natural Resources; and Southern Pacific Transportation Company, a Delaware
corporation, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 860331.
April 12, 1990.
Rehearing Denied July 20, 1990.
Operator of underwater brine canal filed action to
enjoin state and railroad from breaching lake causeway and to recover monetary damages for damage
breach would cause to canal. Following denial of
operator's motion for preliminary injunction, the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay E.
Banks, J., granted state's motion to dismiss, and operator appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that: (1) canal operator stated valid cause of
action for taking or damage of his property caused
by breach in railway causeway; (2) takings clause
of State Constitution was self-executing and not
subject to limitations found in Governmental Immunity Act; and (3) legislation authorizing breach
of causeway was not unconstitutional special legislation.
Reversed and remanded.
Zimmerman, J., filed concurring opinion in which
Durham, J., joined.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error 30

863

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General

30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Appellate court would not consider evidence
presented at preliminary injunction hearing on appeal from order dismissing claim for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted where
trial court had not treated motion to dismiss as motion for summary judgment. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules
12, 12(b), 56.
[2] Eminent Domain 148

2.17(1)

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.17 Waters and Water Courses;
Flooding
148k2.17(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 148k2(10))
Claim that Utah Division of State Land and
Forestry granted canal operator an easement for the
maintenance and operation of underwater brine
canal as part of operator's lease with state adequately alleged a property interest protectible under the Utah Constitution. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[3] Eminent Domain 148

293(1)

148 Eminent Domain
148IV Remedies of Owners of Property; Inverse
Condemnation
148k293 Pleading
148k293(1) k. Petition or Complaint.
Most Cited Cases
Allegation by operator of underwater brine canal
that breach in causeway of Great Salt Lake would
result in total destruction of at least 300-foot segment of canal and would create such turbidity in
canal area that remaining portions of canal would
be filled with sediment, and would require that he
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move canal and pumps to another location free
from current caused by breach, alleged a permanent
or recurring interference with his property rights
under his alleged easement for maintenance and operation of canal. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[4] Eminent Domain 148

2.17(5)

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.17 Waters and Water Courses;
Flooding
148k2.17(5) k. Flooding. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 148k2(10))
Question of whether state's action in deciding to
breach causeway in Great Salt Lake in response to
rapid rise in lake level was valid exercise of state's
police power was not relevant to question of whether state's actions resulted in actual physical taking
of property of underwater brine canal operator.
Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[5] Eminent Domain 148

2.17(5)

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.17 Waters and Water Courses;
Flooding
148k2.17(5) k. Flooding. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 148k2(10))
Alleged taking of property of underwater brine
canal through breach in causeway did not fall within exception to taking of property for abatement of
nuisances, absent any allegation that operator was
causing nuisance on property. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[6] States 360

112.2(3)

360 States
360III Property, Contracts, and Liabilities

360k112 Torts
360k112.2 Nature of Act or Claim
360k112.2(3) k. Property Damage in
General. Most Cited Cases
Exception to state's liability for damage or destruction to property in case where property is destroyed
by government entity to prevent imminent public
catastrophe must be narrowly construed and cannot
extend to situations of mere expediency. Const. Art.
1, § 22.
[7] Eminent Domain 148

315

148 Eminent Domain
148IV Remedies of Owners of Property; Inverse
Condemnation
148k315 k. Appeal and Error. Most Cited
Cases
Questions of whether rising water level in Great
Salt Lake constituted an “extraordinary flood” and
whether there were otherwise circumstances of
overwhelming necessity warranting emergency action, the role played by the state itself in creating
circumstances causing emergency, and whether permanent taking of underwater brine canal operator's
property occurred involved questions of fact to be
determined at trial. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[8] States 360

191.6(2)

360 States
360VI Actions
360k191 Liability and Consent of State to Be
Sued in General
360k191.6 Mode and Sufficiency of Consent
360k191.6(2) k. Necessity of Constitutional or Statutory Consent. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 360k191(1.13))
Inverse condemnation under takings clause of Utah
Constitution was self-executing and was not subject
to sovereign immunity limitations by the Governmental Immunity Act; overruling Fairclough v. Salt
Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105; State
ex rel. Railroad Commission v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d
65, 368 P.2d 585; Holt v. Utah State Road Com-
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mission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286. U.C.A.1953,
63-30-10.5; Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[9] Eminent Domain 148

315

148 Eminent Domain
148IV Remedies of Owners of Property; Inverse
Condemnation
148k315 k. Appeal and Error. Most Cited
Cases
Jury question existed as to whether state exceeded
its authority in granting lease to underwater brine
canal operator to use bed of Great Salt Lake at time
state granted operator right to conduct his business,
so as to allow state to later revoke lease without
compensation to canal operator. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[10] Statutes 361

76(1)

361 Statutes
361II General and Special or Local Laws
361k76 Applicability of General Law as Affecting Validity of Special or Local Law
361k76(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
The fact that legislation benefited one individual
did not prove a violation of Constitutional provision prohibiting enactment of private or special law
where general law could be applicable. Const. Art.
6, § 26.
[11] Statutes 361

statute did not discriminate against anyone since
railroad owned causeway and operated railway that
crossed causeway. Const. Art. 6, § 26.

77(1)

361 Statutes
361II General and Special or Local Laws
361k77 Laws of Special, Local, or Private
Nature in General
361k77(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Legislation providing indemnity to railroad for actions arising out of breach of railroad causeway
crossing lake did not violate prohibition against
special legislation; provision made reasonable classification to accomplish purpose of preventing
widespread flood damage to public lands, major
transportation routes and other public facilities, and

*623 Carol Clawson,Gary Bendinger, Salt Lake
City, for Colman.
R. Paul Van Dam, Dallin W. Jensen, Michael M.
Quealy, R. Douglas Credille, Salt Lake City, for
State appellees.
L. Ridd Larson, Thomas L. Kay, Craig L. Taylor,
Salt Lake City, for Southern Pacific.
STEWART, Justice:
William J. Colman filed an action against the Utah
State Land Board and against Ralph Miles, Director
of the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry of
the Department of Natural Resources (referred to
collectively as “the State”), and against Southern
Pacific Transportation Company for the destruction
of an underwater brine canal Colman maintained on
the bed of the Great Salt Lake. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and Colman appealed.
I. FACTS
This case arose out of the breach of the Great Salt
Lake causeway on August 1, 1984. The causeway is
a raised bed of fill which crosses the lake in an
east-west direction. Southern Pacific runs a railroad
line over the causeway. The causeway was constructed in 1959 by Southern Pacific after obtaining
a right-of-way for its construction from the state of
Utah.
The Great Salt Lake Causeway Act (the “Act”),
1984 Utah Laws ch. 32, enacted during the 1984
budget session of the Utah legislature, authorized
breaching the causeway as a response to the rapid
rise of the water level in the lake. During this same
session, the legislature amended the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to limit the liability of governmental entities for management of flood waters.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3; 1984 Utah Laws ch. 33,
§ 1.
Prior to the breach of the causeway by the State and
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Southern Pacific, Colman operated and maintained
a five-mile-long underwater*624 brine canal running parallel to and approximately 1,300 feet north
of the causeway. The canal was authorized by a
lease and easement granted by the State. The brine
canal was used in Colman's business of extracting
minerals from deep lake brines.
On July 20, 1984, Colman filed a complaint in the
Third District Court seeking (1) to enjoin the State
and Southern Pacific from breaching the causeway,
and (2) to recover monetary damages for the damage the breach would cause his property if the court
did not grant the injunction.
Colman's mineral extraction operation was located
on the western shore of the lake. The canal began
near that point and ran five miles eastward into the
lake. Colman alleged that for his mineral extraction
operation to be economically feasible, it was necessary for him to draw brines from the deeper strata
of the lake, where the brines are more dense. His
complaint alleged that he had dredged and maintained the canal so that its bottom was at a constant
elevation. Colman alleged that the canal made it
possible for him to pump the deep-water brines into
his mineral extraction operation.
Colman alleged that the breach of the causeway
would cause water from the south arm of the lake to
flow through the breach under great pressure and
cut through the canal banks. He also claimed that
the breach would create turbidity and sedimentation, making the use of the canal as a brine conduit
impossible.
The trial court denied Colman's motion for a preliminary injunction on July 31, 1984, after an evidentiary hearing, and the causeway was breached the
following day. On August 20, 1984, the State filed
a motion to dismiss Colman's damage claims. That
motion was granted by the trial court May 2, 1986.
The trial court concluded that (1) the Utah Governmental Immunity Act immunized the State from liability, (2) the breach of the causeway was a valid
exercise of the police powers of the State, (3) the

breach of the causeway was in furtherance of the
State's public trust responsibilities, and (4) there
was no compensable taking of a property interest.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A dismissal is a severe measure and should be
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a
party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts
which could be proved in support of its claim. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 460,
243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952). The courts are a forum
for settling controversies, and if there is any doubt
about whether a claim should be dismissed for the
lack of a factual basis, the issue should be resolved
in favor of giving the party an opportunity to
present its proof. Baur v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 14
Utah 2d 283, 284, 383 P.2d 397, 397 (1963). On
this appeal, we look solely to the material allegations of Colman's complaint, not to the evidence
presented at the preliminary injunction hearing. In
their briefs and at oral argument, the State and
Southern Pacific rely extensively on the evidence
presented at the preliminary injunction hearing to
support their position. We do not, however, consider this evidence on this appeal.
SeeUtah
R.Civ.P. 12(b). Colman's complaint was dismissed
on a rule 12 motion to dismiss. When reviewing a
dismissal based on rule 12, an appellate court must
accept the material allegations of the complaint as
true, Petersen v. Jones, 16 Utah 2d 121, 122, 396
P.2d 748, 748 (1964), and the trial court's ruling
should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that
Colman can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim. Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l
Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988); Freegard v.
First Western Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah
1987); Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 590 P.2d
1261, 1263 (Utah 1979).
The State argues in its supplemental brief that
“[t]here is no virtue in rigid adherence to a technical rule that has no practical bearing on the proper
outcome of a particular case.” We decline to follow the State's suggestion that we should ignore the
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The “technical rule”
the State refers to is found in rule 12(b), which
provides that a *625 motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted shall
be treated as a motion for summary judgment under
rule 56 if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court. However, the
rule provides that if a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment, it must only
be done so as to not create procedural prejudice to
one of the parties. The rule states, “[A]ll parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56.” Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b). This rule gives the opposing party an opportunity to gather evidence to
rebut the movant's evidence. Without such a rule,
one party could have the benefit of significant, supporting evidence while the other party would be left
to rely solely on the unsubstantiated pleadings.
This rule has much “practical bearing on the proper
outcome” of this case. The State and Southern Pacific moved for dismissal based on Colman's failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Colman responded to these motions with a memorandum opposing the motions to dismiss, which focused exclusively on points of law. Colman appears
to have assumed at that point that the rule 12 standard would be followed. His memorandum began by
stating, “For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the
truth of the Complaint's fact allegations must be assumed.” Colman was not given reasonable opportunity to present additional evidence pursuant to
rule 12(b). Had Colman known that the State would
rely on the preliminary injunction evidence, he
could have submitted other evidence to the trial
court rebutting that evidence.
Furthermore, the trial court treated the motion to
dismiss only under rule 12 and not under rule 56.
The trial court did not make any factual findings in
denying Colman's motion for a preliminary injunction. The trial court specifically stated that it only
ruled that plaintiff had not met his burden of proof
for a preliminary injunction and that its ruling was

not dispositive of any other issues. The trial court
also refused to order Colman to order the transcript
of the preliminary injunction proceedings for this
appeal. In granting the State's motion to dismiss,
the trial court only entered conclusions of law.
Finally, if a trial court cannot on its own motion
convert a rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment, Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 123, 477 P.2d 150, 151
(1970), then certainly we should not allow the moving party to do so on appeal.
III. TAKING OR DAMAGING PROPERTY
A. Was Colman's canal “property” for purposes of
article I, section 22?
[2] Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution
provides, “Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation.” A claimant must possess some protectible interest in property before that interest is entitled to
recover under this provision. Colman alleged that
the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry granted him, as part of a lease with the state, an easement for the maintenance and operation of the
canal. It has always been accepted in this state that
even an implied easement is a property interest protectible under article I, section 22. Utah State Road
Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah
1974); Hampton v. State ex rel. Road Comm'n, 21
Utah 2d 342, 345, 445 P.2d 708, 710 (1968); Dooly
Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 37,
33 P. 229, 231-32 (1893). An express easement,
such as that alleged by Colman, is also “private
property” for the purposes of article I, section 22.
See Whiterocks Irrigation Co. v. Mooseman, 45
Utah 79, 79-80, 141 P. 459, 460 (1914); Utah Code
Ann. § 78-34-2(2) (Supp.1989). Nichols on Eminent Domain states, “An easement is an interest in
land, and it is taken in the constitutional sense when
the land over which it is exercised is taken; but if it
is only destroyed and ended, a destruction for pub-
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lic purposes may also be an appropriation for the
same purpose.” 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain §
5.14, at 5-186 (3d ed.1989) (citing *626United
States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339, 30 S.Ct. 527,
54 L.Ed. 787 (1910)).
A lessee holding under a valid lease also has a
property interest protected by the takings clause of
the constitutional provisions:
It has been judicially established that lessees for
years or from year to year, holding under a valid
devise, grant, or lease, have such an interest in
property as to be classed as “owners” in the constitutional sense, and to be entitled to compensation
for the taking of their interest....
2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.06, at 5-97 to
101 (3d ed.1989).
We conclude that Colman has alleged a property interest protectible under article I, section 22 of the
Utah Constitution. We emphasize again that we regard the allegations of the complaint as true. We do
not look to evidence presented at the preliminary
injunction hearing. Colman cannot recover if the
State proves that in fact there was no canal or that
Colman had no legal rights in the canal. Colman
can only recover for the taking of property to the
extent that property exists and to the extent he has
legal rights in that property.
B. Was Colman's canal “taken or damaged” for
purposes of article I, section 22?
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution
provides, “Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation.” This Court has previously outlined what constitutes a taking and what constitutes damage under
this constitutional provision.
In State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District
Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78
P.2d 502 (1937), the Court stated that a “taking” is
“any substantial interference with private property

which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by
which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is
in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed.”
94 Utah at 394, 78 P.2d at 506 (quoting Stockdale
v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah 201, 211,
77 P. 849, 852 (1904)); see Hampton v. State Road
Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 342, 347, 445 P.2d 708,
711-12 (1968). This Court has also defined the term
“damage” for the purpose of article I, section 22
and for the purpose of the eminent domain statute
in Board of Education of Logan City School District v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d 697 (1962).
In that case, the Court cited article I, section 22 and
stated:
Damages to land, by the construction of a public or
industrial improvement, though no part thereof is
taken as provided for under 78-34-10(3), contrary
to the rule for severance damages, is limited to injuries that would be actionable at common law, or
where there has been some physical disturbance of
a right, either public or private, which the owner
enjoys in connection with his property and which
gives it additional value, and which causes him to
sustain a special damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public generally.
13 Utah 2d at 313-14, 373 P.2d at 699; see State
ex rel. Road Comm'n v. Williams, 22 Utah 2d 331,
334, 452 P.2d 881, 883-84 (1969); Twenty-Second
Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 238,
247, 103 P. 243, 246 (1909) (“[T]o bring the case
within the damage clause of the Constitution, there
must be some physical interference with the property itself or with some easement which constitutes
an appurtenant thereto.”). The Court went on to explain that such “damage” requires a “definite physical injury cognizable to the senses with a perceptible effect on the present market value.” Croft, 13
Utah 2d at 314, 373 P.2d at 699. The Court listed
various types of injuries that would be compensable
as “damage” under the constitutional provision.
These
included
“drying
up
wells
and
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springs,” “destroying lateral supports,” “preventing
surface waters from running off adjacent lands or
running surface waters onto adjacent lands,” or
“depositing of cinders and other foreign materials
on neighboring lands by the permanent operation of
the business or improvement established on the adjoining *627 lands.” Croft, 13 Utah 2d at 314, 373
P.2d at 699-700.
In our recent case of Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores,
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah
1989), we stated: “Plaintiffs alleged that damages
[from the flooding] resulted from a temporary, onetime occurrence and not a permanent, continuous,
or inevitably recurring interference with property
rights usually associated with and requisite in a
compensable taking.” 784 P.2d at 465 (citing Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149, 44
S.Ct. 264, 265, 68 L.Ed. 608 (1924); Accardi v.
United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 347, 356-57, 599 F.2d
423, 429 (1979); Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101
Wash.2d 307, 334, 678 P.2d 803, 818 (1984)). See
also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3172, 73
L.Ed.2d 868 (1982).
[3] Colman alleged in his complaint that the breach
would result in the total destruction of at least a
300-foot segment of the canal. He also alleged that
the breach would create such turbidity in the area of
the canal that the remaining portions of the canal
would be filled with sediment over much of its
course. Colman alleged that the breach would require that he move the canal and pumps to another
location free from the current caused by the breach.
We conclude that Colman has alleged a permanent
or recurring interference with property rights. Thus,
Colman has alleged sufficient facts to constitute a
“taking” or “damage” under article I, section 22.
C. Was Colman's property “taken or damaged” or
merely regulated under the State's general police
powers?
The State suggests that because the breach of the

causeway was a valid exercise of the State's police
powers, it is not liable for the damage caused to
Colman. However, in Utah State Road Commission
v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), we plainly
stated, “The constitutional guarantee of just compensation for the taking or damaging of private
property for public use is in no way affected by the
fact that the expropriator ... exercis[ed] the police
power.” 526 P.2d at 928.
The State seems to have misled itself on this point
by relying on isolated language from discussions of
a related but different issue. It is true that the courts
will not disturb the legislature's judgment in the exercise of the general police powers as long as it
does not violate constitutional limits. Salt Lake City
v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 355, 145 P. 1047, 1048-49
(1915). The police powers are not, however, beyond the limitations established by the constitution.
Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 107, 125-26,
292 P. 194, 202 (1930).
The emphasis the State places on the police powers
is often made when there is a close issue that turns
on the difference between a taking or damage under
article I, section 22 and mere regulation of property
and activities on property. Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a property owner can do with
and on the owner's property. Those regulations may
have a significant impact on the utility or value of
property, yet they generally do not require compensation under article I, section 22. Only when
governmental action rises to the level of a taking or
damage under article I, section 22 is the State required to pay compensation.
Previous cases of this Court have wrestled with the
issue. In Bountiful City v. De Luca, the Court
stated:
Broad and comprehensive as are the police powers
of the state, still we think it may not successfully be
contended that the power may be so exercised as to
infringe upon or invade rights safeguarded and
guaranteed by constitutional provisions.... The
cases are numerous to the effect that ... the state
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may without compensation regulate and restrain the
use of private property when the health, safety,
morals, or welfare of the public requires or demands it; ... that the exercise of proper police regulations may to some extent prevent enjoyment of
individual rights in property or cause inconvenience
or loss to the owner, does not necessarily render the
police law unconstitutional, for the reason that *628
such laws are not considered as appropriating
private property for a public use, but simply as regulating its use and enjoyment, and if the owner
through a lawful exercise of the power suffers inconvenience, injury, or a loss, it is regarded as damnum absque injuria, provided always, that constitutional mandates have not been invaded by a confiscation, destruction, or deprivation of property, unless it is per se injurious or obnoxious or a menace
to public health or public safety or morals or general welfare, or unless under conditions similar to
tearing down a building to prevent spreading of a
conflagration; but however broad the scope of the
police power, it is always subject to the rule that
the Legislature may not exercise any power expressly or impliedly forbidden by constitutional
provisions.
77 Utah at 119-121, 292 P. at 199-200 (emphasis
added). In Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349,
362, 145 P. 1047, 1051 (1915), we held that “a
landowner cannot complain because he is inconvenienced in the use of his property, where such inconvenience arises out of the proper enforcement of
the police power to protect the public health, and
where such enforcement does not amount to a taking or destruction of his property.”
[4] Here, Colman argues that the State's actions
were not a mere regulation of property, but constituted an actual physical taking. It is not relevant
that the State's action in this case was a valid exercise of its police power. Rather, the issue is whether
sufficient facts were alleged to show a taking of
property.
[5] It is not alleged that Colman was causing a nuisance on the property. Thus, the case does not fall

into the exception for the abatement of nuisances.
D. Does the State avoid liability because its action
was in response to an emergency?
The State argues that no liability should be imposed
on it because the breach destroyed the canal to
avert an overwhelming destruction of property.
Colman argues, however, that that principle only
applies when the plaintiff's property would have
been destroyed by the emergency condition irrespective of the governmental action.
Colman correctly states that many of the cases involve situations where the plaintiff's property
would have been destroyed by the emergency even
if there had been no governmental action. See
United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344
U.S. 149, 73 S.Ct. 200, 97 L.Ed. 157 (1952); Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149, 44
S.Ct. 264, 265, 68 L.Ed. 608 (1924). Colman argues that the “emergency” created by the higher
lake waters did not affect the operation of the canal.
However, the trial court must determine whether
Colman's canal would have been in danger without
the breach.
Other cases dealing with emergencies and eminent
domain can be distinguished because they involve
questions of proper regulation and the use of the
police power as discussed above. See Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246, 72 L.Ed. 568
(1928); Teresi v. State, 180 Cal.App.3d 239, 225
Cal.Rptr. 517 (1986). These cases do not involve a
direct physical taking, as is alleged in this case.
[6] However, all of the cases dealing with this
emergency doctrine cannot be distinguished on
these bases. The State argues correctly that in some
cases there is no liability where property is destroyed by a governmental entity to prevent imminent public catastrophe. The privilege to take or
damage private property without compensation
arises from the necessity of sacrificing some property to prevent overwhelming damage or loss of
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life. This privilege is based on the privilege of any
individual to take immediate action that harms
property so as to prevent loss of life or great destruction of property. City of Rapid City v. Boland,
271 N.W.2d 60, 65 (S.D.1978). This exception to
the general requirement of just compensation for
property taken is explained in 1 Nichols on Eminent
Domain §§ 1.43[1] and 1.43[2]:
More closely allied to the power of eminent domain
is the power of destruction*629 from necessity. In
the case of fire, flood, pestilence or other great public calamity, when immediate action is necessary to
save human life or to avert an overwhelming destruction of property, any individual may lawfully
enter another's land and destroy his property, real or
personal, providing he acts with reasonable judgment.
....
If the individual who enters and destroys private
property happens to be a public officer whose duty
it is to avert an impending calamity, the rights of
the owner of the property to compensation are no
greater than in the case of a private individual. The
most familiar example of the exercise of this right
is seen in case of fire. The neighbors and fireman
freely trespass on the adjoining land, and houses
are even blown up to prevent the spread of the conflagration. The danger of flood or the existence of a
pestilence may call for equally drastic action.
However, the permanent appropriation of private
property without the payment of compensation
therefor cannot be justified under the power.
1 Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 1.43[1], 1.43[2],
at 1-841 to 843 (3d ed.1989) (footnotes omitted).
This exception only applies where there is an extreme, imperative, or overwhelming necessity.
Mere expediency is insufficient. Boland, 271
N.W.2d at 66. There must be “circumstances of imminent necessity.”
Srb v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 43 Colo.App. 14, 18, 601 P.2d 1082,
1085 (1979), cert. denied as improvidently
granted, 199 Colo. 496, 618 P.2d 1105 (1980). This

exception must be narrowly construed. Almost
every act of taking property under the eminent domain powers involves some degree of public necessity. This exception could overcome the rule of just
compensation if it is not limited to only the most
extreme emergencies. In McKell v. Spanish Fork
City, 6 Utah 2d 92, 305 P.2d 1097 (1957), this
Court outlined how a governmental entity or any riparian owner could protect itself against extraordinary floods without liability:
However, it is generally recognized that riparian
owners may embank and protect their lands against
the overflow of extraordinary floods, even though
damage to the lands of others is caused thereby. An
extraordinary flood is one which is not foreshadowed by the usual course of nature, and is of such a
magnitude and destructiveness as could not have
been anticipated or provided against by the exercise
of ordinary foresight.
McKell, 6 Utah 2d at 95-96, 305 P.2d at 1099
(emphasis in original). McKell involved an extraordinary flood. Here, it is a question of fact
whether the rising water level constituted an
“extraordinary flood” and whether there were otherwise circumstances of overwhelming necessity.
These questions cannot be decided on the basis of
the pleadings and will have to be decided at trial.
[7] Also involved in this case is the State's role in
creating the emergency. Colman alleged that Southern Pacific is the owner of a right-of-way granted
by the State over the bed of the lake for the construction of the causeway. It appears that the State
played some role in the construction of the causeway, and the causeway seems to be the major factor
in causing the “emergency” the State is now claiming. It is more difficult to find an emergency of
overwhelming necessity when the State played a
part in creating the circumstances causing the emergency. See McKell, 6 Utah 2d at 96-97, 305 P.2d
at 1099-1100.
Nichols on Eminent Domain makes clear that the
permanent appropriation of property without compensation does not fit into this exception. 1 Nichols

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

795 P.2d 622
795 P.2d 622
(Cite as: 795 P.2d 622)

Page 10

on Eminent Domain § 1.43[2], at 1-843 (3d
ed.1989); see Short v. Pierce County, 194 Wash.
421, 435-36, 78 P.2d 610, 616 (1938). In this case,
Colman alleges a permanent taking of his property.
This is another question of fact for the trial court to
determine.
On remand, the trial court must determine whether
the emergency exception applies in this instance.
To fall within this exception, the trial court must
find that the flooding created a situation of extreme,
imperative, or overwhelming necessity. In *630 addition, the exception is not applicable if the State
played a foreseeable role in causing the emergency.
IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
[8] Colman's complaint states a cause of action for
inverse condemnation of his property. Colman alleged that the destruction of his canal constitutes a
taking of his property without just compensation in
violation of article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution. The State and Southern Pacific claim that
they are immune from this inverse condemnation
claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
FN1
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 to -38. (1989).
The
issue is whether an inverse condemnation claim under article I, section 22 is subject to the limitations
found in the Governmental Immunity Act.
FN1. In 1987, the legislature waived its asserted immunity by adding § 63-30-10.5 to
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
1987 Utah Laws ch. 75, § 3. That section
provides:
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property without just compensation.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be
assessed according to the requirements
of Chapter 34, Title 78.

However, this provision was not in place
at the time this cause of action arose and
does not apply here.
This Court has struggled since the turn of the century to reconcile the doctrine of sovereign immunity with article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, which provides simply that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation.” Early and recent cases
provide valuable insight into the meaning of this
provision.
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention in
1895 spent a great deal of time formulating and debating the language of article I, section 22. The debates show that the delegates believed that the provision limited state government and was not merely
advice that the legislature could choose to follow if
it wished. See Proceedings and Debates of the
Constitutional Convention, 326-344, 623-53
(1898). The specific issue of the relation between
sovereign immunity and article I, section 22 never
arose in these debates. However, the more general
issue of the role of the constitution in relation to the
role of legislature was frequently discussed during
the debates on article I, section 22. Throughout
these discussions, the delegates assumed that article
I, section 22 would be a limitation on the state and
that further legislation would provide no less protection than that mandated by article I, section 22.
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional
Convention, 625, 629-33 (1898) (indicating that the
delegates saw the constitutional provision as the
minimum expected of the state and the legislature).
The framers of the Utah Constitution expected it to
act as a real limit on the powers of the state. The
framers certainly did not intend to allow state government to override the constitutional guarantee
with a legislative enactment.
This Court originally held that article I, section 22
was self-executing. Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40
Utah 221, 224, 120 P. 503, 504 (1911). Later, the
Court switched to a position that the state was immune from suit for damages under the doctrine of
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sovereign immunity and that article I, section 22
was not self-executing. Fairclough v. Salt Lake
County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). We
now reaffirm that article I, section 22 is selfexecuting. In doing so, clarity requires that we specify the cases that the Court overrules.
The question of whether article I, section 22 is selfexecuting involves the issue of whether the constitutional provision requires a legislative enactment
to be enforced in the courts. As the law developed
in this state, the question of whether article I, section 22 is self-executing gave rise to the specific issue of whether the legislature can block enforcement of article I, section 22 against the state or its
political subdivisions by a grant of immunity.
In Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 28
Utah 201, 77 P. 849 (1904), the *631 Court stated
that “a party whose property is about to be specially
damaged in any substantial degree for public use
has the same rights and is given the same remedies
for the protection of his property from the
threatened injury as would be accorded him if his
property was actually taken and appropriated for
such use.” 28 Utah at 213, 77 P. at 853. See State
ex rel. State Road Commission v. District Court,
Fourth Judicial Dist., 94 Utah 384, 393, 78 P.2d
502, 506 (1937). In Stockdale, the Court referred to
the discussions in the Constitutional Convention to
support that proposition. 28 Utah at 213, 77 P. at
853. Nevertheless, the Court later ignored the principle that “takings” and “damages” should be afforded the same remedies.
In Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P.
503 (1911), the Court explicitly held that article I,
section 22 was self-executing and the right to recover consequential damages for damage to property did not rely on legislative enactment. 40 Utah
at 224, 120 P. at 504; see Coalter v. Salt Lake
City, 40 Utah 293, 298, 120 P. 851, 853 (1912)
(“Consequential damages to property which are
caused by making public improvements are recoverable under the Constitution of this state, and not
by virtue of a statute.”).

Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913),
did not deal with article I, section 22, but it seems
to have led to confusion in subsequent decisions
dealing with sovereign immunity in the context of
that provision. See Fairclough v. Salt Lake
County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 425, 354 P.2d 105, 110-11
(1960) (Wade, J., dissenting). In Wilkinson, the
plaintiff sought recovery from a state fund for damage to his property caused by flooding from a canal
the state had constructed. The Court stated that
without the consent of the state an action against
the sovereign could not be maintained: “We have
neither a statute nor a constitutional provision authorizing a suit against the state.” 42 Utah at 492,
134 P. at 630.
Eight years later, the Court again stated that article
I, section 22 was binding on the state as sovereign.
In Croft v. Millard County Drainage District No. 1,
59 Utah 121, 202 P. 539 (1921), the Court stated:
Even the state itself, when acting within the scope
of its sovereign powers, cannot take or damage
private property for public use without making just
and adequate compensation to the person to whom
the property belongs.
This is a fundamental law of the commonwealth,
binding upon every department of the state government. It is the duty of the courts to give it full force
and effect whenever it is properly invoked by one
claiming its protection, even as against the sovereign power of the state.
59 Utah at 126, 202 P. at 541 (emphasis added).
Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Commission,
95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937), was like Wilkinson in holding that an action could not be maintained against the state without its consent. It was
also like Wilkinson in that it did not deal with article I, section 22.
State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District
Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78
P.2d 502 (1937), held that the individual commis-
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sioners of the State Road Commission could be enjoined from pursuing a highway project until payments for consequential damage were made to
property owners. Because this action was brought
before the improvement was constructed, the property owners sought an injunction, not damages. Because of this, the Court did not consider in depth
the relation of sovereign immunity to article I, section 22. The Court simply stated that the state could
not be sued without its consent and cited Wilkinson
and Campbell as authority. 94 Utah at 389, 78 P.2d
at 504. As mentioned above, neither of those cases
dealt with sovereign immunity in the context of an
article I, section 22 claim.
The Court did state, however, that “it is clear that
the framers of the Constitution did not intend to
give the rights granted by section 22, and then leave
the citizen powerless to enforce such rights.” 94
Utah at 397, 78 P.2d at 508. The Court then stated
in dicta that if an injunction would not *632 adequately protect the constitutional right, then the
state could be found to have consented to suit
against itself under article I, section 22. 94 Utah at
399, 78 P.2d at 509.
Nevertheless, this and other similar dicta were soon
ignored in the later cases. Anderson Investment
Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144
(1972); Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241
P.2d 907 (1952). In Hjorth, the Court held that the
road commissioners individually could not be sued
for consequential damages done to property in regrading for a highway project. 121 Utah at 330,
241 P.2d at 909. Chief Justice Wolfe concurred and
stated that Hjorthoverruled State ex rel. State Road
Commission v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937). Hjorth, 121
Utah at 331, 241 P.2d at 910.
In Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d
100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960), the plaintiff tried to circumvent sovereign immunity and the holding in
Hjorth by seeking a writ of mandamus to compel
the members of the State Road Commission to initiate eminent domain proceedings to assess con-

sequential damages to the plaintiff's property. The
Court held that sovereign immunity could not be
circumvented in that way. Springville Banking, 10
Utah 2d at 103, 349 P.2d at 159.
In Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417,
354 P.2d 105 (1960), we held that “Art. I, Sec. 22
of our Constitution is not self-executing, nor does it
give consent to be sued, implied or otherwise; and
that to secure such consent is a legislative matter....”
10 Utah 2d at 419, 354 P.2d at 106
(footnotes omitted). Fairclough was followed in
State ex rel. Road Commission v. Parker, 13 Utah
2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962), and in Holt v. Utah
State Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d
1286 (1973).
In Hampton v. State ex rel. Road Commission, 21
Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968), the Court took a
less restrictive position on the issue of compensation from the state. In Hampton, the plaintiffs' right
of access to their property was interfered with by
the construction of Interstate 15. The Court held
that the state had given its consent to be sued for
the taking of property under Utah Code Ann. §
78-11-9 (1953). The Court held that if the action of
the state amounted to a “substantial and material
impairment of access to their property,” then it constituted a taking requiring compensation from the
state. 21 Utah 2d at 348, 445 P.2d at 712. Thus, the
Court made it possible for the plaintiff to recover
by classifying the plaintiffs' damages as a taking,
for which immunity had been waived by statute,
rather than as damage, for which the plaintiff could
not recover under Fairclough.
Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), held
the state liable because the state's conduct, which
led to the damages sustained by the plaintiffs, fell
within the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-9 (1953), although Judge Bullock, sitting pro tempore, dissented and argued that article
I, section 22 was self-executing and should be applied. 541 P.2d at 1122 (Bullock, D.J., dissenting).
In dissent in separate cases, Justice Wade and Judge
Bullock both cited many cases from other states
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holding that similar state constitutional provisions
are self-executing. See Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d
at 1123 n. 6 (Bullock, D.J., dissenting); Springville
Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d at 105-09, 349
P.2d at 159-62 (Wade, J., dissenting). Today the
overwhelming majority of states with similar constitutional provisions hold them to be self-exFN2
ecuting.
FN2. The following states hold their constitutional provisions requiring just compensation for taking or damaging private
property to be self-executing or otherwise
binding on the state.
ALABAMA. Ala. Const. art. I, § 23
(“[B]ut private property shall not be
taken for, or applied to public use, unless
just compensation be first made therefor....”); City of Fairhope v. Raddcliffe,
48 Ala.App. 224, 229, 263 So.2d 682,
686 (1972) (authority to sue for damage
caused by negligent construction of sewer system arises from Alabama constitution, not from statutory waiver of sovereign immunity).
ALASKA. Alaska Const. art. I, § 18
(“Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just
compensation.”); State, Dept. of Highways v. Crosby, 410 P.2d 724, 728-29
(Alaska 1966) (basis of action was article I, section 18 of the Alaska constitution).
ARIZONA. Ariz. Const. art. II, § 17
(“No private property shall be taken or
damaged for public or private use
without just compensation having first
been made....”); Pima County v. Bilby,
87 Ariz. 366, 370, 351 P.2d 647, 649
(1960) (“This Court has previously held
section 17, article 2, of the Arizona Constitution to be self-executing ( County of
Mohave v. Chamberlin, 78 Ariz. 422,

281 P.2d 128 (1955)), and it is perfectly
clear that the absence of enabling legislation cannot deprive plaintiff of his constitutional right to just compensation for
any of his private property which is
‘taken or damaged’ by the County.”).
CALIFORNIA. Cal. Const. art. I, § 19
(“Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless
waived, has first been paid to, or into
court for, the owner.”); Pacific Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. City of Burbank, 86
Cal.App.3d 5, 9, 149 Cal.Rptr. 906, 909
(1978) (“[Article I, section 19] requires
no statutory implementation, since it is
self-executing.”);
Rose v. State, 19
Cal.2d 713, 726, 123 P.2d 505, 513
(1942) (“Immunity from suit cannot
avail in this instance, and, if no statute
exists, liability still exists, because as to
this provision the Constitutions are selfexecuting.”) (quoting Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Hwy. Dept., 159 S.C.
481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931)).
COLORADO. Colo. Const. art. II, § 15
(“Private property shall not be taken or
damaged, for public or private use,
without just compensation.”); Srb v. Bd.
of County Commissioners, 43 Colo App.
14, 19, 601 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1979) (the
just compensation clause of the Colorado
constitution creates an exception to the
doctrine of governmental immunity),
cert.
denied
as
improvidently
granted, 199 Colo. 496, 618 P.2d 1105
(1980).
GEORGIA. Ga. Const. art. I, § 3, ¶ 1
(“[P]rivate property shall not be taken or
damaged for public purposes without
just and adequate compensation being
first paid.”); Fulton County v. Baranan,
240 Ga. 837, 838, 242 S.E.2d 617, 619
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(1978) (action for damage done to
private property by county not barred by
statute granting counties immunity from
liability).
ILLINOIS.
Ill. Const. art. I, § 15
(“Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just
compensation as provided by law.”);
People ex rel. Alexander v. City of
Mount Vernon, 404 Ill. 58, 66, 88 N.E.2d
45, 49 (1949) (“The provision of the
constitution guaranteeing compensation
if property is taken or damaged for public use is self-executing, requires no legislation for its enforcement, and cannot
be impaired by legislation or ordinance.”).
KENTUCKY. Ky. Const. § 13 (“[N]or
shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use without the consent
of his representatives and without just
compensation being previously made to
him.”); Holloway Constr. Co. v. Smith,
683 S.W.2d 248 (Ky.1984) (state waives
immunity for suits under takings clause);
Kentucky Bell Corp. v. Commonwealth,
295 Ky. 21, 25, 172 S.W.2d 661, 663
(1943) (the constitutional provisions
“support the rule that ... where a trespass
... amounts to [a] taking, the state's immunity from suit is waived ...”).
LOUISIANA. La. Const. art. I, § 4
(“Property shall not be taken or damaged
by the state or its political subdivisions
except for public purposes and with just
compensation....”); Reymond v. State ex
rel. Dep't. of Highways, 255 La. 425,
447, 231 So.2d 375, 383 (1970)
(constitutional provision supports suit
for inverse condemnation by property
owner); Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069,
1076, 34 So.2d 321, 323 (1948) (“This
provision, which is similar to that ap-

pearing in other State Constitutions, has
been generally regarded as self-executing.”).
MINNESOTA. Minn. Const. art. I, § 13
(“Private property shall not be taken,
destroyed or damaged for public use
without just compensation therefor, first
paid or secured.”); State v. Prow's
Motel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 171 N.W.2d 83
(1969) (property owner is entitled to
damages for constitutional taking).
MISSISSIPPI. Miss. Const. art. III, § 17
(“Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use, except on due
compensation being first made to the
owner or owners thereof....”); State
Highway Comm'n v. Mason, 192 Miss.
576, 593, 4 So.2d 345, 349 (1941) (“It
would be a mockery for the Constitution
to guarantee a right to the property owner, and a duty on the taker thereof, and
leave the enforcement of both dependent
upon the legislative will.”).
MISSOURI. Mo. Const. art. I, § 26 (
[P]rivate property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just
compensation.”); Page v. Metropolitan
St. Louis Sewer Dist., 377 S.W.2d 348,
354 (Mo.1964) (“While the state cannot
be sued without its consent, and there is
no statutory provision authorizing such
suits, nevertheless, ‘if the injury alleged
is a damage within the constitutional
provision, that provision is self-enforcing.’ ”) (quoting Anderson v. InterRiver Drainage & Levee Dist., 309 Mo.
189, 274 S.W. 448, 455 (1925)).
MONTANA. Mont. Const. art. II, § 29
(“Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just
compensation to the full extent of the
loss....”); City of Three Forks v. State
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Highway Comm'n, 156 Mont. 392, 398,
480 P.2d 826, 830 (1971) (the constitutional provision prohibiting the taking or
damaging of private property without
just compensation waives the immunity
of the state where that provision applies).
NEBRASKA. Neb. Const. art. I, § 21
(“The property of no person shall be
taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation therefor.”); Kula v.
Prososki, 219 Neb. 626, 629, 365
N.W.2d 441, 443 (1985) ( “[Article I,
section 21] of the Constitution is selfexecuting, and legislative action is not
necessary to make the remedy available.”).
NEW MEXICO. N.M. Const. art. II, § 20
(“Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just
compensation.) McClure v. Town of
Mesilla, 93 N.M. 447, 448, 601 P.2d 80,
81 (St.App.1979) (citing Summerford v.
Board of Commr's of Dona Ana County,
35 N.M. 374, 379, 298 P. 410, 413
(1931) (plaintiff property owner could
base suit on article II, section 20)).
NORTH DAKOTA. N.D. Const. art. I, §
16 (“Private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just
compensation....”); Jamestown Plumbing
& Heating Co. v. City of Jamestown, 164
N.W.2d 355, 358 (N.D.1968) (“We have
held on numerous occasions that under
this constitutional provision the owner
may maintain an action to recover damages for the taking of his property and
for consequential damages to his property resulting from a public use.”).
SOUTH DAKOTA. S.D. Const. art. VI,
§ 13 (“Private property shall not be
taken for public use, or damaged,

without just compensation....”); Hurley
v. State, 82 S.D. 156, 170, 143 N.W.2d
722, 729 (1966) (“In the absence of an
adequate remedy provided by the legislature which condemnees may invoke in
such cases, Section 13, Article VI of our
Constitution is deemed to be selfexecuting granting them a right of trial
by jury in the circuit courts of our
state.”).
TEXAS. Tex. Const. art. I, § 17 (“No
person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation
being made....”); San Antonio River Authority v. Lewis, 363 S.W.2d 444, 449
(Tex.1962) (“The provisions of Section
17, Article I of the Constitution of Texas
applies as well to the State and its agencies as to private corporations.”).
VIRGINIA. Va. Const. art. I, § 11
(“[N]or any law whereby private property shall be taken or damaged for public
uses, without just compensation....”);
Heldt v. Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist.,
196 Va. 477, 482, 84 S.E.2d 511, 515
(1954) (“It is well settled that such a
constitutional provision is self-executing
and the landowner may enforce his constitutional right to compensation in a
common-law action.”).
WASHINGTON. Wash. Const. art. I, §
16 (“No private property shall be taken
or damaged for public or private use
without just compensation having been
first made....”);
Kincaid v. City of
Seattle, 74 Wash. 617, 621, 134 P. 504,
506 (1913) (“The city is bound to make
compensation under a compact no less
formal than the constitution itself, and it
cannot defeat this constitutional right by
a charter provision or an ordinance, nor
can the legislature take it away by any
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arbitrary requirement....”).
WEST VIRGINIA. W.Va. Const. art. III,
§ 9 (“Private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use, without just
compensation....”); Johnson v. City of
Parkersburg, 16 W.Va. 402, 422-23
(1880) (“I have nowhere seen it contended that the clause of a Constitution,
which declares, that ‘private property
shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation,’ requires legislation
to put it in force. It has always been regarded as self executing. It is a limitation, not only upon the rights of individuals and corporations, but also upon
the Legislatures of the States.” The
court proceeds to hold that the result is
the same if the constitutional provision
covers damages as well.).
WYOMING. Wyo. Const. art. I, § 33
(“Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public or private use
without just compensation.”); State
Highway Comm'n v. Peters, 416 P.2d
390, 395 (Wyo.1966) (“However, the legislature cannot infringe upon or take
from property owners the right to be
compensated, according to the requirement of art. I, § 33.”).
The law in three states differs from the
positions of these courts.
ARKANSAS. Ark. Const. art. II, § 22
(“[A]nd private property shall not be
taken, appropriated or damaged for public use, without just compensation therefor.”) (law on this issue is unclear).
OKLAHOMA. Okla. Const. art. II, § 24
(“Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just
compensation.”); State ex rel. Department of Transp. v. Hoebel, 594 P.2d

1213, 1214-15 (Okla.1979) (under the
Oklahoma constitution, a claim in inverse condemnation for a taking for a
public use is not subject to sovereign immunity, but a claim for damages is).
PENNSYLVANIA. Pa. Const. art. I, § 10
(“[N]or shall private property be taken or
applied to public use, without authority
of law and without just compensation
being first made or secured.”). The law
on this issue is not clear in Pennsylvania,
but a recent case indicates that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold
it to be self-executing. Hughes v. Commonwealth Dept. of Transp., 514 Pa.
300, 306, 523 A.2d 747, 750 (1987) (
“What is ‘just compensation’ cannot be
determined by the exclusive fiat of the
General Assembly, for like all others
they cannot be the judge in their own
case. The determination of what is ‘just’
between the Commonwealth and a condemnee is the function of the judiciary.”).
*634 The history of these cases shows that for a
time the Court's concentration on the doctrine of
sovereign immunity caused it to neglect this constitutional provision, which was designed to protect
individual rights. This elevation of legislation and
common law principles over a clear constitutional
limitation strikes at the heart of constitutional government. The people of Utah established the Utah
Constitution as a limitation on the power of government. It can hardly be maintained that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, alone among all doctrines,
is outside of the limitations the people*635 established. In Dean v. Rampton, 556 P.2d 205 (Utah
1976), we stated:
The purpose of a constitution is to provide an orderly foundation for government and to keep even
the sovereign ... within its bounds. Therefore, the
legislative power itself must be exercised within the
framework of the constitution. Accordingly, it has
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been so long established and universally recognized, as to be hardly necessary to state, that if a
statutory enactment contravenes any provision of
the constitution, the latter governs.
556 P.2d at 206-07 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)).
In sum, article I, section 22 needs no legislation to
activate it; it is mandatory and obligatory as it is.
SeeUtah Const. art. I, § 24.
The trial court concluded that Southern Pacific acted as the State's contractor on the causeway breach
project and was therefore protected by the State's
immunity. Since we hold that the State is not immune, Southern Pacific can no longer depend on
the State's immunity. We express no opinion as to
Southern Pacific's argument of derivative immunity
based on its status as the State's contractor for the
project.

The essence of this doctrine is that navigable waters
should not be given without restriction to private
parties and should be preserved for the general public for uses such as commerce, navigation, and fishing. Recent cases have examined this doctrine in
deciding whether the state could grant uses of public waters to private parties. See, e.g., Kootenai
Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc.,
105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983).
This case, however, presents a different problem.
The State has already exercised its powers under
the public trust in leasing the canal on the bed of
the lake to Colman. Now, the State wishes to revoke that grant without compensation to Colman.
The State maintains that it can do so since it holds
the waters of the lake under the public trust. In taking such a position, the State essentially argues that
it originally acted without authority in granting the
lease to Colman.

V. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Illinois Central provides some guidance on this
question. The Supreme Court stated:

[9] The trial court held that the breaching of the
causeway was in furtherance of the State's public
trust responsibilities and that the State could not be
liable for the damage allegedly done to Colman's
canal. The State maintains that it can take any action relating to the lake that is in the public interest
and be immune from liability for that action. Colman argues that the public trust doctrine does not
apply to flood control, but only to certain limited
purposes, such as commerce, fishing, navigation,
and perhaps recreational use and preservation of
ecological integrity.

But the decisions are numerous which declared that
such property is held by the State, by virtue of its
sovereignty, in trust for the public. The ownership
of the navigable waters of the harbor and of the
lands under them is a subject of public concern to
the whole people of the State. The trust with which
they are held, therefore, is governmental and cannot
be alienated, except in those instances mentioned of
parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus
held, or when parcels can be disposed of without
detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.

The controlling case on this issue is Illinois Central
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36
L.Ed. 1018 (1892), where the United States Supreme Court discussed the public trust doctrine and
held that the Illinois legislature's earlier grant to the
railroad of lands submerged under Lake Michigan
could be revoked by a later legislature because the
earlier grant was in violation of the public trust the
state held over the waters.

146 U.S. at 455-56, 13 S.Ct. at 119 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court made clear that a state
can grant certain rights in navigable waters if those
rights can be disposed of without affecting the public *636 interest in what remains. 146 U.S. at 453,
13 S.Ct. at 118. At this point in the litigation, there
is nothing to show that Colman's canal impaired the
public interest in any way at the time the State
granted him the right to conduct his operation. This

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

795 P.2d 622
795 P.2d 622
(Cite as: 795 P.2d 622)

Page 18

is a question of fact to be decided by the trial court.
VI. SPECIAL LEGISLATION
Colman argues on appeal that the Great Salt Lake
Causeway Act (the “Act”) was beyond legislative
authority and constituted special legislation in violation of article VI, section 26 of the Utah Constitution. Article VI, section 26 provides, “No private or
special law shall be enacted where a general law
can be applicable.” In this case, the Act provided
indemnity to Southern Pacific for actions arising
out of the breach of the causeway.
[10][11] The fact that legislation benefited one individual does not prove a violation of article VI,
section 26. Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1223
(Utah 1980). The standards for judging challenged
legislation under this provision were stated by this
Court in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Utah
Insurance Guaranty Association, 564 P.2d 751
(Utah 1977):
A general law applies to and operates uniformly
upon all members of any class of persons, places, or
things requiring legislation peculiar to themselves
in the matters covered by the laws in question. On
the other hand, special legislation relates either to
particular persons, places, or things or to persons,
places or things which, though not particularized,
are separated by any method of selection from the
whole class to which the law might, but for such legislation, be applied.
... [A] law is general when it applies equally to all
persons embraced in a class founded upon some
natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction. It is
special legislation if it confers particular privileges
or imposes peculiar disabilities, or burdensome
conditions in the exercise of a common right; upon
a class of persons arbitrarily selected, from the general body of those who stand in precisely the same
relation to the subject of the law. The constitutional
prohibition of special legislation does not preclude
legislative classification, but only requires the clas-

sification to be reasonable.
564 P.2d at 754 (following State v. Kallas, 97 Utah
492, 505, 94 P.2d 414, 420 (1939); People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 494, 506, 140
P.2d 13, 19-20 (1943)).
In the Act, the legislature found that extreme
weather conditions had caused the water level in
the lake to rise sharply, causing severe flood damage. 1984 Utah Laws ch. 32, § 1. It also found that
the causeway had caused the water level in the
south arm of the lake to be significantly higher than
the water level in the north arm. The legislature declared it to be in the public interest to breach the
causeway and authorized the Division of State
Lands and Forestry to do so. The legislature then
stated: “In order to obtain the cooperation of the
Southern Pacific Railroad which is necessary for
the timely accomplishment of the objectives of this
act, the division is authorized to enter into formal
agreement with the railroad for indemnification as
follows....” 1984 Utah Laws ch. 32, § 2.
This legislation makes a reasonable classification to
accomplish its purposes of preventing widespread
flood damage to public lands, major transportation
routes, and other public facilities. Southern Pacific
owns the causeway. This statute does not discriminate against anyone since Southern Pacific is the
owner of the causeway and the operator of the railway that crosses the causeway. The Act is not special legislation in violation of article VI, section 26.
VII. CONCLUSION
The trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, Associate C.J.,
concur.*637 ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring).
I join in all of Justice Stewart's opinion. However,
as to part IIIB, which holds that the allegations of
Colman's complaint are sufficient to state a claim
for a taking or damaging under article I, section 22
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of the Utah Constitution, I would observe that the
precise limits of a taking or damaging have yet to
be carefully or consistently spelled out by this
court. Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d
1321, 1324-25 (Utah Ct.App.1988). There will be
time enough for us to carefully consider this question in future cases.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of
ZIMMERMAN, J.
Utah,1990.
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.
795 P.2d 622
END OF DOCUMENT
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[1] Eminent Domain 148
Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.
The STATE of Washington, Petitioner,
v.
Donald M. EVANS and Ramona L. Evans, his wife; Albert T. Evans and Cynthia AnnEvans, his wife; Neil H.
Evans and Glennette Evans, his wife; Ornia R.
Evansand Lucille Evans, his wife; Robert C. Evans, Jr.
and Virginia Evans, his wife;d/b/aEvans Bros., a partnership, d/b/a D&E Livestock Company, a partnershipa/
k/a Evans Brothers, Respondents.
No. 47218-1.
Oct. 1, 1981.
Editor's Note: Opinion Changed by 649 P.2d 633.
State appealed from decision of the Superior Court,
Benton County, Robert S. Day, J., which awarded, pursuant to jury verdict, $400,000 to landowners for condemnation of 17.58 acres of land. After the Court of
Appeals, 26 Wash.App. 251, 612 P.2d 442, affirmed,
the Supreme Court, Dore, J., held that: (1) trial court
improperly allowed landowners' appraisers to testify as
to value of feed mill adjacent to condemned land in determining value of property taken; (2) State did not
waive its right to assert error in trial court's admission
of testimony concerning value of feed mill on basis that
it failed to object to testimony; and (3) State was entitled to jury instruction charging jury not to consider
anything remote, imaginary, or speculative, even though
mentioned or testified to by witnesses, in arriving at
award, but were only to consider elements which would
actually affect fair market value of property and which
were established by evidence.
Reversed and remanded.
Utter, J., dissented and filed opinion which Brachtenbach, C. J., and Dolliver and Stafford, JJ., joined.
West Headnotes

202(2)

148 Eminent Domain
148III Proceedings to Take Property and Assess
Compensation
148k199 Evidence as to Compensation
148k202 Value of Property
148k202(2) k. Comparison with Other
Property. Most Cited Cases
Trial court improperly allowed landowners' appraisers
to testify as to value of feed mill adjacent to condemned
land in determining value of property taken where, prior
to trial, trial court ordered that valuations were to be set
at market value of property before taking, minus value
of remainder after taking, and not on valuations of personal property.
[2] Eminent Domain 148

2.6

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.6 k. Agriculture. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1), 148k2)
Trial court improperly admitted market value testimony
regarding feed mill in establishing value of condemned
parcel of ranch where landowners did not own land underlying feed mill.
[3] Eminent Domain 148

255

148 Eminent Domain
148III Proceedings to Take Property and Assess
Compensation
148k250 Appeal
148k255 k. Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review. Most Cited Cases
State did not waive its right to assert error in trial
court's admission of testimony concerning value of feed
mill in determining condemnation award on basis that it
failed to object to testimony where testimony showed
that State argued from initial motion in limine that State
had to pay for only what it was taking and, as it was not
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taking the feed mill and as the condemnee had no interest in the land on which the feed mill was located,
testimony as to value of feed mill was inadmissible.
[4] Pretrial Procedure 307A

3

307A Pretrial Procedure
307AI In General
307Ak3 k. Motions in Limine; Preclusion of
Evidence, Argument, or Reference. Most Cited Cases
Purpose of motion in limine is to dispose of legal matters so counsel will not be forced to make comments in
the presence of the jury which might prejudice his
presentation.
[5] Eminent Domain 148

255

148 Eminent Domain
148III Proceedings to Take Property and Assess
Compensation
148k250 Appeal
148k255 k. Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review. Most Cited Cases
Assuming State failed to make proper objection to testimony regarding value of feed mill not on land subject to
condemnation for purpose of determining condemnation
award, State did not waive objection where no proper
question was ever answered at trial by a witness in reference to market value of the feed mill, State made objections to landowner's testimony that he always
thought that lease gave him interest in land on which
feed mill was built and State renewed objection to testimony at least once during trial, objected to numerous
questions of witnesses concerning it and moved to strike
appraiser's testimony when it came in over objection.
[6] Eminent Domain 148

81.1

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
148II(B) Taking or Injuring Property as Ground
for Compensation
148k81 Property and Rights Subject of Compensation
148k81.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k81)
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State had standing to raise issue of whether or not
landowner had enforceable interest in land upon which
feed mill was located in objecting to testimony as to
value of feed mill in determining condemnation award
since question of title was not collateral to the eminent
domain proceeding.
[7] Eminent Domain 148

222(4)

148 Eminent Domain
148III Proceedings to Take Property and Assess
Compensation
148k213 Assessment by Jury
148k222 Instructions
148k222(4) k. Value of Property. Most
Cited Cases
State was entitled to jury instruction charging jury not
to consider anything remote, imaginary, or speculative,
even though mentioned or testified to by witnesses, in
arriving at condemnation award, but were only to consider elements which would actually affect fair market
value of property and which were established by evidence where erroneous rulings by trial court on admissibility of testimony concerning value of condemned land,
individually and collectively, created great confusion
and necessarily required jurors to speculate as to meaning of trial court's instructions on the damages.
[8] Eminent Domain 148

240

148 Eminent Domain
148III Proceedings to Take Property and Assess
Compensation
148k240 k. Assessment by Court or Referee.
Most Cited Cases
Trial court improperly included both value of feed mill
and its enhancing operation and market value of feed
lots in condemnation award where feed mill and feedlots were not taken by eminent domain.
**846 Slade Gorton, *120 Atty. Gen., Joseph B. Loonam, Charles F. Secrest, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for
petitioner.
Halverson, Applegate & McDonald, Bryan G. Evenson,
Alan A. McDonald, Yakima, for respondents.
DORE, Justice.
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The State appeals from a jury award of $400,000 to respondent Evans and others for condemnation of 17.58
acres from the respondents' 746-acre ranch to be used
for the construction of Interstate 82 in the vicinity of
Prosser, Washington. The State's primary assignments
of errors are that the court (1) failed to grant the State's
*121 motion in limine to exclude testimony as to the
value of an adjacent feed mill, (2) erroneously ruled on
the admissibility of certain testimony, and (3) erroneously refused one of the State's proposed instructions
to the jury. We find prejudicial error, and reverse and
remand for a new trial.

Page 3

[1] Prior to trial, the State successfully moved, through
a motion in limine, to limit the damage issue as to the
value of the property before the taking, minus the market value of the property remaining after the acquisition.
The State's chief appraiser, Mellor, testified that the respondents' entire property had a market value of
$492,250. According to Mellor, after the taking the respondents would be left with a farm having a market
value of $307,786. He testified that Evans was entitled
to a just compensation award of $138,750, broken down
as follows:

I

(1)

Market value of the 17.58 acres

$ 39,786

(2)

Improvements on the 17.58 acres

$ 57,980

(3)

Consequential damages

$ 13,968

(4)

Cure (water truck, 4000 gallon

$ 27,000

truck to keep dust down on feedlot)
Total just compensation

$138,734

Total just compensation rounded
out

$138,750
and the feed mill?

However, the court failed to enforce its valuation order
as to respondents. Respondents' appraisers, McMinemee
and Golob, were permitted to testify, over objection, as
to the replacement value of the two feedlots on the remainder property and nothing else. McMinemee testified that the feedlots were presently worth $450,000 to
$500,000 and that, after the taking, the freeway would
be within 80 to 100 feet from the north feedlot causing
such feedlots to have no value. During cross-examination, McMinemee admitted he was unaware that
part of the north feedlot was on land not owned by
Evans. Later, McMinemee gave his opinion of market
value on the improvements only but not on the land underlying the improvements. McMinemee *122 testified:

**847 A. No.
Q. You just value improvements?
A. The improvements is all.
A. Yes, I'm talking about strictly just the corrals and
the scales and the mill.
(Italics ours.)
The State's motion to strike his testimony was denied.
The respondents' second witness on valuations was Golob, who testified:

Q. Did you value the land under that? Under the pens
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Q. Well, in other words, did you value the whole?
You didn't intend to express an opinion of value of
the entire Evans' ownership, did you?
A. I was looking at the feedlot, corrals and the mill
facility.
Q. That's what I thought, and the reason which you
found to depreciate them was the proximity of the
freeway to the north?
A. Right. Yes, this is what I've been following the
conversation from, yes.
The trial judge should have stricken the testimony of
both McMinemee and Golob. Both were in violation of
the court's order that the valuations must be based on
the market value of the property before the taking,
minus the value of the remainder after the taking, and
not on valuations of personal property.
All respondents' appraisal witnesses, McMinemee, Golob and Evans, were permitted to violate the court's order on evaluation, and to testify as to the value of the
two feedlots, suggesting by inference that the jury could
award the landowner the market value of the two feedlots even though they weren't being condemned. This
was prejudicial error.
II
The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Market Value Testimony Regarding the Feed Mill
[2] Respondents owned a feed mill which had been used
to *123 serve their feedlots. However, they did not own
the underlying property. Paragraph 8 of the State's motion in limine requested the court to exclude any evidence as to land not owned by the respondents in defining the single larger parcel for the purpose of determining just compensation. State counsel, in a supporting
memorandum, cited State ex rel. Wirt v. Superior Court,
10 Wash.2d 362, 371, 116 P.2d 752 (1941), for the proposition that condemnees are not entitled to recover
damages from any tract except the one over which a
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private way of necessity was condemned.
The damages for taking a right of way are based on
ownership of land actually taken and are limited to
lands held under the same title.
Other cases support this contention. State v. Corvallis
Sand and Gravel Co., 69 Wash.2d 24, 30, 416 P.2d 675
(1966); Grays Harbor Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54
Wash. 83, 97-98, 102 P. 1041, 104 P. 267 (1909).
[3] The trial judge took this issue under advisement and
subsequently ruled that the value of the feed mill was
admissible and that the State had no standing to raise
the ownership issue. The court of appeals held that this
was prejudicial error because the respondents failed to
establish an enforceable interest in the property upon
which the feed mill was located. However, it held that
the State waived its right to assert an error because it
failed to object to testimony concerning the value of the
feed mill. This holding is not supported by the record.
The testimony shows that the State argued from its initial motion in limine that the State only had to pay for
what it was taking and, as they were not taking the feed
mill, and as the condemnee had no interest in the land
on which the feed mill was located, testimony as to the
value of the feed mill was not admissible.
[4] The reasons for the objection to the introduction of
such evidence were clearly elucidated in the affidavit of
Pitman and were amply argued in the memorandum
brief. The purpose of a motion in limine is to dispose of
legal matters so counsel will not be forced to make
comments in the **848 presence of the jury which
might prejudice his presentation.*124 Once the State
had made its motion in limine, properly legally supported, and the court had taken under advisement an objection to any testimony arising afterwards, the State need
not object further. In the absence of a request from the
court that evidence, which was the subject matter of the
motion in limine, should be objected to as it comes in,
the State had a continuing objection to this testimony
until the judge ruled on its motion. Fenimore v. Donald
M. Drake Constr. Co., 87 Wash.2d 85, 92, 549 P.2d 483
(1976). The trial court erred in not granting the State's
motion in limine in reference to the market value of the
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feed mill.
[5] Moreover, even if the State had failed to make an
objection, there was no waiver. No proper question was
ever answered by a witness in reference to the market
value of the feed mill. Opening statements of counsel
are not evidence. Hypothetical questions posed, on
cross-examination of Mellor, failed to elicit a favorable
response, as reflected in the Verbatim Report of Proceedings at page 364:
Q. All right, so if we are talking about X plus a
$250,000 mill before under your notion of Y plus the
$250,000 mill after the construction, why, X is going
to equal Y in any event, isn't it?
A. I think there would be some difference, but I don't
follow the X and Y's but
It is clear that attorney McDonald mentioned the
$250,000 in reference to a hypothetical question. Mellor
didn't agree that the feed mill was worth $250,000; that
testimony came exclusively from the lips of McDonald
in posing a hypothetical question to which Mellor said,
“but I don't follow the X and Y's but ...”
The second time the value of the feed mill was mentioned was on pages 365 and 366 of the transcript in
Mellor's testimony:
Q. Well, let's take this example a moment further. The
mill added a couple of hundred thousand dollars to
the value of this operation and in the market for the
cattle yard and the after situation was zilch because of
the freeway, then, in addition to what he was losing
*125 because of that result presently he'd be also losing the utility of the mill, wouldn't he, unless he
wanted to junk it for salvage?
A. Under your premise, but not what I would agree
with.
Q. I'm perfectly comfortable. I've asked you to assume
A. Yes.
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Q. the hypothesis that I'm asking you. Just so we're
clear, then, that if you'd make that assumption, then,
indeed, his damages are greater, are they not?
A. If you make that assumption.
(Italics ours.)
Again counsel refers to a valuation of $200,000 for the
feed mill on a hypothetical question, and again Mellor
responds he doesn't agree. Again the value comes in
through the statement of the attorney which is not testimony. By no stretch of the imagination did Mellor ever
testify, agree or infer that the feed mill was worth
$200,000 or $250,000.
The testimony of landowner Evans on this subject came
prior to the court giving the State a continuing objection
as to any testimony concerning the market value of the
mill. Evans stated:
Q. What else goes into setting up a cattle yard? We've
heard testimony about a mill. What would it cost realizing that cost isn't the sole guide but what would it
cost to replace that mill that the jury saw?
A. Approximately $250,000.
It is to be noted the Evans spoke of the “cost of replacement” of the feed mill, not the “market value” of the
feed mill. This is not evidence of market value, and cannot constitute a waiver. Even stronger, in order to lay a
foundation, landowner Evans introduced a lease he had
entered into with Burlington Northern concerning property **849 not involved in this condemnation. Over objection, Evans testified that he always thought that such
lease gave him a lessee interest in the land on which the
feed mill was built. This was clearly prejudicial error.
The State's objection to this exhibit protected the State
from any subsequent testimony as to the feed mill, even
if this court wished to equate the “replacement cost of
the feed mill” with the “market *126 value of such feed
mill”. For until Evans established his ownership, or
lessee interest in the property on which the feed mill
was located, any testimony as to the value of the feed
mill was not admissible.
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In any event, the State renewed its objection at least
once at trial, objected to numerous questions of witnesses concerning it, and moved to strike the appraiser's
testimony when it came in over objection. To say the
State waived its objection to testimony as to the value
of the feed mill, is fiction.

permitted to go to the jury. The record is clear that the
jury's verdict included the value placed upon the feed
mill by respondents' witnesses since the verdict is far in
excess of the value testimony given by any witness
which did not include the feed mill.

[6] Some of the difficulty in resolving the State's motion in limine was caused by the court's ruling that the
State did not have standing to raise the issue whether or
not respondent had an enforceable interest in the property upon which the feed mill was located and said this
was not a title case. In fact, the court not only has the
right but the obligation to try questions of title before
the question of damages is submitted to the jury. Tacoma v. Gillespie, 82 Wash. 487, 144 P. 697 (1914).

III

The preliminary question of whether the condemnee has
any legal rights or claims in the property for which he
seeks damages must be answered before any damages
can be awarded. Tacoma v. Mason County Power Co.,
121 Wash. 281, 209 P. 528 (1922); State ex rel. Horne
v. McDonald, 32 Wash.2d 272, 201 P.2d 723 (1949).
The question of title is not collateral to an eminent domain proceeding. Therefore, the court's ruling that the
State did not have such standing was erroneous. State v.
J. R. Leasing Co., 1 Wash.App. 944, 466 P.2d 185
(1970). In Chelan Electric Co. v. Perry, 148 Wash. 353,
268 P. 1040 (1928), the court held that it was proper to
exclude evidence of value of a dock and other structures
located on property which did not belong to the condemnee which would be rendered useless by reason of
the project involved. In State ex rel. Wirt v. Superior
Court, 10 Wash.2d 362, 116 P.2d 752 (1941), it was
held that damages to property which had been farmed in
conjunction with property owned by the condemnee by
reason of an oral lease cannot be considered in the condemnation*127 proceedings. The State was bound only
by record title and was not liable for damages to lands
held under oral, unenforceable leases. See also State v.
Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., supra;Grays Harbor
Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, supra.
As a result of the court's ruling, value testimony concerning the feed mill (which the State was not condemning) was testified to by attorney McDonald and

Reversible Error Not to Instruct Pursuant to WPI 150.11
[7] The trial court committed reversible error by failing
to instruct the jury pursuant to WPI 150.11 which
provides as follows:
In arriving at the amount of compensation to be
paid the respondents, you should not consider anything which is remote, imaginary, or speculative, even
though mentioned or testified to by witnesses. The
only elements which you should take into consideration are those which will actually affect the fair market value of the property and which are established by
the evidence.
By means of several delayed and erroneous trial rulings,
respondents' witnesses refused to testify to the “before
and after” value of the property, but did testify as to the
“before and after” value of the feedlots. This was in violation of the court's pre-trial order and its instructions
on value. The court **850 refused to permit the State to
prove that the feed mill was located on property owned
by the United States Government. It also allowed testimony, over objection, that respondents were leasing the
property under the north feedlot, which lease was filed
after the State's lis pendens became a matter of record
on the Evans property. All of these rulings, individually
and collectively, created *128 great confusion and necessarily required the jurors to speculate as to the meaning of the court's instructions on the measure of damages. On this record, the evidence cried out for instruction WPI 150.11 as a guideline for the jury to eliminate
speculation on damages. It was reversible error not to
give such instruction.
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IV
[8] Judge Roe, dissenting in the court of appeals, concluded:
After having carefully read the entire record, I
come to an inescapable and abiding conclusion that it
was the original purpose of the defendants and their
very capable lawyer to include both the value of the
feed mill and its enhancing operation in the award
and that actually it was included. This is reversible error.
(Italics ours.)
We agree. To compound that error, landowner Evans
was awarded the market value of the feedlots, although
he still possesses them. Evans testified that he owned
two feedlots of equal size, each located on approximately 20 acres and each containing pens to house and
feed 2,500 cattle. One was located approximately 1/2
mile from the freeway (south feedlot) after the take and
one (the north feedlot) was located approximately 100
feet from the freeway after the take. Evans testified that
their market value was in the neighborhood of $450,000
to $500,000. It is undisputed that a feedlot located 1/2
mile from a freeway is not damaged by it; Evans admits
that the south feedlot is not affected by the taking. The
state appraiser, Mellor, testified that the north feedlot
could be cured by the State's buying a water truck to
water down the cattle; this would cost $27,000. Evans
offered testimony disputing the use of the water truck as
a cure. However, he doesn't dispute an effective “cure”
would be to simply move the north feedlot some 1/4
mile away (1,320 feet) on the same property by simply
removing the pens, which are personal property, to the
new location. As the north feedlot is much *129 smaller
than the feed mill, which testimony stated could be
moved for $10,000, it could presumably be moved for
even a lesser figure.
We conclude that the trial court committed prejudicial
error in refusing to grant the State's motion in limine to
exclude all testimony concerning the value of the feed
mill. We further hold that the State's motion in limine,
which was properly buttressed by affidavits and legal
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memorandums, relieved the State from the need to make
individual objections to any testimony which was admitted prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion. We
set aside the judgment and remand for a new trial, to be
conducted in accordance with the provisions of this
opinion.
ROSELLINI, WILLIAMS and DIMMICK, JJ., and
SWAYZE, J. Pro Tem.
UTTER, Justice (dissenting).
I find, on this record, that there is no reversible error.
By holding otherwise, the majority overturns decades of
precedent.
I
The trial court erred in admitting the feed mill testimony, but its error is not reversible. That testimony,
though inadmissible, is inadmissible for reasons not
given by the State. By finding reversible error, the majority ignores the long-standing rule that evidentiary reversals require a legally-sufficient objection.
The State objected to the feed mill evidence solely because the feed mill is located on leased land.[FN1] That,
however, does not **851 indicate the testimony is inadmissible. Rather, the testimony is inadmissible because
the feed mill was not condemned, does not constitute realty, and because its value is not related to the value of
the land actually taken.
FN1. The motion in limine simply asked for the
exclusion of “ (a)ny evidence or opinion which
includes any lands not owned by the respondents in defining the single larger parcel for the
purpose of determining just compensation in
this action.”That was also the only objection
made at trial.
*130 Our prior cases hold that evidentiary objections
must have enough specificity to apprise both the court
and the adversary of the claimed error. State v. Thacker,
94 Wash.2d 276, 282, 616 P.2d 655 (1980); State v.
Boast, 87 Wash.2d 447, 451, 553 P.2d 1322 (1976). The
grounds for the objection must be presented “ ‘so that
the judge may understand the question raised and the
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adversary may be afforded an opportunity to remedy the
claimed defect.’” Boast, at 451, 553 P.2d 1322, quoting
Presnell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 60 Wash.2d 671, 675,
374 P.2d 939 (1962).
When an objection is so indefinite as not to call the
court's attention to the real reason for the testimony's
inadmissibility, error may not be based upon the overruling of the objection.
(Italics mine.) Boast, 87 Wash.2d at 451, 553 P.2d
1322, quoting Kull v. Department of Labor & Indus., 21
Wash.2d 672, 682-83, 152 P.2d 961 (1944). Accord,
Coleman v. Montgomery, 19 Wash. 610, 53 P. 1102
(1898).
As for a motion in limine, the same requirements apply.
In Fenimore v. Donald M. Drake Constr. Co., 87
Wash.2d 85, 91, 549 P.2d 483 (1976), we stated:
(T)he trial court should grant such a motion if it describes the evidence which is sought to be excluded
with sufficient specificity to enable the trial court to
determine that it is clearly inadmissible under the issues as drawn or which may develop during the trial
... To enable the court to make such a determination
prior to trial and “out of context” the moving party
should provide a memorandum of authorities showing
that the evidence is inadmissible. If the court does not
have the benefit of legal arguments, it can hardly be
said to have abused its discretion if it denies a motion
asking it to rule on the admissibility of evidence before it knows what the issues and circumstances are.
In this case, both the motion in limine and the trial objections technically conformed to the above requirements. The challenged evidence was unambiguously
identified and reasons as well as authority were
provided. The problem, however, is that the reasons and
cited authority *131 do not render the evidence inadmissible.
The feed mill is relevant to the compensation award
only if it enhances the value of the land taken or is a
compensable item itself. Bradley v. State, 73 Wash.2d
914, 442 P.2d 1009 (1968); North Coast R.R. v. Kraft
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Co., 63 Wash. 250, 115 P. 97 (1911); State ex rel. State
Highway Comm'n v. Gray, 81 N.M. 399, 467 P.2d 725
(1970); United States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300 (10th
Cir. 1951). As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals,
the value of the feed mill is not relevant to the former
determination, for what the mill is worth does not tend
to prove the degree to which its presence enhances the
value of the land taken. See State v. Demos, 94
Wash.2d 733, 619 P.2d 968 (1980). Evidence is relevant
only if it tends to prove a fact or theory to be established.Demos, supra; Ladley v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 73 Wash.2d 928, 934, 442 P.2d 983 (1968).
Since the State did not object on these grounds, it cannot now assert that error.Boast, supra; Bolster v. Stocks,
13 Wash. 460, 43 P. 532 (1896).
The State's only objection was that the leasehold made
the mill noncompensable. But unless the leased land or
the mill was actually condemned, the fact that the mill
is on leased land is completely irrelevant. As already
stated, the mill is compensable only if the State deprives
its owner of its use or possession. Short of that, it makes
no difference where the mill is located, except insofar
as its location augments the value of the land actually
taken.
**852 In this case, the mill was not technically condemned. The owner retains its use and possession. And
if it were constructively condemned (in that it will become valueless after the feedlots are taken), it is still
noncompensable because it constitutes personal property.[FN2]Personal property*132 is not compensable,
for condemnation awards cover only land, buildings,
and fixtures. Bradley v. State, supra;North Coast R.R. v.
Kraft Co., supra.
FN2. Under existing Washington law, the feed
mill is personal property. An item is a compensable fixture, rather than personalty, when
(1) actually annexed to the realty, (2) applied to
the use or purpose to which that part of the realty with which it is connected is appropriated,
and (3) the party making the annexation intends
it to be a permanent accession to the freehold.
Oden v. Seattle, 72 Wash.2d 221, 432 P.2d 642
(1967); Filley v. Christopher, 39 Wash. 22, 80
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P. 834 (1905).
The respondents lacked the requisite intent to
make this feed mill a fixture. The feed mill,
alleged to be worth $250,000, is located on a
leasehold which “either party may terminate
... at any time upon giving the other party not
less than thirty (30) days written notice of
such termination ...”(Exhibit 9, item 13). And
upon termination of the lease any “structures
and property (belonging to the lessee and not
removed) shall become the property of
Lessor ...”(Exhibit 9, item 14). Moreover, the
respondents admitted that the mill is personality. The value of the mill, the inexpensiveness of moving it, and the terminable nature
of the lease indicate the respondents neither
intended to make the mill a permanent accession to the land nor considered it anything
other than personal property.
Hence, the leasehold objection was completely beside
the point. “Leasehold” is not a talismanic word. For
some reason, though, the majority fails to realize that.
Consequently, after today, virtually any evidentiary objection will preserve the error.
I therefore believe that the State, inasmuch as it failed
to make an adequate objection, is not entitled to a reversal.[FN3]
FN3. From the record it appears that respondents' attorney deliberately introduced the value
testimony, knowing it was inadmissible and
creating difficulties for himself and his client.
But that behavior and a desire for justice in this
individual case should not cause us to ignore
long-standing precedent.
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The proper measure of compensation is the difference
between the “before and after” fair market values of the
entire tract. Idaho & W. Ry. v. Coey, 73 Wash. 291, 131
P. 810 (1913); State v. Sherrill, 13 Wash.App. 250, 534
P.2d 598,rev. denied, 86 Wash.2d 1002 (1975). Despite
that, we have repeatedly stated that if there is some
competent evidence which permits the application of
the proper rule, it is not reversible to introduce evidence
as to the value of separate tracts. Coey, 73 Wash. at
295, 131 P. 810; In re Mercer Street, Seattle, 55 Wash.
116, 104 P. 133 (1909). The majority, however, totally
fails to acknowledge this.
In this case, the State introduced evidence from several
witnesses as to the “before and after” values for the entire tract, and one of the condemnees testified as to the
before *133 value of the whole property and how the
condemnation would affect it. He testified:
Q ... I have to ask you in the before situation what do
you think that your place is worth?
A Are you talking about the feed lot or the whole?
Q No, the whole thing....
A Well, I believe the whole Evans' Brothers holdings
in this particular mapping arrangement here is probably worth a million to a million, two.
...
Q ... (W)hat do you think your property, again, all of
it, will be worth afterwards, after the highway is
built?
A Well, I think it will be diminished by the worth of
the feed lot, and it is anything connected directly with
the feed lot.
Q All right, and how much in dollars? ...

II
A ... I think that feed lot is worth $450,000 right now.
The majority contends, without citing any authority,
that it was reversible error to permit testimony as to the
“before and after” values of only a portion of the entire
tract.

...
**853 Q And what will it be worth after this freeway
goes through in your opinion, Don?
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A I don't believe we'll have a feed lot.
Q ... Do you feel that it will have any market value?
Do you think any willing buyer informed who is not
compelled to buy would be interested in buying that
feed lot?
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willing but not obliged to buy the property, would
pay, and which a well-informed seller, willing but not
obligated to sell it, would accept, taking into consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and
might in reason be applied.
(Italics mine.) Instruction No. 9.

A No, sir.
Verbatim Report, at 464-65. Also, the jury was properly
instructed as to the rule to apply.[FN4] Since the jury
was properly instructed, and given that all the essential
figures were presented, the error is not reversible. By
concluding otherwise, the majority acts in disregard of
our prior cases.
FN4. Instruction No. 8 provides in pertinent
part:
“ ‘Just compensation’ is the difference
between the fair market value of the entire
property before the acquisition and the fair
market value of the remainder after the acquisition measured as of the date of the trial.”
III
The majority additionally concludes that it was reversible error not to give WPI 150.11. Interestingly, the failure to use that instruction has never until this case constituted *134 error. State v. Williams, 68 Wash.2d 946,
416 P.2d 350 (1966); Renton v. Scott Pac. Terminal,
Inc., 9 Wash.App. 364, 512 P.2d 1137 (1973). Yet, the
majority believes, again without citing any authority,
that the confused record required it. A confused record,
however, has never been the test for erroneous instructions. Instead, the test has been whether the given instructions, when read as a whole, were prejudicial.Id.

I do not believe a “well-informed buyer” would consider speculative or remote damages. Moreover, the instruction implies that only reasonable effects should be
recognized. Consequently, the absence of WPI 150.11,
in light of the other instructions, was not prejudicial.
That has been our result before and this record does not
require otherwise.
For these reasons, I dissent.[FN5]
FN5. As to the other issues raised by the
parties, but not discussed by the majority, I
find no reversible error.
BRACHTENBACH, C. J., and DOLLIVER and
STAFFORD, JJ., concur.
Wash., 1981.
State v. Evans
96 Wash.2d 119, 634 P.2d 845
END OF DOCUMENT

While none of the instructions in this case even mention
speculative damages, the court did instruct the jury to
award compensation only for the difference between the
“before and after” fair market values. See Instruction
No. 8. And it defined “fair market value” as
the amount in cash which a well-informed buyer,
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Court of Appeals of New York.
Soon Duck KIM et al., Appellants, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent, et al., Defendants.
Feb. 18, 1997.
Property owners brought action to recover damages
for alleged taking of their property for public use
without just compensation. The Supreme Court,
Queens County, DiTucci, J., granted cross-motion
of city for summary judgment dismissing second
cause of action. Property owners appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 204 A.D.2d 711,
613 N.Y.S.2d 31, affirmed. Permission to appeal
was granted. The Court of Appeals, Ciparick, J.,
held that provision of city charter imposing obligation on property owners to maintain lateral-support
for public highway was prevailing rule of state's
property law when owners acquired their property,
and thus, city's subsequent enforcement of obligation by depositing side fill along highway did not
constitute unconstitutional taking of any property
interest owned by plaintiffs for which they were entitled to compensation.
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State defines rights and obligations that constitute
“property” in absence of any superseding Federal
law, and thus, threshold step in takings inquiry is to
determine whether, in light of existing rules or understandings of State law, plaintiffs ever possessed
property interest they now claim has been taken by
challenged governmental action; only if claimed
property interest inhered in owner's title does court
proceed to determine whether challenged governmental action works compensable taking of that
property interest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
[2] Eminent Domain 148

81.1

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
148II(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k81 Property and Rights Subject of
Compensation
148k81.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Threshold inquiry into owner's title is generally necessary to proper analysis of takings case, whether
alleged taking is of regulatory or physical nature.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
[3] Eminent Domain 148

81.1

Affirmed.
Smith, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Wesley, J., concurred.
West Headnotes
[1] Eminent Domain 148

81.1

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
148II(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k81 Property and Rights Subject of
Compensation
148k81.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
148II(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k81 Property and Rights Subject of
Compensation
148k81.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
In identifying background rules of state property
law that inhere in owner's title, for purposes of determining whether property owner ever possessed
property interest allegedly taken by government action, court should look to law in force, whatever its
source, when owner acquired property. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.
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[4] Highways 200

84

200 Highways
200V Title to Fee and Rights of Abutting Owners
200k84 k. Lateral Support. Most Cited Cases
Provision of city charter requiring property owner
to fill any “sunken” portions of property pursuant to
order of transportation department includes obligation to fill portion of lot adjacent to public highway
to provide lateral support up to level of legal grade,
even if cause of disparity in grade is city's prior
raising of legal grade rather than some event requiring repair of property to its natural state. New York
City Charter, § 2904(2).
[5] Eminent Domain 148

2.19(2)

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.19 Highways and Streets
148k2.19(2) k. Construction and Maintenance. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(6))
Provision of city charter imposing obligation on
property owners to maintain lateral-support for
public highway was prevailing rule of state's property law when owners acquired their property and,
accordingly, encumbered their title and constituent
bundle of rights such that city's subsequent enforcement of obligation by depositing side fill after owners refused to do so did not constitute unconstitutional taking of any property interest owned by
property owners for which they were entitled to
compensation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; New
York City Charter, § 2904(2).
[6] Eminent Domain 148

2.19(2)

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.19 Highways and Streets
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148k2.19(2) k. Construction and Maintenance. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(6))
Basic purpose of takings law to protect private
landowner from unfair fiscal burdens that should be
shared by public as a whole supported denial of takings claim by owners for city's placement of fill on
property for lateral support of public highway when
it was raised to legal grade; owners presumably
could have inquired into legal grade of property and
obtained reduced purchase price to factor in possibility that city would enforce lateral support obligation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; New York City
Charter, § 2904(2).
***146 *2 **313 Richard S. Graver, White Plains,
for appellants.
*3 Paul A. Crotty, Corporation Counsel of New
York City (Jane L. Gordon and Barry P. Schwartz,
of counsel), for respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT
CIPARICK, Judge.
In 1990, the City of New York regraded a public
road in Queens. To maintain lateral support
between the road and plaintiffs' property, the City
placed side fill on the portion of plaintiffs' property
abutting the roadway. In this lawsuit, plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to compensation for the
portion of their property taken by the City. We disagree.
Plaintiffs acquired their property with constructive
notice that the property abutted a public road that
was below the legal grade. In regrading the road
and raising a portion of *4 plaintiffs' property up to
the legal grade, the City acted pursuant to a longstanding common-law principle and in conformity
with a provision of its Charter that was in force
when plaintiffs acquired title to their property.
Therefore, we conclude that the City did not take
any property interest from plaintiffs for which compensation is due.
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I.
In June 1978, the now-defunct New York City
Board of Estimate raised the legal grade of a section of College Point Boulevard in Queens from 9.1
to 13.5 feet. In October 1978, a map reflecting that
legal grade was properly filed in the office of the
Queens Borough President. Ten years later,
plaintiffs purchased a parcel of property on College
Point Boulevard, on which they currently operate a
car wash and lease space to an auto repair shop.
When plaintiffs purchased the property, the grade
of their parcel was more than four feet below the
legal grade. Plaintiffs had constructive notice of
this feature by virtue of the filed map.
As part of a public construction project on College
Point Boulevard in 1990, the City undertook to
raise the roadway to its legal grade. In March of
that year, the City's Department of Transportation
gave plaintiffs written notice of the plan to raise
College Point Boulevard to the previously established legal grade and advised plaintiffs of their obligation under the City Charter to raise their property to the legal grade (see, N.Y. City Charter §
2904[2] ). The notice informed plaintiffs that the
City would regrade the property at no cost to them
upon receiving their consent within 10 days, but
that if consent was not timely received, the City
was authorized to do the work itself and seek reimbursement for its cost from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
failed to respond to the notice.
The City regraded the relevant portion of College
Point Boulevard in June 1990. On account of the
nearly five-foot disparity between the legal grade of
College Point Boulevard and the lower grade of
plaintiffs' property, the Department of Transportation raised plaintiffs' property to the legal grade by
placing side fill on 2,390 square feet of plaintiffs'
property abutting the public roadway. It is undisputed that the side fill was necessary to support the
street and prevent erosion.
Plaintiffs had previously commenced this action in
March 1990, alleging, among other things, that the
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City's regrading project would work an unconstitutional taking of their property*5 without just comFN1
pensation.
***147 **314 Plaintiffs moved and
the City cross-moved for summary judgment on the
takings claim. Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' motion and granted the City's cross motion, concluding
that because the City was authorized by New York
City Charter § 2904 to compel plaintiffs to raise
their property to the legal grade, no taking had occurred. The Appellate Division affirmed. After the
parties stipulated to discontinue all causes of action
other than the takings claim, we granted leave to
appeal and now affirm.
FN1. Apart from the takings claim,
plaintiffs asserted a cause of action against
the City for interference with their business and sought to enjoin the City from regrading the road. In addition, plaintiffs asserted a cause of action against the prior
owners of the property and the prior owners' attorneys for fraudulent misrepresentations in connection with the sale of the
property. The only cause of action at issue
on this appeal is plaintiffs' takings claim
against the City.
II.
Plaintiffs contend that the City's action in placing
side fill on almost 2,400 square feet of their property constitutes an unconstitutional taking of a portion of their property without just compensation. In
support of this contention, plaintiffs invoke the rule
that any government-authorized “permanent physical occupation” of property is a taking, no matter
how small the area occupied and without regard to
the public interest served by the government's action (with the magnitude of the occupation factoring only into the amount of compensation due) (see,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 426-428, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3170-72,
73 L.Ed.2d 868). If this case involved simply the
City's dumping of side fill on 2,400 square feet of
plaintiffs' property, we might well agree with
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plaintiffs and the dissent, and conclude that there
was a taking (see, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13
Wall [80 U.S.] 166, 181, 20 L.Ed. 557 [taking
found where water overflow from dam permanently
flooded landowner's property];
Matter of
Cheesebrough, 78 N.Y. 232, 238 [taking found
where City constructed permanent drain on
landowner's property]; but cf., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., supra, 458 U.S.
at 440, n. 19, 102 S.Ct. at 3179, n. 19). However,
that is not this case. We conclude instead that, by
virtue of the common-law and City Charter obligation of lateral support to a public roadway,
plaintiffs' title never encompassed the property interest they claim has been taken.
[1] Central to the analysis of the issue on appeal is
the settled proposition that “[p]roperty interests * *
* are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they
are created and their dimensions*6 are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law” (Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701,
2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548). Because the State defines
the rights and obligations that constitute “property”
in the absence of any superseding Federal law, the
threshold step in a takings inquiry is to determine
whether, in light of the “ ‘existing rules or understandings' ” of State law, plaintiffs ever possessed
the property interest they now claim has been taken
by the challenged governmental action (Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1030, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2901, 120 L.Ed.2d 798
[quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S.
at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709] ). As explained by the Supreme Court in Lucas, the purpose of this “logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate” is to determine whether the allegedly taken
property interest was a stick in the “bundle of property rights” acquired by the owner ( 505 U.S. at
1027, 112 S.Ct. at 2899,supra ). Only if the claimed
property interest inhered in the owner's title does
the court proceed to determine whether the challenged governmental action works a compensable
taking of that property interest (see, e.g., Penn
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Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
123-125, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2658-2660, 57 L.Ed.2d
631).
[2] A threshold inquiry into an owner's title is generally necessary to the proper analysis of a takings
case, whether of a regulatory or physical nature
(see, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
supra, 505 U.S. at 1028-1029, 112 S.Ct. at 2900
[“Where ‘permanent physical occupation’ of land is
concerned, we have refused to allow the government to decree it anew (without compensation), no
matter how weighty the asserted ‘public interests'
involved, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. at 426, 102 S.Ct., at 3170-3171though we assuredly would permit the government
to assert a permanent easement that was a preexisting limitation upon the landowner's title”] ).
Thus, regardless of whether this case is characterized as a physical or regulatory***148 **315 takFN2
ing, a question we do not reach,
our analysis
starts with a search into the bundle of rights and
concomitant obligations contained in plaintiffs'
title.
FN2. Insofar as plaintiffs' real grievance is
with the City's regulation requiring the
maintenance of lateral support to the roadway, the issue might be characterized as a
regulatory rather than a physical taking.
Although the City physically placed the
side fill on plaintiffs' property, it did so
only after plaintiffs refused to discharge
their obligation under the City Charter to
do the work (see, N.Y. City Charter §
2904[2]; accord, Hoeck v. City of Portland, 57 F.3d 781, 787 [9th Cir] [city's demolition of structure on plaintiff's property
“was not a physical taking for public use *
* *, it was a restriction on the use of the
property to maintain an abandoned structure”], cert denied 516 U.S. 1112, 116
S.Ct. 910, 133 L.Ed.2d 842). Moreover,
the property owner, not the City, continues
to own the area containing the side fill, and
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the owner can do whatever it likes to that
area as long as lateral support to the roadway is maintained (see, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., supra,
458 U.S. at 440, and n. 19, 102 S.Ct. at
3179, and n. 19).
*7 It has been suggested that this “logically antecedent inquiry” into the owner's title should be limited to a review of those property and nuisance
rules recognized at common law, and that statutory
law should not factor into the analysis (see, e.g., K
& K Constr. v. Department of Natural Resources,
217 Mich.App. 56, 63-64, 551 N.W.2d 413,
417-418; Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court
Solves the Takings Puzzle, in Callies [editor], Takings: Land-Development Conditions and Regulatory Takings After Dolan and Lucas, at 110-112).
Some confusion in this respect stems from the Supreme Court's emphasis on the nuisance doctrine in
Lucas to illustrate the type of background restriction of State law that would inhere in a property
owner's title (see, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, supra, 505 U.S. at 1029, 112 S.Ct.
at 2900 [property owner's title contains the restrictions on use that “could have been achieved in the
courts * * * under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary
power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally”] ). However, we do not think that this aspect
of the Lucas opinion should be read so narrowly.
Given the theoretical basis of the logically antecedent inquiry-namely, “the State's power over * *
* the ‘bundle of rights' that [property owners] acquire when they obtain title” (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, supra, 505 U.S. at 1027, 112
S.Ct. at 2899)-we can discern no sound reason to
isolate the inquiry to some arbitrary earlier time in
the evolution of the common law. It would be an illogical and incomplete inquiry if the courts were to
look exclusively to common-law principles to
identify the preexisting rules of State property law,
while ignoring statutory law in force when the owner acquired title (accord, Hunziker v. State, 519
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N.W.2d 367, 371 [Iowa] [no taking when statutory
restriction on use of land was in effect when
plaintiffs acquired title], cert denied 514 U.S. 1003,
115 S.Ct. 1313, 131 L.Ed.2d 195; Grant v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353-354,
461 S.E.2d 388, 391 [same] ). To accept this proposition would elevate common law over statutory
law, and would represent a departure from the established understanding that statutory law may
trump an inconsistent principle of the common law
(see, e.g., Gombert v. McKay, 201 N.Y. 27, 30, 94
N.E. 186). As the Supreme Court has aptly observed:
“A person has no property, no vested interest, in
any rule of the common law. That is only one of *8
the forms of municipal law, and is no more sacred
than any other. Rights of property which have been
created by the common law cannot be taken away
without due process; but the law itself * * * may be
changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and
circumstances” (Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134,
24 L.Ed. 77).
[3] The corpus juris of this State comprises constitutional law, statutory law and common law. To the
extent that each of these sources establishes binding
rules of property law, each plays a role in defining
the rights and restrictions contained in a property
owner's title. Therefore, in identifying the background rules of State property law that inhere in an
owner's title, a court ***149 **316 should look to
the law in force, whatever its source, when the
owner acquired the property (see, Matter of Gazza
v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 89
N.Y.2d 603, 657 N.Y.S.2d 555, 679 N.E.2d 1035
[decided today] [enforcement of preexisting statutory wetlands restriction not a taking]; Matter of
Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 89 N.Y.2d 535,
656 N.Y.S.2d 184, 678 N.E.2d 870 [decided today]
[enforcement of preexisting steep-slope ordinance
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FN3
not a taking] ).
In this case, we find applicable
rules in the common law and in New York City's
Charter.
FN3. We acknowledge the language in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825,
833, n. 2, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3147, n. 2, 97
L.Ed.2d 677 indicating that the regulatory
restriction in that case did not inhere in the
plaintiffs' title even though plaintiffs had
constructive notice of the restriction when
they acquired the property. However, we
think the Nollan footnote is readily harmonized with the “logically antecedent inquiry” subsequently elucidated in Lucas
(see generally, Mandelker, InvestmentBacked Expectations in Takings Law, in
Takings, op. cit., at 135-138 [concluding
that the Nollan footnote should not be understood as prohibiting inquiry into preexisting statutory or regulatory restrictions] ).
Specifically, the property interest allegedly
taken in Nollan was not subject to any
preexisting restriction; rather, the case
centered on a State agency's policy of conditioning the grant of building permits on
the property owner's surrender of a public
easement over the beachfront property
(see,
Nollan v. California Coastal
Commn., supra ). Because plaintiffs' predecessors in interest had neither applied
for nor been granted the conditioned permit, the government's interest in the easement was, at the time of plaintiffs' acquisition of the property, a mere “unilateral
claim of entitlement,” not an enforceable
property interest (id., at 833, n. 2, 107
S.Ct. at 3147, n. 2 [emphasis added] ).
There was simply no existing title restriction which a purchaser took subject to in
that case. We believe that a different situation would have been presented in Nollan,
and a different result compelled under Lucas's “logically antecedent inquiry,” if the
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property was already subject to a conditioned permit when plaintiffs acquired it.
*9 III.
Plaintiffs' obligation to preserve and maintain the
legal grade has its roots in New York's commonlaw obligation of lateral support. In Village of
Haverstraw v. Eckerson, 192 N.Y. 54, 84 N.E. 578,
the Court discussed this obligation and distinguished between the lateral-support obligations of
adjoining private landowners and the lateral-support obligation of a private landowner abutting a
public roadway, noting that the landowner's duty
with respect to the public roadway “will be somewhat broader” than the duty owed to an adjoining
private landowner; indeed, the obligation was said
to run in only one direction-“the municipality is not
under a similar obligation to the abutting
FN4
owner” (id., at 59, 84 N.E. 578).
Elaborating
on the broad scope of this duty, the Court explained
that “the preservation of lateral support to a highway, as constructed and prepared for the public use,
is an obligation to the community, which rests upon
the adjacent landowner. It is an absolute right of the
public, in the maintenance of which the members of
the community are concerned” (id., at 59, 84 N.E.
578; see also, 1 Rasch, New York Law and Practice of Real Property § 20:23, at 616 [2d ed] [“the
fee owner of land abutting on a highway is under an
obligation to preserve the lateral support to a public
highway”] ).
FN4. Under current law, the City provides
a limited claims procedure for actual physical damage caused by its regrading
projects (see, Administrative Code of City
of NY §§ 3-316-3-320). Specifically, recovery is limited to change-of-grade damages to preexisting buildings or improvements (see,Administrative Code § 3-318[a]
). In March 1991, plaintiffs filed a notice
of claim with the City pursuant to this provision, the outcome of which is not contained in the record. Nevertheless, insofar
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as the issue on appeal relates to the separate question of lateral support, which is addressed elsewhere in the City Charter and
Administrative Code, this claims procedure is inapposite.
The dissent's reliance on authorities discussing the
separate and narrower obligation owed to a neighboring private landowner is misplaced (see, dissenting opn., at 22, at 157 of 659 N.Y.S.2d, at 324 of
681 N.E.2d [citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §
817; 1 Am Jur 2d, Adjoining Landowners, § 40] ).
For example, the rule that the obligation of lateral
support only prohibits “the withdrawal of the support of any land naturally necessary to maintain another's land in its natural condition” (dissenting
opn., at 22, at 157 of 659 N.Y.S.2d, at 324 of 681
N.E.2d) does not apply when a public roadway is
involved. As explained in one treatise: “An exception to the general rule that the absolute right to
***150 **317 support extends only to the land in
its natural state occurs when the supported land is
an adjacent public highway. The duty to provide
lateral support includes the duty to support *10 the
highway in its improved condition. The courts have
held that the public interest in highways justifies
the enlargement in the scope of duty” (9 Powell,
Real Property ¶ 699 [1], at 63-6 [emphasis added] ).
Nevertheless, we need not define the precise contours of the common-law duty in this case, because
the property owner's obligation of lateral support to
a public roadway finds its specific, contemporary
formulation in the New York City Charter, which
provides:
“The owner of any property at his own cost, shall *
* * fill any sunken lot or lots comprising part or all
of such property or cut down any raised lot or lots
comprising part or all of such property whenever
the transportation department shall so order pursuant to standards and policies of the transportation
department * * *. In the event that the owner fails
to comply with the provisions of this section, the
transportation department may provide for the doing of same at the expense of the owner in the man-
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ner to be provided by local law” (N.Y. City Charter
§ 2904[2]; see, L. 1992, ch. 813, § 2).
[4] Under this section, the property owner's obligation to “fill any sunken lot” is juxtaposed with the
related obligation to “cut down any raised lot”
(N.Y. City Charter § 2904[2] ). Together, these provisions embody the rule that the landowner must
maintain lateral support to the roadway. According
to the dissent, however, property can only be considered “sunken” when “something has happened to
the lot in question which might * * * require repair,” and, therefore, a property owner's City
Charter obligation to raise the property is not
triggered “when it is the City that has caused the
disparity.” (Dissenting opn., at 21, 23, at 156, 158
of 659 N.Y.S.2d, at 323, 325 of 681 N.E.2d.) We
do not construe the statute so narrowly and conclude that section 2904 applies to this case because
the City raised the roadway up to the legal grade
that was established before plaintiffs acquired their
property.
While acknowledging that one accepted meaning of
the term “ ‘sunken’ ” is “ ‘situated or lying on a
lower level,’ ” the dissent contends that section
2904 contemplates only the “primary meanings” of
the term, which are “ ‘having sunk or been sunk beneath the surface’ ” and “ ‘having sunk to a lower
level’ ” (dissenting opn., at 20-21, at 156 of 659
N.Y.S.2d, at 323 of 681 N.E.2d [quoting Random
House Webster's*11 College Dictionary 1339
FN5
(1991) ] ).
However, in view of its juxtaposition with the term “raised,” we believe the term
“sunken” has the more general meaning of “situated
or lying on a lower level” (see also, Webster's New
World Dictionary 1427 [2d ed] [“sunken” defined
as “below the level of the surrounding or adjoining
area”] ). This definition, considered in light of the
broad common-law obligation of lateral support to
a public roadway, supports the conclusion that a
“sunken” lot, for purposes of section 2904, is one
that is below legal grade. Moreover, this construction best serves the statutory purpose of supporting
the roadway and protecting it from erosion, as well
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as abating the substantial safety hazard posed by
drop-offs between the roadway and abutting properties.
FN5. We note that another dictionary first
defines
“sunken”
as
“submerged,
esp[ecially]: lying at the bottom of a body
of water” (see, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1180 [10th ed] ). Of course,
the term “sunken” as used in section 2904
does not mean underwater, but has the
meaning that best comports with its statutory context and purpose.
The applicability of section 2904's lateral-support
obligation to the facts of this case-where a property
owner acquires property on notice of a legal grade
different from the existing grade-is illustrated by
this Court's analysis in Laba v. Carey, 29 N.Y.2d
302, 311-312, 327 N.Y.S.2d 613, 277 N.E.2d 641.
In Laba, the Court addressed the marketability of
title of a property on which the existing grade of the
public sidewalk was lower than the legal grade. Rejecting the purchaser's argument that this defect
rendered title unmarketable, the Court explained in
a particularly instructive passage:
***151 **318 “Although there is no present violation, respondents contend that they may be required
in the future to raise the level of the sidewalk. This
is nothing more than a normal incident to the ownership of real property within the City of New
York.Section 230 of the New York City Charter
[the predecessor provision to section 2904] places
the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of
sidewalks on the individual owner. This must be
done in accordance with such specifications as may
be prescribed by the Transportation Administration.
Thus, if title is unmarketable here, then so is all
property similarly situated within the city. This is
manifestly not so” ( 29 N.Y.2d, at 312, 327
N.Y.S.2d 613, 277 N.E.2d 641,supra [emphasis added] ).
[5] *12 In this case, the City Charter obligation of
lateral support to the legal grade of a public road-
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way-“a normal incident to the ownership of real
property within the City of New York” (Laba v.
Carey, supra, 29 N.Y.2d, at 312, 327 N.Y.S.2d 613,
277 N.E.2d 641)-was in force when plaintiffs
bought their property. In addition, plaintiffs acquired their property with constructive notice that
the existing grade was below the legal grade, which
had been duly established by the filing of a revised
city map in accordance with statutory procedure
(see,Administrative Code § 25-101 [“The city map
is to be deemed final and conclusive with respect to
the location, width and grades of the streets shown
thereon, so far as such location, width and grades
have been duly adopted”] ).
Thus, plaintiffs acquired a “sunken lot” insofar as it
was below the legal grade of the road and, accordingly, took the property subject to the section 2904
obligation to raise it to the legal grade (see, Trubia
v. Koch, NYLJ, Aug. 15, 1979, at 13, col. 1 [Sup.
Ct., Queens County], affd. 87 A.D.2d 742, 449
FN6
N.Y.S.2d 819).
Moreover, plaintiffs were on
notice that if they failed to discharge their obligation, the City could perform the work at their expense and on the public's behalf. Plaintiffs' deliberate noncompliance with this obligation cannot be
converted into their present takings claim (see,
Hoeck v. City of Portland, 57 F.3d 781,
787-788,supra [no taking when City entered
plaintiff's property to demolish abandoned structure: “if Hoeck had obeyed the City's order to repair
the structure * * *, it would not have been necessary for the City to enter his property to enforce its
FN7
regulations”] ).
FN6. The dissent's contention that “an
easement on plaintiffs' property was not
created when the City filed the map raising
the legal grade of the street” (dissenting
opn., at 25, at 159 of 659 N.Y.S.2d, at 326
of 681 N.E.2d) is beside the point since the
filing of the revised map “final[ly] and
conclusive[ly]” established a higher legal
grade (Administrative Code § 25-101).
Whether denominated an easement, a ser-
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vitude or simply a restriction on title,
plaintiffs took their property subject to the
City Charter obligation requiring lateral
support to the previously established legal
grade. The dissent's related assertion that
“[u]ntil the City actually raised the grade
of the street * * * it would have been impossible to determine the extent” of any
taking (dissenting opn., at 25, at 159 of
659 N.Y.S.2d, at 326 of 681 N.E.2d) is
similarly misdirected given that plaintiffs'
property interests “are defined by those
State laws enacted and in effect at the time
[plaintiffs] took title and they are not dependent on the timing of State action pursuant to such laws.” ( Matter of Gazza v.
New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, supra, 89 N.Y.2d, at 616, 657
N.Y.S.2d 555, 679 N.E.2d 1035.)
FN7. If plaintiffs had purchased the property at the legal grade, and the City thereafter raised the legal grade of the roadway,
a different takings question might be
presented.
The thrust of the dissenting opinion is that the City
did not meet its burden to demonstrate that City
Charter § 2904 applies*13 to this case (see, dissenting opn., at 21, 25, at 156, 159 of 659 N.Y.S.2d, at
323, 326 of 681 N.E.2d). Even assuming that
plaintiffs demonstrated a prima facie takings claim
by showing that the City added side fill to their
property, the City clearly discharged its burden to
rebut plaintiffs' case by establishing that, pursuant
to section 2904, plaintiffs never owned the property
interest they claim was taken (see, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, supra, 505 U.S. at
1031-1032, 112 S.Ct. at 2901-2902). The City relied on section 2904 at each phase of this action and
brought to each court's attention the 1979 case of
Trubia v. Koch, in which Supreme Court held and
the Appellate Division affirmed that section 2904
applies when a landowner acquires property that is
below the legal grade (see, Trubia v. Koch,
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***152 **319 at 13, col. 2 [“Under the statutory
authority, instead of placing the fill on petitioners'
property at its own expense, the City could have
compelled the petitioners, at their own expense, to
fill the property to legal grade”] ).
We are mindful of the concern expressed by the
dissent that government might attempt to proffer
novel interpretations of State law to justify what
would otherwise amount to an unconstitutional taking. To guard against this possibility, the Supreme
Court explained that only those rules derived from
an “objectively reasonable application” of preexisting State law can be said to inhere in a property
owner's title (see, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, supra, 505 U.S. at 1032, n. 18, 112 S.Ct.
FN8
at 2902, n. 18).
Thus, while the dissent might
plausibly disagree with the Court's interpretation of
section 2904, its concession that the statute “is
amenable to two differing yet reasonable interpretations” (dissenting opn., at 21, at 156 of 659
N.Y.S.2d, at 323 of 681 N.E.2d) forecloses its contention that the application of the statute in this case
works a taking of plaintiffs' property.
FN8. Although the Supreme Court made
this observation in discussing a court's application of common-law nuisance doctrine
(while disavowing reliance on the Legislature's stated general justification for
newly enacted “confiscatory” laws), this
proposition should extend to judicial interpretation of any preexisting State law for
the same reasons explained above that the
threshold inquiry into title should not be
limited to nuisance law.
[6] Finally, when plaintiffs purchased the property,
an inquiry would have revealed the disparity
between the existing grade and the previously established legal grade. Plaintiffs' potential lateralsupport obligation, then, presumably would have
been factored into the purchase price of the propFN9
erty.
Consequently, if plaintiffs were to succeed on their takings claim, they could *14 receive
the windfall of initially receiving a reduction in the
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purchase price on account of this obligation and
subsequently receiving compensation when the obligation is enforced. Such a result is inconsistent
with the basic purpose of takings law, which is to
protect the private landowner from unfair fiscal
burdens that should be shared by the public as a
whole (see, Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554), not to
enrich the landowner at the public's expense.
FN9. Plaintiffs paid $800,000 for the property, and it is unclear whether this purchase price actually included an adjustment for the lateral-support obligation. In
their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the
prior owners of the property deliberately
failed to tell them of the City's plan to raise
the street to its legal grade. Whatever the
merits, this sort of claim is properly asserted against other parties to the transaction,
not against the City of New York in the
guise of a takings claim.
In sum, we conclude that the lateral-support obligation imposed on plaintiffs was a prevailing rule of
the State's property law when they acquired their
property and, accordingly, encumbered plaintiffs'
title and the constituent bundle of rights. The City's
enforcement of this legal obligation therefore does
not constitute a taking of any property interest
owned by plaintiffs for which they are entitled to
compensation. When plaintiffs acquired title to
their property in 1988, they acquired ownership of
the entire parcel, including the portion abutting the
public roadway, subject to the obligation to maintain lateral support to the roadway's legal grade.
Today, plaintiffs still own the entire parcel, including the portion abutting the roadway, subject to the
obligation to maintain lateral support to the roadway's legal grade. The only difference between then
and now is not that a property interest has been
taken, but that the preexisting lateral-support obligation has been enforced by the City itself because
plaintiffs refused to do so.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from and order
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of the Appellate Division brought up for review
should be affirmed, with costs.
SMITH, Judge (dissenting).
When the City put side fill on plaintiffs' property to
shore up a roadway, it took their property for public
use and plaintiffs are entitled to be compensated for
the taking. Contrary to the instant interpretation of
the majority, neither the New York City Charter nor
the common law is a preexisting limitation on
plaintiffs' title that would authorize a ***153 **320
taking of plaintiffs' property without compensation.
I, therefore, dissent.
Under the reasoning of the majority, plaintiffs must
suffer *15 “the City's dumping of side fill on 2,400
square feet of plaintiffs' property” (majority opn., at
5, at 147 of 659 N.Y.S.2d, at 314 of 681 N.E.2d)
solely to create additional lateral support that will
“protect” and “maintain” an artificially created
roadway dedicated to the public. The majority finds
the physical invasion complained of to be permissible under section 2904 of the New York City
Charter and as an extension of a landowner's obligation to provide such support for public roadways.
In 1978, the Board of Estimate raised the legal
grade of College Point Boulevard from 9.1 to 13.5
feet. A portion of that public roadway abutted a lot
at 31-25 College Point Boulevard which plaintiffs
purchased in 1988. Because a map reflecting the
legal grade had previously been duly filed in the office of the Queens Borough President, plaintiffs arguably were on constructive notice that their property was approximately 4.5 feet short of the legal
grade of the adjacent roadway.
In 1990, work finally began to regrade the roadway.
Construction on the street included installing a new
sewer system and water main. In March 1990,
plaintiffs filed the instant action against the City alleging that due to the “reconstruction of street”
abutting their property, “the highest and best use of
the property has been diminished resulting in a taking” by the City. Later that same month, following
completion of the sewer system and water main in-
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stallation, the City's Department of Transportation
(DOT) requested plaintiffs' “consent” to “permit the
placing and sloping” of side fill on plaintiffs' propFN1
erty to “protect” and “maintain” the street.
FN1. Specifically, the notice read as follows:
“This Department intends to improve to
its legal grade the street abutting your
property. This will result in the raising
of the street elevation approximately 5.0
feet, subject to modification. To protect
the street against the resulting lower
grade of your property and to maintain
the street at legal grade requires that side
fill be placed on your property.
“Your consent to permit the placing and
sloping of such side fill by the Department of Highways or its agents is requested. Please sign and send one copy
of the accompanying ‘CONSENT’ form
to this office in the enclosed stamped
self-addressed envelope within ten (10)
days from the date stamped on the return
receipt. Retain the second copy for your
records.
“There will be no charge to you for the
placing and sloping of side fill on your
property if the return of the signed form
is timely. You, however, will be responsible for the removal and relocation
of landscaping, fences, walks, stairs and
other structures, whether or not they are
attached to a building, which may be disturbed due to fill operations. The within
consent in no way constitutes a waiver
of or release from your obligation to
construct and/or maintain the sidewalk
abutting your property pursuant to Section 2903 & 2904 of the New York City
Charter.
“In the event we do not receive the con-
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sent within the said ten (10) days, you
may be required to fill your lot abutting
the street to legal grade at your own cost.
Upon your failure to do so, this Department may fill your lot to legal grade, the
cost of which shall be due and payable
and shall constitute a lien against your
property.”
Although DOT offered to perform the construction
at no charge if consent were timely returned, DOT
warned that it *16 would proceed even without consent, “the cost of which shall be due and payable
and shall constitute a lien against your property.”
The notice stated that plaintiffs would “be responsible for the removal and relocation of landscaping,
fences, walks, stairs and other structures, whether
or not they are attached to a building, which may be
disturbed due to fill operations.” The notice further
provided that any consent to the placement of side
fill on plaintiffs' property “in no way constitutes a
waiver of or release from your obligation to construct and/or maintain the sidewalk abutting your
property pursuant to Section[s] 2903 & 2904 of the
New York City Charter.” Plaintiffs never responded to the notice.
The regrading of the roadway began in June 1990.
Rather than leave an almost five-foot disparity
between the lower grade of plaintiffs' property and
the neighboring roadway, the DOT proceeded to
dump side fill on that portion of plaintiffs' property
that abutted the roadway (about 2,390 square feet)
until the two were level. The DOT also built permanent driveway ramps from College Point
Boulevard to plaintiffs' property which provided
greater roadway access. The driveway ramps were
built at no cost to plaintiffs. ***154 **321 Following the regrading project, plaintiffs filed a notice
with the New York City Comptroller for a “claim
for damages by reason of a change of grade” pursuant to title 3, §§ 3-316 through 3-320 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York.
The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and an
order directing an immediate trial on damages on
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the takings claim against the City. The City crossmoved for summary judgment in its favor. Supreme
Court denied plaintiffs' motion but granted the
City's cross motion and dismissed the plaintiffs'
claim. In so holding, the court stated that plaintiffs'
claim must fail because “the City could have compelled plaintiffs to fill the property to legal grade at
their own expense pursuant to New York City
Charter § 2904.”

facilities upon his property or premises' ” (458 U.S.
at 423, 102 S.Ct. at 3169). The Court found in favor of the plaintiff. However, the Court distinguished the “permanent physical occupation” by the
cable equipment in that case from permissible regulations affecting a property owner such as the requirement to comply with building codes and
provide utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers and the like.

The Appellate Division affirmed and held that the
side fill did not constitute a “permanent physical
occupation” and plaintiffs' property rights “were
not effectively destroyed by *17 the City's actions.” (204 A.D.2d 711, 613 N.Y.S.2d 31.) The
Appellate Division held that no taking had occurred
because “the fill was necessary to support the street
and prevent erosion, and there is no evidence that
the placement of the fill had an impact on the
plaintiffs' business or their use of the
property” (id.).

Respondents argue that the “lateral support” obligation here falls within the latter category of permissible regulations. However, the regulations described
by the Loretto Court are all directed toward the
public safety and health of those persons invited to
the landowner's property by the landowner. They
do not benefit the public-at-large. In the present
case, the plaintiffs' personal property and obligations are dedicated to the public benefit without regard to plaintiffs' property interests. Indeed, the
Loretto Court recognized this distinction when it
stated that the statute at issue there “might present a
*18 different question” if it required landlords to
provide cable installation if a tenant so desired (458
FN2
U.S. at 440, n. 19, 102 S.Ct. at 3179, n. 19).

In affirming the order of the Appellate Division, a
majority of this Court adopts the reasoning of Supreme Court and holds that “the City did not take
any property interest from plaintiffs for which compensation is due” because the “City acted pursuant
to a long-standing common-law principle and in
conformity with a provision of its Charter that was
in force when plaintiffs acquired title to their property.” (Majority opn., at 4, at 146 of 659 N.Y.S.2d,
at 313 of 681 N.E.2d.)
Contrary to the view of the majority, the placing of
side fill on the plaintiffs' property constituted a taking of private property for public use which requires compensation. Moreover, neither the common law nor section 2904 of the New York City
Charter supports the argument of the majority.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868, the
plaintiff filed a takings claim against the placement
of cable television equipment on her roof pursuant
to a statute which provided that “a landlord may not
‘interfere with the installation of cable television

FN2. Moreover, the flexibility envisioned
by the “different question” is not available
to the plaintiffs here since dirt filling 2,400
square feet of a delineated area offers little
room for plaintiffs' input or modifications.
Although the plaintiffs may use the dirt deposited on their property, they are necessarily denied dominion over their property
beneath the side fill. That area is occupied,
and permanently so. Furthermore, a permanent physical taking may occur regardless of the size of the area occupied or the
de minimis impact the taking has on the
owner's use of the rest of his land (Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
supra, at 430, 102 S.Ct. at 3173).
Importantly, the Loretto Court reiterated the rule
that “a permanent physical occupation authorized
by government is a taking without regard to the
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public interests that it may serve” (458 U.S. at 426,
102 S.Ct. at 3171). The long-standing application
of this ***155 **322 rule is undeniable. In 1879,
this Court stated that “there never can be any necessity under the police power or the law of necessity
to permanently appropriate land to the public use
without compensation” ( Matter of Cheesebrough,
78 N.Y. 232, 237). More recently, the Supreme
Court stated that “[i]n general (at least with regard
to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the
intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public
purpose
behind
it,
we
have
required
compensation” (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886,
2893, 120 L.Ed.2d 798).
In Matter of Cheesebrough (78 N.Y. 232,supra ), a
property owner charged that newly enacted legislation to provide for proper drainage of lands within
New York City was unconstitutional because the
law made no provision for compensating the owners for the land taken for the “acquisition of an
easement” in lands for the construction and maintenance of drains. This Court agreed and stated:
“It was a work not so much necessary for the lands
of the petitioner as for other lands requiring drainage through his. It is believed that no case can be
found justifying the permanent appropriation of
land without compensation under such circumstances. * * * The statute * * * did not and no statute could confer authority to construct this drain
through the land of the petitioner without his consent and without compensation to him for the land
taken” (id., at 238).
Such is the rule even where the legislation “did not
deprive the owner of the fee and gave the public but
an easement” (People ex rel. Williams v. Haines, 49
N.Y. 587, 590; see also, People v. Nearing, 27
N.Y. 306).
*19 Although government may not decree land
anew such that a permanent physical occupation
may be sustained without compensation, the Supreme Court has noted that government may assert
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a “permanent easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon the landowner's title” (Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1028-1029,
112 S.Ct. at 2900; see also, Matter of Gazza v.
New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 89
N.Y.2d 603, 657 N.Y.S.2d 555, 679 N.E.2d 1035
[decided herewith] ). Clearly, a “pre-existing limitation” may not be based upon subsequently enacted
legislation or novel interpretations of State law
(see, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. at 1029, 112 S.Ct. at 2900 [“Any limitation so
severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance already
place upon land ownership”] ).
Obviously, the placement of enough side fill across
2,400 square feet of plaintiffs' land to raise it almost five feet higher is a physical invasion.
Moreover, there can be no argument that the invasion is temporary in any way. Thus, the placing of
side fill on the plaintiffs' property constituted a taking. Accordingly, under the guidance of Lucas, the
circumstances presented here may only be validated
without compensation if respondent can show that a
“pre-existing limitation” upon plaintiffs' title may
be found in State law (505 US, at 1031, 112 S.Ct. at
2901-02).
In Lucas, the Supreme Court advised that a showing of “background principles” of property law that
may create such a preexisting limitation upon title
must stem from more than “the conclusory assertion” of “a common-law maxim such as sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas ” ( 505 US, at 1031, 112
S.Ct. at 2901; see, Black's Law Dictionary 1380
[6th ed] [“one should use his own property in such
a manner as not to injure that of another”] ). Contrary to the instruction of the Supreme Court, the
majority holds that a newly expanded obligation
under that same common-law principle provides a
basis for validating the permanent physical occupation at issue here.
Neither New York City Charter § 2904 nor the
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common law supports the argument of the majority.
Section 2904 devolves from section 230 which became part of the City Charter in 1962. The two sections, 2904 and 230, do not differ in any material
respect. What is significant is that the legal grade of
the street was changed in 1978, well after the enactment of section 230. In other words, when section
230 became law, there was no indication that it
would be applied to require ***156 **323 a private
property owner to shore up this or any other public
roadway.

FN3. Section 2904 was amended in 1992
to add a reference to section 19-152 of the
Administrative Code which provides that
an order to “fill any sunken lot” following
an inspection of the real property by a
“departmental inspector” must be based on
“risk or hazard assessment criteria” (see,
L. 1992, ch. 813, §§ 2-3). The impact of
this amendment, which did not take effect
until after the occurrence of the events giving rise to this action, is not before us.

*20 Section 2904 of the City Charter defines certain landowner obligations under the auspices of the
transportation department such as maintaining sidewalks. Whether the statute is truly the
“contemporary formulation” of the common-law
lateral support obligation as noted by the majority
is certainly open to debate (see, e.g., City of
Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N.Y. 405, 412, 25 N.E.
937 [no obligation to repair streets or sidewalks
rests upon lot owners at common law]; Village of
Fulton v. Tucker, 3 Hun 529, 531-532 [“The owner
of adjoining territory has no greater duty in regard
to keeping sidewalks in repair, than he has in regard
to other parts of the highway”] ). Moreover, the
statute does not address the circumstances here.
The provision reads, in relevant part:

The plain language of section 2904 refers to
FN4
“sunken” lots.
The majority's position necessarily hinges upon an interpretation of this term.
While “sunken” may mean “situated or lying on a
lower level,” its primary meanings are listed as
“having *21 sunk or been sunk beneath the surface”
or “having sunk to a lower level” (Random House
Webster's College Dictionary 1339 [1991] ). The
Second Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary
provides several definitions of the word, only two
of which are relevant. One definition is “that has
sunk below the usual or general level, subsided”
(see, 17 Oxford English Dictionary 197 [2d ed] ).
Another meaning is given as “In modern technical
use, applied to a surface area lowered, or to an object let in, so as to lie below the general surface, or
to work of which depression of level is a general
feature.” Clearly, plaintiffs' land may not be characterized as “sunken” under the latter definition.
Thus, the primary definition of the word “sunken”
implies that something has happened to the lot in
question which might therefore require repair (see,
Italian Sav. Bank v. Le Grange, 169 App. Div.
120, 123, 125, 154 N.Y.S. 814 [referring to “low
and swampy” ground which new purchasers filled
as “sunken lots”] ). Such a reading comports with
FN5
the traditional lateral support obligation.

“Duties and obligations of property owner with respect to sidewalk flags, fencing of vacant lots and
filling of sunken lots or cutting down of raised lots.
The owner of any property at his own cost, shall * *
*
“(2) fence any vacant lot or lots comprising part or
all of such property and fill any sunken lot or lots
comprising part or all of such property or cut down
any raised lot or lots comprising part or all of such
property whenever the transportation department
shall so order pursuant to standards and policies of
the transportation department. In the event that the
owner fails to comply with the provisions of this
section, the transportation department may provide
for the doing of same at the expense of the owner in
FN3
the manner to be provided by local law.”

FN4. Although not dispositive, it should be
noted that only the obligation to repair
sidewalks under section 2904 is referred to
in the notice sent to plaintiffs in March
1990 by the DOT. The DOT notice con-
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tains no cited authority, statutory or otherwise, for which plaintiffs would have an
obligation to raise their property to the
level of the roadway.
FN5. While the majority refers to the reference to “raised lot[s]” within section 2904
as somehow indicative of the proper meaning of “sunken,” it should be noted that the
reference to “raised lot[s]” was not added
to the provision until 1977 (Local Laws,
1977, No. 27 of City of New York). Oversight of “sunken lots” has been included in
the New York City Charter for decades
(see, 1901 Greater N.Y. Charter § 388;
N.Y. City Charter former § 230 [added by
L. 1962, ch. 998, § 25]; People ex rel.
Collins v. Ahearn, 193 N.Y. 441, 444, 86
N.E. 474). Of course, “raised lot[s]” could
also refer to the elevation of the lot itself
rather than the lowering of the surrounding
property.
The reference to “sunken lots” is amenable to two
differing yet reasonable interpretations. Notably,
the majority fails to offer a ***157 **324 shred of
legislative history to support its interpretation of
this ambiguous phrase. Instead, the majority offers
a meaning that is inconsistent with the same common-law principle which the majority contends is
the root of the provision itself. Under Lucas, the respondent must offer some specific support, from
any source whatsoever, that the City Charter has
ever been applied in this manner. No such evidence
comes from respondent, the party with the burden
of proof to demonstrate that background understandings of State law serve to create a preexisting
limitation on plaintiffs' title.
The protections guaranteed under the Constitution
do not support the majority's decision to read a statute that is, at best, ambiguous in such a way as to
do away with the traditional right to property. This
interpretation to validate an otherwise impermissible taking is clearly “beyond what the *22 relevant
background principles would dictate” (Lucas v.
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South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1030,
FN6
112 S.Ct. at 2901).
FN6. Neither may the majority's conclusion be supported by Laba v. Carey, 29
N.Y.2d 302, 327 N.Y.S.2d 613, 277
N.E.2d 641. In that case, this Court noted
that the City Charter places the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of sidewalks on the individual owner, thereby ensuring that sidewalks are at the legal grade
which is “nothing more than a normal incident to the ownership of real property
within the City of New York” (29 N.Y.2d,
at 312, 327 N.Y.S.2d 613, 277 N.E.2d
641). The holding of that case is wholly
dissimilar to the circumstances here. The
issue in Laba was whether the legal grade
applicable to the sidewalks would inhere in
title when a variance had previously been
granted by the City. Similar to zoning ordinances and variances thereto, the Court
simply ruled that the legal grade and variance were properly considered limitations
within title (see also, Matter of Gazza v.
New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, supra ). Here, there is no “legal”
grade of plaintiffs' property. Moreover, the
oft-cited duty to maintain and repair defective sidewalks is clearly dissimilar from
the heretofore unknown obligation to add
side fill over 2,400 square feet of one's
property to protect a new, adjacent roadway construction.
The doctrine of lateral support restricts the withdrawal of the support of any land naturally necessary to maintain another's land in its natural condition (Restatement [Second] of Torts § 817; 1 Am
Jur 2d, Adjoining Landowners, § 40). As stated in
Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159,“it is better that one
man should surrender a particular use of his land,
than that another should be deprived of the beneficial use of his property altogether, which might be
the consequence if the privilege of the former
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should be wholly unrestricted” (2 N.Y., at 161).
This common-law principle is limited to the support
of land in its natural state when asserted by owners
of adjacent property. Nevertheless, in the case of a
public roadway, the common-law obligation is extended to include the sustenance of lateral support
for even the artificially created street. As stated in
Finegan v. Eckerson, 26 Misc. 574, 57 N.Y.S.
605,“although, as claimed by the defendants, the
right to lateral support between adjoining owners
does not include the right to the support of an artificial structure, that doctrine has no application to the
case of a highway” (id. at 575, 57 N.Y.S. 605).
While a certain amount of excavation might be permissible when land is in its natural state, the added
pressure of an artificial structure will further limit
what an adjoining landowner might do (see, Milburn v. Fowler, 27 Hun 568, 569-570, 3 Warren's
Weed, New York Real Property, Lateral and Subjacent Support, § 2.04[1] [4th ed] ).
The majority cites Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson, 192 N.Y. 54, 84 N.E. 578 as authority for its
position that the common law does not permit compensation here. The case is not applicable. While
*23 the majority relies upon Village of Haverstraw
to create plaintiffs' obligation to raise their own
land to the legal grade of the street, the express
holding of that case is that a landowner could not
do certain acts upon his own property that would
injure a public street. As the Court concluded:
“My conclusion is that, whether the acts of persons
menace the condition of a highway in a direct manner, or indirectly, by so digging, or excavating,
upon the adjacent lands as to affect the lateral support and to cause, or to threaten, the subsidence of
the highway, the exercise of the equitable power of
the court may, properly, be invoked by the municipality in restraint of their continuance” (192 N.Y.,
at 60, 84 N.E. 578).
***158 **325 Thus the Haverstraw Court says
nothing about the placing of side fill on property
without the owner's consent or about any compens-
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ation due an owner as a result. The holding in
Haverstraw simply applies the general obligation of
lateral support to a roadway, an artificial structure
which would not fall under an ordinary application
of the doctrine (see, Adlin v. Excelsior Brick Co.,
129 App. Div. 713, 715, 113 N.Y.S. 1017 [“It is not
disputed that the rule of lateral support binds the
owner of land along a highway, and that if he
wrongfully excavate so close as to cause the highway to cave in he is liable for any damage caused
thereby”]; Milburn v. Fowler, 27 Hun 568,
570,supra [one may not dig on his own land “so as
to cause a subsidence or destruction of the highway
itself”]; City of Troy v. Murray, 128 Misc. 419,
421, 219 N.Y.S. 681 [defendant “has no right to
further threaten the destruction of the streets in
question, as the removal of sand and gravel has
now reached the point that further excavation will
result in the caving in of the streets at some
points”] ).
However, the majority reads the “contemporary formulation” of the lateral support obligation much
more broadly than any of our authorities have ever
seen fit to do. Under the facts of this case, the City
merely regraded a roadway, thereby rendering the
area higher than plaintiffs' property. The “existing
understanding” of the obligation of lateral support
clearly does not apply here when it is the City that
has caused the disparity. Moreover, there is no indication that the common-law doctrine of lateral
support negates plaintiffs' fundamental property interest in resisting a permanent physical occupation
FN7
*24 by the City.
Indeed, where a change in the
grade of a public street led to damage to property,
this Court has approved compensation to plaintiff
only for a physical encroachment for a foundation
wall (McCabe v. City of New York, 213 N.Y. 468,
107 N.E. 1049). General damage to the property
due to the regrading was not compensable.
FN7. There is no evidence that the purchase price paid by plaintiffs was based
upon an awareness of the obligations and
rights announced by the majority. Indeed,
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plaintiffs sued the sellers for fraud because
they allegedly were unaware of such duties.
Clearly, this common-law principle does not support the proposition advanced by the majority. As
the Supreme Court held in Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co., 13 Wall. [80 U.S.] 166, 20 L.Ed. 557:
“for a consequential injury to the property of the individual arising from the prosecution of improvements of roads, streets, rivers, and other highways,
for the public good, there is no redress * * * But we
are of opinion * * * that it remains true that where
real estate is actually, invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, * * *
it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution” (13 Wall. [80 U.S.], at 180-181, 20 L.Ed.
557).
The ultimate question a court must answer upon a
“taking” claim is whether government action inevitably forces property owners “alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole” (Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563,
1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554). The majority seems to argue that there has been no taking here because
plaintiffs never had unrestricted title to the portion
of the premises on which side fill was placed. The
argument appears to be that the New York City
Charter and the common law both prevented
plaintiffs from having unrestricted title to this portion of the premises as part of the bundle of rights
they acquired (see, Matter of Gazza v. New York
State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, supra ).
The argument fails. Simply, adjoining property
owners do not have an obligation under the common law to encumber their property for the lateral
support of a raised road. Although the referenced
provision of the City Charter sets forth certain obligations of a landowner which were not required
under the common law, such obligations do not
reach the circumstances here. Other than general
language regarding the “broader” obligation to sup-
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port an adjacent roadway by property owners, *25
the interpretation of the City Charter advanced by
the respondent and adopted by the majority finds no
support as part of the “existing rules or understandings” of property law before this litigation.
***159 **326 While the majority characterizes the
arguments presented herein as a “narrow” reading
of the law, the interpretation is consistent with the
authorities and evidence submitted by the respondent. It is the majority that expands the existing obligations under State property law beyond the limits
that such law has heretofore been interpreted. The
fact that the respondent has the burden to prove the
result reached by the majority is especially troubling when one considers the substantial difference
between the preservation of existing support and
the obligation to create the level of additional support necessary under the circumstances. Indeed, under the subject City Charter provision, plaintiffs are
required to suffer a permanent physical invasion of
their property and pay for any direct property damage as well as the costs for respondent's construction-construction that would, ordinarily, constitute
a compensable taking.
Allowing the City to justify the permanent physical
occupation of part of plaintiffs' property on the
basis of a spontaneous construction of the common
law and a City Charter provision would be allowing
the City, “ ‘by ipse dixit, [to] transform private
property into public property without compensation’ ” (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
supra, 505 U.S. at 1031, 112 S.Ct. at 2901, quoting
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 164, 101 S.Ct. 446, 452-453, 66 L.Ed.2d
358). The result reached by the majority is precisely the situation the Supreme Court refused to
sanction in Lucas.
Finally, an easement on plaintiffs' property was not
created when the City filed the map raising the legal grade of the street (see, Nollan v. California
Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 833, n. 2, 107 S.Ct.
3141, 3147, n. 2, 97 L.Ed.2d 677). However, that
filing may have thereafter limited the ability of
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plaintiffs to construct improvements on their property at any grade other than the legal grade (see,
People ex rel. Architects' Offs. v. Ormond, 201
App. Div. 787, 792, 194 N.Y.S. 881,affd. 234 N.Y.
549, 138 N.E. 442; Matter of Mellilo v. Kracke,
261 App. Div. 631, 634, 26 N.Y.S.2d 743). Until
the City actually raised the grade of the street,
however, it would have been impossible to determine the extent of any necessary taking of the property of plaintiffs or any other adjoining landowners.
In sum, plaintiffs have suffered a permanent physical occupation which constitutes a taking. The
judgment appealed *26 from and the order of the
Appellate Division brought up for review should be
reversed and the case remanded for a determination
FN8
of just compensation.
FN8. The issue of just compensation cannot be resolved on the current record.
However, it should be noted that plaintiffs
have the burden to demonstrate the value
lost due to the taking and a conclusory assertion that the property is “worthless to
them” is clearly insufficient.
KAYE, C.J., and BELLACOSA and LEVINE, JJ.,
concur with CIPARICK, J.
SMITH, J., dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which WESLEY, J. concurs.
TITONE, J., taking no part.
Judgment appealed from and order of the Appellate
Division brought up for review affirmed, with
costs.
N.Y.,1997.
Kim v. City of New York
90 N.Y.2d 1, 681 N.E.2d 312, 659 N.Y.S.2d 145,
65 USLW 2541, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 01498
END OF DOCUMENT
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(Formerly 33k23.25 Arbitration)
McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah
Utah App.,1999.

Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Gerald McCOY, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Frieda McCoy, deceased, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF UTAH, a
Utah corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 981246-CA.
June 17, 1999.
Insured sued his health insurer after it refused to
cover his wife's breast cancer treatment. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Pat B. Brian,
J., denied the insurer's motion to compel arbitration, and the insurer appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkins, P.J., held that: (1) the denial of the
motion was a legal conclusion reviewable for correctness; (2) evidence that the insurer used a mass
mailing to communicate the addition of an arbitration provision to the policy did not establish that
the insured received the notice to which he was entitled under the policy; (3) this evidence also did
not establish an inference of mailing with respect to
the insured; and (4) the insured did not waive his
right to challenge the arbitration provision.
Affirmed.

213(5)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk204 Remedies and Proceedings for
Enforcement in General
25Tk213 Review
25Tk213(5) k. Scope and Standards
of Review. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.25 Arbitration)
Trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration was a legal conclusion where it was based on
affidavits and other documentary evidence and no
evidentiary hearing was conducted; thus, the Court
of Appeals would review it for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court's decision.
[2] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

200

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk197 Matters to Be Determined by
Court
25Tk200 k. Arbitrability of Dispute.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.14 Arbitration)

West Headnotes
Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T
[1] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

205

211

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk204 Remedies and Proceedings for
Enforcement in General
25Tk211 k. Trial or Hearing. Most
Cited Cases

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk204 Remedies and Proceedings for
Enforcement in General
25Tk205 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 33k23.13 Arbitration)
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Court deciding a motion to compel arbitration must
first determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and if so, whether the agreement encompasses
the claims asserted. U.C.A.1953, 78-31a-4(1).
[3] Insurance 217

1831

217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction
217k1830 Favoring Insureds or Beneficiaries; Disfavoring Insurers
217k1831 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Insurance policies should be strictly construed
against the insurer and in favor of the insured.
[4] Insurance 217

1710

217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(A) In General
217k1710 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Insurance 217

1871

1871

217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(J) Modification of Policies
217k1871 k. Notice. Most Cited Cases
Insurance 217

217k1880 k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Evidence that a health insurer mailed over 30,000
letters notifying its insureds that an arbitration provision was being added to the policy did not establish that a particular insured received the notice to
which he was entitled under the policy's noticeof-amendment provision, absent evidence that notice was sent to any specific insureds, including this
particular insured, or that notice was sent by firstclass mail as the notice provision required.
[6] Insurance 217

1880

217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(J) Modification of Policies

1880

217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(J) Modification of Policies
217k1880 k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Evidence that a health insurer mailed over 30,000
letters notifying its insureds that an arbitration provision was being added to the policy did not establish an inference of mailing with respect to a particular insured, absent direct evidence that a notice
was prepared specifically for the particular insured.
[7] Evidence 157

217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(J) Modification of Policies
217k1871 k. Notice. Most Cited Cases
Insurer is required to strictly comply with all provisions that give an insured notice of the terms, conditions, limitations, or changes to an insurance
policy.
[5] Insurance 217
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71

157 Evidence
157II Presumptions
157k71 k. Mailing, and Delivery of Mail
Matter. Most Cited Cases
For an inference of mailing to arise, a party must
present evidence of an office mailing custom and
that the particular mailing in question occurred pursuant to the established custom.
[8] Evidence 157

71

157 Evidence
157II Presumptions
157k71 k. Mailing, and Delivery of Mail
Matter. Most Cited Cases
In establishing an office custom to support an inference of mailing, a party must demonstrate the document in question was: (1) prepared for mailing, that
is, the document was written, signed, placed in an
envelope, addressed, and deposited in the regular
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place of mailing; and (2) that the party followed the
office mailing custom.
[9] Evidence 157

71

157 Evidence
157II Presumptions
157k71 k. Mailing, and Delivery of Mail
Matter. Most Cited Cases
Direct evidence is required to prove that a document was prepared for mailing, which is one of the
elements for establishing an office custom to support an inference of mailing.
[10] Insurance 217

1800

217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(E) Estoppel and Waiver
217k1799 Estoppel of Insureds
217k1800 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Insured, by remaining silent for two years after receiving a letter from his health insurer stating that
he had the “right” to seek arbitration of a coverage
dispute, did not waive his right to assert that the insurer had not provided adequate notice when it added the arbitration provision to the policy, where
the letter did nothing to dispel the implication that
arbitration was only one option available for dispute resolution, particularly since the insurer had
not proved that the insured ever received notice of
the arbitration provision or had an opportunity to
review its terms.
*695 Andrew H. Stone and James E. Magleby,
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant.
Paul M. Simmons, David R. Olsen, and Jeffrey D.
Eisenberg, Dewsnup King & Olsen, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.
Before WILKINS, P.J., GREENWOOD, Associate
P.J., and BENCH, J.
OPINION
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WILKINS, Presiding Judge:
¶ 1 Defendant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah
(Blue Cross) appeals the trial court's order denying
its motion to compel arbitration. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 In October 1985, Gerald McCoy purchased a
health insurance policy known as the Qualifier I
plan (the plan) from Blue Cross. Under the terms of
the plan, Blue Cross reserved “the absolute right to
modify or amend this [a]greement from time to
time provided, however, that no such modification
or amendment shall be effective until thirty (30)
days after written notice thereof has been given to
the [s]ubscriber.” The plan further provided that
“[a]ny notice ... shall be deemed to have been given
to and received by the [s]ubscriber when deposited
in the United States Mail with first class postage
prepaid and addressed to the [s]ubscriber at the address shown in the records of the [p]lan.”
¶ 3 At the time Mr. McCoy purchased the plan, it
did not contain an arbitration provision. However,
Blue Cross later added an arbitration clause, which
was to take effect on January 1, 1986. In March
1994, Mr. McCoy's wife was diagnosed with breast
cancer. When chemotherapy proved ineffective,
Mr. McCoy requested that Blue Cross preauthorize
payment for an alternative breast cancer treatment.
Blue Cross denied Mr. McCoy's request. Mr. McCoy appealed the decision to Blue Cross's Appeals
Committee, which ultimately upheld the denial of
preauthorization. In October 1994, Mr. McCoy appealed the Committee's decision to Blue Cross's
general counsel, Frank Pignanelli. In January 1995,
Mr. McCoy received a letter from Mr. Pignanelli
“conclu[ding] that the decision of the Benefit Appeals Committee is correct.” The letter also stated
that “[i]f you remain dissatisfied with this decision,
you have the right to seek binding arbitration of the
dispute pursuant to the Rules of the American Arbitration Association. The Customer Service Department can assist you with information about how
to initiate and participate in arbitration.” Mr. Mc-
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Coy asserts that this letter was the “first [time he]
received notice that his policy purportedly provided
for arbitration.”
¶ 4 In February 1997, Mr. McCoy brought suit
against Blue Cross alleging various *696 claims
arising out of Blue Cross's refusal to provide coverage for treatment of his wife's breast cancer. Blue
Cross responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. A hearing was held
in August 1997 to determine whether “the arbitration provision enacted by [Blue Cross] after [Mr.
McCoy and Blue Cross] contracted compels [Mr.
McCoy] to arbitrate.”
¶ 5 The main issue before the trial court was whether Blue Cross complied with the plan's notice requirement by sending a written notice of the arbitration provision to Mr. McCoy. Blue Cross offered
several affidavits stating that between 1985 and
1990 it mailed three separate notices of the arbitration provision to all persons enrolled in the plan.
However, Mr. McCoy denied receiving these mailings and argued that the evidence presented by Blue
Cross failed to establish that Blue Cross actually
sent Mr. McCoy written notice of the arbitration
provision. Thus, Mr. McCoy asserted the arbitration
provision was invalid because he could not agree to
a provision of which he was unaware.
¶ 6 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
ordered a continuance and requested supplemental
briefing on the issue of whether Mr. McCoy
“waive[d] any objection to arbitration he may have
had after being notified in January of 1995 that arbitration was going to be required [by] continu[ing]
to pay insurance premiums and [remain] covered by
Blue Cross for at least two years thereafter.” The
trial court also stated that Blue Cross was “entitled
to” submit additional affidavits as evidence that it
sent written notice of the arbitration provision to
Mr. McCoy.
¶ 7 When the hearing resumed in February 1998,
the trial court had before it additional affidavits
submitted by Blue Cross and heard arguments from
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both parties regarding whether Blue Cross adequately complied with the plan's notice requirement. On February 26, 1998, the trial court entered
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order
denying Blue Cross's motion to compel arbitration.
The trial court ruled that Blue Cross had failed to
establish that it sent Mr. McCoy notice of the arbitration provision and “[c]onsequently, Blue Cross
[could not] apply the arbitration amendment to
him.” The trial court did not explicitly rule on Blue
Cross's argument that Mr. McCoy waived any objection to the arbitration clause by failing to cancel
his policy after being notified of the arbitration provision. Blue Cross appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8 Blue Cross assails the trial court's conclusion
that Blue Cross failed to establish a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. First, Blue
Cross contends that it presented sufficient evidence
to establish the arbitration provisions were mailed
to Mr. McCoy, thus creating a binding arbitration
agreement between the parties. Second, Blue Cross
argues that Mr. McCoy's failure to object to the arbitration provision for approximately two years
after he became aware of the arbitration provision
constitutes an acceptance of its terms.
[1] ¶ 9 In reviewing the trial court's decision, we
must first identify the appropriate standard of review. The parties disagree on this court's scope of
review. Blue Cross contends that we should review
the trial court's determination that Blue Cross failed
to establish the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement de novo. Mr. McCoy insists that the
more deferential standard of abuse of discretion is
appropriate.
¶ 10 We conclude that Cade v. Zions First National
Bank, 956 P.2d 1073 (Utah Ct.App.1998), controls
this case. In Cade, the trial court determined that
the parties had agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration. See id. at 1076. The trial court based this
determination on documentary evidence without
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conducting an evidentiary hearing on the disputed
facts. See id. We stated that “[b]ecause this conclusion was a legal one, we review it for correctness.”
Id.; see also Reed v. Davis County Sch. Dist., 892
P.2d 1063, 1064 (Utah Ct.App.1995)(stating that
determination of whether valid arbitration agreement exists is a question of law). In this case, the
trial court also based its denial of Blue Cross's motion on affidavits and other documentary evidence
without conducting *697 an evidentiary hearing.
This decision was a legal conclusion and therefore,
we review it for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court's decision.
ANALYSIS
[2] ¶ 11 Parties are required to arbitrate only those
disputes they have agreed to submit to arbitration.
SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(1) (1996). Thus, a
court deciding a motion to compel arbitration must
first determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and if so, whether the agreement encompasses
the claims asserted. See id. In this case, Mr. McCoy
does not dispute the applicability of the arbitration
provision to his claims. Accordingly, we need only
determine whether Blue Cross established a binding
agreement to arbitrate.
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insurer is required to strictly comply with all provisions that give an insured notice of the terms, conditions, limitations or changes to an insurance
policy. See Majernicek v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.,
240 Conn. 86, 688 A.2d 1330, 1334 (1997) (stating
when written notice is required, “an insurer must
comply strictly with policy provisions”).
¶ 14 In this case, Blue Cross reserved the absolute
right to modify or amend the policy by providing
“written notice ... to the [s]ubscriber.” However,
any modification or amendment to the plan did not
become “effective until thirty (30) days after ... [the
notice] has been given to the subscriber.” The plan
further provided that “[a]ny notice ... shall be
deemed to have been given to and received by the
[s]ubscriber when deposited in the United States
Mail with first class postage prepaid and addressed
to the [s]ubscriber at the address shown in the records of the [p]lan.” Because the arbitration agreement was an amendment to Mr. McCoy's insurance
policy, it is only binding on Mr. McCoy if he was
afforded proper notice of the amendment. Therefore, we first address whether Mr. McCoy received
adequate notice in compliance with the terms of the
plan's notice provision.
A. Proof of Mailing

¶ 12 Blue Cross argues that the trial court's ruling
was erroneous because Blue Cross established the
existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate. More
specifically, Blue Cross contends the affidavits it
submitted demonstrate that it complied with the
plan's notice requirement by mailing a letter which
included the arbitration provision to Mr. McCoy.
We disagree.
1. Notice
[3][4] ¶ 13 A fundamental tenet of the law of contracts between an insured and insurer is that
“insurance policies should be strictly construed
against the insurer and in favor of the insured.”
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854
P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993). Under this principle, an

[5] ¶ 15 Under the plan's notice provision, Blue
Cross was required to provide written notice to specific subscribers of changes to their policy. More
specifically, Blue Cross was required to mail the
notice with first class postage to a subscriber at his
or her address of record. At trial, Blue Cross submitted several affidavits in an attempt to demonstrate that it prepared and mailed a letter, including
the arbitration provision, to Mr. McCoy. These affidavits show that in November 1985, Blue Cross's
programming department prepared a magnetic tape
containing the names and addresses of over 30,000
subscribers who were to receive a copy of the arbitration provision. The magnetic tape was then forwarded to a printing company which printed a cover letter to be mailed with the arbitration provision,
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inserting the subscribers' names and addresses on
Blue Cross letterhead. The letters, including the arbitration provision, were then forwarded to a mailing service which inserted the materials into envelopes and delivered the mailings to the post office.
¶ 16 Although this evidence demonstrates that Blue
Cross mailed over 30,000 letters to plan subscribers
and establishes its general mailing procedure, the
affidavits fail to specify whether Mr. McCoy's
name and address were actually on the magnetic
tape or whether written notice of the arbitration
provision was actually prepared and sent to Mr.
McCoy. Instead, the affidavits merely state that because Mr. McCoy was a plan subscriber*698 the
“magnetic tape ...would have included” his name.
However, Blue Cross failed to show that notice of
the arbitration agreement was sent to any specific
subscribers, including Mr. McCoy. In addition,
Blue Cross failed to present any evidence that notice of the arbitration agreement was sent by first
class mail as required by the plan's notice provision. We therefore conclude that the evidence
presented by Blue Cross was insufficient to establish compliance with the plan's notice provision.
¶ 17 Blue Cross relies on this court's decision in
Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 851
P.2d 647 (Utah Ct.App.1993), to support its argument that “the [a]ffidavits submitted by Blue Cross
defeat [Mr.] McCoy's denial of receipt of the
[a]rbitration [a]greement.” However, Baumgart is
readily distinguishable from the case at bar. In
Baumgart, the insurer canceled the insured's policy
for failure to pay premiums and sent the insured a
notice of cancellation. See id. at 650. The policy at
issue provided that a cancellation notice “ ‘must be
delivered or mailed by first class mail.’ ” Id. The
insured challenged the cancellation, presenting an
“affidavit in which he claim[ed] he never actually
received the cancellation notice.” Id. at 652. We
concluded that the insured's denial of receipt did
not create an issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. See id. This determination was
based in part on the fact that the insurer “produced
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a copy of [the postal service form] which it used to
record addresses to which it sent certified mail ....
indicat[ing] that the United States Postal Service received from [the insurer] a notice of cancellation
form mailed” to the insured at his correct business
address. Id. at 650. Thus, in Baumgart there was
specific evidence that the insurer fully complied
with its cancellation notice requirement by actually
delivering and mailing the cancellation notice to the
insured. See id. at 652.
¶ 18 In this case, Blue Cross did not introduce any
document from its business records showing that
the arbitration provision was actually mailed to Mr.
McCoy. Rather, Blue Cross relies on affidavits stating that because Mr. McCoy was a plan subscriber,
the “magnetic tape ...would have included” his
name. This evidence is inadequate to establish that
Blue Cross complied with the plan's notice requirement. Although Blue Cross argues our holding will
place an unreasonable burden on it to prove that individual subscribers were notified of policy amendments, we fail to see the difficulty or added expense
in requiring Blue Cross to retain the magnetic tape
containing the name of each individual subscriber
to whom notice was mailed, or some other actual
record demonstrating those names and addresses.
B. Inference of Mailing
[6] ¶ 19 Blue Cross next argues that the trial court
erred in denying its motion to compel arbitration
because it established an inference that notice of the
arbitration agreement was mailed to Mr. McCoy.
Again, we disagree.
[7][8][9] ¶ 20 Utah common law provides that in
order for an inference of mailing to arise, a party
must present evidence of an office mailing custom
and “that the particular mailing in question occurred pursuant to the established custom.” Litster
v. Utah Valley Community College, 881 P.2d 933,
940 (Utah Ct.App.1994). In establishing an office
custom, a party must demonstrate the document in
question was: (1) prepared for mailing, that is, the
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document was written, signed, placed in an envelope, addressed, and deposited in the regular place
of mailing; and (2) that the party followed the office mailing custom. See id. at 941. Although courts
have allowed habit or custom evidence to show that
an office mailing custom was followed, direct evidence is required to prove that a document was prepared for mailing. See id. at 940. Thus, in order for
Blue Cross to establish a mailing custom, it was required to present direct evidence that the arbitration
provision was prepared to be mailed specifically to
Mr. McCoy. See Diamond T. Utah, Inc. v. Canal
Ins. Co., 12 Utah 2d 37, 41, 361 P.2d 665, 667
(1961) (stating insurer bears burden to prove insured was provided adequate notice). Although
Blue Cross presented evidence from which one
could infer that a notice of the arbitration provision
was prepared for Mr. McCoy, Blue Cross failed
*699 to present any direct evidence that the notice
was prepared specifically for Mr. McCoy. Thus,
Blue Cross not only failed to present sufficient
evidence to show that it complied with its own notice provision, but also failed to establish an inference of mailing by failing to present direct evidence
that notice of the arbitration agreement was prepared to be mailed to Mr. McCoy.
2. Waiver
[10] ¶ 21 In January 1995, Mr. McCoy received a
letter from Mr. Pignanelli stating that “you have the
right to seek binding arbitration of the dispute pursuant to the Rules of the American Arbitration Association. The Customer Service Department can
assist you with information about how to initiate
and participate in arbitration.” Blue Cross argues
that because Mr. McCoy retained the plan without
objection for two years after receiving Mr. Pignanelli's letter, he accepted the terms of the arbitration
agreement-waiving his right to challenge the arbitration provision. Again, we disagree.
¶ 22 Blue Cross relies on Imperial Savings Ass'n v.
Lewis, 730 F.Supp. 1068 (D.Utah 1990), to support
its argument that Mr. McCoy waived his right to
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challenge the arbitration provision. In that case,
Stewart Title Company agreed to provide Imperial
with a title insurance policy. See id. at 1070. Initially, Stewart sent Imperial a commitment for the
policy, which did not contain an arbitration provision. See id. at 1071. Although there was conflicting evidence regarding whether Imperial received
the original policy issued by Stewart, Imperial ultimately acknowledged receiving a copy of the arbitration provision in August 1988. See id. Apparently, Imperial reviewed the policy because
“shortly after receipt of the [p]olicy, and because of
having received it, Imperial contacted Stewart regarding coverage under the [p]olicy” and requested
that Stewart indemnify it. Id. at 1073. Stewart
denied Imperial's claim and, relying on the policy's
arbitration provision, brought a motion to compel
arbitration. See id. at 1070-71. Imperial objected to
the arbitration provision in July 1989, arguing that
“the parties did not agree to arbitrate.” Id. at 1071.
The court granted Stewart's motion to compel arbitration concluding that “Imperial's receipt of a copy
of the [p]olicy early in August 1988 and its retention for over eleven months without objection” was
a sufficient period of time to constitute an acceptance of the arbitration provision. Id. at 1073.
¶ 23 In this case, Mr. Pignanelli's letter stated only
that Mr. McCoy had “the right to seek binding arbitration of the dispute.” Unlike the insured in Imperial who received and reviewed the specific
terms of the arbitration agreement, the letter sent to
Mr. McCoy merely informed him of his “right” to
arbitration-leading Mr. McCoy to believe that arbitration was only one option available for dispute resolution. Mr. McCoy stated,
I understood from Mr. Pignanelli's letter that I
could request arbitration of Blue Cross's decision
but was not required to resolve my dispute with
Blue Cross through binding arbitration. I understood from Mr. Pignanelli's letter that I had the
choice of resolving the dispute through arbitration or through the normal litigation process.
Furthermore, the evidence is insufficient to show
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that Mr. McCoy received the arbitration agreement
or that he had an opportunity to review its terms.
Thus, we conclude Mr. McCoy did not waive his
right to challenge the arbitration provision because
Mr. Pignanelli's letter did not provide Mr. McCoy
with adequate notice of the specific terms of the arbitration policy.
CONCLUSION
¶ 24 Blue Cross presented insufficient evidence to
show that it adequately complied with its notice
provisions or to establish an inference of mailing.
We therefore reject Blue Cross's argument that Mr.
McCoy received adequate notice of the arbitration
provision. Furthermore, Mr. Pignanelli's letter did
not give Mr. McCoy sufficient notice to implicate a
valid waiver of his right to challenge the arbitration
provision. We therefore*700 conclude Blue Cross
failed to establish the existence of a binding arbitration agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's order denying Blue Cross's motion to compel arbitration.
¶ 25 Affirmed.
¶ 26 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Associate Presiding Judge, and RUSSELL W.
BENCH, Judge.
Utah App.,1999.
McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah
980 P.2d 694, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 1999 UT
App 199
END OF DOCUMENT
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Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase
Cal.,1992.
Supreme Court of California,In Bank.
Philip I. MONCHARSH, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
HEILY & BLASE et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. S020997.
July 30, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1992.
Attorney petitioned to vacate and modify arbitration award entered under his employment agreement with law firm in dispute arising over fees generated by attorney's clients after attorney left firm.
The Superior Court, Santa Barbara County, No.
179759,Thomas R. Adams, J., confirmed arbitrator's award, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeal affirmed, and review was granted. The Supreme Court, Lucas, C.J., held that arbitrator's
award was not subject to judicial review.
Affirmed.
Kennard, J., filed opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part in which Mosk, J., joined.
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25TII Arbitration
25TII(G) Award
25Tk327 Mistake or Error
25Tk330 k. Mistake of Fact and Miscalculation. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k63.2 Arbitration)
Arbitrator's decision is not generally reviewable for
errors of fact or law, whether or not such error appears on face of award and causes substantial injustice to the parties. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 1280
et seq.
[2] T

230

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(E) Arbitrators
25Tk228 Nature and Extent of Authority
25Tk230 k. Agreement or Submission
as Determinative. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k29.1 Arbitration)
In cases involving private arbitration, scope of arbitration is matter of agreement between the parties
and powers of arbitrator are limited and circumscribed by agreement or stipulation of submission.
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 1280 et seq.
[3] T

382

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(G) Award
25Tk327 Mistake or Error
25Tk329 k. Error of Judgment or Mistake of Law. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k63.1 Arbitration)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(H) Review, Conclusiveness, and Enforcement of Award
25Tk381 Conclusiveness of Adjudication
25Tk382 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 33k82(1) Arbitration)
Generally, parties to private arbitration impliedly
agree that arbitrator's decision will be both binding
and final. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 1280 et seq.

T

[4] T

West Headnotes
[1] T

329

330

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution

324

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
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25TII(G) Award
25Tk324 k. Consistency and Reasonableness; Lack of Evidence. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k61 Arbitration)
Courts will not review validity of arbitrator's reasoning. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 1280 et seq.

when arbitrators exceed their powers, absent claim
that arbitrator resolved issues parties did not agree
to arbitrate. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. §§ 1286.2(d),
1286.6(b, c).

[5] T

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(G) Award
25Tk342 k. Objections and Exceptions to
Award, and Waiver Thereof. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k68 Arbitration)
Attorney's claim that fee-splitting provision of his
employment agreement with law firm was illegal
and in violation of public policy was not waived by
attorney's failure to object to arbitration on that
ground, where attorney raised illegality issue before
arbitrator. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. §§ 1281, 1281.2.

324

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(G) Award
25Tk324 k. Consistency and Reasonableness; Lack of Evidence. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k73.7(2) Arbitration)
Court may not review sufficiency of evidence supporting arbitrator's award. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. §
1280 et seq.
[6] T

[8] T

328
[9] T

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(G) Award
25Tk327 Mistake or Error
25Tk328 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 33k63.3, 33k63 Arbitration)
By voluntarily submitting to arbitration, parties
have agreed to bear risk that arbitrator will make a
mistake in return for quick, inexpensive, and conclusive resolution to their dispute. West's
Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 1280 et seq.
[7] T

342

328

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(G) Award
25Tk327 Mistake or Error
25Tk328 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 33k63.3, 33k63 Arbitration)
Claim that arbitrator reached erroneous decision did
not subject arbitration award to judicial review under statute permitting vacation of arbitration award

135

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(B) Agreements to Arbitrate
25Tk135 k. Modification or Termination.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k7.2 Arbitration)
If contract includes arbitration agreement, and
grounds exist to revoke entire contract, such
grounds would also vitiate arbitration agreement;
thus, if otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement
is contained in illegal contract, party may avoid arbitration altogether. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. §§
1281, 1281.2.
[10] T

140

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(B) Agreements to Arbitrate
25Tk140 k. Severability. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 33k7.2 Arbitration)
When alleged illegality goes only to portion of contract that does not include arbitration agreement,
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entire controversy, including issue of illegality, remains arbitrable. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. §§ 1281,
1281.2.
[11] T

342

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(G) Award
25Tk342 k. Objections and Exceptions to
Award, and Waiver Thereof. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k68 Arbitration)
Unless party is claiming entire contract is illegal, or
arbitration agreement itself is illegal, he or she need
not raise illegality question prior to participating in
arbitration process, so long as issue is raised before
arbitrator; failure to raise claim before arbitrator,
however, waives claim for any further judicial review. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. §§ 1281, 1281.2.
[12] T

362(3)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(H) Review, Conclusiveness, and Enforcement of Award
25Tk360 Impeachment or Vacation
25Tk362 Grounds for Impeachment or
Vacation
25Tk362(3) k. Particular Grounds.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k76(3) Arbitration)
Attorney's claim that fee-splitting provision of his
employment contract with law firm that was interpreted and enforced by arbitrator was illegal and violated public policy as reflected in Rules of Professional Conduct was not ground for judicial review
of arbitrator's decision in dispute over fees generated by attorney's clients after he left firm. West's
Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 1280 et seq.; Code of Prof.Resp.,
DR 2-107, DR 2-108, DR 2-109.
[13] T

362(3)

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
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25TII(H) Review, Conclusiveness, and Enforcement of Award
25Tk360 Impeachment or Vacation
25Tk362 Grounds for Impeachment or
Vacation
25Tk362(3) k. Particular Grounds.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k76(3) Arbitration)
There may be some limited and exceptional circumstances justifying judicial review of arbitrator's decision when party claims illegality affects only portion of underlying contract; such cases would include those in which granting finality to arbitrator's
decision would be inconsistent with protection of
party's statutory rights.
***184 **900 *5 Philip I. Moncharsh, in pro. per.
Townsend & Townsend, Paul W. Vapnek and Mark
L. Pettinari, San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.
DeWitt F. Blase, in pro. per.
Heily & Blase, and John R. Johnson, Ventura, for
defendants and respondents.
*6 LUCAS, Chief Justice.
[1] We granted review in this case to decide, inter
alia, the extent to which a trial court may review an
arbitrator's decision for errors of law. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude an arbitrator's
decision is not generally reviewable for errors of
fact or law, whether or not such error appears on
the face of the award and causes substantial injustice to the parties. There are, however, limited
exceptions to this general rule, which we also discuss below.
FACTS
On June 16, 1986, appellant Philip Moncharsh, an
attorney, was hired by respondent Heily & Blase, a
law firm. As a condition of employment as an associate attorney in the firm, Moncharsh signed an
agreement containing a number of provisions governing various aspects of his employment. One provision (hereafter referred to as “paragraph X-C”)
stated: “X C. EMPLOYEE-ATTORNEY agrees not
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to do anything to cause, encourage, induce, entice,
recommend, suggest, mention or otherwise cause or
contribute to any of FIRM'S clients terminating the
attorney-client relationship with FIRM, and/or substituting***185 **901 FIRM and retaining or associating EMPLOYEE-ATTORNEY or any other attorney or firm as their legal counsel. In the event
that any FIRM client should terminate the attorneyclient relationship with FIRM and substitute EMPLOYEE-ATTORNEY or another attorney or law
firm who[m] EMPLOYEE-ATTORNEY suggested,
recommended or directed as client's successor attorney, then, in addition to any costs which client
owes FIRM up to the time of such substitution, as
to all fees which EMPLOYEE-ATTORNEY may
actually receive from that client or that client's successor attorney on any such cases, BLASE will receive eighty percent (80%) of said fee and EMPLOYEE-ATTORNEY will receive twenty percent
(20%) of said fee.”
Moncharsh terminated his employment with Heily
& Blase on February 29, 1988. DeWitt Blase, the
senior partner at Heily & Blase, contacted 25 or 30
of Moncharsh's clients, noted that they had signed
retainer agreements with his firm, and explained
that he would now be handling their cases. Five clients, whose representation by Moncharsh predated
his association with Heily & Blase, chose to have
Moncharsh continue to represent them. A sixth client, Ringhof, retained Moncharsh less than two
weeks before he left the firm. Moncharsh continued
to represent all six clients after he left the firm.
When Blase learned Moncharsh had received fees
at the conclusion of these six cases, he sought a
quantum meruit share of the fees as well as a percentage of the fees pursuant to paragraph X-C of
the employment agreement. Blase rejected Moncharsh's offer to settle the matter for only a *7
quantum meruit share of the fees. The parties then
invoked the arbitration clause of the employment
FN1
agreement
and submitted the matter to an arbitrator.
FN1. The arbitration clause provided:
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“Any dispute arising out of this Agreement
shall be subject to arbitration under the
rules of the American Arbitration Association. No arbitrator shall have any power
to alter, amend, modify or change any of
the terms of this agreement. The decision
of the arbitrator shall be final and binding
on FIRM and EMPLOYEE-ATTORNEY.”
None of the rules of the American Arbitration Association have any bearing on the
issues raised in this case.
FN2
The arbitrator heard two days of testimony
and
the matter was submitted on the briefs and exhibits.
In his brief, Moncharsh argued (1) Heily & Blase
was entitled to only a quantum meruit share of the
fees, (2) Moncharsh and Blase had an oral agreement to treat differently the cases Moncharsh
brought with him to Heily & Blase, (3) the employment agreement had terminated and was therefore
inapplicable, (4) the agreement was one of adhesion
and therefore unenforceable, and (5) paragraph X-C
is unenforceable because it violates public policy,
the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar,
and because it is inconsistent with Fracasse v.
Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784, 100 Cal.Rptr. 385, 494
P.2d 9, and Champion v. Superior Court (1988) 201
Cal.App.3d 777, 247 Cal.Rptr. 624.
FN2. The hearing before the arbitrator was
not reported.
In its brief, Heily & Blase contended paragraph XC (1) is clear and unequivocal, (2) is not unconscionable, and (3) represented a reasonable attempt
to avoid litigation and was thus akin to a liquidated
damages provision. In addition, “To the extent it
becomes important to the Arbitrator's decision,”
Heily & Blase alleged that Moncharsh solicited the
six clients to remain with him, and further suggested that Moncharsh retained those six because it
was probable that financial settlements would soon
be forthcoming in all six matters. Heily & Blase
contrasted these six matters with the other cases
Moncharsh left with the firm, all of which allegedly
required a significant amount of additional legal
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work.
The arbitrator ruled in Heily & Blase's favor, concluding that any oral side agreement between Moncharsh and Blase was never documented and that
Moncharsh was thus bound by the written employee
agreement. Further, the arbitrator ruled that,
“except for client Ringhof, [paragraph X-C] is not
unconscionable, and it does not violate the rules of
professional conduct. At the time MR. MONCHARSH agreed to the employment contract, he
was a mature, experienced attorney, with employable ***186 **902 skills. Had he not been willing
to agree to the eighty/twenty (80/20) split on termination, he could simply have refused to sign the
document, negotiated something different, or if negotiations were unsuccessful, his choice was to
leave his employment .... *8 [¶] ... The Arbitrator
excludes the Ringhof client from the eighty/twenty
(80/20) split because that client was obtained at the
twilight of MR. MONCHARSH'S relationship with
HEILY & BLASE, and an eighty/twenty (80/20)
split with respect to that client would be unconscionable.”
Moncharsh petitioned the superior court to vacate
and modify the arbitration award. (Code Civ.Proc.,
§ 1286.2; all subsequent statutory references are to
this code unless otherwise stated.) Heily & Blase
responded by petitioning the court to confirm the
award. (§ 1285.) The court ruled that, “The arbitrator's findings on questions of both law and fact are
conclusive. A court cannot set aside an arbitrator's
error of law no matter how egregious.” The court
allowed an exception to this rule, however, “where
the error appears on the face of the award.” Finding
no such error, the trial court denied Moncharsh's
petition to vacate and granted Heily & Blase's petition to confirm the arbitrator's award.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal also recognized the
rule, announced in previous cases, generally prohibiting review of the merits of the arbitrator's
award. It noted, however, that an exception exists
when “an error of law appears on the face of the
ruling and then only if the error would result in sub-
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stantial injustice.” Although Moncharsh claimed
paragraph X-C violated law, public policy, and the
State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, the appellate court disagreed and affirmed the trial court
judgment.
We granted review and directed the parties to address the limited issue of whether, and under what
conditions, a trial court may review an arbitrator's
decision.
DISCUSSION
1. The General Rule of Arbitral Finality
[2] The parties in this case submitted their dispute
to an arbitrator pursuant to their written agreement.
This case thus involves private, or nonjudicial, arbitration. (See Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985)
38 Cal.3d 396, 401-402 & fn. 5, 212 Cal.Rptr. 151,
696 P.2d 645 [discussing the differences between
judicial and nonjudicial arbitration].) In cases involving private arbitration, “[t]he scope of arbitration is ... a matter of agreement between the
parties”(Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney
& Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d
312, 323, 197 Cal.Rptr. 581, 673 P.2d 251
[hereafter Ericksen ] ), and “ ‘[t]he powers of an arbitrator are limited and circumscribed by the agreement or stipulation of submission.’ ” *9(O'Malley
v. Petroleum Maintenance Co. (1957) 48 Cal.2d
107, 110, 308 P.2d 9 [hereafter O'Malley ], quoting
Pac. Fire etc. Bureau v. Bookbinders' Union (1952)
115 Cal.App.2d 111, 114, 251 P.2d 694.)
Title 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as enacted
and periodically amended by the Legislature, represents a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating private arbitration in this state. (§ 1280 et seq.)
Through this detailed statutory scheme, the Legislature has expressed a “strong public policy in favor
of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive
means of dispute resolution.” (Ericksen, supra, 35
Cal.3d at p. 322, 197 Cal.Rptr. 581, 673 P.2d 251;
Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17
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Cal.3d 699, 706-707, 131 Cal.Rptr. 882, 552 P.2d
1178; Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d
734, 750, 222 Cal.Rptr. 1, 710 P.2d 833 [dis. opn.
of Lucas, J.]; City of Oakland v. United Public Employees (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 356, 363, 224
Cal.Rptr. 523; see also Shearson/American Express
Inc. v. McMahon (1987) 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107
S.Ct. 2332, 2337, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 [Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., establishes federal
policy in favor of arbitration].) Consequently,
courts will “ ‘indulge every intendment to give effect to such proceedings.’ ” (Doers v. Golden Gate
Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 189, 151
Cal.Rptr. 837, 588 P.2d 1261, quoting
***187**903Pacific Inv. Co. v. Townsend (1976)
58 Cal.App.3d 1, 9, 129 Cal.Rptr. 489.) Indeed,
more than 70 years ago this court explained: “The
policy of the law in recognizing arbitration agreements and in providing by statute for their enforcement is to encourage persons who wish to avoid
delays incident to a civil action to obtain an adjustment of their differences by a tribunal of their own
choosing.” (Utah Const. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry.
Co. (1916) 174 Cal. 156, 159, 162 P. 631 [hereafter
Utah Const.].) “Typically, those who enter into arbitration agreements expect that their dispute will
be resolved without necessity for any contact with
the courts.” (Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., supra, at
p. 402, fn. 5, 212 Cal.Rptr. 151, 696 P.2d 645.)
[3] The arbitration clause included in the employment agreement in this case specifically states that
the arbitrator's decision would be both binding and
final. The parties to this action thus clearly intended
the arbitrator's decision would be final. Even had
there been no such expression of intent, however, it
is the general rule that parties to a private arbitration impliedly agree that the arbitrator's decision
FN3
will be both binding and final.
Indeed, “The
very essence of the term ‘arbitration’ [in this context] connotes a binding award.” (Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 402, 212
Cal.Rptr. 151, 696 P.2d 645, citing Domke on
Commercial Arbitration (rev. ed. 1984) p. 1
[hereafter *10 Domke].) In the early years of this

Page 6

state, this court opined that, “When parties agree to
leave their dispute to an arbitrator, they are presumed to know that his award will be final and conclusive....” (Montifiori v. Engels (1853) 3 Cal. 431,
434.) One commentator explains, “Even in the absence of an explicit agreement, conclusiveness is
expected; the essence of the arbitration process is
that an arbitral award shall put the dispute to rest.”
(Comment, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality (1976) 23 UCLA L.Rev. 948-949 [hereafter Judicial Deference].) It has thus been observed that,
“The parties [to an arbitration] can take a measure
of comfort in knowing that the arbitrator's award
will almost certainly mean an end to the dispute.”
(Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration (1987) § 6:10, p.
140 [hereafter Oehmke].)
FN3. We assume for this discussion of
general principles that an enforceable arbitration agreement exists. We do not address here the situation where one party
advances a legal theory that would vitiate
the parties' voluntary agreement to submit
to arbitration. (See § 1281.2 [court will not
order arbitration if “[g]rounds exist for the
revocation of the agreement”].)
This expectation of finality strongly informs the
parties' choice of an arbitral forum over a judicial
one. The arbitrator's decision should be the end, not
the beginning, of the dispute. (See Feldman, Arbitration Modernized-The New California Arbitration
Act (1961) 34 So.Cal.L.Rev. 413, 414, fn. 11.) Expanding the availability of judicial review of such
decisions “would tend to deprive the parties to the
arbitration agreement of the very advantages the
process is intended to produce.” (Victoria v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 751, 222 Cal.Rptr.
1, 710 P.2d 833 [dis. opn. of Lucas, J.]; see generally, Judicial Deference, supra,23 UCLA L.Rev. at
p. 949.)
Ensuring arbitral finality thus requires that judicial
intervention in the arbitration process be minimized. (City of Oakland v. United Public Employees,
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supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 363, 224 Cal.Rptr. 523;
Lindholm v. Galvin (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 443,
450-451, 157 Cal.Rptr. 167.) Because the decision
to arbitrate grievances evinces the parties' intent to
bypass the judicial system and thus avoid potential
delays at the trial and appellate levels, arbitral finality is a core component of the parties' agreement
to submit to arbitration. Thus, an arbitration decision is final and conclusive because the parties
have agreed that it be so. By ensuring that an arbitrator's decision is final and binding, courts simply
assure that the parties receive the benefit of their
FN4
bargain.
FN4. Professor Feldman suggests that,
“Psychologically and economically, the
parties having selected their own decider,
they would, on the whole, be satisfied with
his award, as the best which could be had
under the circumstances.” (Feldman, Arbitration Law in California: Private
Tribunals for Private Government (1957)
30 So.Cal.L.Rev. 375, 384 [discussing the
arbitration scheme under the 1927 law].)
***188 **904 Moreover, “[a]rbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of
law, may base their decision upon broad principles
of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly
or impliedly reject a claim *11 that a party might
successfully have asserted in a judicial action.”
(Sapp v. Barenfeld (1949) 34 Cal.2d 515, 523, 212
P.2d 233; see also Morris v. Zuckerman (1968) 69
Cal.2d 686, 691, 72 Cal.Rptr. 880, 446 P.2d 1000;
Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. L.A. Joint Board (1959) 52
Cal.2d 568, 589, 343 P.2d 23.) As early as 1852,
this court recognized that, “The arbitrators are not
bound to award on principles of dry law, but may
decide on principles of equity and good conscience,
and make their award ex aequo et bono [according
to what is just and good].” (Muldrow v. Norris
(1852) 2 Cal. 74, 77.) “As a consequence, arbitration awards are generally immune from judicial review. ‘Parties who stipulate in an agreement that
controversies that may arise out of it shall be settled
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by arbitration, may expect not only to reap the advantages that flow from the use of that nontechnical, summary procedure, but also to find themselves
bound by an award reached by paths neither marked
nor traceable and not subject to judicial review.’
(Case v. Alperson (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 757, 759,
5 Cal.Rptr. 635 ...)”(Nogueiro v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1192, 1195, 250
Cal.Rptr. 478.)
[4][5] Thus, both because it vindicates the intentions of the parties that the award be final, and because an arbitrator is not ordinarily constrained to
decide according to the rule of law, it is the general
rule that, “The merits of the controversy between
the parties are not subject to judicial review.”
(O'Malley, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 111, 308 P.2d 9;
Griffith Co. v. San Diego Col. for Women (1955) 45
Cal.2d 501, 510, 289 P.2d 476; Pacific Vegetable
Oil Corp. v. C.S.T. Ltd. (1946) 29 Cal.2d 228, 233,
174 P.2d 441 [hereafter Pacific Vegetable ].) More
specifically, courts will not review the validity of
the arbitrator's reasoning. (Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v.
L.A. Joint Board, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 589, 343
P.2d 23; Nogueiro v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1195, 250 Cal.Rptr.
478; Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Memorial Hospital
Assn. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1091, 213
Cal.Rptr. 62; American & Nat. etc. Baseball Clubs
v. Major League Baseball Players Assn. (1976) 59
Cal.App.3d 493, 498, 130 Cal.Rptr. 626 [hereafter
Baseball Players ].) Further, a court may not review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an
arbitrator's award. (Morris v. Zuckerman, supra, 69
Cal.2d at 691, 72 Cal.Rptr. 880, 446 P.2d 1000; Pacific Vegetable, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 238, 174
P.2d 441; Nogueiro v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1195, 250
Cal.Rptr. 478; see generally, 6 Cal.Jur.3d (rev.),
Arbitration and Award, § 76, pp. 133-134.)
[6] Thus, it is the general rule that, with narrow exceptions, an arbitrator's decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law. In reaffirming this
general rule, we recognize there is a risk that the ar-
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bitrator will make a mistake. That risk, however, is
acceptable for two reasons. First, by voluntarily
submitting to arbitration, the parties have agreed to
bear that risk in return for a quick, inexpensive, and
conclusive resolution to their dispute. *12 See That
Way Production Co. v. Directors Guild of America,
Inc. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 960, 965, 158 Cal.Rptr.
475 [hereafter That Way ].) As one commentator
explains, “the parties to an arbitral agreement
knowingly take the risks of error of fact or law
committed by the arbitrators and that this is a
worthy ‘trade-off’ in order to obtain speedy decisions by experts in the field whose practical experience and worldly reasoning will be accepted as
correct by other experts.” (Sweeney, Judicial Review of Arbitral Proceedings (1981-1982) 5 Fordham Int'l L.J. 253, 254.) “In other words, it is within the power of the arbitrator to make a mistake
either legally or factually. When parties opt for the
forum of arbitration they agree to be bound by the
decision of that forum knowing that arbitrators, like
judges, are fallible.”***189 **905 (That Way,
supra, at p. 965, 158 Cal.Rptr. 475.)
Griffith Co. v. San Diego Col. for Women, supra,
45 Cal.2d 501, 289 P.2d 476, is illustrative. In that
case, the plaintiff contracted to build certain buildings for the defendant college. When work was
delayed, a dispute arose and the matter was submitted to arbitration. When a split arbitration panel
ruled in the defendant's favor, the plaintiff moved
the superior court to vacate the award, claiming,
inter alia, that “the decision is arbitrary, harsh and
inequitable; that it is contrary to law; and that it is
not coextensive with the issues submitted.” (Id. at
p. 510, 289 P.2d 476.) This court rejected these
contentions, stating, “ ‘Even if the arbitrator decided [the] point incorrectly, he did decide it. The
issue was admitted properly before him. Right or
wrong the parties have contracted that such a decision should be conclusive. At most, it is an error
of law, not reviewable by the courts.’ ” (Id. at pp.
515-516, 289 P.2d 476, quoting Crofoot v. Blair
Holdings Corp. (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 189,
260 P.2d 156[Crofootdisapproved on other
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grounds, Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc. (1961) 56
Cal.2d 169, 183], 14 Cal.Rptr. 297, 363 P.2d 313.)
A second reason why we tolerate the risk of an erroneous decision is because the Legislature has reduced the risk to the parties of such a decision by
providing for judicial review in circumstances involving serious problems with the award itself, or
with the fairness of the arbitration process. As
stated ante, private arbitration proceedings are governed by title 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, sections 1280-1294.2. Section 1286.2 sets forth the
grounds for vacation of an arbitrator's award. It
states in pertinent part: “[T]he court shall vacate the
award if the court determines that: [¶] (a) The
award was procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means; [¶] (b) There was corruption in any
of the arbitrators; [¶] (c) The rights of such party
were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a
neutral arbitrator; [¶] (d) The arbitrators exceeded
their powers and the award cannot be corrected
without affecting the merits of the decision upon
the controversy submitted; or [¶] (e) The rights of
such party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the *13 arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.”
In addition, section 1286.6 provides grounds for
correction of an arbitration award. That section
states in pertinent part: “[T]he court, unless it vacates the award pursuant to Section 1286.2, shall
correct the award and confirm it as corrected if the
court determines that: [¶] (a) There was an evident
miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in
the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; [¶] (b) The arbitrators exceeded their powers but the award may be corrected
without affecting the merits of the decision upon
the controversy submitted; or [¶] (c) the award is
imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy.”
The Legislature has thus substantially reduced the
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possibility of certain forms of error infecting the arbitration process itself (§ 1286.2, subds. (a), (b),
(c)), of an arbitrator exceeding the scope of his or
her arbitral powers (§§ 1286.2, subd. (d), 1286.6,
subd. (b)), of some obvious and easily correctable
mistake in the award (§ 1286.6, subd. (a)), of one
party being unfairly deprived of a fair opportunity
to present his or her side of the dispute (§ 1286.2,
subd. (e)), or of some other technical problem with
the award (§ 1286.6, subd. (c)). In light of these
statutory provisions, the residual risk to the parties
of an arbitrator's erroneous decision represents an
acceptable cost-obtaining the expedience and financial savings that the arbitration process provides-as
compared to the judicial process.
Although it is thus the general rule that an arbitrator's decision is not ordinarily reviewable for error
by either the trial or appellate courts, Moncharsh
contends three exceptions to the general rule apply
to his case. First, he claims a court may review an
arbitrator's decision if an error of law is ***190
**906 apparent on the face of the award and that
error causes substantial injustice. Second, he claims
the arbitrator exceeded his powers. (§ 1286.2, subd.
(d).) Third, he argues courts will not enforce arbitration decisions that are illegal or violate public
policy. We discuss each point seriatim.
2. Error on the Face of the Arbitration Decision
A review of the pertinent authorities yields no
shortage of proclamations that a court may vacate
an arbitrator's decision when (i) an error of law appears on the face of the decision, and (ii) the error
causes substantial injustice. (See, e.g., Abbott v.
California State Auto. Assn. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d
763, 771, 137 Cal.Rptr. 580.) Indeed, some cases
hold the error *14 need only appear on the face of
the award, with no mention of resulting injustice.
(See, e.g., Park Plaza, Ltd. v. Pietz (1987) 193
Cal.App.3d 1414, 1420, 239 Cal.Rptr. 51.) As previously noted, however, the Legislature has set
forth grounds for vacation (§ 1286.2) and correction (§ 1286.6) of an arbitration award and “[a]n er-
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ror of law is not one of the grounds.” (Nogueiro v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 203
Cal.App.3d at p. 1195, 250 Cal.Rptr. 478, and cases
cited.) Because Moncharsh contends that an additional exception to the general rule for errors of law
is authorized by both common law and statute, we
next determine the genesis of that notion as well as
its continuing validity.
a. The Early Common Law Rule
We begin with Muldrow v. Norris, supra, 2 Cal. 74
[hereafter Muldrow ], a case arising before the enactment of any arbitration statutes in this state. In
Muldrow, a dispute arose between the parties and
they agreed to submit the matter to a panel of three
arbitrators, whose decision “should be final and
conclusive.” (Ibid.) The arbitrators reached a decision and Norris, the losing party, sought to vacate
the award. This court ruled in his favor, and we
quote the opinion at length because it exemplifies
the contradictory rule of judicial review that has
been repeated in modified form since those early
days:
“The first point we propose to examine, is, as to the
power of the Court below to inquire into the award
now before us. It is a well settled principle that
courts of equity, in the absence of statutes, will set
aside awards for fraud, mistake, or accident, and it
makes no difference whether the mistake be one of
fact or law. It is true, under a general submission,
arbitrators have power to decide upon the law and
facts: and a mere mistake of law cannot be taken
advantage of. The arbitrators are not bound to
award on principles of dry law, but may decide on
principles of equity and good conscience, and make
their award ex aequo et bono. If, however, they
mean to decide according to the law, and mistake
the law, the courts will set their award aside. A distinction seems to have been taken in the books
between general and special awards. In the case of
a general finding, it appears to be well settled that
courts will not inquire into mistakes by evidence
aliunde : but where the arbitrators have made any
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point a matter of judicial inquiry by spreading it
upon the record, and they mistake the law in a palpable and material point, their award will be set
aside. [Citation.] The mere act of setting forth their
reasons must be considered for the purpose of enabling those dissatisfied to take advantage of them.
[Citation.] In all cases where the arbitrators give the
reasons of their finding, they are supposed to have
intended to decide according to law, and to refer the
point for the opinion of the Court. In such cases, if
they mistake the law, the award must be set aside;
*15 for it is not the opinion they intended to give,
the same having been made through mistake.
[Citation.] In the case already cited, the Court says,
‘these special awards are not to be commended, as
arbitrators may often decide with perfect equity
between parties, and not give good reasons for their
decision; but when a special award is once before
the Court, it must stand or fall by its own intrinsic
correctness, tested by legal principles.’ [Citations.]”
(2 Cal. at pp. 77-78.)
The Muldrow court concluded: “In the case before
us, the arbitrators have set forth the particular
grounds upon which ***191 **907 their finding
was based: and it follows from the authorities
already cited, that the correctness of the principles
by which they must be supposed to have been governed is a proper subject for judicial inquiry.” (2
Cal. at p. 78.)
Although Muldrow, supra, thus acknowledged that,
at common law, an arbitrator need not follow the
law in arriving at a decision, and that “a mere mistake of law cannot be taken advantage of”(2 Cal. at
p. 77), the opinion qualified that statement and held
that an award reached by an arbitrator may nevertheless be reversed if the error is “spread[ ] ... upon
the record” and the mistake is on a “palpable and
material point.” (Ibid.) Muldrow also stated that
when an arbitrator gives reasons to support his decision, the award was subject to full-blown judicial
oversight, and “must stand and fall by its own intrinsic correctness, tested by legal principles.” (Id.
FN5
at p. 78.)
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FN5. By ensuring some measure of judicial
control over arbitral awards, Muldrow,
supra, was typical of courts from that early
era in exhibiting suspicion of private arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.
Thus, for example, courts had held that a
common law submission to arbitration was
revocable at any time prior to the award.
(See California Academy of Sciences v.
Fletcher (1893) 99 Cal. 207, 209, 33 P.
855; 3 Cal.Jur., Arbitration and Award §
19, p. 55.) In addition, early courts held
agreements to arbitrate future disputes
were unenforceable, both at common law
and under the early statutes. (Blodgett Co.
v. Bebe Co. (1923) 190 Cal. 665, 214 P.
38; Feldman, Arbitration Law in California: Private Tribunals for Private Government, supra, 30 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 382.)
Even under the initial arbitration statutes,
courts held invalid an agreement that the
arbitrator's decision was final and that no
appeal could be taken therefrom. (Kreiss v.
Hotaling (1892) 96 Cal. 617, 621, 31 P.
740; In re Joshua Hendy Machine Works
(1908) 9 Cal.App. 610, 611, 99 P. 1110.)
Later that same term, this court again addressed the
issue. In Tyson v. Wells (1852) 2 Cal. 122, the
parties agreed to submit their commercial dispute to
a referee, whose decision was to be final. When the
losing party challenged the referee's ruling, this
court concluded the finality accorded a referee's report pursuant to statute was the same as for an arbitrator's ruling at common law. (Id. at p. 130.) This
time avoiding any suggestion that an arbitrator's decision was subject to unqualified judicial review,
we stated: “it may be regarded as the settled rule,
that the Court will not disturb the award of an arbitrator ... unless the error which is complained of,
whether it be of *16 law or fact, appears on the face
of the award.” (Id. at p. 131.) Although the court
purported to be following Muldrow, supra, 2 Cal.
74, there was no qualification that the error must be
on a “palpable and material point.” (Id. at p. 77.)

© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

832 P.2d 899
3 Cal.4th 1, 832 P.2d 899, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183
(Cite as: 3 Cal.4th 1, 832 P.2d 899, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183)

Six months later, we addressed the issue again. In
Headley v. Reed (1852) 2 Cal. 322, another case involving a reference, we wrote, “According to the
rule settled in [Muldrow ], the decision of the referee can only be set aside on account of fraud or
gross error of law or fact apparent on its face.” (Id.
at p. 325, italics added.) The Headley court thus injected a new factor into the Muldrow test-gross error-but did not repeat Muldrow's assertion that an
arbitrator's decision was subject to full-blown judicial review.
These three early cases-Muldrow,Tyson,Headleyinvolved arbitration (or a reference, which was considered functionally equivalent to arbitration) at
common law. From them, we can perceive the beginnings of the rule permitting judicial review of an
arbitrator's ruling if error appeared on the face of
the award.
b. The Development of Statutory Law before 1927
Around the time the aforementioned cases were decided, the Legislature enacted the Civil Practice Act
of 1851 and established the rules governing statutory arbitration. In section 386 of that act, the Legislature specified the grounds on which a court
could vacate an arbitrator's award. “The Court, on
motion, may vacate the award upon either of the
following grounds ...: [¶] 1st. That it was procured
by corruption or fraud: [¶] 2d. That the arbitrators
were guilty of misconduct, or committed gross error in refusing, on cause shown, to postpone the
hearing, or in refusing***192 **908 to hear pertinent evidence, or otherwise acted improperly, in a
manner by which the rights of the party were prejudiced: [¶] [3d.] That the arbitrators exceeded their
powers in making their award; or that they refused,
or improperly omitted, to consider a part of the
matters submitted to them; or that the award is indefinite, or cannot be performed.” (Stats. 1851, ch.
4, § 386, pp. 112-113, hereafter section 386 of the
Civil Practice Act.) Significantly, there was no express provision permitting judicial review if there
was a gross error on the face of the award. Nor was
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a court permitted to vacate an award if it concluded
it lacked “intrinsic [legal] correctness,” as suggested in Muldrow, supra, 2 Cal. at pages 77-78.
This court first considered section 386 of the Civil
Practice Act in Peachy et al. v. Ritchie (1854) 4
Cal. 205 (hereafter Peachy ). In that case, the losing
party to an arbitration moved to vacate the award,
claiming among other *17 things that “the arbitrators refused to hear pertinent evidence,” and “the arbitrators exceeded their powers.” (Id. at p. 206.)
The trial court “refused to entertain the motion” on
procedural grounds. (Id. at p. 207.) Although the
grounds asserted in support of the motion to vacate
seemed to fall within the then-existing statutory
grounds for vacation, this court refused to examine
the decision of the court below, finding the asserted
grounds to vacate the award “wholly insufficient.
[¶] Our Statute is but a re-affirmance of the common law, and gives to the parties no higher rights
than they might have asserted in a court of equity in
case of mistake, fraud or accident. The misconduct,
contemplated by the Statute, was intended to apply
to improper conduct in fact, such as that of a witness or juror, as contra-distinguished from mere error of judgment. [¶] The whole doctrine of Arbitration was fully reviewed by this Court in the case of
Muldrow v. Norris, 2 Cal. 74, in which we decided
that we would not disturb the general finding of arbitrators, and that an award could not be set aside
except in the cases there mentioned.” (Peachy,
supra, 4 Cal. at p. 207, punctuation and capitalization in original.)
The Peachy opinion is noteworthy for two reasons.
First, it failed to construe strictly the terms of the
statute. Thus, although the appellant raised grounds
for review that were apparently permitted under
section 386 of the Civil Practice Act (i.e., claims
that the arbitrator failed to hear pertinent evidence
and exceeded his powers), the court declined to invoke those statutory provisions. Instead, it concluded that the new statute was merely an affirmation of the common law and that the statute granted
disputants no greater rights than they would have
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had before its enactment. The court concluded that
permitting a litigant to attack an award on the asserted statutory grounds would destroy this mode of
adjusting private differences. (Peachy, supra, 4 Cal.
at p. 207.)
Second, Peachy reaffirmed the availability of judicial review of arbitration awards as limited in
Muldrow, supra, 2 Cal. 74, expressly mentioning
mistake, fraud, and accident. Thus, despite the enactment of section 386 of the Civil Practice Act, the
availability of judicial review of arbitration awards
was still controlled by the common law principles
established in earlier cases. (Peachy, supra, 4 Cal.
at p. 207.)
The evolution away from an emphasis on the common law, first suggested by the enactment of the
Civil Practice Act of 1851, continued in Carsley v.
Lindsay (1859) 14 Cal. 390. In that case, partners in
the Salamander Iron Works desired to dissolve their
partnership and submitted their dispute to an arbitrator, who found in Carsley's favor. When Lindsay
successfully moved the trial court to vacate the
award, Carsley appealed. In support of the trial
court's decision, Lindsay argued, inter alia, that the
award was properly *18 vacated because it was
contrary to law and evidence. This court rejected
that argument, reasoning, “we are not aware that an
award of an Arbitrator can be impeached on this
ground.... An impeachment on this ground was not
admissible at common law, and, if it were, our statute, (Practice Act, [§] 385 et seq.) prescribes other
grounds, as those upon which alone the award can
be ***193 **909 vacated by the District Court
upon motion.” (Carsley, supra, at p. 394, first italics in original, second added, citing Muldrow,
supra, 2 Cal. 74; Peachy, supra, 4 Cal. 205.) Although Carsley cited Muldrow and its progeny, it is
clear the court had subtly shifted its position to
place greater reliance on the statutory provisions as
the exclusive grounds on which an arbitration
award could be vacated.
This trend continued when, in 1872, section 386 of
the Civil Practice Act was codified without change
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as Code of Civil Procedure former section 1287.
We addressed the new statute in In re Connor
(1900) 128 Cal. 279, 60 P. 862. In that case, Pratt
and Connor had a dispute over a promissory note
and submitted the controversy to an arbitrator, who
found in Connor's favor. Pratt moved to modify the
award, and to vacate a portion of it. When the trial
court denied his motion, he appealed, claiming witnesses in the hearing below were not sworn. This
court affirmed, reasoning, “Where controversies are
voluntarily submitted to arbitrators who need not
be, and frequently are not, learned in the law, it is
not contemplated that their awards will be viewed
in the light of that strict adherence to legal rules
and procedure which is expected in purely judicial
trials.” (Id. at pp. 281-282, 60 P. 862.) After quoting Muldrow, supra, 2 Cal. 74, the Connor court
flatly stated: “the only grounds for a motion to vacate or modify an award are specified in sections
1287 and 1288 of the code; and the grounds for vacating an award (Code Civ.Proc., sec. 1287) include
only cases of fraud, corruption, misconduct, ‘or
gross error,’.... These grounds do not include mere
ordinary errors nor even faults of judgment. They
refer to things that are ‘gross.’ ” (In re Connor,
supra at p. 282, 60 P. 862, italics added.)
By the time of In re Connor, supra, then, this court
had declined to perpetuate Muldrow 's suggestion
that courts could indulge in unfettered review of the
“intrinsic correctness” of an arbitrator's decision.
Indeed, the opposite was true; courts following the
legislative scheme concluded the grounds for vacating an award were exclusively those set forth by
statute. The Connor court, however, retained an exception to this general rule. Muldrow 's holding permitting judicial review of errors “spread upon the
record” affecting a “palpable and material point”
(Muldrow, supra, 2 Cal. at p. 77), was transmogrified in In re Connor into a rule permitting judicial
review of an award if it contained a “gross” error,
although former section 1287 did not specify that
ground as a permissible reason to vacate an award.
*19 In re Connor, supra, 128 Cal. at p. 282, 60 P.
862.) Thus, although emphasizing the exclusivity of
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the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration
award, the Connor court retained a vestige of the
common law rule that provided more generous judicial oversight.
Sixteen years later, this court retreated somewhat
from In re Connor, supra, 128 Cal. 279, 60 P. 862,
and apparently returned to the rule developed in
earlier cases (most notably Muldrow, supra, 2 Cal.
74, and especially Peachy, supra, 4 Cal. 205), that
deemphasized the exclusivity of the statutory
grounds for vacating an award. In Utah Const.,
supra, 174 Cal. 156, 162 P. 631, a dispute arose
between a railroad and a construction company
over whether a debt had been discharged. The
parties submitted their dispute to an arbitrator, who
ruled in the railroad's favor. The construction company moved to vacate the award and appealed when
the trial court denied its motion. We affirmed the
trial court's decision, citing Muldrow, supra, 2 Cal.
74, and its progeny. “The code provisions are in aid
of the common-law remedy of arbitration, a reaffirmance thereof, and do not alter its principles.
[Citations.] An award made upon an unqualified
submission cannot be impeached on the ground that
it is contrary to law, unless the error appears on its
face and causes substantial injustice. (Carsley v.
Lindsay, [supra,] 14 Cal. 390; Morse on Arbitration, 296.)” (Utah Const., supra, 174 Cal. at pp.
160-161, 162 P. 631.)
Although Carsley v. Lindsay, supra, 14 Cal. 390,
was cited in support, the basis for this court's apparent resurrection of the common law dominated
view of judicial review of arbitration awards is
puzzling. As ***194 **910 explained, ante, at
pages 192-193 of 10 Cal.Rptr.2d, at pages 908-909
of 832 P.2d,Carsley held that an arbitrator's award
cannot be “impeached” merely because it contained
an error of law, and that even if it could, section
386 of the Civil Practice Act (then codified verbatim in former section 1287) set forth the exclusive grounds to vacate an award. (Carsley v. Lindsay, supra at p. 394.) Thus, close scrutiny
revealsCarsley does not support the proposition for
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which it was cited in theUtah Const. opinion.
Utah Const.'s citation to Morse, The Law of Arbitration and Award (1872), is similarly unavailing.
That treatise states that when parties submit to an
arbitrator under a general submission, “such award
is conclusive as well of the law as the fact; and the
court upon the return of such an award will not inquire whether the referees, thus authorized, have
decided correctly upon principles of law or not.”
(Id. at p. 296, fn. omitted.) As is clear, Morse does
not provide support for the conclusion in Utah
Const., supra, 174 Cal. 156, 162 P. 631, that a court
can vacate an arbitration award for a legal error appearing on the face of the award causing substantial
injustice.
By the time this court decided Utah Const., supra,
174 Cal. 156, 162 P. 631, the law governing judicial review of arbitration awards was in a state of
flux. The *20 initial common law view permitting
unfettered review of an award's “intrinsic correctness,” first set forth in Muldrow, supra, 2 Cal. 74,
had fallen by the wayside. More importantly, an alternate rule permitting review of an error-or perhaps, a “gross” error-on the face of the award causing substantial injustice, also begun with Muldrow,
waned with the advent of statutes (first in 1851,
then in 1872) governing the area, and had also apparently fallen into disfavor (Carsley v. Lindsay,
supra, 14 Cal. 390), although the notion was not
completely abandoned. (In re Connor, supra, 128
Cal. 279, 60 P. 862.) By 1916, however, that notion
had been revived in Utah Const., supra, 174 Cal.
156, 162 P. 631. Indeed, Utah Const. has been cited
in appellate decisions in the last 10 years for this
very proposition. (See, e.g., Park Plaza, Ltd. v.
Pietz, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 1420, 239
Cal.Rptr. 51.) After 1927, the limits of judicial review of arbitration awards would evolve still further, this time shaped by additional legislation.
c. Development of the Law After 1927
By 1926, the popularity of private arbitration as a
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viable alternate to resolving disputes outside court
was in decline. “[W]idespread dissatisfaction with
our laws respecting arbitration [had] been often expressed by chambers of commerce, mercantile associations and business men generally.” (First Rep. of
the Judicial Council of Cal. (1926) exhibit B, p. 57
[hereafter First Report].) In addition, there were indications that the organized bar also opposed
private arbitration. (See Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting Cal. State Bar Assn. (1924)
pp. 70-73, quoted in Feldman, Arbitration Law in
California: Private Tribunals for Private Government, supra, 30 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 388, fn. 42.) In
1926, Los Angeles County reported its clerk filed
only three submissions to arbitrate; Alameda
County reported no petitions were filed that year.
(First Report, supra, p. 57.)
The reason for the dearth of submissions to arbitration could be traced to two factors. First, private arbitration was no more efficient than regular judicial
adjudication due to the statutory rule permitting a
disputant to revoke his or her submission to arbitrate “at any time before the award is made.”
(Former § 1283; see also First Report, supra, p.
58.) Second, private arbitration was not viewed as a
particularly valuable method of dispute resolution
because courts would not enforce contractual provisions agreeing to submit future disputes to arbitration. (Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., supra, 190 Cal. at
p. 667, 214 P. 38.)
These perceived flaws were remedied when, in
1927, the Legislature amended the statutes governing private arbitration. (Stats.1927, ch. 225, p. 403
et seq.) We may infer that by amending the existing
statutes in response *21 to the report to the ***195
**911 Judicial Council of California, the Legislature intended to encourage the use of private arbitration. The 1927 amendments thus represent a
clear legislative expression of public policy in favor
of private arbitration as an alternate method of dispute resolution.
In addition to those changes, former section
1287-setting forth the grounds for vacating an arbit-
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ration award-was recodified and renumbered as
new section 1288. That section provided in pertinent part: “In either of the following cases the superior court of the county or city and county in which
said arbitration was had must make an order vacating the award, upon the application of any party to
the arbitration: [¶] (a ) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means. [¶] (b )
Where there was corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them. [¶] (c ) Where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct, in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehaviors, by which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced. [¶] (d
) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and
definite award, upon the subject matter submitted,
was not made.” (Stats.1927, ch. 225, § 9, pp.
406-407.)
The major changes in the new statute were: (i) the
addition in subdivision (a) permitting vacation
when the award was procured by “undue means”;
and (ii) the addition to subdivision (d) permitting
vacation when the arbitrators “so imperfectly executed [their powers] that a mutual, final and definite award ... was not made.” (Former § 1288,
Stats.1927, ch. 225, § 9, p. 407.)
The limits of judicial review of an arbitration award
under the 1927 amendments were addressed in Pacific Vegetable, supra, 29 Cal.2d 228, 174 P.2d
441. In that case, the seller claimed its contract with
a buyer to ship copra from the Fiji Islands to San
Diego, California, was cancelled due to the outbreak of World War II. The matter was submitted to
an arbitration panel, which found in favor of the
seller. The buyer moved in superior court to vacate
the award, claiming it was not given an adequate
opportunity to address the seller's arguments.
The Pacific Vegetable court stated that, “The merits
of the controversy between the parties are not subject to judicial review. By section 1288 of the Code
of Civil Procedure the superior court has power to
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vacate an award [quoting the terms of section
1288].” (Pacific Vegetable, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p.
233, 174 P.2d 441.) Later, the court explained,
“The form and sufficiency of the evidence, and the
credibility and good faith of the parties, in the absence of *22 corruption, fraud or undue means in
obtaining an award, are not matters for judicial review.” (Id. at p. 238, 174 P.2d 441.) It is significant
that the court twice emphasized the statutory
grounds for vacating an award, but never reiterated
the old common law based rule permitting review
for an error on the face of the award that causes
substantial injustice. In this way, the Pacific Vegetable court suggested that former section 1288-and
not the common law-established the limits of judiFN6
cial review of arbitration awards.

supra, 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 260 P.2d
156
[hereafter Crofoot ], Justice Raymond Peters, then
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal for the
First Appellate District, Division One, confronted a
case involving alleged fraud in a complex stock
deal. After numerous lawsuits were filed in California and New York, the interested parties agreed to
submit the entire matter to arbitration. Following
presentation of evidence to the arbitrator, he
rendered a five-page award accompanied by findings and opinions covering two hundred fifteen
pages. The overall result was a judgment in favor of
Blair Holdings Corporation (Blair) and against Crofoot. Blair successfully moved in superior court to
correct and confirm the award, and Crofoot appealed.

FN6. Although Pacific Vegetable, supra,
29 Cal.2d 228, 174 P.2d 441, thus implied
the statutory grounds were exclusive, its
ultimate meaning was somewhat ambiguous, for it also noted that “ ‘The statutory
provisions for a review thereof are manifestly for the sole purpose of preventing
the misuse of the proceeding, where corruption, fraud, misconduct, gross error, or
mistake has been carried into the award to
the substantial prejudice of a party to the
proceeding.’ ” (Id. at p. 240, 174 P.2d 441,
quoting Utah Const., supra, 174 Cal. at p.
159, 162 P. 631, italics added.) Because
this quotation came in a paragraph discussing the requirement that a challenger must
show prejudice flowing from the alleged
error, however, it is doubtful the court
meant to embrace the old rule permitting a
court to vacate an award when error appeared on the face of the award causing
substantial injustice.

At the outset, the Court of Appeal explained that
after the 1927 amendments to the Code of Civil
Procedure, written agreements to arbitrate were
governed exclusively by statute and there was “no
field for a common law arbitration to operate....”
(Crofoot, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d at p. 181, 260 P.2d
156.) The appellate court therefore rejected Crofoot's argument that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction because Blair never secured a court order submitting the cases to arbitration. “Prior to [1927], it
was undoubtedly the law that both common law and
statutory arbitrations existed in this state, that in the
absence of [a court] order of submission the arbitration was deemed to be a common law arbitration,
and that in such common law arbitration the award
could only be enforced by an independent action
and could not be entered as a judgment.... [¶] Since
1927, however, these limitations on statutory *23
arbitration no longer exist.” (Id. at pp. 180-181, 260
P.2d 156.) After noting some of the differences
between common law and statutory arbitration, the
appellate court concluded, “that by the adoption of
the 1927 statute, the Legislature intended to adopt a
comprehensive all-inclusive statutory scheme applicable to all written agreements to arbitrate, and
that in such cases the doctrines applicable to a common law arbitration were abolished.” (Id. at p. 182,
FN7
260 P.2d 156.)

A few years after Pacific Vegetable, supra, 29
Cal.2d 228, 174 P.2d 441, the murky issue of the
scope of judicial review of arbitration awards
gained
some
much-needed
clarity.
In
***196**912Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp.,
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FN7. This conclusion was foreshadowed
three years earlier by a scholarly article on
which the Crofoot court relied. (See Crofoot, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d at p. 182, 260
P.2d 156.) The article noted that “The
present statute, a detailed one, contravenes
common law principles almost point by
point. Legislative purpose to abolish applicable common law might be found from
this fact alone. The statute obliterates all
guideposts under which the previous statutes permitted notice whether one was contracting for statutory or common law arbitration. It is reasonable that parties who
voluntarily agree in writing to arbitrate
should be bound by the statute and should
not as an afterthought be permitted to escape from their contract through the
portals of the common law.” (Kagel, Labor
and Commercial Arbitration Under the
California Arbitration Statute (1950) 38
Cal.L.Rev. 799, 809.)
On the question of arbitral finality, the Crofoot
court was more circumspect, admitting “The law is
not quite so clear as to a court's powers of review
over questions of law. The earlier cases held that
the court had the power to review errors of law, at
least where they appeared upon the face of the
[FN8]
award.
(In re Frick, 130 Cal.App. 290, 19
P.2d 836; Utah Const. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry. Co.,
174 Cal. 156, 162 P. 631.) The later cases have
gone much farther in granting finality to the award
even as to questions of law. In Pacific Vegetable
Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., [supra,] 29 Cal.2d 228,
233, 174 P.2d 441, it was bluntly held that ‘The
merits of the controversy between the parties are
not subject to judicial review.’ ” (Crofoot, supra,
119 Cal.App.2d at p. 185, 260 P.2d 156.) After surveying cases that note an arbitrator need not rule in
conformity with the law, the Crofoot court made a
dramatic conclusion: “Under these cases it must be
held that in the absence of some limiting clause in
the arbitration agreement, the merits of the award,
either on questions of fact or of law, may not be re-
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viewed except as provided in the statute.” (Crofoot,
supra, 119 Cal.App.2d at p. 186, 260 P.2d 156, italics added.)
FN8. At this point, the Crofoot court inserted a footnote and stated: “But even prior
to 1927 it was held that only ‘gross' errors
of an arbitrator were reviewable-In re Connor, 128 Cal. 279, 282 [60 P. 862].”
This bold statement reflected the end result of many
years of evolution in the ***197 **913 law, from
the common law roots of Muldrow, supra, 2 Cal.
74, through the growth of the rule permitting review of errors on the face of the award (Utah
Const., supra, 174 Cal. at pp. 160-161, 162 P. 631),
and through the important changes occasioned by
the 1927 amendments as interpreted first by Pacific
Vegetable, supra, 29 Cal.2d 228, 174 P.2d 441, and
then definitively by Crofoot, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d
156, 260 P.2d 156. Later opinions of this court relied heavily on the reasoning and conclusion of the
Crofoot opinion to declare that the sole grounds for
*24 vacating an arbitration award were those set
forth by statute. (See O'Malley, supra, 48 Cal.2d at
pp. 111-112, 308 P.2d 9; Griffith Co. v. San Diego
Col. for Women, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 515-516,
289 P.2d 476.)
In the years following Crofoot, supra, 119
Cal.App.2d 156, 260 P.2d 156, a large majority of
appellate decisions also adopted the Crofoot conclusion that former section 1288 set forth the exclusive means for vacating an arbitration award.
(Cecil v. Bank of America (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d
249, 251, 298 P.2d 24 [“the merits of the award ...
may not be reviewed except as provided in the statute”]; Downer Corp. v. Union Paving Co. (1956)
146 Cal.App.2d 708, 715, 304 P.2d 756 [same];
Wetsel v. Garibaldi (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 4, 13,
323 P.2d 524, disapproved on other grounds, Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc., supra, 56 Cal.2d at p.
183, 14 Cal.Rptr. 297, 363 P.2d 313 [same]; Ulene
v. Murray Millman of California (1959) 175
Cal.App.2d 655, 660, 346 P.2d 494 [same]; Meat
Cutters Local No. 439 v. Olson Bros. (1960) 186
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Cal.App.2d 200, 203-204, 8 Cal.Rptr. 789 [same];
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brunner (1961)
191 Cal.App.2d 334, 340-341, 12 Cal.Rptr. 547
[same]; but see, U.S. Plywood Corp. v. Hudson
Lumber Co. (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 527, 532, 269
P.2d 93 [reiterating the “error on face of award”
standard].) Some cases did not expressly recognize
the exclusiveness of the statutory grounds, but implied that point by flatly stating the merits of an arbitration award were not subject to judicial review.
(Atlas Floor Covering v. Crescent House &
Garden, Inc. (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 211, 216, 333
P.2d 194; Gerard v. Salter (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d
840, 846, 304 P.2d 237.)
In 1956, the Legislature authorized the California
Law Revision Commission to study and determine
whether the statutory arbitration scheme should be
revised. (Assem. Conc. Res. No. 10, Stats. 1957
(1956 Reg.Sess.) res. ch. 42, p. 264.) The Commission's report was transmitted to the Governor in
December 1960. (Recommendation and Study Pertaining to Arbitration (Dec.1960) 3 Cal.Law Revision Com.Rep. (1960) [hereafter Arbitration
Study].) On the subject of the scope of judicial review, the report explained that, “Nothing in the
California statute defines the permissible scope of
review by the courts. Numerous court rulings have,
however, developed the following basic principles
which set the limits for any court review: [¶] ... [¶]
(2) Merits of an arbitration award either on questions of fact or of law may not be reviewed except
as provided for in the statute in the absence of
some limiting clause in the arbitration agreement.
[FN9]
[¶] ...
[¶](5) Statutory provisions for a review
of arbitration proceedings are for the sole purpose
of preventing misuse of the proceedings where corruption, *25 fraud,misconduct, gross error or mis[FN10]
take
has been carried into the award to the
substantial prejudice of a party to the proceedings.”
(Arbitration Study, supra, pp. G-53 to G-54, italics
added.)
FN9. For this proposition, the report cited
O'Malley, supra, 48 Cal.2d 107, 308 P.2d
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9, and Crofoot, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d
156, 260 P.2d 156, among other cases.
FN10. Although the inclusion of the phrase
“gross error or mistake” may suggest the
commission approved of (or at least recognized) the rule permitting judicial review
of gross errors on the face of the award
causing substantial injustice, the report
later refutes this notion, stating, “Even a
gross error or mistake in an arbitrator's
judgment is not sufficient grounds for vacation, unless the error amounts to actual
or constructive fraud.” (Arbitration Study,
supra, p. G-55.)
The Arbitration Study emphasized that arbitration
should be the end of the dispute and that “the ordinary concepts of judicial appeal and review are not
applicable to ***198 **914 arbitration awards.
Settled case law is based on this assumption.”
(Arbitration Study, supra, p. G-54.) After surveying
the state of the law, the report concluded that although the California statutes do not “attempt to express the exact limits of court review of arbitration
awards, ... no good reason exists to codify into the
California statute the case law as it presently exists.” (Ibid.) Further, the report recommended that
the “present grounds for vacating an award should
be left substantially unchanged.” (Id. at p. G-57.)
The report of the California Law Revision Commission thus concluded that the state of the law, as represented by Crofoot, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d 156,
260 P.2d 156, and its progeny, should not be altered
by any statutory amendments.
The California Legislature thereafter enacted a revision of the arbitration statutes. (Stats.1961, ch. 461,
p. 1540 et seq.) Former section 1288, which had set
forth the grounds on which an award could be vacated, was slightly altered and renumbered as new
section 1286.2, and this section still controls
today.FN11 The new grounds are “substantially a
restatement of the grounds set out in a bit more archaic form in the 1927 statute.” (Feldman, Arbitration Modernized-The New California Arbitration
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Act, supra, 34 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 433.) It is significant that there is no mention of the rule permitting
judicial review for errors apparent on the face of
the arbitration award causing substantial injustice.
We may infer from this omission that the Legislature intended to reject that rule, and instead adopt
the position taken in case law and endorsed in the
Arbitration Study, that is, “that in the absence of
some limiting clause in the arbitration agreement,
the merits of the award, either on questions of fact
or of law, may not be reviewed except as provided
in the statute.” (Crofoot, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d at
p. 186, 260 P.2d 156.)
FN11. The current version of section
1286.2 is quoted on page 189 of 10
Cal.Rptr.2d, page 905 of 832 P.2d.
The Legislature's intent is further revealed by an
examination of other statutes. For example, in
providing for arbitrating disputes arising from public construction contracts, section 1296 directs that
“a court shall ... *26 vacate the award if after review of the award it determines either that the
award is not supported by substantial evidence or
that it is based on an error of law.” By specifically
providing in that provision for judicial review and
correction of error, but not in section 1286.2, we
may infer that the Legislature did not intend to confer traditional judicial review in private arbitration
cases. “ ‘ “Where a statute, with reference to one
subject contains a given provision, the omission of
such provision from a similar statute concerning a
related subject ... is significant to show that a different intention existed.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Drake (1977) 19 Cal.3d 749, 755, 139 Cal.Rptr.
720, 566 P.2d 622.)
The law has thus evolved from its common law origins and moved towards a more clearly delineated
scheme rooted in statute. A majority of California
appellate decisions have followed the modern rule,
established by Pacific Vegetable, supra, 29 Cal.2d
228, 174 P.2d 441, and Crofoot, supra, 119
Cal.App.2d 156, 260 P.2d 156, and generally limit
judicial review of private arbitration awards to
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those grounds specified in sections 1286.2 and
1286.6. (See, e.g., Severtson v. Williams Construction Co. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 86, 92-93, 220
Cal.Rptr. 400; Lindholm v. Galvin, supra, 95
Cal.App.3d at pp. 450-451, 157 Cal.Rptr. 167;
Baseball Players, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d at p. 498,
130 Cal.Rptr. 626; Santa Clara-San Benito etc.
Elec. Contractors' Assn. v. Local Union No. 332
(1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 431, 437, 114 Cal.Rptr. 909;
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Guleserian
(1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 397, 402, 104 Cal.Rptr. 683;
Jones v. Kvistad (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 836,
840-843, 97 Cal.Rptr. 100; Allen v. Interinsurance
Exchange (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 636, 641, 80
Cal.Rptr. 247; Durand v. Wilshire Ins. Co. (1969)
270 Cal.App.2d 58, 61, 75 Cal.Rptr. 415.)
This view is consistent with a large majority of decisions in other states. Although***199 **915 California has not adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act,
more than half the states have done so. (See 7
West's U. Laws Ann. (1985) U. Arbitration Act,
1991 Cum.Ann. Pocket Pt., p. 1.) The statutory
grounds to vacate a private arbitration award set
forth in the uniform law largely mirror those codiFN12
fied in section 1286.2, however,
and most
states have concluded that these grounds are exclusive. (See, e.g., Verdex Steel and Const. Co. v.
Board of Supervisors (1973) 19 Ariz.App. 547 [509
P.2d 240]; *27Affiliated Marketing, Inc. v. Dyco
Chem. & Coatings, Inc. (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1976) 340
So.2d 1240, 1242,cert. den.353 So.2d 675; Morrison-Knudsen v. Makahuena Corp. (1983) 66 Hawaii
663, 668 [675 P.2d 760]; Bingham County Com'n v.
Interstate Elec. Co. (1983) 105 Idaho 36, 42 [665
P.2d 1046, 1052]; Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet
Club, Inc. (1982) 110 Ill.App.3d 217, 223 [65
Ill.Dec. 819, 823, 441 N.E.2d 1333, 1337]; State,
Dept. of Admin., Per. Div. v. Sightes
(Ind.Ct.App.1981) 416 N.E.2d 445, 450; City of
Sulphur v. Southern Builders (La.Ct.App.1991) 579
So.2d 1207, 1210,cert. den.587 So.2d 699; Plymouth-Carver School Dist. v. J. Farmer (1990) 407
Mass. 1006, 1007 [553 N.E.2d 1284, 1285]
[rescript opinion]; AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrow-
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head Reg. Corr. Bd. (Minn.1984) 356 N.W.2d 295,
299; Savage Educ. Ass'n v. Trustees of Richland
Cty. (1984) 214 Mont. 289, 295-296 [692 P.2d
1237, 1240]; New Shy Clown Casino, Inc. v. Baldwin (1987) 103 Nev. 269, 271 [737 P.2d 524, 525]
[per curiam ]; Kearny PBA No. 21 v. Town of
Kearny (1979) 81 N.J. 208, 220-221 [405 A.2d 393,
399]; Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co.
(1984) 312 N.C. 224, 233-234 [321 S.E.2d 872,
879]; Aamot v. Eneboe (S.D.1984) 352 N.W.2d
647, 649; Util. Trailer Sales of Salt Lake v. Fake
(Utah 1987) 740 P.2d 1327, 1329; Milwaukee Police Asso. v. City of Milwaukee (1979) 92 Wis.2d
175, 181-182 [285 N.W.2d 133, 136-137]; but see
Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v. Fitzgerald
(Wyo.1986) 726 P.2d 1056, 1060-1061 [finding
statutory grounds to vacate an arbitration award not
exclusive].)
FN12. Section 12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act states in pertinent part:
“(a) Upon application of a party, the
court shall vacate an award where:
“(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
“(2) There was evident partiality by an
arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any
party;
“(3) The arbitrators exceeded their
powers;
“(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone
the hearing upon sufficient cause being
shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to
prejudice substantially the rights of a
party; or
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and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and
the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the fact that the relief was such
that it could not or would not be granted
by a court of law or equity is not a
ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.” (7 West's U.Laws Ann.
(1985) U. Arbitration Act, § 12, subd.
(a).)
Although the matter would seem to have been put
to rest, several California decisions rendered since
the 1961 statutory amendments have inexplicably
resurrected the view in Utah Const., supra, 174
Cal. 156, 162 P. 631, that an arbitration award may
be vacated when an error appears on the face of the
award and causes substantial injustice. (See, e.g.,
Schneider v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1989)
215 Cal.App.3d 1311, 1317, 264 Cal.Rptr. 227;
Park Plaza, Ltd. v. Pietz, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1420, 239 Cal.Rptr. 51; Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Memorial Hospital Assn., supra, 166
Cal.App.3d at p. 1091, 213 Cal.Rptr. 62; Hirsch v.
Ensign (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 521, 529, 176
Cal.Rptr. 17; Abbott v. California State Auto Assn.,
supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 771, 137 Cal.Rptr. 580;
Campbell v. Farmer's Ins. Exch. (1968) 260
Cal.App.2d 105, 111-112, 67 Cal.Rptr. 175; see
generally, 6 Cal.Jur.3d, Arbitration and Award, §
83, pp. 145-147.)
In light of the development of decisional law embracing as exclusive the statutory grounds to vacate
an arbitration award, as well as the apparent *28 intent of the Legislature to generally exclude nonstatutory grounds to vacate an award, we adhere to the
Pacific Vegetable/Crofoot line of cases that limit
judicial review of private arbitration awards to
those cases in which **916 there ***200 exists a
statutory ground to vacate or correct the award.
Those decisions permitting review of an award
where an error of law appears on the face of the
award causing substantial injustice have perpetu-

“(5) There was no arbitration agreement
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ated a point of view that is inconsistent with the
modern view of private arbitration and are therefore
disapproved.
3. The Arbitrator Did Not Exceed His Powers
[7] Section 1286.2, subdivision (d), provides for vacation of an arbitration award when “The arbitrators
exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision
upon the controversy submitted.” Moncharsh argues this statutory exception to the rule generally
precluding judicial review of arbitration awards applies to his case. It is unclear, however, on what
theory Moncharsh would have us conclude the arbitrator exceeded his powers. It is well settled that
“arbitrators do not exceed their powers merely because they assign an erroneous reason for their decision.” (O'Malley, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 111, 308
P.2d 9; Hacienda Hotel v. Culinary Workers Union
(1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1127, 1133, 223 Cal.Rptr.
305.) A contrary holding would permit the exception to swallow the rule of limited judicial review; a
litigant could always contend the arbitrator erred
and thus exceeded his powers. To the extent Moncharsh argues his case comes within section 1286.2,
subdivision (d) merely because the arbitrator
reached an erroneous decision, we reject the point.
Moreover, consistent with our arbitration statutes
and subject to the limited exceptions discussed in
section 4 post, it is within the “powers” of the arbitrator to resolve the entire “merits” of the
“controversy submitted” by the parties. (§ 1286.2,
subd. (d); § 1286.6, subd. (b), (c).) Obviously, the
“merits” include all the contested issues of law and
fact submitted to the arbitrator for decision. The arbitrator's resolution of these issues is what the
parties bargained for in the arbitration agreement.
Moncharsh does not argue that the arbitrator's
award strayed beyond the scope of the parties'
agreement by resolving issues the parties did not
agree to arbitrate. The agreement to arbitrate encompassed “[a]ny dispute arising out of” the employment contract. The parties' dispute over the al-

Page 20

location of attorney's fees following termination of
employment clearly arose out of the employment
contract; the arbitrator's award does no more than
resolve that dispute. Under these circumstances, the
arbitrator was within his “powers” in resolving the
questions of law presented to him. The award is not
subject to vacation or correction based on any of
the statutory grounds asserted by Moncharsh.
*29 4. Illegality of the Contract Permits Judicial
Review
Moncharsh next contends the arbitrator's award is
subject to judicial review because paragraph X-C of
the employment agreement is illegal and in violation of public policy. Focussing on the fee-splitting
provision of the employment agreement, he contends that despite the limited scope of judicial review of arbitration awards, such review has historically been available when one party alleges the underlying contract, a portion thereof, or the resulting
award, is illegal or in violation of public policy. Before addressing the merits of the claim, we first discuss whether Moncharsh adequately preserved the
issue for appellate review.
a. Waiver
[8] Respondent Heily & Blase suggests Moncharsh
waived the issue of illegality by failing to object to
arbitration on this ground. We reject the claim because, as we explain below, Moncharsh's allegation
that paragraph X-C was illegal, even if true, does
not render illegal either (i) the entire employment
agreement, or (ii) the agreement to arbitrate itself.
Accordingly, his illegality claim was an arbitrable
one, and he did not waive the issue by failing to object to arbitration on this ground.
Section 1281.2 states that when a written agreement
to arbitrate exists, the court shall compel the parties
to arbitrate their dispute “unless it determines that:
[¶] ... [¶] (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of
***201 **917 the agreement.” (Italics added.) Although this statute does not expressly state whether
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grounds must exist to revoke the entire contract, the
arbitration agreement only, or some other provision
of the contract, a fair reading of the statutory
scheme reveals the Legislature must have meant revocation of the arbitration agreement.
For example, section 1281 states “A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy ... is valid ... save upon such grounds as exist
for the revocation of any contract.” (Emphasis added.) Section 1281.2 also speaks in terms of an
“arbitration agreement” and a “written agreement to
arbitrate.” Thus, the plain meaning of section
1281.2 requires enforcement of the arbitration
agreement unless there exist grounds for revocation
of that agreement.
[9] If a contract includes an arbitration agreement,
and grounds exist to revoke the entire contract,
such grounds would also vitiate the arbitration
agreement. Thus, if an otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement is contained in an illegal contract,
a party may avoid arbitration altogether. *30(California State Council of Carpenters v. Superior
Court (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 144, 157, 89 Cal.Rptr.
625 [hereafter Carpenters ]; Bianco v. Superior
Court (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 126, 71 Cal.Rptr.
322.)
[10] By contrast, when-as here-the alleged illegality
goes to only a portion of the contract (that does not
include the arbitration agreement), the entire controversy, including the issue of illegality, remains
arbitrable. (Green v. Mt. Diablo Hospital Dist.
(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 63, 71, 254 Cal.Rptr. 689;
Carpenters, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d at p. 157, 89
Cal.Rptr. 625; Baseball Players, supra, 59
Cal.App.3d at p. 503, 130 Cal.Rptr. 626 (dis. opn.
of Brown (H.C.), J.) [“question of illegality is one
which may be considered by the arbitrators”].)
FN13
FN13. Ericksen, supra, 35 Cal.3d 312, 197
Cal.Rptr. 581, 673 P.2d 251, does not compel a different result. In that case, we held
that when one party to an arbitration agree-
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ment claimed fraud in the inducement of
the contract, the entire controversy was
nevertheless an arbitrable one, and the
question of whether fraud existed was
properly determined by the arbitrator, and
not by a court of law. Although fraud in
the inducement could result in “revocation
of the agreement” (§ 1281.2), we distinguished that case from those in which a
party claimed illegality of the underlying
agreement. (Ericksen, supra, at pp.
316-317, fn. 2, 197 Cal.Rptr. 581, 673 P.2d
251.) Moreover, we reasoned that requiring a party claiming fraud in the inducement to submit the claim to arbitration was
justified because, “The difference between
a breach of contract and such fraudulent
inducement turns upon determination of a
party's state of mind at the time the contract was entered into, and we ought not
close our eyes to the practical consequences of a rule which would allow a
party to avoid an arbitration commitment
by relying upon that distinction.” (Id. at
pp. 322-323, 197 Cal.Rptr. 581, 673 P.2d
251.)
We apply this rule here. Moncharsh does not contend the alleged illegality constitutes grounds to revoke the entire employment contract. Nor does he
contend the alleged illegality voids the arbitration
clause of that contract. Accordingly, the legality of
the fee-splitting provision was a question for the arbitrator in the first instance. Thus, Moncharsh was
not required to first raise the issue of illegality in
the trial court in order to preserve the issue for later
judicial review.
The issue would have been waived, however, had
Moncharsh failed to raise it before the arbitrator.
Any other conclusion is inconsistent with the basic
purpose of private arbitration, which is to finally
decide a dispute between the parties. Moreover, we
cannot permit a party to sit on his rights, content in
the knowledge that should he suffer an adverse de-
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cision, he could then raise the illegality issue in a
motion to vacate the arbitrator's award. A contrary
rule would condone a level of “procedural gamesmanship” that we have condemned as “undermining
the advantages of arbitration.” (Ericksen, supra, 35
Cal.3d at p. 323, 197 Cal.Rptr. 581, 673 P.2d 251
[rejecting a rule permitting determination by courts
of preliminary issues prior to submission to arbitration]; see also Christensen v. Dewor Developments
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 778, 783-784, 191 Cal.Rptr. 8,
661 P.2d 1088 [condemning filing of pre-***202
**918 arbitration lawsuit in order to obtain pleadings that would reveal opponent's legal strategy].)
Such a waste of arbitral and judicial time and resources should not be permitted.
*31 [11] We thus hold that unless a party is claiming (i) the entire contract is illegal, or (ii) the arbitration agreement itself is illegal, he or she need not
raise the illegality question prior to participating in
the arbitration process, so long as the issue is raised
before the arbitrator. Failure to raise the claim before the arbitrator, however, waives the claim for
any future judicial review. Because Moncharsh
raised the illegality issue before the arbitrator, the
issue was thus properly preserved for our review.
b. Judicial Review of Claims of Illegality
[12] Although Moncharsh acknowledges the general rule that an arbitrator's legal, as well as factual,
determinations are final and not subject to judicial
review, he argues that judicial review of the arbitrator's decision is warranted on the facts of this
case. In support, he claims that the fee-splitting
provision of the contract that was interpreted and
enforced by the arbitrator was “illegal” and violative of “public policy” as reflected in several provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Such illegality, he claims, has been recognized as a ground
for judicial review as stated in a line of cases emanating from this court's decision in Loving & Evans
v. Blick (1949) 33 Cal.2d 603, 204 P.2d 23
[hereafter Loving & Evans ].
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Loving & Evans, supra, 33 Cal.2d 603, 204 P.2d
23, involved a dispute about money due on a construction contract for remodeling done on appellant
Blick's premises. In his pleading before the arbitrator, Blick claimed as a “separate and special defense” that respondent contractors could not legally
recover because they were unlicensed in violation
of the Business and Professions Code. The arbitrator found in respondents' favor, and they moved to
confirm the award. Blick objected to the award on
grounds that one of the respondents was unlicensed
in violation of the code. The trial court granted the
motion to confirm, but that judgment was reversed
by this court. Although we recognized the general
rule that the merits of a dispute before an arbitrator
are not subject to judicial review, “the rules which
give finality to the arbitrator's determination of ordinary questions of fact or of law are inapplicable
where the issue of illegality of the entire transaction is raised in a proceeding for the enforcement of
the arbitrator's award.” (Id. at p. 609, 204 P.2d 23,
italics added.)
The Court of Appeal reached a similar result in All
Points Traders, Inc. v. Barrington Associates
(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 723, 259 Cal.Rptr. 780
[hereafter All Points Traders]. In that case, Barrington Associates (hereafter Barrington), an investment banking firm, sought payment of a commission for its assistance in negotiating the transfer of
all the corporate stock of appellant All Points
Traders. The arbitrator found in Barrington's favor
and *32 the trial court confirmed the award. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding the
commission agreement between the parties was invalid and unenforceable in its entirety because Barrington did not hold a real estate broker's license as
required by Business and Professions Code section
10130 et seq. The appellate court reasoned that
“The Legislature selected the specific means to protect the public and has expressed its intention in
section 10136 [prohibiting an unlicensed broker
from bringing an action to collect a commission],”
and that “Enforcement of the contract for a commission would be in direct contravention of the
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statute and against public policy.” (All Points
Traders, supra, at p. 738, 259 Cal.Rptr. 780 [italics
added].)
Both Loving & Evans, supra, 33 Cal.2d 603, 204
P.2d 23, and All Points Traders, supra, 211
Cal.App.3d 723, 259 Cal.Rptr. 780, permitted judicial review of an arbitrator's ruling where a party
claimed the entire contract or transaction was illegal. By contrast, Moncharsh challenges but a single
provision of the overall employment contract. Accordingly, neither ***203**919Loving & Evans,
supra, nor All Points Traders, supra, authorizes juFN14
dicial review of his claim.
FN14. To the extent that Webb v. West
Side District Hospital (1983) 144
Cal.App.3d 946, 193 Cal.Rptr. 80, suggests judicial review of an arbitrator's decision is routinely available where one
party claims merely that a portion of a contract is illegal, we disapprove that suggestion.
[13] We recognize that there may be some limited
and exceptional circumstances justifying judicial
review of an arbitrator's decision when a party
claims illegality affects only a portion of the underlying contract. Such cases would include those in
which granting finality to an arbitrator's decision
would be inconsistent with the protection of a
party's statutory rights. (Accord Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon (1987) 482 U.S. 220,
225-227, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2336-2337, 96 L.Ed.2d
185 [federal statutory claims are arbitrable under
the Federal Arbitration Act unless party opposing
arbitration demonstrates “that Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue”].)
Without an explicit legislative expression of public
policy, however, courts should be reluctant to invalidate an arbitrator's award on this ground. The
reason is clear: the Legislature has already expressed its strong support for private arbitration and
the finality of arbitral awards in title 9 of the Code
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of Civil Procedure. (§ 1280 et seq.) Absent a clear
expression of illegality or public policy undermining this strong presumption in favor of private arbitration, an arbitral award should ordinarily stand
immune from judicial scrutiny.
Moncharsh contends, as he did before the arbitrator,
that paragraph X-C is illegal and violates public
policy because, inter alia, it violates former rules
*33 2-107 [prohibiting unconscionable fees], 2-108
[prohibiting certain types of fee splitting arrangements], and 2-109 [prohibiting agreements restricting an attorney's right to practice], of the Rules of
FN15
Professional Conduct of State Bar.
We perceive, however, nothing in the Rules of Professional Conduct at issue in this case that suggests resolution by an arbitrator of what is essentially an ordinary fee dispute would be inappropriate or would
improperly protect the public interest. Accordingly,
judicial review of the arbitrator's decision is unavailable.
FN15. Rules of Professional Conduct
former rules 2-107, 2-108, and 2-109, were
recodified in substantially the same form
in new rules 4-200, 2-200, and 1-500, respectively.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that an award reached by an arbitrator
pursuant to a contractual agreement to arbitrate is
not subject to judicial review except on the grounds
set forth in sections 1286.2 (to vacate) and 1286.6
(for correction). Further, the existence of an error
of law apparent on the face of the award that causes
substantial injustice does not provide grounds for
judicial review.
Finally, the normal rule of limited judicial review
may not be avoided by a claim that a provision of
the contract, construed or applied by the arbitrator,
is “illegal,” except in rare cases when according finality to the arbitrator's decision would be incompatible with the protection of a statutory right. We
conclude that Moncharsh has demonstrated no reas-
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on why the strong presumption in favor of the finality of the arbitral award should not apply here.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
PANELLI, ARABIAN, BAXTER and GEORGE,
JJ., concur.KENNARD, Justice, concurring and dissenting.
The majority holds that when a trial court is presented with an arbitration award that is erroneous on
its face and will cause substantial injustice, the
court has no choice but to confirm it. (Maj. opn.,
ante, at pp. 184, 203 of 10 Cal.Rptr.2d, at pp. 900,
919 of 832 P.2d.) Because an order confirming an
arbitration award results in the entry of a judgment
with the same force and effect as a judgment in a
civil action (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.4), the majority's holding requires our trial courts not only to
***204 **920 tolerate substantial injustice, but to
become its active agent.
I cannot join the majority opinion. I will not agree
to a decision inflicting upon this state's trial courts
a duty to promote injustice by confirming arbitration awards they know to be manifestly wrong and
substantially *34 unjust. Nor can I accept the proposition, necessarily implied although never directly stated in the majority opinion, that the general
policy in favor of arbitration is more important than
the judiciary's solemn obligation to do justice.
Nothing in this state's statutory or decisional law
compels the rule the majority announces. On the
contrary, the majority has misperceived legislative
intent, misconstrued the relevant statute, and misunderstood the decisional law establishing the
scope of review for arbitration decisions. Worst of
all, the majority has forsaken the goal that has
defined and legitimized the judiciary's role in society-to strive always for justice.
I
The object of government is justice. “Justice is the
end of government. It is the end of civil society. It
ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be
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obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”
(James Madison, The Federalist, No. 51.) As the
preamble to the United States Constitution affirms,
our country was founded to “establish justice.”
Justice is a special obligation of the judiciary.
Every court has the power and the duty to “amend
and control its process and orders so as to make
them conform to law and justice.” (Code Civ.Proc.,
§ 128, subd. (a)(8).) When they construe statutes,
courts are enjoined to do so in a way that will promote justice. (E.g., Civ.Code, § 4; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 4; Ed.Code, § 2; Pen.Code, § 4.) And, because the
very purpose of our legal system is to do justice
between the parties (Sand v. Concrete Service Co.
(1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 169, 172, 1 Cal.Rptr. 257),
the interests of justice are paramount in all legal
proceedings (Travis v. Southern Pacific Co. (1962)
210 Cal.App.2d 410, 425, 26 Cal.Rptr. 700). In
short, justice is the “sole justification of our law
and courts.” (Gitelson & Gitelson, A Trial Judge's
Credo Must Include His Affirmative Duty to be an
Instrumentality of Justice(1966) 7 Santa Clara Law.
7, 8.)
The majority never mentions the judiciary's paramount obligation to do justice, and the rule it announces-which requires trial courts to endorse decisions known to be substantially unjust-is its very
antithesis. By filling its discussion with references
to the expectations of the parties, the development
of decisional law over the course of a century, and
legislative intent as evidenced in our statute, the
majority implies both that these considerations support its holding and that they are more important
than doing justice.
The majority is wrong on both counts. For the judiciary, nothing can be more important than justice.
This proposition is so self-evident that no *35 further elaboration is necessary. Moreover, as we shall
see, respect for parties' freedom to contract, the development of decisional law, the relevant statute,
and ascertainable legislative intent belie rather than
support the majority's holding.
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II
As a method of dispute resolution, arbitration is
generally faster and cheaper than judicial proceedings, but it has fewer safeguards against error. For
this reason, parties who agree to binding arbitration
must be deemed to have accepted the increased risk
of error inherent in their chosen system. The majority takes this proposition, unobjectionable in itself,
and from it jumps to the conclusion that parties who
agree to arbitration thereby agree also to be bound
by an award that on its face is manifestly erroneous
and results in substantial injustice. But the conclusion defies both logic and experience. Reasonable
contracting parties would never assume a risk that
is so unnecessary and self-destructive.
The majority goes astray when it equates substantial injustice with a mere mistake. The two are not
the same. Mistakes commonly occur in the course
of dispute resolution***205 **921 proceedings
without producing substantial injustice. As our state
Constitution recognizes, determining whether a
mistake has been made, and determining whether
an injustice has occurred, are separate and distinct
inquiries. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [court cannot
set aside a judgment for error unless the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice].)
Parties who agree to resolve their disputes by arbitration should not and do not expect busy trial courts
to comb the records of arbitration proceedings to
determine whether any error has occurred and, if
so, the effect of the error. But they no doubt do expect, and ought to be able to expect, that if the
award on its face is erroneous and results in substantial injustice, a court asked to confirm the
award will not turn a blind eye to the consequences
of its action, but will instead take the only course
consistent with its fundamental mandate, and will
vacate the award.
Moreover, even if the parties were to do what is
virtually inconceivable by expressly agreeing that
the arbitrator's award would be binding even if substantially unjust, the agreement would not bind the
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judiciary. The exercise of judicial power cannot be
controlled or compelled by private agreement or
stipulation. (See California State Auto. Assn. InterIns. Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d
658, 664, 268 Cal.Rptr. 284, 788 P.2d 1156; Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Industries, Inc. (3d
Cir.1991) 936 F.2d 127, 129 [“action by the court
can be neither purchased nor parleyed by the *36
parties”].) As the United States Supreme Court has
remarked, a court should refuse to be “the abettor
of iniquity.” (Precision Co. v. Automotive Co.
(1945) 324 U.S. 806, 814, 65 S.Ct. 993, 997, 89
L.Ed. 1381.)
III
To support its holding radically curtailing judicial
review of arbitration awards, the majority surveys
the decisional law of California since 1850. Undeterred by the plain language of the decisions,
which is almost uniformly contrary to the majority's
holding, the majority attempts to penetrate the surface of the opinions in order to trace the ebb and
flow of more than a century's dark currents of judicial thought. Thus, the majority relies on what it
terms
“subtle
shifts”
in
the
decisions,
“transmogrification” of principles, and citations in
one opinion that on “close scrutiny” are alleged to
be at odds with a clear statement of law in the opinion's text. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 193, 194 of 10
Cal.Rptr.2d, at pp. 909, 910 of 832 P.2d.) As an exercise in divination or telepathy, the majority's discussion is fascinating. But as sober legal analysis,
the majority's discussion is simply wrong. From the
outset, this court has consistently-until nowacknowledged that courts should refuse to permit
use of the judiciary's awesome coercive power to
perpetrate a substantial injustice.
In the first decision cited by the majority, Muldrow
v. Norris (1852) 2 Cal. 74, this court held that it
would not enforce an erroneous arbitration award
when the error was on a “palpable and material
point.” (Id. at p. 77.) Although this court used a
verbal
formulation-“palpable
and
material
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point”-different from the term “substantial injustice” that became the standard expression in later
cases (e.g., Utah Const. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry.
Co. (1916) 174 Cal. 156, 160-161, 162 P. 631), the
concept is the same. To be on a “palpable and material point,” an error must be of real importance or
great consequence (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dict. (1988) p. 733), or, in other words, an error
that causes substantial injustice.
Other early decisions used the term “gross error” to
describe the very same ground for vacating an arbitration award. (E.g., Headley v. Reed (1852) 2
Cal. 322, 325; In re Connor (1900) 128 Cal. 279,
282, 60 P. 862.) An error is “gross” if it is glaringly
noticeable “because of inexcusable badness or objectionableness.” (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dict., supra, p. 538.) Thus, the term “gross error,”
like the “palpable and material point” formulation,
represents an early articulation of what has subsequently become known as error causing substantial injustice.
***206 **922 Fairly read, the decisions of this
court, although varying semantically, uniformly and
firmly support the proposition that the judiciary
will not *37 knowingly perpetuate and enforce an
arbitration award that is substantially unjust. This
court has adopted the same standard for determining when a court should decline to follow the rule
known as law of the case. (See People v. Shuey
(1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 846, 120 Cal.Rptr. 83, 533
P.2d 211 [“a manifest misapplication of existing
principles resulting in substantial injustice”]; accord, George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural
Labor Relations Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1279, 1291,
265 Cal.Rptr. 162, 783 P.2d 749.)
The Courts of Appeal have correctly interpreted our
decisions. In case after case, they have reaffirmed
the rule that a court will vacate an arbitration award
when error appears on the face of the award and
causes substantial injustice. (E.g., Cobler v. Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown & Associates (1990)
217 Cal.App.3d 518, 526, 265 Cal.Rptr. 868; All
Points Traders, Inc. v. Barrington Associates
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(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 723, 736, 259 Cal.Rptr.
780; National Football League Players' Assn. v.
National Football League Management Council
(1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 192, 199, 233 Cal.Rptr.
147; Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Memorial Hospital
Assn. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1090, 213
Cal.Rptr. 62; Abbott v. California State Auto. Assn.
(1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 763, 771, 137 Cal.Rptr. 580;
Campbell v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (1968) 260
Cal.App.2d 105, 112, 67 Cal.Rptr. 175.)
Searching for some departure from this prominent
line of authority, the majority relies heavily on the
Court of Appeal decision in Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp. (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 260 P.2d
156 (disapproved on another ground in Posner v.
Grunwald-Marx, Inc. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 169, 183, 14
Cal.Rptr. 297, 363 P.2d 313), but its reliance is
misplaced. Crofoot cites this court's opinion in Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd. (1946) 29
Cal.2d 228, 174 P.2d 441, for the proposition that
courts had recently narrowed somewhat the judicial
review of arbitration awards for legal error. (Crofoot, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d at p. 185, 260 P.2d
156.) But neither Crofoot nor Pacific Vegetable
suggests that review had become so narrow that
courts were obliged to confirm awards containing
obvious error causing substantial injustice. Indeed,
Pacific Vegetable affirms that courts review arbitration awards to prevent “ ‘misuse of the proceeding,
where corruption, fraud, misconduct, gross error,
or mistake has been carried into the award to the
substantial prejudice of a party to the proceeding.’
” (Pacific Vegetable, supra, at p. 240, 174 P.2d
441, quoting Utah Const. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry.
Co., supra, 174 Cal. 156, 159, 162 P. 631, italics
added.) Thus, legal error is a proper basis on which
to challenge an arbitration award, provided that
“the error appears on its face and causes substantial
injustice.” (Utah Const. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry.
Co., supra, at p. 161, 162 P. 631.)
As the majority notes, the Crofoot opinion does
state that the merits of an arbitration award may not
be judicially reviewed except as provided in the
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*38 statute. (Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp.,
supra, 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 186, 260 P.2d 156.)
Because the relevant statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, does not say in so many words
that an arbitration award may be challenged for obvious error causing substantial injustice, the majority concludes that a court may not vacate an award
on this ground. But this conclusion is wrong. Our
statute does not, by negative implication or otherwise, mandate injustice.
IV
Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 lists five
grounds for vacating an arbitration award. This statFN1
utory list is reproduced in the margin.
Although the statute***207 **923 states only that a
court “shall vacate the award” if any of these
grounds is present, the majority construes the statute as precluding a court from vacating an arbitration award on any ground not specifically defined
in the statute. In thus construing the statutory list,
the majority ignores the statute's legislative history.
FN1. “(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; [¶]
(b) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators; [¶] (c) The rights of such party
were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator; [¶] (d) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the
award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the
controversy submitted; or [¶ ] (e) The
rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to
postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefor or by the refusal of
the arbitrators to hear evidence material to
the controversy or by other conduct of the
arbitrators contrary to the provisions of
this title.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 is essentially unchanged from its 1927 predecessor
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(Stats.1927, ch. 225, § 9, p. 406), and materially the
same as the original provision enacted in 1851
(Stats.1851, ch. 5, § 386, pp. 112-113). (See maj.
opn., ante, at pp. 189, 191, 194-195 of 10
Cal.Rptr.2d, at pp. 905, 907, 910-911 of 832 P.2d.)
The Legislature enacted section 1286.2 in its
present form in 1961 (Stats.1961, ch. 461, § 2, p.
1540) following a recommendation and study of the
California
Law
Revision
Commission.
(Recommendation and Study Relating to Arbitration (Dec.1960) 3 Cal.Law Revision Com.Rep.
(1961), p. G-1 et seq.) In its report to the Legislature, the commission separately and expressly addressed the subject of judicial review of arbitration
awards. Because the commission accurately stated
California law on this subject, and because its statement belies the majority's reading of the statute, the
commission's comment is worth quoting in some
detail:
“Nothing in the California statute defines the permissible scope of review by the courts. Numerous
court rulings have, however, developed the following basic principles which set the limits for any
court review: ... [¶] (5) Statutory provisions for a
review of arbitration proceedings are for the sole
*39 purpose of preventing misuse of the proceedings where corruption, fraud, misconduct, gross error or mistake has been carried into the award to the
substantial prejudice of a party to the proceedings.... [¶] Neither the Uniform Arbitration Act nor
other state statutes attempt to express the exact limits of court review of arbitration awards. And no
good reason exists to codify into the California statute the case law as it presently exists.”
(Recommendation and Study Relating to Arbitration, supra, 3 Cal.Law Revision Com.Rep., pp. G53-G-54, fns. omitted, italics added.)
The commission, in other words, did not intend to
either alter or codify the judicially established
grounds for challenging an arbitration award. Contrary to the majority's view, Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 was never meant to define the
“permissible scope of review by the courts” or to
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“express the exact limits of court review of arbitration awards.” Thus, the statute does not preclude a
court from vacating an arbitration award on a
ground well established by decisional law.
In words that closely track the language this court
used in Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd.,
supra, 29 Cal.2d 228, 240, 174 P.2d 441, the commission acknowledged that one purpose of judicial
review is to prevent gross errors or mistakes from
being carried into an award to the substantial prejudice of a party, that is, substantial injustice.
(Recommendation and Study Relating to Arbitration, supra, 3 Cal.Law Revision Com.Rep. (1961),
p. G-55.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2
may not be read as barring a court from vacating an
arbitration award when these conditions are present.
The majority attempts to evade the obvious import
of the commission's statement by referring to language in another part of the report that “[e]ven a
gross error or mistake in an arbitrator's judgment is
not sufficient grounds for vacation unless the error
amounts to actual or constructive fraud.” (Maj.
opn., ante, at p. 197, fn. 10 of 10 Cal.Rptr.2d, at p.
913, fn. 10 of 832 P.2d.) But this statement is not in
the portion of the commission's report setting forth
the basic principles governing judicial review.
Moreover, it is derived from a federal district court
case expressly recognizing that “Gross error or mistake prejudicing substantially the rights of a
party”***208 **924 is a ground for vacating an arbitration award under California law. (Lundblade v.
Continental Ins. Co. (N.D.Cal.1947) 74 F.Supp.
795, 797.) Finally, the word “fraud” as used in the
Commission's statement includes a mistake that
prevents the fair exercise of judgment(California
Sugar Etc. Agency v. Penoyar (1914) 167 Cal. 274,
279, 139 P. 671), and thus includes gross errors or
mistakes that result in substantial injustice.
Even if one were to conclude, contrary to the report
of the Law Revision Commission, that Code of
Civil Procedure section 1286.2 defines the permissible scope of review by the courts, it still would not
follow that a court *40 cannot vacate an award for
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error appearing on the award's face and resulting in
substantial injustice. Under the statute, a court must
vacate an award if it determines that “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be
corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.” (Code
Civ.Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (d).) As the Courts of
Appeal have recognized time and again, arbitrators
exceed their statutory powers when they make an
award that is erroneous on its face and results in
substantial injustice. (E.g., Cobler v. Stanley,
Barber, Southard, Brown & Associates, supra, 217
Cal.App.3d 518, 526, 265 Cal.Rptr. 868; All Points
Traders, Inc. v. Barrington Associates, supra, 211
Cal.App.3d 723, 736, 259 Cal.Rptr. 780; Greenfield
v. Mosley (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 735, 744-745,
247 Cal.Rptr. 314; Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Memorial Hospital Assn., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 1081,
1090, 213 Cal.Rptr. 62; Abbott v. California State
Auto. Assn., supra, 68 Cal.App.3d 763, 771, 137
Cal.Rptr. 580; see also Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1333, 283
Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d 240 [excess of jurisdiction
not confined to subject-matter jurisdiction, but includes acts in excess of authority as defined in the
Constitution, statutes, or judicial decisions]; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d
280, 288, 109 P.2d 942 [same].)
V
Despite my disagreement with the reasoning of the
majority opinion, I agree with the result it reaches.
This is not a case in which error appearing on the
face of an arbitration award would cause a substantial injustice.
The agreement was negotiated between sophisticated parties; the disparity in bargaining power
between the parties was not substantial; there is no
indication of harm to the clients or other third
parties; and there is no basis in the arbitrator's
award for finding that the fees were wholly disproportionate to the services rendered. Therefore, the
award was not substantially unjust.
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CONCLUSION
Although I concur in the result, I cannot join the
majority to support judicially sanctioned and enforced substantial injustice. The majority's holding
violates the most basic obligation of the judiciary,
and is inconsistent with both our well-established
decisional law and our statute.
MOSK, J., concurs.
Cal.,1992.
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase
3 Cal.4th 1, 832 P.2d 899, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Department of Natural Resources,
Division of Wildlife Resources, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
HUNTINGTON-CLEVELAND IRRIGATION
CO., Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20000413.
July 30, 2002.
Rehearing Denied July 30, 2002.
Department of Wildlife Resources (DWR) sued irrigation company, of which it was a shareholder,
challenging unequal share assessments and reduction of DWR's voting rights. The Seventh District
Court, Bruce K. Halliday, J., dismissed complaint.
DWR appealed. The Supreme Court, Russon, J.,
held that: (1) statute of limitations on causes of action for breach of implied contract ran from the
date of each new assessment, and (2) statute of limitations for claims for statutory violations began to
run on each assessment or denial of voting rights
from the date of each individual assessment or
denial of voting rights.
Reversed and remanded.
Wilkins, J., dissented.
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Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Determination of whether the trial court properly
concluded that the statute of limitations expired to
bar action is a question of law that appellate court
reviews for correctness.
[3] Waters and Water Courses 405

234

405 Waters and Water Courses
405IX Public Water Supply
405IX(B) Irrigation and Other Agricultural
Purposes
405k232 Irrigation or Ditch Companies
405k234 k. Capital Stock, and Stockholders. Most Cited Cases
Relationship between a mutual irrigation corporation and its shareholders is contractual, implied in a
subscription for stock and construed by the provisions of a charter or articles of incorporation.
[4] Appeal and Error 30

842(1)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
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Trial court's interpretation of statute is a question of
law that appellate court reviews for correctness.
[5] Statutes 361

181(1)

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k180 Intention of Legislature
361k181 In General
361k181(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Statutes 361

188

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k187 Meaning of Language
361k188 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Unless a statute is ambiguous, court will not look
beyond the plain language of the statute.
[7] Statutes 361

188

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k187 Meaning of Language
361k188 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Statutes 361

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k212 Presumptions to Aid Construction
361k212.6 k. Words Used. Most Cited
Cases
In interpreting a statute, court presumes that the legislature used each word advisedly and gives effect
to the term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning.
[8] Statutes 361

188

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k187 Meaning of Language
361k188 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
In interpreting statutes, court's paramount concern
is to give effect to the legislative intent, manifested
by the plain language of the statute.
[6] Statutes 361
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212.6

206

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire
Statute. Most Cited Cases
Court seeks to render all parts of a statute relevant
and meaningful.
[9] Limitation of Actions 241

49(1)

241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241k49 Implied Contracts
241k49(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Statute of limitations for action on an implied contract is triggered either when “the last charge is
made or the last payment is received.”
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25(1).
[10] Limitation of Actions 241

43

241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241k43 k. Causes of Action in General.
Most Cited Cases
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Statute of limitations ordinarily will not begin to
run on an action until it has accrued.
[11] Limitation of Actions 241

46(6)

241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241k46 Contracts in General
241k46(6) k. Breach of Contract in
General. Most Cited Cases
A cause of action for breach of contract for failure
to make a payment, for deficient payment, or for
overpayment accrues only after a charge is made or
the payment is received, that is, an action for overassessment accrues only after the relevant assessment has been made, and thus the limitation period
begins to run when the payment is received or the
charge is made. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25(1).
[12] Limitation of Actions 241

49(1)
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Complaint filed by Department of Wildlife Resources (DWR) against irrigation company of
which it was a shareholder challenged assessments
levied, rather than just challenging amendments to
articles of incorporation and bylaws, as complaint
sought declaratory judgment relating to irrigation
company's “actions in stripping DWR of voting
rights and imposing higher assessments,” DWR alleged that irrigation company breached contract
with DWR by “unilaterally amending its [b]ylaws
and [a]rticles of [i]ncorporation ... to increase
DWR's assessment costs,” and DWR sought injunctive relief and damages for “illegal assessments
levied against it.”
[14] Pleading 302

16

302 Pleading
302I Form and Allegations in General
302k16 k. Sufficiency of Allegations in General. Most Cited Cases
A party is required only to notice plead.

241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241k49 Implied Contracts
241k49(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Whenever irrigation company made a new assessment against shareholder under purportedly unlawful mechanism, a new cause of action accrued on
that individual assessment, such that statute of limitations on the newly arisen cause of action for
breach of implied contract began to run from the
date of the new assessment.

[15] Waters and Water Courses 405

[13] Declaratory Judgment 118A

[16] Judgment 228

314

118A Declaratory Judgment
118AIII Proceedings
118AIII(D) Pleading
118Ak312 Complaint, Petition or Bill
118Ak314 k. Subjects of Relief in
General. Most Cited Cases

234

405 Waters and Water Courses
405IX Public Water Supply
405IX(B) Irrigation and Other Agricultural
Purposes
405k232 Irrigation or Ditch Companies
405k234 k. Capital Stock, and Stockholders. Most Cited Cases
Where shareholder alleges that irrigation company's
assessments were made pursuant to an unlawful
mechanism, shareholder can assail the assessments
by challenging the mechanism upon which the assessments are based.
585(.5)

228 Judgment
228XIII Merger and Bar of Causes of Action
and Defenses
228XIII(B) Causes of Action and Defenses
Merged, Barred, or Concluded
228k585 Identity of Cause of Action in
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General
228k585(.5) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Judgment 228

720

228 Judgment
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228XIV(C) Matters Concluded
228k716 Matters in Issue
228k720 k. Matters Actually Litigated
and Determined. Most Cited Cases
Once mechanism for assessment levied by irrigation company has been challenged and a final judgment has been rendered on the issue, whether the
judgment vindicated the shareholder's position or
not, res judicata precludes relitigation of the particular claim or issue.
[17] Limitation of Actions 241

46(6)

241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241k46 Contracts in General
241k46(6) k. Breach of Contract in
General. Most Cited Cases
Fact that irrigation company informed shareholder,
outside of the limitations period for breach of contract claims, that a portion of its shares would be
subject to reduced voting rights period did not preclude shareholder's challenge to particular assessments levied by irrigation company; at most, shareholder would be precluded from challenging any reduction in voting rights for time period outside limitations period.
[18] Limitation of Actions 241

58(1)

241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241k58 Liabilities Created by Statute
241k58(1) k. In General. Most Cited
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Cases
On shareholder's claims for statutory violations
based on overassessments and reduced voting rights
by irrigation company following amendments to
articles of incorporation and bylaws, statute of limitations began to run on each assessment or denial
of voting rights from the date of each individual assessment or denial of voting rights; until damages
were sustained, statutory claims remained inchoate
and would not have accrued. U.C.A.1953, 16-4-4,
16-4-7, 16-4-24, 78-12-26(4).
[19] Limitation of Actions 241

58(1)

241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241k58 Liabilities Created by Statute
241k58(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Statute of limitations for actions for liability created
by a statute begins to run only after the cause of action based on statute has accrued; running of the
statute of limitations is not triggered until all of the
elements that must be proved at trial under the statute allegedly creating liability on the part of the defendant are existing and may be established.
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-26(4).
[20] Limitation of Actions 241

43

241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241k43 k. Causes of Action in General.
Most Cited Cases
Generally, a cause of action accrues when it becomes remediable in the courts, that is, when the
claim is in such condition that the courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim is established.
[21] Limitation of Actions 241
241 Limitation of Actions
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241II Computation of Period of Limitation
241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241k43 k. Causes of Action in General.
Most Cited Cases
Unless a statute otherwise provides, generally the
plaintiff must have suffered damages before a cause
of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes.
*1259 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Michael M.
Quealy, Norman K. Johnson, Martin B. Bushman,
Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
J. Craig Smith, David B. Hartvigsen, Salt Lake
City, for defendant.
RUSSON, Justice:
¶ 1 The Utah Department of Wildlife Resources
(“DWR”), a shareholder in the Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company (“HCIC”), filed a complaint to challenge unequal share assessments
levied by HCIC and the reduction of DWR's voting
rights. The trial court dismissed the complaint,
finding that the statute of limitations precluded the
claims asserted therein. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
[1] ¶ 2 When determining whether a trial court
properly dismissed an action, we accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and consider
them, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn
from them, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT
10, ¶ 2, 40 P.3d 1128; Clark v. Deloitte & Touche
LLP, 2001 UT 90, ¶ 2, 34 P.3d 209. We recite the
facts accordingly.
¶ 3 HCIC, a Utah mutual nonprofit irrigation company, delivers water to its shareholders and charges
each shareholder an annual assessment relating to
the amount of water the shareholder receives from
the HCIC canal system. DWR is an HCIC shareholder and uses HCIC water to cultivate crops that
are not harvested but are left onsite for wildlife forage. This dispute arises out of the assessment of
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HCIC shares held by DWR.
¶ 4 In 1977, HCIC amended its articles of incorporation to permit unequal share assessments. The
amended articles instructed the HCIC board of directors to consider the purpose of water use when
making assessments.
¶ 5 Ten years later, in 1987, HCIC again amended
its articles of incorporation. This amendment modified the rights of shareholders who used the water
received under their shares for “municipal and industrial use.” Under the amended articles, the voting rights of such shareholders were limited to voting only at HCIC's annual meeting to approve
newly elected directors. The *1260 amended articles also directed the board to levy an additional
assessment on shares used for municipal and industrial purposes, increasing the assessment on those
shares.
¶ 6 In January 1995, the HCIC board of directors
adopted bylaws that defined the terms “irrigation
use” and “municipal and industrial use” as used in
the 1987 amended articles of incorporation. As
defined in the bylaws, “irrigation use” means
“water applied to land for crop or livestock-feed
production purposes for pecuniary gain,” and
“municipal and industrial use” refers to all other
uses not classified as “irrigation use.”
¶ 7 As a result, in February 1995, HCIC informed
DWR that it could no longer vote a portion of its
shares at HCIC meetings for the election of officers
because those shares had been reclassified as
“municipal and industrial use” pursuant to the 1987
change in the articles of incorporation and the 1995
adoption of bylaws. DWR protested this reclassification. On October 11, 1995, DWR received the first
annual assessment under the amended articles of incorporation and bylaws that reclassified some of
DWR's shares as municipal and industrial shares
(“M & I shares”), and left the remaining shares as
irrigation shares. The shares reclassified as M & I
shares were subject to the additional assessment
and the reduced voting rights.
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¶ 8 In 1996, HCIC reduced the number of DWR's
shares it considered to be M & I shares. However,
in 1999, HCIC reconsidered and determined that all
of DWR's shares were M & I shares, subject to decreased voting rights and increased annual assessments, because DWR's crops irrigated by the HCIC
canal system failed to meet the pecuniary gain requirement in order for DWR's water use to be classified as “irrigation use.” From 1995 to 1998,
DWR paid its annual assessment under protest. Ultimately, DWR filed a complaint on June 14, 1999,
which it then amended on August 16, 1999, asking
the trial court to hold that none of its shares should
be classified as M & I shares. On September 3,
1999, HCIC moved to dismiss DWR's amended
complaint under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that the statute of limitations had run.
¶ 9 On April 20, 2000, the trial court dismissed
DWR's complaint, concluding that the applicable
statutes of limitation had expired. Specifically, the
trial court found (1) that each of DWR's claims was
based either upon an implied contract between
DWR and HCIC or upon alleged violations of the
Utah Code, and (2) that all contract and statutory
violations occurred no later than February 1995.
Accordingly, the trial court held that the four-year
statute of limitations in section 78-12-25(1) of the
Utah Code that applies to claims based upon an implied contract, as well as the three-year statute of
limitations in section 78-12-26(4) that applies to liability predicated upon Utah statutes, precluded
DWR from pursuing all of its causes of action.
¶ 10 DWR appeals the trial court's dismissal of its
amended complaint. The primary issues on appeal
are whether DWR's claims are barred by the statutes of limitation in sections 78-12-25(1) and
78-12-26(4) of the Utah Code.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[2] ¶ 11 The determination of whether the trial
court properly concluded that the statute of limita-
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tions expired to bar DWR's action is a question of
law that we review for correctness. Quick Safe-T
Hitch, Inc. v. RSB Sys. L.C., 2000 UT 84, ¶ 10, 12
P.3d 577; see also State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, ¶
11, 37 P.3d 1103.
ANALYSIS
I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Implied Contracts
[3][4] ¶ 12 The resolution of whether the statute of
limitations expired on DWR's implied contract
claims depends upon when the four-year limitation
period commenced. This determination hinges upon
the construction of Utah Code section
FN1
78-12-25(1).
The trial *1261 court determined
that the four-year limitation period began running
no later than February 1995 when HCIC informed
DWR that it could no longer vote a portion of its
shares under the January 1995 bylaws. The trial
court's interpretation of this statute is a question of
law that we review for correctness. State ex rel.
Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele
County, 2002 UT 8, ¶ 8, 44 P.3d 680.
FN1. The relationship between a mutual irrigation corporation and its shareholders is
contractual, see Badger v. Brooklyn Canal
Co., 922 P.2d 745, 749-50 (Utah 1996);
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Cahoon &
Maxfield Irrigation Co., 879 P.2d 248, 252
(Utah 1994); E. Jordan Irrigation Co. v.
Morgan, 860 P.2d 310, 314 (Utah 1993),
“implied in a subscription for stock and
construed by the provisions of a charter or
articles of incorporation.” Jacobucci v.
Dist. Court, 189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667,
671 (1975) (en banc). As such, the limitation period applicable to causes of action
relating to this implied contract between an
irrigation company and its shareholders is
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governed
by
Utah
Code
section
78-12-25(1). Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc.
v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19
(Utah 1990); Petty & Riddle, Inc. v. Lunt,
104 Utah 130, 136-38, 138 P.2d 648,
651-52 (1942). Neither party disputes that
all but one of the causes of action in this
case are based upon implied contract and
that, therefore, the statute of limitations of
section 78-12-25(1) applies to those actions.
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founded upon an instrument in writing; also on
an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open account for work, labor or
services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases
may be commenced at any time within four years
after the last charge is made or the last payment
is received....
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (emphasis added).

[5][6][7][8] ¶ 13 In interpreting statutes, our paramount concern is to give effect to the legislative intent, manifested by the plain language of the statute. State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, ¶ 19, 37 P.3d
1103; Regal Ins. Co. v. Bott, 2001 UT 71, ¶ 10, 31
P.3d 524; City of Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, ¶
36, 28 P.3d 697. Unless a statute is ambiguous, we
will not look beyond the plain language of the statute. Lusk, 2001 UT 102 at ¶ 19, 37 P.3d 1103. In
doing so, we “ ‘presume that the legislature used
each word advisedly and [we] give effect to the
term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning,’ ” C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ¶ 9, 977 P.2d
479 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d
872, 875 (Utah 1995)), and “we seek ‘to render all
parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful,’ ”
Hall v. State Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24
P.3d 958 (quoting Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609
P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)).

[9] ¶ 15 The plain language unequivocally provides
that an action “may be commenced at any time
within four years after the last charge is made or the
last payment is received” (“statute of limitations
trigger phrase”) in all of the situations listed in section 78-12-25(1), which are actions on an open account on goods, on an open account for work or
services rendered, or “upon a contract, obligation,
or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing.” Id.; see also CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State,
2001 UT 37, ¶¶ 9-10, 24 P.3d 966. The legislature's
use of the phrase “in all the foregoing cases”
clearly indicates the legislature's intent that the statute of limitations trigger phrase apply to all cases
explicitly enumerated in the statute, including implied contracts. Construing the statute otherwise
would render the last phrase of the “statute superfluous or inoperative,” contrary to Utah law. Hall,
2001 UT 34 at ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958.

¶ 14 Unless otherwise provided, a civil action “may
be commenced only within the periods prescribed
in [chapter twelve of title seventy-eight], after the
cause of action has accrued.” Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-1 (1996); see also Davidson Lumber Sales,
Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah
1990). The plain language of section 78-12-25(1) is
unambiguous regarding when the four-year limitation period begins to run on implied contracts. That
section provides:

¶ 16 Moreover, this interpretation of section
78-12-25(1) comports with “[a]n application of
‘elementary rules of punctuation and grammar.’ ”
State ex rel. Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v.
Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ¶ 13, 44 P.3d 680
(quoting *1262Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax Comm'n, 938 P.2d 266, 271
(Utah 1997)). In section 78-12-25(1), the punctuation, which we do not arbitrarily ignore, bolsters
the construction of the statute that the limitation
period commences either when the final charge is
made or the final payment is received. Id. The first
three phrases of the statute are uniformly separated
by semicolons and the second and third phrases be-

An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not
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gin with the word “also.” By so grammatically
structuring the statute, the legislature divided the
sentence into three distinct cases to which the statute of limitations trigger phrase expressly applies.
See id.; Newspaper Agency Corp., 938 P.2d at
271.
[10][11] ¶ 17 Further, the statute of limitations ordinarily will not begin to run on an action until it
has accrued. Davidson Lumber Sales, 794 P.2d at
19. A cause of action for breach of contract for failure to make a payment, for deficient payment, or
for overpayment accrues only after a charge is
made or the payment is received, i.e., an action for
overassessment accrues only after the relevant assessment has been made, and thus the limitation
period begins to run when the payment is received
or the charge is made. SeeUtah Code Ann. §
78-12-25(1); see also CIG Exploration, Inc., 2001
UT 37 at ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 966 (holding that limitation
period expired on plaintiff's claims to recover overpaid royalties because plaintiff's final payment to
State was more than four years before action was
commenced); DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co.,
926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996) (“As a general rule,
a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff could
have first filed and prosecuted an action to successful completion.”).
¶ 18 Many “contract[s], obligation[s], or liabilit[ies] not founded upon an instrument in writing”-such as oral contracts, implied contracts, and
quasi-contracts-require charges and payments to be
made, many of which are made more than four
years after the parties agree to such payments. If the
statute of limitations precluded a party from pursuing a cause of action before it accrued, then parties
could breach contracts with impunity once the statute of limitations had expired. Therefore, we have
repeatedly held that all contracts covered by section
78-12-25(1) accrue when the last charge has been
made or the last payment received. CIG Exploration, Inc., 2001 UT 37 at ¶¶ 10 & 14, 24 P.3d 966,;
Davidson Lumber Sales, 794 P.2d at 19; Petty &
Riddle, Inc. v. Lunt, 104 Utah 130, 138, 138 P.2d
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648, 652 (1942); see also CIG Exploration, Inc. v.
Hill, 824 F.Supp. 1532, 1546 (D.Utah 1993).
[12][13][14][15][16] ¶ 19 Here, whenever HCIC
makes a new assessment under the purportedly unFN2
lawful mechanism,
a new cause of action accrues on that individual assessment, permitting the
statute of limitations on the newly arisen cause of
action to run from the date of the new assessment.
Inasmuch as DWR alleges that HCIC's assessments
were made pursuant to an unlawful mechanism,
DWR can assail the assessments by challenging the
mechanism upon which the assessments*1263 are
FN3
based.
See, e.g., Utah Ry. Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 2000 UT 49, ¶¶ 11-12, 5 P.3d 652; Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Prop. Tax Div. of State Tax
Comm'n, 1999 UT 41, ¶¶ 14 & 22, 979 P.2d 346;
Walker v. Brigham City, 856 P.2d 347, 348-49
(Utah 1993).
FN2. DWR argues that the trial court fundamentally mischaracterized its first
amended complaint by concluding that all
of DWR's implied contract claims had accrued no later than February 1995, rather
than a challenge to the assessments levied
by HCIC. Conversely, HCIC, concurring
with the trial court, stated that DWR implicitly conceded that all challenges to the
amendments of the articles of incorporation or adoption of bylaws were barred by
the statute of limitations and that DWR
“attempts to argue a new, unpled theoryi.e., that [HCIC's] alleged wrongful conduct was not the amendments to [a]rticles
or adoption of the [b]ylaws, but instead
was the annual assessments of shareholders.” In Utah a party is required only to
“notice plead.” Fishbaugh v. Utah Power
& Light, 969 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah 1998).
With this in mind, we review DWR's first
amended complaint.
In this complaint, DWR sought declaratory judgment relating to “HCIC's actions
in stripping DWR of voting rights and
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imposing higher assessments relating to
property/stock ownership” and regarding
how “the higher ‘municipal and industrial’ assessments do not reasonably, or
‘equitably,’ reflect any increased costs
of water delivery.” Further, DWR alleged in the complaint that HCIC
breached its contract with DWR by
“unilaterally amending its [b]ylaws and
[a]rticles of [i]ncorporation after DWR's
acquisition of shares to increase DWR's
assessment costs.” In addition, DWR
sought injunctive relief and damages for
“illegal assessments levied against it by
HCIC,” which DWR paid HCIC, and for
which DWR requested the trial court to
award DWR damages “to refund to
DWR excess assessments paid.” Accordingly, DWR's complaint challenged
the assessments levied.
FN3. Our holding should not be misconstrued to stand for the proposition that the
mechanism may be attacked every time a
new assessment is made contrary to our
well-established doctrine of res judicata.
Once the mechanism has been challenged
and a final judgment has been rendered on
the issue, whether the judgment vindicated
the plaintiff's position or not, res judicata
precludes relitigation of the particular
claim or issue. E.g., Miller v. USAA Cas.
Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, ¶¶ 57-58, 44 P.3d
663;
Culbertson v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, ¶ 12, 44 P.3d
642; Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways,
Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶¶ 34-37, 16 P.3d 1214.
¶ 20 However, DWR is still subject to the statute of
limitations, which precludes actions that accrued
more than four years before DWR filed this suit.
Where, as here, a plaintiff brings suit to recover for
overassessments, the statute of limitations runs
against each assessment from the date the assessment is made, that is, from the date when an action
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may be brought on that particular assessment.
Greene v. Bursey, 733 So.2d 1111, 1114
(Fla.Ct.App.1999). Hence, the limitation period
may expire on some assessments but not on others.
Id. Specifically, DWR cannot challenge every assessment made under the mechanism in perpetuity.
As we have previously applied the limitation period
of section 78-12-25(1), only payments due or assessments charged within the four years prior to filing the lawsuit can be the basis for a contractual
claim. See Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 545, 554,
236 P.2d 451, 456 (1951). DWR has only four
years from the date of an assessment within which
to challenge that particular assessment. The statute
of limitations precludes DWR from challenging assessments made more than four years before this
case was filed on June 14, 1999. See id.(holding
that because services rendered were compensable
monthly, limitation period would begin to run at
end of each month on each individual monthly payment due). However, inasmuch as the first assessment in this suit challenged by DWR was made on
October 11, 1995, the statute of limitations does not
preclude any of the claims at issue in this case challenging purportedly unlawful assessments.
[17] ¶ 21 Although the trial court found that HCIC
informed DWR that a portion of its shares would be
subject to reduced voting rights in February 1995,
this fact does not preclude a challenge to particular
assessments levied by HCIC. Therefore, the limitation period does not preclude DWR from recovering on any alleged overassessments should DWR
prevail below on its implied contract claims.
¶ 22 In addition, the four-year statute of limitations
commenced to preclude an action on particular
shares with respect to DWR's claims of reduced
voting rights when HCIC specifically reclassified
those shares, thus effectively denying voting rights
on those particular shares, because a cause of action
for reduced voting rights accrues when those rights
are effectively denied. HCIC notified DWR that
some of DWR's shares would be subject to reduced
voting rights in February 1995, although it is un-
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clear from the record whether HCIC specifically
notified DWR regarding which and how many
shares would be reclassified and thus subject to the
reduced voting rights. Accordingly, the four-year
limitation period commenced on DWR's reduced
voting rights claim either in February 1995 or on
October 11, 1995, depending upon when HCIC specifically reclassified some of DWR's shares as M &
I shares, which were subject to reduced voting
rights. If HCIC specifically notified DWR regarding which shares were subject to reduced voting
rights in February 1995, effectively reducing the
voting rights on those shares from that time, then a
cause of action on those particular shares would be
time-barred. However, if the February notice was
merely general and did not specifically reduce
DWR's voting rights, then the statute of limitations
would have expired on those voting rights claims
stemming from the 1995 reclassification on October
11, 1999. With respect to the shares reclassified as
M & I shares in 1999, the statute of limitations will
not expire on those voting rights claims until 2003,
and those claims are therefore not time-barred. We
therefore remand to the trial court to
determine*1264 whether some of DWR's shares
were reclassified in February or October 1995 so
that it can be determined whether any cause of action with respect to reduced voting rights on those
shares is precluded.
B. Statutory Claims
[18] ¶ 23 In its amended complaint, DWR alleged
that it suffered damages in the form of overassessments and reduced voting rights because HCIC violated sections 16-4-4, -7, and -24 by amending its
articles of incorporation in 1977 and 1987, and by
adopting new bylaws in 1995 to implement those
amendments (“statutory claims”). However, in dismissing the action, the trial court also concluded
that the three-year statute of limitations in section
78-12-26(4) barred DWR's statutory claims because
this limitation period commenced no later than February 1995, more than three years before DWR
filed its statutory claims. Section 78-12-26(4)
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states:
An action may be brought within three years:
...
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this
state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under
the laws of this state, except where in special
cases a different limitation is prescribed by the
statute of this state....
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4) (1996).
[19][20][21] ¶ 24 The statute of limitations set forth
in section 78-12-26(4) begins to run only after the
cause of action based on Utah statute has accrued.
Id.§ 78-12-1; see also Davidson Lumber Sales,
Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah
1990); State Tax Comm'n v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah
177, 181, 100 P.2d 575, 577 (1940). Generally, a
cause of action accrues when “it becomes remediable in the courts, that is when the claim is in such
condition that the courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim is established.” Spanish Fork, 99
Utah at 181, 100 P.2d at 577; see also Hill v.
Allred, 2001 UT 16, ¶ 15, 28 P.3d 1271 (“In most
circumstances, a cause of action accrues ‘upon the
happening of the last event necessary to complete
the cause of action.’ ” (quoting Myers v. McDonald,
635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981))); Retherford v. AT &
T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., 844
P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992) (“In order to determine
when the limitation period began to run, then, we
must determine when each of the causes of action
became actionable by the courts.”). Accordingly,
the running of the statute of limitations is not
triggered until all of the elements that must be
proved at trial under the statute allegedly creating
liability on the part of the defendant are existing
and may be established. See Davidson Lumber
Sales, 794 P.2d at 19; see also Spears v. Warr,
2002 UT 24, ¶ 33, 44 P.3d 742 (noting that statute
of limitations will not run until all events necessary
to complete cause of action have occurred). Thus,
unless a statute otherwise provides, generally the
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plaintiff must have suffered damages before a cause
of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes.
Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah
1996); Williams v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 95 Utah
376, 378, 81 P.2d 649, 649 (1938); Salt Lake City
v. Indus. Comm'n, 93 Utah 510, 513-14, 74 P.2d
FN4
657, 659 (1937);
see also Monsanto Co. v.
Miller, 455 N.E.2d 392, 394 (Ind.Ct.App.1983);
Luick v. Rademacher, 129 Mich.App. 803, 342
N.W.2d 617, 618 (1983); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Mo.1984) (en banc);
Snyder v. Town Insulation, Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 429,
599 N.Y.S.2d 515, 615 N.E.2d 999, 1000 (1993);
Children's Hosp. v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 69
Ohio St.2d 523, 433 N.E.2d 187, 190 (1982); Osborn Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs., 80 Ohio
App.3d 205, 608 N.E.2d 1149, 1150 (1992); Young
v. Young, 709 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Wyo.1985);
*126551 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 109
(1970); cf. Spears, 2002 UT 24 at ¶ 32, 44 P.3d
742 (noting that limitation period and discovery
rule involve determination of “the point at which a
person reasonably should know that he or she has
suffered a legal injury ” (emphasis added)).
FN4. For a period of time, Williams, 95
Utah 376, 81 P.2d 649, and Salt Lake City,
93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657, were superseded
by a specific statutory limitation period
directly applicable to workers' compensation cases, as noted by McKee v. Industrial
Commission, 115 Utah 550, 554, 206 P.2d
715, 717 (1949). However, in 1990, that
statute was repealed. S.B. 35, 48th Leg.,
Gen. Sess., 1990 Utah Laws 69. Nevertheless, despite the specific statutory history
involved in these cases, the general analysis we employed with respect to when the
limitation period of section 78-12-26(4)
commenced running was never in doubt,
and we are not hesitant to rely upon that
analysis here.
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Code remained inchoate and would not have accrued, and the limitation period was not triggered.
See Seale, 923 P.2d at 1364. Therefore, the threeyear statute of limitations did not commence until
each wrong occurred.
¶ 26 On every purportedly illegal assessment, HCIC
could have violated the statute anew, giving rise to
new liability. Consequently, the statute of limitations began to run on each assessment or denial of
voting rights from the date of each individual assessment or denial of voting rights. Therefore,
DWR can raise only the statutory claims to assail
assessments or reduced voting rights for the threeyear period immediately before DWR filed this action on June 14, 1999. Accordingly, DWR can recover only on statutory claims since June 14, 1996.
CONCLUSION
¶ 27 In light of the foregoing, we reverse and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
¶ 28 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice DURRANT, and Justice HOWE concur in
Justice RUSSON'S opinion.
¶ 29 Justice WILKINS dissents.
Utah,2002.
State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co.
52 P.3d 1257, 453 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 2002 UT 75
END OF DOCUMENT

¶ 25 In this case, until damages were sustained,
DWR's statutory claims under title 16 of the Utah
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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
Matter of the Arbitration Between the STATE INSURANCE FUND, Appellant, and
STATE of New York, Respondent.
June 9, 1995.
State Insurance Fund (SIF) as workers' compensation insurer sought arbitration of claim against state
for reimbursement of payments to worker who was
struck by state-owned garbage truck. Arbitrator
determined that state was not subject to mandatory
arbitration, and SIF sought to vacate decision. The
Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Murphy, J., determined that mandatory arbitration provisions of
no-fault law did not apply to state as self-insured.
Appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, held that mandatory arbitration provisions
of no-fault law applied to state.
Reversed.
West Headnotes
[1] Insurance
3269
217k3269 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 217k567.1)
[1] Workers' Compensation
2190
413k2190 Most Cited Cases
State was subject to mandatory arbitration of claim
by workers' compensation insurer to recover reimbursement for benefits paid on behalf of worker
who was struck by state garbage truck; by electing
to be self-insured and contracting with private firm
to act as representative in automobile accident
claims involving state and employees, state implicitly waived sovereign immunity and requirement
of suit in Court of Claims in order to participate in
comprehensive no-fault statutory scheme, including
mandatory arbitration. McKinney's Insurance Law
§ 5105.
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[2] Insurance
3328
217k3328 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 217k574(7))
[2] Workers' Compensation
2242
413k2242 Most Cited Cases
Appeal on issue of whether mandatory arbitration
of reimbursement claim under no-fault law applied
to state as self-insured could be decided despite
claim of mootness arising from state's acknowledgment that it would pay reimbursement sought by
workers' compensation insurer; case presented novel and important issue not previously passed on by
courts and was likely to recur.
[3] Insurance
2817
217k2817 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 217k531.4(1))
By electing to be self-insured, state stands in same
position as any other insurer under no-fault law.
**986 *99 Raymond C. Green, Liverpool (Jean S.
Kneiss, of counsel), for appellant.
Dennis C. Vacco, Atty. Gen., Syracuse (John Volinski, Ed J. Thompson and Nancy A. Spiegel, of
counsel), for respondent.
Before PINE, J.P., and LAWTON, WESLEY,
CALLAHAN and BOEHM, JJ.
CALLAHAN, Justice:
[1] The State Insurance Fund (State Fund) requests
this Court to reverse a Supreme Court order that
dismissed its petition seeking, inter alia, to vacate
an arbitrator's decision that the State of New York
(State) is not subject to the mandatory arbitration
provisions of Insurance Law § 5105.
On May 7, 1990, John Kowal, an employee of
McNye Transportation (McNye) was unloading a
truck at the Auburn Landfill when he was struck by
a garbage truck owned by the State and operated by
a State employee. He suffered serious personal injuries as a result of the accident. Subsequently, he
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made a claim for workers' compensation benefits.
As the workers' compensation carrier for McNye,
State Fund paid wage and medical benefits "in lieu
of first-party benefits" on behalf of Mr. Kowal in
the amount of $37,354 through May 7, 1993.
Pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 29(1-a)
and the loss transfer provisions of section 5105 of
the Insurance Law, State Fund sought reimbursement from the State, a self-insurer, for all payments
made to Mr. Kowal "in lieu of first-*100 party benefits". The State, through Continental Loss Adjusting Services, Inc. (Continental), its authorized
no-fault claims representative, reimbursed State
Fund a total of $25,000 in first-party benefits.
When Continental refused to make additional reimbursements in the amount of $12,354, State Fund
filed for mandatory arbitration against the State under section 5105 of the Insurance Law. The arbitrator found that State Fund had failed to prove that
the State was a proper party to the arbitration and,
thus, that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction.
By petition pursuant to CPLR 7511, State Fund
sought an order vacating the arbitrator's decision
upon the ground that it was arbitrary, capricious
and without a rational basis in fact or law. The
State opposed that application, contending that the
State was not subject to the arbitration provisions of
the No-Fault Law and that the only forum available
to obtain judgment against the State is the Court of
Claims. Supreme Court agreed with the State.
[2] In its appellate brief, the State contends that
"this appeal should be dismissed as academic because the State now acknowledges that the claim
petitioner sought to enforce through arbitration
should and will be paid". We conclude that this
appeal should not be dismissed as academic because it presents a novel and important issue not
previously passed on by the courts in New York,
and is an issue that is likely to recur, either between
the parties or among other insurers in New York
(see, Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d
707, 714-715, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d
876). Accordingly, we will discuss the merits of
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the appeal.
Insurance Law § 5105 provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
"(a) Any insurer liable for the payment of first
party benefits to or on behalf of a covered person
and any compensation provider paying benefits in
lieu of first party benefits which another insurer
would otherwise be obligated to pay pursuant to
subsection (a) of section five thousand one hundred three of this article or section five thousand
two hundred twenty-one of this chapter has the
right to recover the amount paid from the insurer
of any other covered person to the extent that
such other covered person would have been liable, but for the provisions of this article, to pay
damages in an action at law. * * *
**987 "(b) The sole remedy of any insurer or
compensation provider to recover on a claim
arising pursuant to subsection (a) *101 hereof,
shall be the submission of the controversy to
mandatory arbitration pursuant to procedures promulgated or approved by the superintendent.
Such procedures shall also be utilized to resolve
all disputes arising between insurers concerning
their responsibility for the payment of first party
benefits" (emphasis added).
When the Legislature enacted the No-Fault Law
(Insurance Law art. 18, L.1973, ch. 13, recodified
without substantive changes as Insurance Law art.
51 by L.1984, ch. 367 and ch. 805), it created a partial modification of the pre-existing system of reparation for personal injuries suffered in automobile accidents (Matter of City of Syracuse v.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 83 A.D.2d 116, 118, 443
N.Y.S.2d 901, affd. 61 N.Y.2d 691, 472 N.Y.S.2d
600, 460 N.E.2d 1085). As part of the No-Fault
Law, the Legislature enacted section 674 of the Insurance Law (now section 5105) adopting a new
procedure that authorizes first-party benefits with a
resulting equitable adjustment between insurers
without the need for the formalities applicable to
claims and lawsuits (Matter of City of Syracuse v.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 61 N.Y.2d, at 693, 472
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N.Y.S.2d 600, 460 N.E.2d 1085). Subdivision (b)
of section 5105 (formerly section 674[2] ) provides
that the "sole remedy" of an insurer or compensation provider to recover on a claim for reimbursement of benefits paid shall be submission of the
controversy to mandatory arbitration.
[3] In our view, the comprehensive nature of the
no-fault legislation indicates a legislative intent that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity should have no
application to the statutory arbitration proceedings
between insurers or self-insurers (cf., Matter of City
of Syracuse v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 61
N.Y.2d, at 693, 472 N.Y.S.2d 600, 460 N.E.2d
1085). By electing to be self-insured, the State
stands in the same position as any other insurer under the No-Fault Law (Matter of City of Syracuse v.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 83 A.D.2d, at 122, 443
N.Y.S.2d 901). Thus, we conclude that the Legislature, in enacting section 674 of the Insurance Law
(now section 5105) providing that mandatory arbitration shall be the "sole remedy" of an insurer or
compensation provider to recover reimbursement
for benefits paid from another insurer or self-insurer, must be deemed to have waived both the immunity of the State to suit and the requirement that
it be sued in the Court of Claims (cf., Koerner v.
State of New York, 62 N.Y.2d 442, 448-449, 478
N.Y.S.2d 584, 467 N.E.2d 232; State Div. of Human Rights v. State of New York, Dept. of Mental
Hygiene, 85 A.D.2d 915, 446 N.Y.S.2d 784). In
light of the comprehensive nature of the No-Fault
Law and the mandatory arbitration procedures of
Insurance Law § 5105, as well as the wellestablished intent of the No-Fault Law to reduce
court congestion (see, *102 Montgomery v.
Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 50-51, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 340
N.E.2d 444), we conclude that the Legislature has
provided implicit consent that the State submit to
arbitration in the circumstances of this case.
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contract with a private firm to represent the State's
interests with respect to settlement and subrogation
of claims against State employees arising out of
automobile accidents during the course of their
State duties (see, L.1993, ch. 50, 533- 534). The
legislation provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any
such contract may provide for the payment of benefits up to a maximum of $50,000 for any occurrence in accordance with article 51 of the insurance law and also for the payment of other property damage or bodily injury or wrongful death
claims caused by a tort of such officers, employees, or other authorized personnel up to a maximum of $25,000 for each claimant in accordance
with such terms, conditions, and requirements as
shall be set forth in such contract" (id., at 534).
Therefore, the State, in electing to be a self-insured
and contracting with a private firm to act as its representative in automobile accident claims involving
the State and its **988 employees, must be deemed
to have implicitly waived its sovereign immunity
and the requirement that it be sued in the Court of
Claims, in order to participate in the comprehensive
no-fault statutory scheme, including the mandatory
arbitration procedures of section 5105 of the Insurance Law.
Accordingly, the order of Supreme Court should be
reversed, the petition granted and the decision of
the arbitrator vacated.
Order unanimously reversed on the law without
costs and petition granted.
212 A.D.2d 98, 628 N.Y.S.2d 985
END OF DOCUMENT

Moreover, that conclusion is buttressed by the fact
that the Legislature has authorized the State, as part
of the State operations budget establishing an Automobile Accident Claims Account, to enter into a
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In re Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, L.L.P.
Tex.App.-Fort Worth,2007.
Court of Appeals of Texas,Fort Worth.
In re SPIRITAS RANCH ENTERPRISES, L.L.P.,
Relator.
No. 2-06-463-CV.
March 22, 2007.
Background: Landowner brought action against
town, seeking a declaratory judgment, a temporary
and permanent injunction to enjoin town from taking any action to directly or indirectly annex the
property according to the fast-track annexation procedures until arbitration was completed, and a temporary restraining order restraining the town from
directly or indirectly taking any steps to annex the
property before notice could be given and a hearing
held on landowner's temporary injunction request.
The 16th District Court, Denton County, Carmen
Rivera-Worley, J., denied the temporary restraining
order application, and landowner petitioned for writ
of mandamus.
Holdings: On denial of rehearing, the Court of Appeals, Terrie Livingston, J., held that:
(1) mandamus request was not moot;
(2) landowner was entitled to temporary restraining
order to preserve the status quo;
(3) landowner lacked an adequate remedy by appeal;
(4) landowner had standing under statute to bring
mandamus action; and
(5) exercise of jurisdiction did not violate the state
constitution's separation of powers provision.
Petition conditionally granted.

250I Nature and Grounds in General
250k4 Remedy by Appeal or Writ of Error
250k4(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Mandamus 250

12

250 Mandamus
250I Nature and Grounds in General
250k12 k. Nature of Acts to Be Commanded.
Most Cited Cases
Mandamus relief is proper only to correct a clear
abuse of discretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal.
[2] Mandamus 250

28

250 Mandamus
250II Subjects and Purposes of Relief
250II(A) Acts and Proceedings of Courts,
Judges, and Judicial Officers
250k28 k. Matters of Discretion. Most
Cited Cases
A clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply
the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion and may result in mandamus.
[3] Mandamus 250

172

250 Mandamus
250III Jurisdiction, Proceedings, and Relief
250k172 k. Scope of Inquiry and Powers of
Court. Most Cited Cases
With respect to the resolution of factual issues or
matters committed to the trial court's discretion, the
appellate court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court unless the relator seeking
mandamus establishes that the trial court could
reasonably have reached only one decision and that
the trial court's decision is arbitrary and unreasonable; this burden is a heavy one.

West Headnotes
[4] Mandamus 250
[1] Mandamus 250
250 Mandamus

4(1)

4(1)
250 Mandamus
250I Nature and Grounds in General
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250k4 Remedy by Appeal or Writ of Error
250k4(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Absent extraordinary circumstances, mandamus
will not issue unless relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal.
[5] Mandamus 250

4(1)

250 Mandamus
250I Nature and Grounds in General
250k4 Remedy by Appeal or Writ of Error
250k4(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Determining whether an appeal is an adequate remedy precluding mandamus requires the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations.
[6] Mandamus 250

or the error cannot be made part of the appellate record.
[9] Injunction 212

150

212 Injunction
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)4 Proceedings
212k150 k. Restraining Order Pending
Hearing of Application. Most Cited Cases
The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to
preserve the status quo, which is the last, actual,
peaceable, non-contested status which preceded the
pending controversy.

4(1)
[10] Injunction 212

250 Mandamus
250I Nature and Grounds in General
250k4 Remedy by Appeal or Writ of Error
250k4(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
An appellate remedy is adequate and precludes
mandamus when any benefits to mandamus review
are outweighed by the detriments.
[7] Mandamus 250

4(1)

250 Mandamus
250I Nature and Grounds in General
250k4 Remedy by Appeal or Writ of Error
250k4(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Whether an appellate remedy is adequate so as to
preclude mandamus review depends heavily on the
circumstances presented.
[8] Mandamus 250

4(1)

250 Mandamus
250I Nature and Grounds in General
250k4 Remedy by Appeal or Writ of Error
250k4(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
An appeal is inadequate for mandamus purposes
when parties are in danger of permanently losing
substantial rights, such as when the appellate court
would not be able to cure the error, the party's ability to present a viable claim or defense is vitiated,

150

212 Injunction
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)4 Proceedings
212k150 k. Restraining Order Pending
Hearing of Application. Most Cited Cases
A temporary restraining order restrains a party from
acting only during the pendency of a motion for
temporary injunction, i.e., until a full evidentiary
hearing on the motion occurs. Vernon's Ann.Texas
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 680.
[11] Injunction 212

150

212 Injunction
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)4 Proceedings
212k150 k. Restraining Order Pending
Hearing of Application. Most Cited Cases
A temporary restraining order may not be granted
without notice to the adverse party unless it clearly
appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by
the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the ap-
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plicant before notice can be served and a hearing
had thereon. Vernon's Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 680.

has been annexed is through a quo warranto proceeding, rather than a suit by a private citizen, unless the annexation is wholly void.

[12] Municipal Corporations 268

[14] Quo Warranto 319

33(9)

268 Municipal Corporations
268I Creation, Alteration, Existence, and Dissolution
268I(B) Territorial Extent and Subdivisions,
Annexation, Consolidation, and Division
268k26 Alteration and Creation of New
Municipalities
268k33 Proceedings
268k33(9) k. Proceedings to Prevent or Contest Annexation in General. Most Cited
Cases
Landowner's mandamus proceeding to obtain temporary restraining order to preclude town from taking any action to annex landowner's property until
the trial court could determine the merits of
landowner's injunction request was not moot, although town had agreed to arbitrate dispute with
landowner regarding appropriate annexation procedures, as town's correspondence to landowner indicated that town's position was that, after the court
stay was lifted, it could proceed to annex the property under fast-track annexation procedure at any
time while the arbitration was pending.
[13] Quo Warranto 319

5

319 Quo Warranto
319I Nature and Grounds
319k5 k. Exclusiveness of Remedy by Quo
Warranto. Most Cited Cases
Quo Warranto 319

8

319 Quo Warranto
319I Nature and Grounds
319k8 k. Exercise of Powers by Municipality. Most Cited Cases
In the absence of specific legislative authorization,
the only proper method for attacking the validity of
a city's annexation of territory once that property

1

319 Quo Warranto
319I Nature and Grounds
319k1 k. Nature and Scope of Remedy. Most
Cited Cases
Through quo warranto proceedings, the state acts to
protect itself and the good of the public generally,
through the duly chosen agents of the state who
have full control of the proceeding.
[15] Quo Warranto 319

32

319 Quo Warranto
319II Procedure
319k30 Parties Plaintiff or Petitioners
319k32 k. Use of Name of State. Most
Cited Cases
In a quo warranto proceeding attacking an annexation, the State must bring the action to question irregular use of the delegated annexation authority.
[16] Municipal Corporations 268

33(10)

268 Municipal Corporations
268I Creation, Alteration, Existence, and Dissolution
268I(B) Territorial Extent and Subdivisions,
Annexation, Consolidation, and Division
268k26 Alteration and Creation of New
Municipalities
268k33 Proceedings
268k33(10) k. Collateral Attack on
Proceedings. Most Cited Cases
Once a property is annexed, a landowner has no
private recourse against the annexing municipality
for irregularities in the annexation.
[17] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T
25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(A) Nature and Form of Proceeding
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25Tk118 Matters Which May Be Subject
to Arbitration Under Law
25Tk121 k. Statutory Rights and Obligations. Most Cited Cases
Quo Warranto 319

5

319 Quo Warranto
319I Nature and Grounds
319k5 k. Exclusiveness of Remedy by Quo
Warranto. Most Cited Cases
A private landowner has a statutorily-created right
to arbitrate a dispute regarding whether its land
should be included in a municipality's three-year
annexation plan, and, in accordance with that right,
may maintain an action to compel arbitration
without the necessity of a quo warranto proceeding.
V.T.C.A., Local Government Code § 43.052(i).
[18] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

121

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(A) Nature and Form of Proceeding
25Tk118 Matters Which May Be Subject
to Arbitration Under Law
25Tk121 k. Statutory Rights and Obligations. Most Cited Cases
A party which has met with no success on its petition that a municipality include an area proposed to
be annexed within the three-year annexation plan
has a privately enforceable, statutory right to arbitrate the dispute if party meets requirements of statute providing for election of arbitration before fasttrack annexation actually occurs. V.T.C.A., Local
Government Code § 43.052(b, c), (h)(1), (i).
[19] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

196

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk190 Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration
25Tk196 k. Particular Cases. Most

Cited Cases
Municipal Corporations 268

33(9)

268 Municipal Corporations
268I Creation, Alteration, Existence, and Dissolution
268I(B) Territorial Extent and Subdivisions,
Annexation, Consolidation, and Division
268k26 Alteration and Creation of New
Municipalities
268k33 Proceedings
268k33(9) k. Proceedings to Prevent or Contest Annexation in General. Most Cited
Cases
Landowner which requested that its property be included in town's three-year annexation plan rather
than being annexed according to fast-track procedures was entitled to temporary restraining order to
preserve the status quo and prohibit town from annexing, or attempting to annex, the property
pending a hearing on the merits of landowner's temporary injunction request, so that its right to preannexation arbitration was not lost before such a
hearing could be held. V.T.C.A., Local Government
Code § 43.052(i).
[20] Mandamus 250

4(4)

250 Mandamus
250I Nature and Grounds in General
250k4 Remedy by Appeal or Writ of Error
250k4(4) k. Modification or Vacation of
Judgment or Order. Most Cited Cases
Landowner lacked an adequate remedy by appeal to
contest trial court's denial of request for temporary
restraining order to prohibit town from annexing, or
attempting to annex, landowner's property pending
a hearing on the merits of landowner's temporary
injunction request, and thus was entitled to mandamus relief. Vernon's Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 680; V.T.C.A., Local Government Code §
43.052(i).
[21] Mandamus 250
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250 Mandamus
250I Nature and Grounds in General
250k21 Persons Entitled to Relief
250k22 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Landowner had standing under statute to bring
mandamus action to challenge trial court's denial of
request for temporary restraining order to preserve
the status quo and prohibit town from annexing, or
attempting to annex, landowner's property pending
a hearing on the merits of landowner's temporary
injunction request. V.T.C.A., Local Government
Code § 43.052(i).
[22] Mandamus 250

78

250 Mandamus
250II Subjects and Purposes of Relief
250II(B) Acts and Proceedings of Public Officers and Boards and Municipalities
250k78 k. Organization and Location of
Local Governments or Authorities. Most Cited
Cases
Court's exercise of jurisdiction to grant mandamus
relief to landowner which sought temporary restraining order to prevent town from annexing
property pursuant to fast-track annexation did not
violate the state constitution's separation of powers
provision, as irreparable injury would result to
landowner from the passage of the annexation ordinance due to landowner's loss of its statutory
right to pre-annexation arbitration. Vernon's
Ann.Texas Const. Art. 2, § 1; V.T.C.A., Local Government Code § 43.052(i).

[24] Constitutional Law 92

92 Constitutional Law
92XX Separation of Powers
92XX(A) In General
92k2332 k. Encroachment in General.
Most Cited Cases
Constitutional Law 92

2450

92 Constitutional Law
92XX Separation of Powers
92XX(C) Judicial Powers and Functions
92XX(C)1 In General
92k2450 k. Nature and Scope in General. Most Cited Cases
Because the system of government is crafted to
have three separately defined branches of government, no one of them, and least of all the judicial
department, should attempt to exceed the limits set
about it and invade by such interference the domain
of another. Vernon's Ann.Texas Const. Art. 2, § 1.
[25] Injunction 212

84

212 Injunction
212II Subjects of Protection and Relief
212II(E) Public Officers and Entities
212k84 k. Passage of Ordinances or Resolutions. Most Cited Cases
Restraining passage of an ordinance is a legislative
act, and such restraint cannot be exercised by the
courts. Vernon's Ann.Texas Const. Art. 2, § 1.
[26] Injunction 212

[23] Municipal Corporations 268

2332

84

105

268 Municipal Corporations
268IV Proceedings of Council or Other Governing Body
268IV(B) Ordinances and By-Laws in General
268k105 k. Nature and Requisites in General. Most Cited Cases
The enactment of an ordinance by the legislative
body of a city is a sovereign act of government.

212 Injunction
212II Subjects of Protection and Relief
212II(E) Public Officers and Entities
212k84 k. Passage of Ordinances or Resolutions. Most Cited Cases
A sole exception to the general rule prohibiting a
court from restraining passage of an ordinance exists when irreparable injury will result from the
mere passage of the ordinance. Vernon's Ann.Texas
Const. Art. 2, § 1.
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84

212 Injunction
212II Subjects of Protection and Relief
212II(E) Public Officers and Entities
212k84 k. Passage of Ordinances or Resolutions. Most Cited Cases
More is required than the mere enactment of the
void ordinance, even one invalid on its face, in order for a court to have the power to restrain the passage of the ordinance; it must also clearly appear
that the mere enactment of the ordinance of itself
will work irreparable injury without the intervention of some wrongful act under its authority. Vernon's Ann.Texas Const. Art. 2, § 1.
[28] Injunction 212

85(2)

212 Injunction
212II Subjects of Protection and Relief
212II(E) Public Officers and Entities
212k85 Enforcement of Statutes, Ordinances, or Other Regulations
212k85(2) k. On Ground of Invalidity.
Most Cited Cases
The fact that an ordinance is void alone works no
injury which would allow a court to restrain the ordinance; only after acts are impending or steps are
already being taken to directly cause harm does the
basis for relief exist, and only then may the authority of a court be invoked to restrain the injury. Vernon's Ann.Texas Const. Art. 2, § 1.

[30] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

113

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(A) Nature and Form of Proceeding
25Tk113 k. Arbitration Favored; Public
Policy. Most Cited Cases
Texas public policy favors arbitration.
[31] Statutes 361

181(2)

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k180 Intention of Legislature
361k181 In General
361k181(2) k. Effect and Consequences. Most Cited Cases
The court cannot construe a statutory provision to
lead to an absurd result if the provision is subject to
another more reasonable interpretation.
*891 Winstead Sechrest & Minick, P.C., David F.
Johnson, Fort Worth, Arthur J. Anderson, Dallas,
for Petitioner.
Brown & Hofmeister, L.L.P., Robert F. Brown, Edwin P. Voss, Jr., Richardson, for Real Party in Interest.
PANEL B: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and
HOLMAN, JJ.
OPINION ON REHEARING

[29] Injunction 212

84
TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice.

212 Injunction
212II Subjects of Protection and Relief
212II(E) Public Officers and Entities
212k84 k. Passage of Ordinances or Resolutions. Most Cited Cases
When passage of a ordinance will cause no irreparable harm or injury beyond the power of redress by
subsequent judicial proceedings, judicial interference is not warranted, even if the proposed ordinance disregards some constitutional restraint. Vernon's Ann.Texas Const. Art. 2, § 1.

Introduction
After reconsidering our prior opinion on the Town
of Little Elm's motion for rehearing, we deny the
motion, but we withdraw our opinion and judgment
of February 22, 2007 and substitute the following in
their place.
This original proceeding concerns the Town of
Little Elm's proposed annexation of property owned
by relator Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, L.L.P. The
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main issue is whether the trial court should have issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting the Town from annexing or taking steps to annex Spiritas's property until after Spiritas had been
given the opportunity to arbitrate whether the property could be annexed without inclusion in the
Town's three-year annexation plan. For the reasons
set forth below, having considered all of the filings
FN1
from both parties,
we determine that Spiritas is
entitled to mandamus relief.
FN1. We grant Spiritas's motion for leave
to extend the page limitation on its reply
brief and the Town's motion for leave to
file a supplemental response. Consequently, we deny Spiritas's motion to
strike the Town's supplemental response.
Background Facts
In late September 2006, the Town began the process of annexing approximately 1,103 acres of nonresidential properties located within its extraterritFN2
orial jurisdiction
along State Highway 380
pursuant to *892 section 43.052(h)(1) of the local
government code, which allows largely undeveloped property to be annexed without inclusion
FN3
in the Town's three-year annexation plan.
TEX.
LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 43.052(h)(1) (Vernon
FN4
Supp.2006). Spiritas owns multiple tracts
included
within
this
proposed
fast-track
annexation.FN5 In October 2006, in accordance
with the statutorily-required annexation process applicable to fast-track annexations, the Town sent
written notice to landowners of its intent to annex
their properties. See id. § 43.062. Between November 1 and November 10, 2006, it posted public
hearing notices in accordance with the statute. Id. §
43.063.

of the municipality and that is located:
(1) within one-half mile of those boundaries, in the case of a municipality with
fewer than 5,000 inhabitants;
(2) within one mile of those boundaries,
in the case of a municipality with 5,000
to 24,999 inhabitants;
(3) within two miles of those boundaries,
in the case of a municipality with 25,000
to 49,999 inhabitants;
(4) within 3 1/2 miles of those boundaries, in the case of a municipality with
50,000 to 99,999 inhabitants; or
(5) within five miles of those boundaries, in the case of a municipality with
100,000 or more inhabitants.
TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
42.021 (Vernon 1999).
FN3. For ease of reference, we will refer to
annexation under section 43.052(h)(1), i.e.,
annexation of an “area contain[ing] fewer
than 100 separate tracts of land on which
one or more residential dwellings are located on each tract” without inclusion in a
municipality's three-year annexation plan,
as
“fast-track
annexation.”
Id.§
43.052(h)(1).
FN4. The tracts are separated from the current territorial limits of the Town by Lake
Lewisville and are also located several
traveling miles from the Town's current
emergency facilities.

FN2. Section 42.021 of the local government code provides that

FN5. These properties are not included in
the Town's three-year annexation plan.

[t]he extraterritorial jurisdiction of a municipality is the unincorporated area that
is contiguous to the corporate boundaries

On November 6, 2006, Spiritas sent a letter to the
Town asking that its property be included in the
Town's three-year annexation plan rather than being
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annexed according to the fast-track procedures. The
Town Council held public hearings on the fast-track
FN6
annexation ordinance on November 21, 2006,
but it did not vote on Spiritas's request at that time
because there was not enough time to place it on
the agenda. At a subsequent meeting on December
5, 2006, the Town Council voted not to include
Spiritas's land in the three-year annexation plan and
instead to proceed with the fast-track annexation of
Spiritas's property. Accordingly, on December 6,
2006, Spiritas requested that the Town arbitrate the
issue under section 43.052(i) of the local government code. Id. § 43.052(i). In a December 7, 2006
letter to Spiritas, the Town's attorney confirmed
that the Council would consider whether to arbitrate
at a meeting scheduled for December 19, 2006.
FN6. See id. § 43.0561(a).
The agenda for the December 19 Council meeting
was published on Friday, December 15, 2006. Item
11.e. was titled, “Discussion and consideration to
adopt Ordinances No. 809 an Ordinance of the
Town of Little Elm, Texas annexing territory described in Exhibit A attached hereto to the Town,
and extending the boundary limits of the Town so
as to include the said property within the corporation limits of the Town....” Item 12 read as follows:
The Town Council will hold a Closed (executive)
session meeting pursuant to the provisions of
Chapter 551, Texas Government Code, ... in accordance with the authority contained in:
Section 551.071 Consultation with Town Attorney
to receive legal advice concerning Spiritas Ranch
Enterprises L.L.P. request for arbitration petition
regarding the Little Elm U.S. 380 annexation, and
contemplated litigation.
Discussion and consideration to take any action
necessary as the result of the Closed (executive)
session:
Section 551.071 Consultation with Town Attorney
to receive legal [advice] concerning Spirit[a]s

Ranch Enterprises L.L.P. request for arbitration petition regarding the Little Elm *893 U.S. 380 annexation, and contemplated litigations.
The last page of the agenda contains a notation that
“[p]ursuant to the Texas Open Meeting Act ...,
one or more of the above items may be considered in executive closed session to the public.
Any decision on any item will be taken or conducted in open session following the conclusion
of the executive closed session.” Accordingly, the
agenda appeared to allow the Council to vote on
whether Spiritas's property should be annexed before considering Spiritas's request to arbitrate the
matter.
On Monday, December 18, 2006, Spiritas filed suit
against the Town, asking for a declaratory judgment and a temporary and permanent injunction.
More specifically, Spiritas asked the trial court to
enjoin the Town from taking any action to directly
or indirectly annex the property according to the
fast-track annexation procedures until arbitration is
completed under sections 43.052(i), 43.0565, and
43.0564 of the local government code. Id. §§
43.052(i), .0565, .0564. Spiritas also filed an application for a TRO, asking the trial court to issue a
TRO restraining the Town from directly or indirectly taking any steps to annex the property before
notice could be given and a hearing held on Spiritas's temporary injunction request. That same day,
the Town filed a response, the trial court held a
hearing at which it heard argument from both
parties, and the trial court denied the TRO application. Because the Town Council meeting was to occur at 7:00 p.m. the next day, Spiritas did not have
enough time to schedule a hearing on its request for
temporary injunctive relief. SeeTEX.R. CIV. P. 21
(requiring at least three days' notice of hearing unless shortened by trial court); Tex. Dep't of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 229
(Tex.2004) (noting rule 21's three-day notice period).
On December 19, 2006, Spiritas filed a petition for
writ of mandamus, asking this court to compel the
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trial court to reverse its order denying the TRO and
order the trial court to enter a TRO “maintaining
the status quo” and “precluding [the Town] ... from
taking any action to annex the [p]roperty until the
trial court can determine the merits of Spiritas's
temporary injunction request.” Spiritas also requested that this court issue temporary emergency relief
prohibiting the Town from taking any action to annex the property while Spiritas's petition was
pending. After reviewing Spiritas's motion, petition,
and a faxed response from the Town, we issued an
order granting Spiritas's motion for emergency temporary relief.
In accordance with our order, the Town Council did
not vote on the proposed fast-track annexation ordinance at the December 19 meeting. However, the
Town did vote to arbitrate the dispute with Spiritas.
On December 22, 2006, we received an Agreed
Motion for Reciprocal Temporary Injunctive Relief
in which the parties informed this court of an issue
that had not yet been presented to this court or the
trial court: that Spiritas had submitted two preliminary plat applications to the Town regarding the
property included in the proposed fast-track annexation. Accordingly, the parties agreed that while
this court's stay was in effect, not only would the
Town be prohibited from taking any action to annex
the property, but Spiritas would refrain from submitting any permit applications, except for the two
pending preliminary plat applications, with respect
to the property and from asserting any rights under
section 43.002(a) of the local government code
with respect to the two pending applications. TEX.
LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 43.002(a).
Because it was unclear whether the parties' agreement was intended to encompass *894 the temporary injunctive relief requested by Spiritas in its original petition in the trial court, and because the issue had not been ruled upon by the trial court, we
abated this original proceeding for the trial court to
enter an order based on the parties' agreement.
When we received a copy of the agreed order
FN7
entered by the trial court,
and subsequent cor-

respondence from the parties related to other motions pending in this court, it became clear that the
injunctive relief agreed to by the parties was applicable only during the pendency of this court's
December 19 stay order and did not encompass the
temporary injunctive relief requested by Spiritas in
the trial court. Accordingly, it is necessary for us to
address Spiritas's two issues: (1) whether the trial
court abused its discretion by denying Spiritas's application for a TRO enjoining the Town from attempting to annex the property until an evidentiary
hearing could be held on Spiritas's request for a
temporary injunction and (2) whether Spiritas has
FN8
an adequate remedy by appeal.
FN7. Spiritas's agreed motion to supplement the record with a copy of this order is
granted.
FN8. We note that this proceeding has
been pending for three months and that the
parties agreed temporary injunctive relief
has been in effect since January 5, 2007.
Had the parties instead agreed to the relief
requested by Spiritas-a TRO pending an
evidentiary hearing on Spiritas's request
for temporary injunctive relief-the longest
that agreed relief would have been effective without the Town's consent or good
cause shown would have been fourteen
days. SeeTEX.R. CIV. P. 680.
In its response to Spiritas's petition for writ of mandamus, the Town contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over this original proceeding and that
Spiritas lacks standing to bring it. Because an analysis of the jurisdictional and standing issues necessarily includes a discussion of the merits of Spiritas's complaint-and because we conclude that we
have jurisdiction and that Spiritas has standing-we
will review those typically threshold issues after we
have reviewed the merits of Spiritas's complaint.
Standard of Review
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[1] Mandamus relief is proper only to correct a
clear abuse of discretion when there is no adequate
remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex.2004) (orig. proceeding).
[2][3] A trial court clearly abuses its discretion
when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error
of law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839
(Tex.1992) (orig. proceeding). With respect to the
resolution of factual issues or matters committed to
the trial court's discretion, we may not substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court unless the
relator establishes that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision and that the
trial court's decision is arbitrary and unreasonable.
Id. at 839-40. This burden is a heavy one. In re CSX
Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex.2003) (orig. proceeding). Our review is much less deferential with
respect to a trial court's determination of the legal
principles controlling its ruling because a trial court
has no discretion in determining what the law is or
in applying the law to the facts. Walker, 827
S.W.2d at 840. Thus, a clear failure by the trial
court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion and may result in
mandamus. Id.
[4][5][6][7][8] Absent extraordinary circumstances,
mandamus will not issue unless relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. *895In re Van Waters &
Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 210-11 (Tex.2004)
(citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839). Determining
whether an appeal is an adequate remedy requires
the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations. Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 135-36.
An appellate remedy is adequate when any benefits
to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments. Id. When the benefits outweigh the detriments, we must conduct further analysis. Id.
Whether an appellate remedy is adequate so as to
preclude mandamus review depends heavily on the
circumstances presented. Id. at 137. An appeal is
inadequate for mandamus purposes when parties

are in danger of permanently losing substantial
rights, such as when the appellate court would not
be able to cure the error, the party's ability to
present a viable claim or defense is vitiated, or the
error cannot be made part of the appellate record.
Van Waters & Rogers, 145 S.W.3d at 210-11;
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843-44.
Applicable Law
[9][10][11] The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the
status quo, which the supreme court has defined as
“the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status
which preceded the pending controversy.” In re
Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex.2004) (orig.
proceeding) (quoting Janus Films, Inc. v. City of
Fort Worth, 163 Tex. 616, 358 S.W.2d 589, 589
(1962)). A TRO restrains a party from acting only
during the pendency of a motion for temporary injunction, i.e., until a full evidentiary hearing on the
motion occurs. Del Valle ISD v. Lopez, 845 S.W.2d
808, 809 (Tex.1992); seeTEX.R. CIV. P. 680. A
TRO may not be granted without notice to the adverse party unless it clearly appears from specific
facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the applicant before notice
can be served and a hearing had thereon. TEX.R.
CIV. P. 680.
Section 43.052(c) of the local government code requires a municipality to create and make known to
the public a formal three-year annexation plan.
TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 43.052(c); JNC
Partners Denton LLC v. City of Denton, 190
S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet.
filed). The plan gives three years' advance notice of
the municipality's intention to annex to persons
whose land is described in the plan. TEX. LOC.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 43.052(c); JNC Partners
Denton LLC, 190 S.W.3d at 792. An exception to
FN9
this rule, section 43.052(h)(1),
provides that a
municipality is not required to include sparsely
populated and predominately unimproved land in
its three-year plan. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE
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ANN. § 43.052(h)(1); JNC Partners Denton LLC,
190 S.W.3d at 792. Further, when proceeding under
this fast-track method, the municipality may annex
the land as directed by sections 43.061-.065, which
require substantially shorter notice than three years.
TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 43.052(h)(1)
(providing that annexation outside a three-year plan
is permitted if the area contains “fewer than 100
separate tracts of land on which one or more residential dwellings are located on each tract”),
43.061-.065 (requiring advance notice of intention
to annex of only thirty days and completion of annexation within ninety days). When a landowner is
notified that a municipality intends to annex the
landowner's property under section 43.052(h)(1)'s
fast-track annexation procedures and believes the
procedure*896 to be in violation of section
43.052(c), the landowner may petition the municipality under section 43.052(i) for inclusion of the
land in the three-year annexation plan so that fasttrack annexation of that land would be unavailable
to the municipality. Id. § 43.052(i); JNC Partners
Denton LLC, 190 S.W.3d at 792. If the municipality
“fails to take action on the petition,” the statute
provides that the landowner may request arbitration. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 43.052(i);
JNC Partners Denton LLC, 190 S.W.3d at 792. The
full text of section 43.052(i) provides as follows:
FN9. Section 43.052(h) provides nine exceptions to the requirement of inclusion of
property in a three-year annexation plan; if
no exception is applicable to a particular
property, then, procedurally, it must be included in a municipality's three-year plan
before it is annexed. TEX. LOC. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 43.052(h).
A municipality may not circumvent the requirements of this section [requiring inclusion of property in the municipality's three-year annexation
plan] by proposing to separately annex two or more
areas described by Subsection (h)(1) if no reason
exists under generally accepted municipal planning
principles and practices for separately annexing the

areas. If a municipality proposes to separately annex areas in violation of this section, a person
residing or owning land in the area may petition the
municipality to include the area in the municipality's annexation plan. If the municipality fails to
take action on the petition, the petitioner may request arbitration of the dispute. The petitioner must
request the appointment of an arbitrator in writing
to the municipality. Sections 43.0564(b), (c), and
(e) apply to the appointment of an arbitrator and the
conduct of an arbitration proceeding under this subsection. Except as provided by this subsection, the
municipality shall pay the cost of arbitration. If the
arbitrator finds that the petitioner's request for arbitration was groundless or requested in bad faith or
for the purposes of harassment, the arbitrator shall
require the petitioner to pay the costs of arbitration.
TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 43.052(i).
Analysis
Spiritas contends that the trial court should have issued a TRO pending an evidentiary hearing on its
request for temporary injunctive relief because in
the absence of a TRO, the Town was planning to
vote to annex the property under the fast-track annexation procedure before voting on the arbitration
issue (and before the trial court had the opportunity
to decide whether Spiritas was entitled to arbitration), thus mooting the controversy and extinguishing Spiritas's right to arbitration under section
43.052(i). The Town responds that (1) this court
lacks jurisdiction to enjoin, or order the trial court
to enjoin, the Town from enacting an ordinance under the separation of powers provision in the Texas
Constitution, and (2) that Spiritas lacks standing to
bring this original proceeding and the underlying
suit, which must instead be brought in a quo warranto proceeding.
Whether Controversy is Moot
[12] As a threshold matter, the Town contends that
this original proceeding is moot because it has now
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agreed to arbitrate the dispute with Spiritas.
However, Spiritas has provided this court with correspondence from the Town, to which the Town has
not objected, indicating that the Town's position is
that after this court's stay is lifted, it can proceed to
annex the property under the fast-track annexation
procedure at any time while the arbitration on
whether Spiritas's property should be included in
the Town's three-year annexation plan is pending,
presumably including until Spiritas can schedule a
hearing on its request for temporary injunctive relief. In response to email correspondence from
Spiritas's attorney noting that *897 it appears this
court assumed in its December 28, 2006 abatement
order that the Town “will not annex the property
until the arbitration is completed,” the Town's attorney wrote, “We cannot agree to that. While the arbitration will probably be concluded before the issue of whether the Town can annex before arbitration can be decided, my marching orders from the
Town were to fight for the right to annex, while
still engaging in arbitration.” Accordingly, it appears the Town intends to resume its efforts to complete a fast-track annexation before Spiritas can obtain a hearing on its request for temporary injunctFN10
ive relief.
FN10. Although it is unlikely that the
Town could complete such fast-track annexation proceedings before such a hearing
could be held, it could take steps toward
doing so, which would be in violation of
the TRO that we hold below Spiritas is entitled to.
Therefore, were we to dismiss this original proceeding as moot, the parties would still be faced
with the same live controversy: whether the Town
should be enjoined from taking steps to annex the
property pending a hearing on Spiritas's request for
temporary injunctive relief, at which the trial court
will determine whether the Town should be enjoined from annexing, or taking steps to annex, the
property while arbitration is proceeding and
pending a final trial on the merits. The Town's re-

fusal to refrain from attempting to annex the property until then thus prevents this controversy from
being moot. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,
166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex.2005) (orig. proceeding)
(stating that a case becomes moot if a controversy
ceases to exist between the parties at any stage of
the proceedings); Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171,
184 (Tex.2001).
Whether Fast-track Annexation Before Arbitration is Proper
[13][14][15][16] In the absence of specific legislative authorization, the only proper method for attacking the validity of a city's annexation of territory once that property has been annexed is through
FN11
a quo warranto proceeding,
rather than a suit
by a private citizen, unless the annexation is wholly
void. City of Wichita Falls v. Pearce, 33 S.W.3d
415, 417 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).
Thus, once a property is annexed, a landowner has
no private recourse against the annexing municipality for irregularities in the annexation.
FN11. Through quo warranto proceedings,
“the State acts to protect itself and the
good of the public generally, through the
duly chosen agents of the State who have
full control of the proceeding.” Alexander
Oil Co. v. City of Seguin, 825 S.W.2d 434,
436 (Tex.1992); City of Port Isabel v. Pinnell,
207
S.W.3d
394,
405
(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.).
Therefore, in a quo warranto proceeding,
the State must bring the action to question
irregular use of the delegated annexation
authority. Alexander Oil Co., 825 S.W.2d
at 436; Pinnell, 207 S.W.3d at 408.
[17] Section 43.052(i), which the legislature enFN12
acted in 1999,
states that a landowner may
elect arbitration after it has met with no success on
its petition that a municipality include an area proposed to be annexed within the three-year annexation plan. Hughes v. City of Rockwall, 153 S.W.3d
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709, 714 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. granted); see
also JNC Partners Denton LLC, 190 S.W.3d at 793
(adopting Hughes court's interpretation of section
43.052(i)). Once that occurs, the landowner and the
municipality shall proceed with arbitration as specified by section 43.052(i) pursuant to section
43.0564(b), (c), and (e), which address appointment
of the arbitrator and the conduct of the arbitration.
TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 43.052(i),
43.0564(b), (c), (e); *898Hughes, 153 S.W.3d at
714. Accordingly, a private landowner has a statutorily-created right to arbitrate a dispute under
section 43.052(i) regarding whether its land should
be included in a municipality's three-year annexaFN13
tion plan,
and, in accordance with that right,
may maintain an action to compel arbitration under
section 43.052(i) without the necessity of a quo
warranto proceeding. See Hughes, 153 S.W.3d at
713-14; see also JNC Partners Denton LLC, 190
FN14
S.W.3d at 793.
FN12. Act of May 30, 1999, 76th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 1167, §§ 4, 17, 1999 Tex. Gen.
Laws 4074, 4076-77, 4090.
FN13. The Town attempts to characterize
the arbitration right as a merely procedural
right pertaining only to the features that
will be included in the service plan for the
property to be annexed; however, it is clear
from the plain language of section
43.052(i) that the arbitration right provided
by that section encompasses the broader,
threshold question of whether a municipality must include the property subject to arbitration within its proposed three-year annexation plan in the first place (i.e., before
service plan features are even an issue).
TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. §
43.052(i).
FN14. The Town contends that JNC Partners and Hughes are inapplicable here because those cases dealt with the municipality's refusal to arbitrate while here the
Town has agreed to arbitrate. But as we

have explained above, the Town has not
agreed to refrain from the fast-track annexation process pending arbitration; thus, the
reasoning behind these cases applies.
Moreover, the Town's arguments based on
the merits of the temporary injunctive relief in JNC Partners fail as well because,
here, we are not concerned with the merits
of Spiritas's request for temporary injunctive relief but rather whether the status quo
(no fast-track annexation) should be preserved pending the trial court's determination of the merits of Spiritas's requested
temporary injunctive relief.
[18] Thus, when section 43.052(i) is read together
with section 43.052(b) and (c)-requiring generally
that property be included in a municipality's threeyear service plan before annexation-and section
43.052(h)(1)-providing an exception to the threeFN15
year service plan requirement,
it is clear that a
party has a privately enforceable, statutory right to
arbitrate a dispute if it meets the requirements of
section 43.052(i)before fast-track annexation actually occurs. This timing is important because after
annexation occurs, an arbitration would be meaningless as a landowner could not maintain a private
action to disannex the property. TEX. LOC. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 43.141-.145 (Vernon 1999 &
Supp.2006). Chapter 43 does not include a corresponding right allowing an arbitrator to order disannexation if he or she finds in favor of the private
landowner. Thus, by voting to adopt a fast-track annexation of the property while a landowner's request for arbitration under section 43.052(i) was
pending, a municipality could effectively cut off a
landowner's right to pre-annexation arbitration; a
post-annexation arbitration would be moot, as the
property would have been annexed without being
FN16
included in the three-year plan.
FN15. SeeTEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
311.021(2) (Vernon 2005); Pilgrim's Pride
Corp. v. Cernat, 205 S.W.3d 110, 117-18
(Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied)
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(“Because we are to presume that ‘the entire statute is intended to be effective,’...,
we also presume that each section in a statutory scheme is intended to harmonize
within the scheme.”).
FN16. We note that the supreme court has
issued a stay order in JNC Partners, as did
this court while that appeal was pending
here. JNC Partners Denton LLC, 190
S.W.3d at 792.
[19] Here, preserving the status quo means prohibiting the Town from annexing, or attempting to annex, Spiritas's property pending a hearing on the
merits of the temporary injunction request so that
Spiritas's right to pre-annexation arbitration is not
FN17
lost before such a hearing can be held.
Thus,
we conclude that in order *899 to preserve the
status quo between the parties, the trial court should
have granted Spiritas's application for a TRO.
FN17. The Town argues that Spiritas cannot prove the merits of its entitlement to
arbitration; however, these arguments are
not applicable for two reasons: (1) the issue before us is whether the trial court
should have granted a TRO to protect the
status quo until Spiritas could have an
evidentiary hearing at which it attempted
to prove the allegations it plead in support
of temporary injunctive relief, and (2) the
Town has already agreed to arbitration.
Thus, the issue here hinges on whether
Spiritas is entitled to protect its right to
pre-annexation arbitration until the trial
court can hold a hearing on its request for
temporary injunctive relief.
Adequacy of Remedy by Appeal
[20] Having determined that the trial court should
have issued the TRO in accordance with Spiritas's
request, we also determine that Spiritas did not
have an adequate remedy by appeal. Our supreme
court has held that mandamus relief is available

when a trial court has granted a TRO. Newton, 146
S.W.3d at 652-53 (holding that mandamus available
because TRO is generally not appealable and impending election would have concluded before appeal from trial court's ruling was possible); In re
Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 85
S.W.3d 201, 207 (Tex.2002) (orig.proceeding)
(holding that “mandamus is available to remedy
a[TRO] that violates Rule 680's time limitations”).
The same reasoning applies here to the trial court's
denial of a TRO. Accordingly, we hold that Spiritas
is entitled to mandamus relief to preserve its right
to pre-annexation arbitration pending a hearing on
its request for temporary injunctive relief.
Standing
[21] The Town challenges Spiritas's standing to
bring this original proceeding challenging the
Town's fast-track annexation proceedings in this
case. The Town confuses Spiritas's ability to challenge procedural irregularities in annexation that
are not expressly statutorily created with the right
in section 43.052(i), which was expressly granted to
private landowners by the legislature. See Pearce,
33 S.W.3d at 417; see also JNC Partners Denton
LLC, 190 S.W.3d at 793; Hughes, 153 S.W.3d at
FN18
713-14.
Accordingly, we hold that Spiritas
has standing to bring this original proceeding and
the underlying suit.
FN18. The Town cites City of San Antonio
v. Summerglen Property Owners Ass'n, in
support of its contention that Spiritas lacks
standing. 185 S.W.3d 74, 85-86
(Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied).
However, that case involved property that
was already included in the city's threeyear annexation plan; thus, the arbitration
right set forth in section 43.052 was not
applicable. See id. at 79.
Separation of Powers
[22] The Town also argues that neither the trial
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court nor this court could grant Spiritas's requested
relief because to do so would violate the separation
of powers doctrine as set forth in the Texas Constitution by preventing a legislative body from acting
pursuant to its constitutional and statutory authority. SeeTEX. CONST. art. II, § 1. According to the
Town, because “[t]he power to annex is committed
to the political branches of government ... [and] it is
a legislative prerogative,”see Alexander Oil Co.,
825 S.W.2d at 436, any attempt to enjoin the Town
from enacting the proposed annexation ordinance
would be a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.
[23][24][25] The enactment of an ordinance by the
legislative body of a city is a sovereign act of government. Pinnell, 207 S.W.3d at 417; City of Dallas
v.
Couchman,
249
S.W.
234,
239
(Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1923, writ ref'd). Because our
system *900 of government is crafted to have three
separately defined branches of government, “no one
of them, and least of all the judicial department,
should attempt to exceed the limits set about it and
invade by such interference the domain of another.”
Pinnell, 207 S.W.3d at 417 (quoting Couchman,
249 S.W. at 239). The ability of a court to enjoin
the future enactment of ordinances, including annexation ordinances, has therefore long been
strictly circumscribed, as evidenced by the following quotation:
As before stated, the record clearly establishes that
the ordinance has not been finally enacted, and that
it is still pending before the board of commissioners, to be finally considered and acted upon. The
decree of the court, therefore, enjoins a legislative
act of the board of commissioners. It is well settled
.... that the enactment of a void ordinance will not
be enjoined, although its invalidity clearly appears,
unless it also clearly appears that the mere enactment of the ordinance of itself will work irreparable
injury without the intervention of some wrongful
act under its authority.
Id. (quoting Couchman, 249 S.W. at 239). Restraining passage of an ordinance is a legislative act, and

such restraint cannot be exercised by the courts. Id.;
City of Monahans v. State ex rel. Cook, 348 S.W.2d
176, 179 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1961, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
[26][27][28][29] A sole exception to this general
rule exists when irreparable injury will result from
the mere passage of the ordinance. Pinnell, 207
S.W.3d at 418; Couchman, 249 S.W. at 239. More
is required than the mere enactment of the void ordinance, even one invalid on its face; it must also
clearly appear “that the mere enactment of the ordinance of itself will work irreparable injury
without the intervention of some wrongful act under its authority.” Pinnell, 207 S.W.3d at 418;
Couchman, 249 S.W. at 239. The fact that an ordinance is void alone works no injury. Pinnell, 207
S.W.3d at 418; Couchman, 249 S.W. at 239. Only
after acts are impending or steps are already being
taken to directly cause harm does the basis for relief exist, and only then may the authority of a court
be invoked to restrain the injury. Pinnell, 207
S.W.3d at 418; Couchman, 249 S.W. at 239. When
passage of the ordinance will cause no irreparable
harm or injury beyond the power of redress by subsequent judicial proceedings, judicial interference is
not warranted, even if the proposed ordinance disregards some constitutional restraint. Pinnell, 207
S.W.3d at 418; City of Houston v. Houston Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 697 S.W.2d
850, 852 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no
writ).
Here, the irreparable harm to Spiritas is clear: if the
Town were to annex the property under fast-track
annexation procedures before Spiritas was able to
have a hearing on its request for temporary injunctive relief, which is what the Town has expressly
stated it intends to do, Spiritas would lose its statutory right to pre-annexation arbitration under section 43.052(i) altogether. Accordingly, we believe
that this situation falls within the exception to the
general rule and that granting Spiritas's requested
TRO relief here does not violate the separation of
powers provision in the Texas Constitution.
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[30][31] According to the Town, this interpretation
of state law is erroneous because “[t]he procedures
to provide service plan details are merely procedural matters that do not affect in any way the Town's
authority to annex” and that “[e]ven if [Spiritas's]
concerns about the Town's annexation procedures
were correct (which the Town strenuously denies),
*901 this Court cannot violate the ... separation of
powers doctrine and issue any order to prevent a
governmental body from exercising its legislative
prerogative in an annexation context.” But the
Town's position would render section 43.052(i)'s
arbitration provision meaningless. Faced with a
landowner's attempt to assert its statutory right to
arbitrate a dispute-and, thus, attempt to require a
municipality to include property within its threeyear annexation plan before it is annexed according
to fast-track procedures-a municipality could
simply refuse to arbitrate and complete fast-track
annexation proceedings, leaving a landowner with
no choice but to seek a quo warranto proceeding or
attempt to disannex the property under the procedures set forth in chapter 43. Because Texas public
FN19
policy favors arbitration,
it would make little
sense to conclude that the legislature specifically
granted a private landowner a right to preannexation arbitration without the ability to enforce
that right. We cannot construe a statutory provision
to lead to an absurd result if the provision is subject
to another more reasonable interpretation. C & H
Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315,
322 n. 5 (Tex.1994), abrogated on other grounds
by Battaglia v. Alexander, 177 S.W.3d 893
(Tex.2005); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815
S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991); Astoria Indus. of
Iowa, Inc. v. SNF, Inc., No. 02-05-00315-CV, --S.W.3d ----, ----, 2007 WL 937533, at *4
(Tex.App.-Fort Worth March 29, 2007, no pet. h.).
Accordingly, we hold that our exercise of jurisdiction in this case does not violate the separation of
powers provision set forth in the Texas Constitution.

Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d
266, 268 (Tex.1992) (orig. proceeding).
Conclusion
Having granted Spiritas's motion for leave to extend the page limitation on its reply brief, and the
Town's motion for leave to file a supplemental response, and having concluded that the trial court
should have issued a TRO to maintain the status
quo pending an evidentiary hearing on, and determination of the merits of, Spiritas's request for temporary injunctive relief-i.e., to preserve Spiritas's
statutory right to pre-annexation arbitration pending
such a hearing and determination of the merits of
Spiritas's request for temporary injunctive relief-we
conditionally grant relator's petition for writ of
mandamus and order the trial court to vacate its order denying the TRO and to issue a TRO in accordance with this opinion and the requirements of rule
680, including the time periods included therein for
holding a hearing on Spiritas's request for temporary injunctive relief. SeeTEX.R. CIV. P. 680. The
TRO should preclude the Town or any of its agents
from taking any action to annex Spiritas's property
until the trial court holds an evidentiary hearing on,
and determines the merits of, Spiritas's temporary
injunction request. A writ of mandamus will issue
only if the trial court fails to comply with this order. This court's emergency stay order of December
19, 2006 and the trial court's January 5, 2007 order
granting the parties agreed temporary injunctive relief pending this court's determination of this original proceeding shall remain in effect until the trial court issues the TRO described above, at which
time our emergency stay will be automatically lifted without need for any further order.
Tex.App.-Fort Worth,2007.
In re Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, L.L.P.
218 S.W.3d 887
END OF DOCUMENT

FN19. See In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d
109, 122 (Tex.2004) (orig. proceeding);
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SALT LAKE CITY et al. v. UTAH LIGHT &
TRACTION CO.
Utah 1918.
Supreme Court of Utah.
SALT LAKE CITY et al.
v.
UTAH LIGHT & TRACTION CO.
No. 3209.
May 2, 1918.
Original proceeding by writ of review, obtained by
Salt Lake City, Murray City, the Affiliated Commercial Clubs of Salt Lake County, and E. A.
Walton, to review order of Public Utilities Commission, authorizing the Utah Light & Traction
Company to increase fares on its street railway system. Findings and order of the Commission affirmed.
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Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 3, § 5, subd. “c,” providing
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the courts shall be open, and that “every person for
an injury done to him * * * shall have remedy by
due course of law,” apply to judicial questions; and,
unless a railroad rate fixed by the Public Utilities
commission is either clearly oppressive or confiscatory, no judicial question is presented.
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317AIII Public Service Commissions or Boards
317AIII(B) Proceedings Before Commissions
317Ak168 k. Findings. Most Cited Cases
While the Public Utilities Commission should be
careful to make proper findings respecting material
ultimate facts upon which an order is based, where
the findings and opinion considered together are
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one, they are sufficient.
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317AIII Public Service Commissions or Boards
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and D. W. Moffat, of Murray, for plaintiffs.
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J. F. MacLane and Bismarck Snyder, both of Salt
Lake City, for defendant.
FRICK, C. J.
The Utah Light & Traction Company, a corporation
owning and operating a street railway system in
Salt Lake City and suburbs, hereinafter called defendant, made application to the Public Utilities
Commission of Utah, hereinafter called commission. The defendant made application to the commission in due form to be permitted to increase or
raise the fares for transportation on its street railway system for the alleged purpose of meeting the
increased costs and expenses incident to the maintenance and operation of its railway system in Salt
Lake City and suburbs. The defendant's street railway system extends throughout Salt Lake City,
which now has a population of approximately
115,000, and from thence to Murray City, which is
located about 5 miles south of Salt Lake City, and
from thence south and southwesterly in Salt Lake
county to two other small towns. It also owns and
operates a branch line running northwesterly from
Salt Lake City to the town of Bountiful which is
about 14 miles from Salt Lake City. After the application was filed Salt Lake City, Murray City, and
the other plaintiffs named in the title appeared before the commission and opposed the application. A
hearing was had before the commission, at which
much evidence was produced, both for and against
the application. After the hearing was concluded
the commission in due time rendered an opinion
and made findings whereby it in effect found that,
owing to the increase in the cost of labor and material, etc., the defendant was entitled to some relief,
although not all of the relief prayed for. The commission therefore made an order, authorizing the
defendant to raise its fares in certain particulars, to
which we shall make more specific reference hereinafter. The application of the defendant, the hearing, and the order of the commission were had and
made in pursuance of chapter 47, Laws Utah 1917,
p. 128, popularly known as the Utilities Act, which
hereinafter will be referred to by that name. The
Utilities Act is too long for insertion here. We shall,
however, refer to such portions as are deemed ma-
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terial in the course of the opinion. It may be stated
here, however, that the Utilities Act of this state
does not differ materially from similar acts in force
in many of the other states in the Union. The general jurisdiction of the commission is defined in section 1, art. 4, of the act in the following words:
“The commission is hereby vested with power and
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public
utility in this state, as defined in this act, and to supervise all of the business of every such public utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein
specifically designated, or in addition thereto,
which are necessary or convenient in the exercise
of such power and jurisdiction.”
Section 3 of the same article also confers power on
the commission as follows:
“Whenever the commission shall find after hearing
that the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifications, or any of them, demanded, observed,
charged, or collected by any public utility for any
service or product or commodity, or in connection
therewith, including the rates or fares for excursion
or commutation tickets, or that the rules, regulations, practices, or contracts, or any of them affecting such rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or classifications, or any of them are unjust, unreasonable,
discriminatory or preferential, or in any wise in violation of any provisions of law, or that such rates,
fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifications, are
insufficient, the commission shall determine the
just, reasonable, or sufficient rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, practices, or contracts to be thereafter observed and in
force, and shall fix the same by order as hereinafter
provided.
The commission shall have power to investigate a
single rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, classification,
rule, regulation, contract, or practice, or any number thereof, or the entire schedule or schedules of
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications,
rules, regulations, contracts, and practices, or any
number thereof of *558 any public utility, and to
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establish, after hearing, new rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts, or practices, or schedule or schedules, in lieu
thereof.”
For the purpose of review the act provides for rehearings before the commission in all cases. Section 15 of article 5, so far as material here, provides
that within 30 days after an application for a rehearing is granted or denied an application may be
made to this court “for a writ of certiorari or review.”After specifying how and when the writ shall
be issued and returned, that section provides:
“The case shall be heard on the record of the commission as certified to by it.”
The section then proceeds:
“The review shall not be extended further than to
determine whether the commission has regularly
pursued its authority, including a determination of
whether the order or decision under review violates
any right of the petitioner under the Constitution of
the United States or of the state of Utah. The findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall be final and shall not be subject
to review.”
As before stated, the commission found the facts
and made an order in favor of the defendant, and
the plaintiffs have applied for and obtained a writ
of review as above stated, and the case has been
presented to this court upon plaintiffs' objections to
the findings and order of the commission.
We remark that, while the Attorney General appeared on behalf of the commission, as he is required to do by the Utilities Act, yet he has filed no
brief or argument in the case.
Twenty-three specific reasons are assigned by
plaintiffs why the order made by the commission
should not prevail. It is not necessary to refer to all
of those reasons in detail, and we shall now proceed
to consider those which come within the powers
conferred on this court by the Utilities Act, and
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which we deem material to the controversy.
The first, and perhaps the principal, contention
made by the plaintiffs is that the commission, by its
order, has set aside and annulled the contracts
which were entered into between the defendant and
Salt Lake City and between the defendant and Murray City wherein the rates of fare that the defendant
was authorized to charge and collect were agreed
upon and fixed. The contracts just referred to are in
the form of ordinances which were duly adopted
both by Salt Lake City and Murray City pursuant to
article 12, § 8, of the Constitution of this state
which was in force at the time the ordinances were
passed. The constitutional provision just referred to
reads as follows:
“No law shall be passed granting the right to construct and operate a street railroad, *** within any
city or incorporated town, without the consent of
the local authorities who have control of the street
or highway proposed to be occupied for such purposes.”
The ordinances or contracts will hereinafter be referred to as the franchise ordinances.
In this connection we at this time also desire to call
attention to two other constitutional provisions that
are deemed material, namely article 12, § 12, which
provides:
“All railroad and other transportation companies
are declared to be common carriers, and subject to
legislative control.”
-and to section 15 of the same article which
provides:
“The Legislature shall pass laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight, for correcting abuses, and preventing discrimination and extortion in
rates of freight and passenger tariffs by the different railroads, and other common carriers in the
state, and shall enforce such laws by adequate penalties.”
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In view, therefore, that section 8 of the article of
the Constitution referred to prohibits the Legislature from passing any law by which any street
railway may be constructed or operated in the cities
and towns of this state without the consent of the
local authorities, plaintiffs contend that the authorities of the cities and towns have the exclusive right
and power to impose the conditions upon which
street railways may be constructed and operated in
cities and towns and that the right to determine and
fix the rates of fare is necessarily implied in the
foregoing section. In the franchise ordinances
which were adopted by both Salt Lake City and
Murray City, and the terms of which were accepted
by the defendant, what is termed the “regular fare”
was fixed at five cents for one continuous ride, and
in addition to such fare the defendant also agreed as
follows:
“Said grantee further hereby agrees that it will issue
commutation tickets of fifty fares for two dollars,
the holders of which tickets shall have the same
transfer privileges accorded to passengers paying
regular fare, and shall also issue to students of public schools commutation tickets of fifty fares for
one dollar and fifty cents, with transfer privileges
as aforesaid, good only to and from school attended
by such students, and good only on days when
school is in regular session between the hours of
7:30 o'clock a. m. and 5:30 o'clock p. m. City policemen and firemen in uniform shall be entitled to
free passage on regular cars.”
Transfer rights were also provided for in the franchise ordinances.
The defendant, in connection with other privileges,
accepted all of the provisions contained in the foregoing ordinances, and has operated its street car
system in conformity therewith.
The commission, in its order, relieved the defendant
from issuing the so-called $2 commutation tickets,
and authorized it to charge and collect a fare of 5
cents for each continuous ride in Salt Lake City and
to charge a 5 cent fare for each zone in certain
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zones outside of the city. The commission also
changed the rate somewhat in other particulars on
defendant's system operated outside of Salt Lake
City and Murray City, all of which rates had been
fixed in the franchise ordinances. In view, however,
that a decision upon the so-called $2 commutation
tickets settles all questions affecting the increase
*559 of rates, it is not necessary to set forth the other changes that were made by the commission.
The order of the commission increasing the fares as
aforesaid presents three questions: (1) Did the
passing of the franchise ordinances fixing the fares
and their acceptance by the defendant constitute a
contract between Salt Lake City and the defendant
and between Murray City and the defendant? (2) If
the franchise ordinances constituted contracts, was
it within the power of the Legislature to authorize
the commission to change the fares? (3) Does the
constitutional provision by which the city authorities are given the exclusive right to permit or to refuse permission to street railway companies to construct and operate street cars within the cities of this
state prevent the state, through its Legislature, from
exercising its sovereign prerogative to regulate and
change the fares fixed in the franchise ordinances?
In view that the franchise ordinances after acceptance by the defendant possess all the elements of a
contract, and that such ordinances are generally regarded by the courts as constituting contracts binding as between the parties, we, for the purposes of
this decision, shall treat them as contracts binding
alike on Salt Lake City and on Murray City and on
the defendant to the extent hereinafter stated. The
answer to the first question must therefore be in the
affirmative.
The second proposition, for the reasons herein
stated, in our judgment, must also be answered in
the affirmative, while the answer to the third question, under the great-the overwhelming-weight of
authority must be answered in the negative. The
second and third questions, however, logically
blend, and for that reason we shall treat them together.
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We may as well at this point consider the contention of plaintiffs that by reason of the constitutional
provision above referred to, which prohibits the Legislature from interfering with the city authorities
in authorizing the construction and operation of
street railways, the Legislature is likewise powerless to authorize the commission to interfere with
any rates that have been fixed by the franchise ordinances as before stated. To do that, plaintiffs insist, is not only “impairing the obligation of contracts” (which is prohibited by both the federal and
state Constitutions), but amounts to a complete nullification of such contracts. This objection has often
been made in cases where either the city or the
street car company has sought relief from a rate
fixed by franchise ordinances like those in question
here. It should be observed, however, that where
the controversy has arisen between the contracting
parties merely, and in ordinary actions or proceedings, the courts have usually compelled compliance
with the provisions of the franchise ordinances
treating them as contracts. Where, however, as
here, the application was made to Utilities Commissions in pursuance of a legislative act, the courts
have, with few exceptions, held that a constitutional
or statutory provision prohibiting the Legislature
from passing laws authorizing the construction and
operation of street railways in cities without the
consent of the local authorities does not authorize
such authorities to fix rates which may not be
changed by the Legislature or by a utilities commission created for that purpose. In other words, it is
universally held that the regulation and fixing of
rates is a governmental function, that is, a legislative function, which will not be deemed to have
been surrendered by the sovereign state unless it
has been done in clear and unequivocal terms. A
mere cursory reading of section 8 of the Constitution, which we have before quoted, shows that no
express right is conferred upon the local authorities
of this state to enter into any contract respecting the
fixing of rates. True it is that in determining the
conditions upon which street railways may be constructed and operated within the cities the local authorities may determine the fares that may be
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charged and collected. The authority to do that is,
however, merely implied, and there is nothing in
the Constitution which prohibits the Legislature
from exercising its prerogative in changing the
rates of fare in case they are found to be unreasonable, unfair, or oppressive as against the public on
the one hand and unfair or unjust, or confiscatory,
as against the railway company upon the other.
Such right is an attribute of sovereignty, and is always reserved to the state unless expressly delegated or surrendered. Whether the right and corresponding duty of the state to regulate rates can be
surrendered at all is not before us now, and as to
that we express no opinion. It is manifest that the
constitutional provision does not in express terms
delegate or surrender such a power to the city authorities, and it is equally manifest that there is
nothing in the provision from which such a power
is necessarily implied.
In this connection is must also be remembered that
by another constitutional provision, which we have
also quoted above, the duty of passing laws by
which maximum rates to be charged by all common
carriers shall be established is especially imposed
on the Legislature. The right to regulate the rates or
charges demanded by common carriers was therefore not only reserved to the state when acting in its
governmental capacity, but the duty to regulate and
fix maximum rates or charges is expressly imposed
on the Legislature without any exceptions. In
passing the Utilities Act the Legislature therefore
merely complied with the constitutional mandate,
and the commission is the *560 mere arm of the Legislature through which the constitutional mandate
aforesaid is made effective.
All of the foregoing propositions are exhaustively
considered, and are sustained by the following authorities: Home Telephone, etc., Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 29 Sup. Ct. 50, 53 L. Ed.
176;Benwood v. Public Service Commission (1914)
75 W. Va. 127, 83 S. E. 295, L. R. A. 1915C,
261;State ex rel. v. Superior Court (1912) 67 Wash.
37, 120 Pac. 861, L. R. A. 1915C, 287, Ann. Cas.
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1913D, 78, approved in Puget Sound Tr. Co. v.
Reynolds (1917) 244 U. S. 574, 37 Sup. Ct. 705, 61
L. Ed. 1325;Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. v. Railroad
Commission (1913) 153 Wis. 592, 142 N. W. 491,
L. R. A. 1915F, 744, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 911, affirmed in 238 U. S. 174, 35 Sup. Ct. 820, 59 L. Ed.
1254;City of Woodburn v. Public Service Commission (1916) 82 Or. 114, 161 Pac. 391, L. R. A.
1917C, 98;Denver & S. P. Ry. Co. v. Englewood
(Colo. 1916) 161 Pac. 151;City of Pawhuska v.
Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co. (Okl. 1917) 166 Pac.
1058;Collingswood Sewerage Co. v. Borough of
Collingswood (N. J. 1918) 102 Atl. 901;Northampton, etc., Co. v. Board of Public Utilities (N. J.
1918) 102 Atl. 930;People v. Public Service Commission (1916) 175 App. Div. 869, 162 N. Y. Supp.
405;In re Huntington R. Co., P. U. R. 1918A,
249;Public Utilities Commission v. Chicago & W.
T. Ry. Co. (1916) 275 Ill. 555-572, 114 N. E. 325,
Ann. Cas. 1917C, 50;City of Chicago v. O'Connell
(1917) 278 Ill. 591, 116 N. E. 210;Winfield v. Public Service Commission (Ind. 1918) 118 N. E. 531.
In State ex rel. v. Superior Court, supra, in the
course of the opinion, it is said:
“The power to fix rates, if exercised by a city, unless that power is clearly expressed by legislative
grant, is in the nature of a license, and is revocable
at the will of the Legislature when, in its judgment,
the common good demands its reassertion. The
state does not act by contract, but by grant, license,
or reservation. It is not usually bound by the contracts of others when exercising its police power.
So jealous is it of the sovereignty of its police
power that, in the case of the Home Tel. Co. v. Los
Angeles, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that a grant by the Legislature of the state of
the right ‘to fix and determine charges for telephone, telephone service, and connections,’ did not
carry with it the right to agree upon rates. In other
words, as that court and others have universally
held, the delegation of power must be ‘clear and
unmistakable.’ In dealing with the sovereign power
of the people, nothing can be left to inference. The
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court accordingly said that, the power to fix and determine rates being within the police power, the
city might establish rates, but that it could not, under the delegation quoted, contract so as to bind itself or the other party as against the exercise of the
police power. In principle its holding could not
have been otherwise, for the strength of the police
power lies in the fact that it is not a subject of contract; that it cannot be bartered or bargained away.”
In Puget Sound Tr. Co. v. Reynolds, supra, the
court uses the following language:
“Assuming (what is not clear) that the provision in
the franchise ordinance respecting the rates of fare
and the transfer privilege are contractual in form,
still it is well settled that a municipality cannot, by
a contract of this nature, foreclose the exercise of
the police power of the state unless clearly authorized to do so by the supreme legislative power.”
In Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra, the court, in the course of the opinion,
says:
“Assuming that under this language a city might
make a contract with a public utility, fixing rates or
tolls for a definite period, which would bind the
city itself and prevent any change of rates by the
city authorities during the period, the question still
remains whether the section can be construed as
giving the city authorities any power to bargain
away the sovereign right of the state to regulate
fares and tolls and lower them, if found to be excessive. If this question were a new one in this
state, we should entertain no doubt that it should be
answered in the negative, but we cannot regard it as
new.”
While it is true that two of the justices dissented
from the majority opinion in the foregoing case, yet
it is equally true that the case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the opinion of the majority was affirmed.
In the case of Woodburn v. Public Service Com-
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mission, supra, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in
passing on the question here involved, in the course
of the opinion, said:
“The right of the state to regulate rates by compulsion is a police power, and must not be confused
with the right of a city to exercise its contractual
power to agree with a public service company upon
the terms of a franchise. The exercise of a power to
fix rates by agreement does not include or embrace
any portion of the power to fix rates by compulsion.
When Woodburn granted the franchise to the telephone company, the city exercised its municipal
right to contract, and it may be assumed that the
franchise was valid and binding upon both parties
until such time as the state chose to speak; but the
city entered into the contract subject to the reserved
right of the state to employ its police power and
compel a change of rates, and when the state did
speak, the municipal power gave way to the sovereign power of the state.”
In all of the cases we have cited similar language is
used, and in nearly all of them constitutional or
statutory provisions conferring the authority on the
local authorities of cities to grant or refuse permission to construct and operate street railways in such
cities, similar to our own, were construed and
passed on, and in all of those cases it is held that
those provisions do not foreclose the state from
changing the rates of fare agreed upon in the franchise ordinances. We shall refrain from quoting further from the decided cases.
We desire to add, however, that this court, in the
case of Brummitt v. Ogden Waterworks Co., 33
Utah, 289, 93 Pac. 829, which was decided in 1908
and before practically all of the foregoing cases
were decided, and before the Legislature of this
state passed a law for the purpose of regulating
rates, announced the doctrine laid down in all of the
*561 foregoing cases. In the Brummitt Case the
constitutional provision in question here was,
however, not applicable, and hence was not considered.
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Against the foregoing array of authority plaintiffs
have cited and rely upon the following cases: Allegheny v. Railroad, 159 Pa. 411, 28 Atl. 202;Appeal of the City of Pittsburgh, 115 Pa. 4, 7 Atl.
778;Plymouth v. Railway, 168 Pa. 181, 32 Atl.
19;People v. New York Ry. Co., 217 N. Y. 310,
112 N. E. 49;Adamson v. Nassau El. Ry. Co., 89
Hun, 261, 34 N. Y. Supp. 1073;People v. Tonawanda, 70 Misc. Rep. 91, 126 N. Y. Supp.
186;Detroit v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co., 184 U. S. 368,
22 Sup. Ct. 410, 46 L. Ed. 592;Public Service Commission v. Westchester St. Ry. Co., 206 N. Y. 209,
99 N. E. 536;Gaedeke v. Staten Island M. R. Co.,
43 App. Div. 514, 60 N. Y. Supp. 598;People v.
Willcox, 133 App. Div. 556, 118 N. Y. Supp. 248,
and Re N. Y. & Northshore Tr. Co., P. U. R.
1918A, 893.
Every one of the cases last above cited, however, is
clearly distinguishable from the cases we have first
above referred to except the last one. That case
squarely supports plaintiffs' contention that the
franchise ordinances constituted contracts which
may not be altered in any material part except by
the consent of the parties in interest. That case originated, however, before the Public Service Commission of the state of New York, and therefore
merely represents the views of the commission.
While no doubt the decision is entitled to respectful
consideration, yet it is not authority since it does
not emanate from a court of last resort. The case of
In re Huntington Ry. Co., P. U. R. 1918A, 249, also
originated before the Public Service Commission of
the Second district of the state of New York, and is
a decision of that commission. That decision is,
however, squarely in opposition to the decision
from the commission of the First district and is
therefore in harmony with the great weight of authority. Many, if not all, of the cases relied on by
plaintiffs are also cited and relied on in the opinion
of the Public Service Commission of the First district of New York. In many of those cases it is held
that franchise ordinances, like those in question in
the case at bar, constitute contracts which are binding and enforceable between the parties. The fur-
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ther question was, however, not decided whether
such contracts are also binding upon the state in its
sovereign capacity. Indeed, in many of the cases it
is clearly enough intimated that if that question had
been presented for decision the result might have
been different.
We have no difficulty in reconciling the decisions
in those cases. It is now settled law that so long as
the state does not interfere the rates agreed upon
between the cities and the street railway companies
in the franchise ordinances are binding and enforceable. Neither party, without the consent of the other, may disregard any rate that is agreed upon
between them. Either party may, however, make
application to the Utilities Commission, if one is
created by Legislative enactment, for the purpose of
being relieved from the rates fixed in the franchise
ordinance, and if it be made to appear that the rates
under existing conditions have become unfair or
unreasonable, in that they are either too high or too
low, the commission may establish a rate which
will again respond to the existing conditions, and
may so adjust it as to make it fair, just and reasonable both to the railway company and to the public.
In doing that the constitutional rights of the parties
are neither invaded nor disregarded, for the simple
reason that when the original rate was fixed by
agreement it was still subject to modification at any
time by the sovereign power of the state, providing
the fare as fixed is found to be unfair and unreasonable. Every contract fixing rates entered into
between the cities of this state and street railway
companies, both under the Constitution and the
statute, is always subject to change by the paramount power of the state, and the right of the state
to so change the rates continues unless and until the
Legislature has in express terms surrendered the
power or delegated it to some other arm of the
state.
Plaintiffs' contention, therefore, that the rates of
fare fixed by the franchise ordinances should have
been affirmed by the commission upon the ground
that such rights were contractual cannot prevail,
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and must be overruled.
Plaintiffs, however, also insist that the commutation
tickets are not within the purview of the Utilities
Act, but are excluded therefrom by a certain exception found in subdivision “c” of section 5 of article
3 of that act. It is there provided:
“Nothing in this act contained shall be construed
*** to prevent the carrying out of contracts for free
or reduced rate passenger transportation or other
public utility service heretofore made, founded
upon adequate consideration and lawful when
made.”
The foregoing provision is found among the exceptions in favor of employés and respecting agreements with other utilities. While the language of the
exception is not as clear as it could have been
made, yet it is manifest that it was not intended to
refer to the rates fixed in franchise ordinances. In
our opinion the manifest purpose of the Legislature
was to prevent an injustice like that in the case of
Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467,
31 Sup. Ct. 265, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 671, in which
case life passes were issued to Mottley and his wife
upon a valuable consideration received by the railroad company. In that case the Supreme Court of
the United States held that under the act of Congress of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as
subsequently amended (U. S. Comp. St. 1916, §
*562 8563 et seq.), common carriers were prohibited from transporting either freight or passengers
except at the regular rates, which had to be paid in
cash. Under that decision, therefore, the Mottleys
were prohibited from riding on their passes, although they had paid for them before the congressional act had been passed. Moreover, it sometimes
happens that passes are issued in payment for right
of way and other privileges granted by the owners
of land to common carriers. Under the Mottley decision, however, all such passes would be void regardless of the consideration that the owners had
paid to the common carriers. The Legislature, therefore, very properly, and, as we think, wisely, excepted such cases from the operation of the Utilities
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Act in so far as intrastate business is concerned.
That is all that was attempted, and all that was
done, by the adoption of the exception aforesaid.
This contention must therefore likewise fail.
It is, however, further contended that, because the
franchise ordinances provided for the so-called
commutation tickets and in reliance on them many
persons have built homes in the suburbs of Salt
Lake City and along defendant's line of street railway outside of Salt Lake City, for that reason the
defendant should be held to be estopped from increasing the rates of fare without the consent of
those persons. It needs no argument to show that
the elements of estoppel are lacking in this case. A
conclusive answer to the contention, however, is
that any one who purchased commutation tickets
and who built a home did so subject to the right of
the state to change or alter the fares fixed in the
franchise ordinances in case it was found that such
fares were unfair or unreasonable. Let us assume,
however, that the rate fixed in the franchise ordinance passed by Salt Lake City (which it seems, is
for the term of 50 years) in the course of 10 or 15
years should become unreasonably high, would
those same persons then consent that the defendant
might continue to charge and collect a rate for the
full period of 50 years, although such rate, by reason of unforeseen conditions, had become grossly
unfair and unjust? Moreover, the public, as well as
the persons living along the line aforesaid, are directly interested in maintaining an adequate, efficient, and safe service on the part of the defendant.
In order to maintain such a service the rates of fare
must be sufficient to pay adequate wages to the defendant's employés and sufficient to defray the other incidental costs and expenses necessary to operate the street railway system. When the rates no
longer are sufficient to produce adequate revenue to
meet the costs of giving an adequate, efficient and
safe service and the service for that reason deteriorates, it is the man with limited means, and the
wage-earner, neither of whom have the means to
provide private transportation, who suffer first.
They will be first affected, and will sustain the
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greatest inconvenience if not loss. While it is true
that under such circumstances all will suffer more
or less yet the class first named will necessarily suffer most. It is the duty of the state, therefore, to see
that the rates continue to be fair and just both to the
public and to the street railway company. If
plaintiffs' contention, therefore, that the defendant
be estopped should prevail, it, in the long run,
might result in far greater injury to the persons now
insisting upon the estoppel than will the increased
rate. In no event, however, can it be held that the
state is estopped from regulating the rates whenever
it becomes necessary to do that so as to make them
reasonable and fair unless the state has surrendered
that right as before stated.
From what we have said we do not wish to be understood as either affirming the rate fixed by the
commission or disapproving it. For the reasons
hereinafter stated it will appear that we do not possess the power to review the commission's findings
in respect of whether a certain rate is reasonable or
otherwise.
The plaintiffs, however, also contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the findings and order
of the commission by which the rates were found to
be inadequate and were increased, and, further, that
the findings are in and of themselves insufficient.
Referring to the last objection first, we are of the
opinion that, in view of the elaborate opinion of the
commission, which was filed with the findings, the
findings are sufficient. While it is true that the Utilities Act expressly requires the commission to make
findings, and while it is also true that the commission should be careful to make proper findings respecting the material ultimate facts upon which an
order is based, yet we cannot see wherein the
plaintiffs, or any one else could have been, or can
be, benefited if the findings had been far more specific. When the findings and the opinion filed by
the commission are considered together, as in this
case we think they should be, we are of the opinion
that the objection that the findings are insufficient
is not tenable, and hence that objection must fail.
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It is, however, earnestly insisted that the evidence
is insufficient to sustain the finding that the rates
fixed by the franchise ordinances are unreasonably
low, and are no longer sufficient to enable the defendant to furnish adequate and efficient service to
meet the public necessities. Notwithstanding that it
was suggested at the hearing that, in view of the
limited powers that the Utilities Act has conferred
on this court, and that for that reason we are prohibited from passing on the evidence or upon whether
the commission should have adopted some other
rate, counsel have filed elaborate briefs on the subject. After a careful examination*563 of the authorities we are more than ever confirmed in the opinion that all that we can review in cases of this kind
is whether there is any evidence to sustain the findings of the commission, whether it has exercised its
authority according to law, and whether any constitutional rights of the complaining party have been
invaded or disregarded. In view that the commission is merely an arm of the Legislature through
whom that body acts in matters of this kind, but a
moment's reflection convinces any one that this
court may not interfere except for the reasons just
stated. If interference were extended beyond those
limits, it would, in effect, be an interference by this
court with the lawmaking power of this state. It requires no argument to show why that may not be
done. We have no more right to interfere with the
duties and powers of the Legislature than that body
has to interfere with the powers and duties imposed
upon us as a court. True, the Legislature could perhaps have given us somewhat greater powers to
pass upon the findings and orders of the commission. Such has been done in some other jurisdictions. The Legislature of this state has, however,
not seen fit to clothe this court with greater powers
of review, and we have neither the inclination nor
the right to exercise a power which is neither inherent nor properly conferred. It is also true, as
plaintiffs' counsel suggest, that the Constitution of
this state provides that the courts shall always be
open, and that:
“Every person, for an injury done to him or in his
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person, property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay.”Article 1, §
11.
That provision, however, applies only to judicial
questions. It is not meant thereby that this court
may reach out and usurp powers which belong to
another independent and co-ordinate branch of the
state government. The power conferred upon the
Legislature is supreme respecting the regulation
and establishing of rates. We may not interfere with
or review any legislative act unless some judicial
question is presented for review. Unless a rate established by the commission is clearly oppressive
on the one hand or confiscatory on the other, no judicial question is presented. So far, therefore, as the
questions are judicial the Utilities Act has conferred
power upon this court, and in so far as the acts of
the commission are properly administrative, or in
their nature legislative, the power has been wisely
and properly withheld from us. Whether there is
any substantial evidence to support any finding of
fact that the commission may make is a judicial
question, and may be determined by this court. A
mere cursory reading of the record, however, discloses that there is at least some substantial evidence in support of every essential fact found by the
commission. While it is true that in this case
plaintiffs contend that the rates as fixed by the franchise ordinances provide sufficient revenue to enable the defendant to provide an economical, adequate, and safe service, and to yield a fair return
on its investments, yet it is equally true that the defendant insists to the contrary, and the commission
has so found. The evidence in support of both contentions was submitted to, considered by, and
passed on by the commission, and, as the act
provides, its findings are conclusive upon us. The
record, however, discloses that the defendant always has obtained an income over and above the
cost of operation and maintenance of its railway
system. The only matter, therefore, that now divides the parties is, that owing to the increased cost
of labor and material, the present rates no longer
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yield to defendant a reasonable net return on its investments. The parties also differ with respect to
the amount invested and what would amount to a
reasonable return on the investments. The commission has, however, fully considered and passed on
those questions. Since we are powerless to review
the findings of the commission, in that respect, it is
of no consequence what conclusion the writer, or,
for that matter, this court, might arrive at upon
those questions. It may, however, not be improper
to suggest that, while the commission in establishing and fixing rates is invested with great powers, it
also assumes great responsibilities. It is therefore of
the utmost importance that the commission should
proceed with great care in changing rates. While
caution in that regard should always be exercised,
yet, at this time, when the whole world is engaged
in a most destructive war and every condition is
grossly abnormal, to do so is of special importance.
While, generally speaking, every utility that serves
the public must be allowed a fair and reasonable return on its investments over and above the actual
cost and expense of providing adequate, efficient,
and safe service when economically managed, yet it
is not true that such a return must be assured to
every utility when, as now, the conditions are
grossly abnormal on account of the war and while
such conditions are necessarily temporary. At such
a time and under such conditions every individual
and every enterprise must bear his or its share of
the burden incident to the great conflict, and while
rates should be made adequate to permit every public utility to pay a reasonable wage to its employés
and to provide adequate, safe, and efficient service,
yet rates should not be so high as to become oppressive, and they should be so regulated as to be
fair both to the utility and to the public. A careful
reading of the opinion filed by the commission has,
however, convinced us that in allowing the moderate increase in the present instance the commission
has kept in mind *564 the foregoing propositions. If
the commission has not done so to the full extent
herein outlined, yet it has not entirely overlooked
the propositions.
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After the foregoing was written counsel for defendant called our attention to the case of In the Matter
of the Application of Quinby et al., 223 N. Y. 244,
119 N. E. 433. That case was decided on the 5th
day of April, 1918, by the New York Court of Appeals. The decision is by a divided court, the Chief
Justice and another justice dissenting, while another
justice concurs specially. The decision is, however,
based upon the narrow ground that in the opinion of
the majority the New York Utilities Act (Consol.
Laws, c. 48) has not conferred the power upon the
Public Service Commission of New York to raise
the rates that were agreed to between cities and
street railway corporations. That decision, therefore, can have but little, if any effect upon what the
decision should be in this case. At all events it can
have no controlling influence. Indeed, in view that
every proposition that we contend for herein, except the one stated, is expressly approved in the
majority opinion, the decision is really in harmony
with all that we have decided. We here call attention to the decision, however, for the express purpose of avoiding any misunderstanding respecting
the two cases of In re Huntington Ry. Co., P. U. R.
1918A, 249, and In re New York & Northshore Tr.
Co., P. U. R. 1918A, 893, the first one being cited
in this opinion by us in support of our views and
the second one also being referred to herein in support of plaintiffs' contentions. While the decision in
Re Huntington Ry. Co. is overruled upon the
ground stated, yet none of the propositions decided
in Re New York & Northshore Tr. Co. is sustained.
Upon the contrary, every proposition decided in
that case is tacitly at least overruled. The late New
York case is therefore an authority on the main propositions decided here. We make this statement for
the reason that in our Utilities Act the very ground
on which the New York decision is based is obviated, as will appear from an examination of the
powers that are conferred by that act upon the commission, a part of which we have quoted herein.
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them. We also desire to extend our thanks to counsel for defendant for having called our attention to
the late New York case. We especially appreciate
an act of that kind, since this court has but one purpose, and that is to decide every case in accordance
with the declared law upon the questions presented
for decision.
For the reasons stated, the findings and order of the
commission are affirmed at plaintiffs' costs.
McCARTY, CORFMAN, THURMAN,
GIDEON, JJ., concur.
Utah 1918.
Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co.
52 Utah 210, 173 P. 556, 3 A.L.R. 715
END OF DOCUMENT

In concluding this opinion we desire to express our
appreciation to counsel for both sides for the able
and helpful briefs and arguments presented by
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah corporation; Fred Selman; Laura Selman; and Bret Selman, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
BOX ELDER COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20080229-CA.
April 16, 2009.
Background: Rancher brought action against County, alleging trespass and inverse condemnation with respect
to County's attempt to build a road on a livestock trail that crossed rancher's property, and sought arbitration
with Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman. County filed counterclaim to quiet title. The First District,
Brigham City Department, 070100436, Ben H. Hadfield, J., bifurcated the claims and stayed the arbitration
pending resolution of the quiet title action. Rancher appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, P.J., held that resolution of County's quiet title claim was necessary for arbitration of rancher's trespass and inverse condemnation claims such that bifurcation of proceedings
was the appropriate course.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

186

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement, and Contest
25Tk185 Stay of Arbitration
25Tk186 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
In action in which rancher asserted claims of trespass and inverse condemnation against County, County's counterclaim against rancher to quiet title to land on which it planned to build road did not constitute an action falling under the statutory responsibilities of the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act, meaning the quiet title
claim did not involve a takings or eminent domain issue, and thus, trial court appropriately bifurcated the case
and stayed arbitration of rancher's claims pending the outcome of County's quiet title claim; so long as the very
ownership of the property was in dispute, the remaining claims were undefined. West's U.C.A. § 13-43-204(1).
[2] Statutes 361

181(1)

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k180 Intention of Legislature
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361k181 In General
361k181(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Statutes 361

188

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k187 Meaning of Language
361k188 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
In interpreting a statute, a court's goal is to ascertain the Legislature's intent by first evaluating the best evidence,
namely, the plain language of the statute itself.
[3] Statutes 361

188

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k187 Meaning of Language
361k188 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
In interpreting a statute, courts give the words of a statute their plain, natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.
*536 Brandon J. Baxter and Shaun L. Peck, Logan, for Appellants.
Barton H. Kunz II, Salt Lake City; and Stephen R. Hadfield, Brigham City, for Appellee.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and Brent N. Bateman, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, for
Amicus Curiae Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman.
Before Judges GREENWOOD, BENCH, and McHUGH, JJ.

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
¶ 1 Plaintiffs Fred, Laura, an d Bret Selman are principals of Harold Selman, Inc. (collectively the Selmans),
which engages in a variety of farming, ranching, and other agricultural pursuits on property the Selmans own,
situated on the border between Box Elder and Cache Counties (the Property). Box Elder County attempted to
build a road on a livestock trail that crossed the property. The Selmans sued and subsequently filed a request for
arbitration of their dispute with the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman (the Ombudsman). Box Elder
County filed a counterclaim in district court to quiet title in the property. The district court bifurcated the claims
and stayed the arbitration pending resolution of the quiet title action. The question before us is whether the stay
of arbitration is permissible under the Ombudsman's enabling statutes (the Ombudsman Act), see Utah Code
Ann. §§ 13-43-101 to -206 (Supp.2008). We affirm.
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BACKGROUND
¶ 2 Situated partly in Box Elder County and partly in Cache County, the Property is designated by both counties
as an Agriculture Protection Area, see Utah Code Ann. § 17-41-101(3) (Supp.2008), and is subject to a conservation easement. A livestock trail, on which animals are herded to the upper grazing meadows, traverses the
Property.
¶ 3 In 2007, both counties passed resolutions claiming part of the Property as a county road. Later that year, Box
Elder County initiated road construction on a remote road located on the Property, including the removal of a
gate owned by the Selmans that blocked the livestock trail. The Selmans filed suit, praying for injunctive relief
and asserting claims for trespass and inverse condemnation. The district court entered a Temporary Restraining
Order halting the road construction and ordering reinstallation of the gate. That Temporary Restraining Order is
still in effect. Three weeks later, the Selmans filed a second suit against Box Elder County asserting additional
causes of action. The Selmans also filed suit against *537 Cache County to prevent it from beginning similar
FN1
road construction.
FN1. Plaintiffs filed suit against Box Elder and Cache County separately. Both counties filed counterclaims. On August 7, 2007, Judge Low granted Cache County's motion to bifurcate the proceedings, allowing the quiet title action to move forward to litigation and staying the arbitration of the remaining
claims. Judge Low further noted that “it does not appear to be the kind of claim which the ... Ombudsm[a]n was created to address in the first place.” The Selmans filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with this court that was dismissed for failure to timely file a valid notice of appeal. On October 16,
2007, Judge Hadfield ordered that Box Elder County's and Cache County's cases be consolidated because they “involve common questions of law and fact.” On January 14, 2008, Judge Hadfield ordered
that the two counties' counterclaims to quiet title be tried together and bifurcated from the other issues.
Judge Hadfield further ordered that discovery, deadlines, mediation, and arbitration would all be stayed
until after the counties' quiet title counterclaims were resolved.
¶ 4 Before Box Elder County filed its answer, the Selmans filed a request for arbitration of their dispute with the
Ombudsman, see Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204, which the Ombudsman accepted. Box Elder County then
answered the Selmans' complaint and asserted a counterclaim to quiet title and for injunctive relief. Box Elder
County also filed a motion in district court to stay arbitration before the Ombudsman, to bifurcate the Selmans'
claims from Box Elder County's quiet title claim, and to stay all discovery and deadlines on the Selmans' claims
until the quiet title claim is decided. The district court granted Box Elder County's motion, bifurcating the case
and staying arbitration. The Selmans appeal that decision pursuant to the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 (2008) (allowing parties to appeal “an order granting a motion to stay arbitration”).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 5 We are asked to consider whether the district court erred in bifurcating the claims and staying arbitration of
the dispute. This is an issue of first impression. Because we conclude that the outcome of this case depends on
statutory interpretation, we review the district court's decision for correctness. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference Ctr., 2008 UT 88, ¶ 13, 200 P.3d 643.
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ANALYSIS
[1][2][3] ¶ 6 “In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the Legislature's intent. We do so by first evaluating the best evidence of legislative intent, namely, the plain language of the statute itself. We give the words of a
statute their plain, natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.” Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008
UT 10, ¶ 13, 179 P.3d 768 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We thus carefully consider the statutory language at issue.
¶ 7 The Ombudsman Act establishes and defines the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman, see Utah Code
Ann. § 13-43-101 to -206 (Supp.2008). Among other things, the Ombudsman is authorized to mediate or arbitrate disputes between property owners and government entities:
If requested by the private property owner and otherwise appropriate, the ... Ombudsman shall mediate, or conduct or arrange arbitration for, disputes between private property owners and government entities that involve:
(a) takings or eminent domain issues;
(b) actions for eminent domain under Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 5, Eminent Domain; or
(c) disputes about relocation assistance under Title 57, Chapter 12, Utah Relocation Assistance Act.
Id. § 13-43-204(1).
¶ 8 In this case, arbitration has been stayed pending judicial resolution of Box Elder County's quiet title counterclaim. Plaintiffs argue that quiet title actions fall under the umbrella of “takings or eminent domain issues” articulated by subsection (a), and thus should be included in, not litigated prior to, the arbitration. We disagree, concluding that this interpretation reads the phrase “takings or eminent domain issues” too broadly.
¶ 9 A “taking” is “[t]he government's actual or effective acquisition of private property *538 either by ousting
the owner and claiming title or by destroying the property or severely impairing its utility.” Black's Law Dictionary 1467 (7th ed.1999). Relatedly, “eminent domain” is “[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take
privately owned property, esp[ecially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for
the taking.” Id. at 541. Both of these terms begin with the premise that a private property owner actually owns
the property at issue; title to the property is not in dispute. The principle of inverse condemnation, which is not
specifically included in the Ombudsman Act but was one of the claims originally asserted by the Selmans, also
shares that underlying premise: “An action brought by a property owner for compensation from a governmental
entity that has taken the owner's property without bringing formal condemnation proceedings.” Id. at 287. Even
the constitutional provisions governing all similar claims begin with the premise that ownership of the property
is not in dispute. See U.S. Const. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”); Utah Const. art. I, § 22 (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation.”). Furthermore, “[a] claimant must possess some protect[a]ble interest in property before that
interest is entitled to recover under [the takings provision of the Utah Constitution].” Colman v. Utah State Land
Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990). This principle is applicable to inverse condemnations as well as direct takings. See Stevens v. LaVerkin City, 2008 UT App 129, ¶ 21, 183 P.3d 1059. We conclude that the ownership of
the property in dispute is a threshold issue to the subsequent question of whether there has been a taking. The
facts of this case illustrate why such threshold questions are appropriately resolved judicially before arbitration.
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¶ 10 In their original complaint, the Selmans asserted three causes of action: claims for trespass and inverse condemnation and a petition for injunctive relief. Box Elder County did not assert a takings or eminent domain action and defended its position with a claim to quiet title. Thus, the claims in this case are currently amorphous.
So long as the very ownership of the Property is in dispute, the remaining claims are undefined. Once the quiet
title action is decided, however, the remaining issues are much clearer-either the Property belongs to the Selmans and the action is one for inverse condemnation, trespass, or both, or it does not and the entire dispute most
FN2
likely evaporates.
FN2. We note that if the action is for trespass, it does not fall within the scope of the Ombudsman Act.
See Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-201(1) (Supp.2008).
¶ 11 Accordingly, we conclude that some issues peripherally related to a takings claim are not appropriate for
arbitration by the Ombudsman; the ownership of the property in dispute is one such issue. Further, the district
court clearly retains jurisdiction over any matters not before the Ombudsman. Indeed, “[t]he trial court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by
law.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(1) (2008).
CONCLUSION
¶ 12 The quiet title action in this case does not fall under the statutory responsibilities of the Ombudsman; that
is, it is not a takings or eminent domain issue. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling bifurcating the
claims and staying arbitration pending the outcome of the quiet title claim.
¶ 13 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH and CAROLYN B. McHUGH, Judges.
Utah App.,2009.
Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder County
208 P.3d 535, 628 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2009 UT App 99
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Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v. BriteSmile Management, Inc.
Utah App.,2005.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore limited
liability company, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation; and BriteSmile, Inc., Defendants and Appellants.
BriteSmile Management, Inc., a Utah corporation,
Counterclaim Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd., a Singapore limited liability company, Counterclaim Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20040614-CA.
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25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk204 Remedies and Proceedings for
Enforcement in General
25Tk211 k. Trial or Hearing. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.11 Arbitration)
Whether a party waived its contractual right to arbitrate includes mixed questions of law and fact:
whether the trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and
should be reviewed as factual determinations, with
deference given to the district court.
[2] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T
182(2)

Sept. 9, 2005.
Background: Distributor filed claims against supplier for, inter alia, breach of contract, fraud, and
unjust enrichment, and supplier counterclaimed for
fraud and unjust enrichment. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake Department, Robert K. Hilder, J.,
denied supplier's motion to compel arbitration and
stay litigation. Supplier appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Billings, P.J.,
held that:
(1) supplier waived its contractual right to arbitrate
claims;
(2) supplier substantially participated in litigation
in a manner inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate
claims; and
(3) distributor would have suffered prejudice if
forced to arbitrate its claims.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(2) k. Suing or Participating in Suit. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.3(2) Arbitration)
Supplier waived its contractual right to arbitrate
distributor's claims for breach of contract, fraud,
and unjust enrichment, even though supplier raised
arbitration as an affirmative defense, where supplier filed two motions to dismiss, five joint scheduling orders, and a counterclaim, and did not file motion to compel arbitration for more than two years
after original complaint was filed; supplier substantially participated in litigation in a manner inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, and distributor
would have suffered prejudice if forced to arbitrate
its claims at that stage in litigation.
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[3] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

113

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(A) Nature and Form of Proceeding
25Tk113 k. Arbitration Favored; Public
Policy. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k1.2 Arbitration)
Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

210

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk204 Remedies and Proceedings for
Enforcement in General
25Tk210 k. Evidence. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 33k23.10 Arbitration)
Law favors arbitration, and as such, there is a
strong presumption against finding that a party
waived its right to arbitration.
[4] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T
182(1)
25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.3(1) Arbitration)
Waiver of the right to arbitrate must be intentional,
and may be inferred only if the facts demonstrate
that the party seeking to enforce arbitration intended to disregard its right to arbitrate.
[5] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T
182(1)
25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
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25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.3(1) Arbitration)
Because the issue of whether a party has waived the
right to arbitrate is a factually intensive determination, court infers the original intent of the party asking for arbitration on a case-by-case basis.
[6] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T
182(2)
25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(2) k. Suing or Participating in Suit. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.3(2) Arbitration)
Party alleging waiver of contractual right to arbitrate must demonstrate (1) that the party seeking arbitration substantially participated in the underlying
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to
arbitrate; and (2) that this participation resulted in
prejudice to the opposing party.
[7] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T
182(1)
25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.3(1) Arbitration)
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Both prongs of the two-part test for determining
whether a party has waived its contractual right to
arbitrate must be satisfied in order for a court to
find that a party waived its right to arbitrate.
[8] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T
182(2)
25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(2) k. Suing or Participating in Suit. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.3(2) Arbitration)
Supplier substantially participated in litigation in a
manner inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate distributor's claims for breach of contract, fraud, and
unjust enrichment, even though supplier raised arbitration as an affirmative defense and was reluctant to participate in discovery, supporting finding
that supplier waived its contractual right to arbitrate, where supplier filed two motions to dismiss,
five joint scheduling orders, and a counterclaim,
and did not file motion to compel arbitration for
more than two years after original complaint was
filed, and nothing in record indicated that supplier's
reluctance to participate in discovery was due to a
desire to arbitrate.
[9] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T
182(2)
25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(D) Performance, Breach, Enforcement,
and Contest
25Tk177 Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General
25Tk182 Waiver or Estoppel
25Tk182(2) k. Suing or Participating in Suit. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k23.3(2) Arbitration)
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Distributor would have suffered prejudice if forced
to arbitrate its claims against supplier that actively
participated in litigation for more than two years
prior to filing a motion to compel arbitration, supporting finding that supplier waived its contractual
right to arbitrate, where distributor provided significant and extensive discovery to supplier; distributor could have avoided incurring expenses associated with two years of active litigation, and granting motion to compel arbitration after supplier had
tested judicial waters would have been no different
than allowing supplier to forum-shop.
*655 R. Stephen Marshall, Chad J. Pomeroy, and
David W. Tufts, Durham Jones & Pinegar, Salt
Lake City, for Appellants.
David M. Wahlquist, Merrill F. Nelson, and Karina
Landward, Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, DAVIS, and McHUGH.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
¶ 1 Appellants and Defendants BriteSmile Management, Inc. and BriteSmile, Inc. (collectively BriteSmile) challenge the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration and stay litigation. Specifically, BriteSmile asserts the trial court erred by
ruling that (1) it substantially participated in the
present litigation in a manner inconsistent with an
intent to arbitrate and (2) Appellee and Plaintiff
Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. (Smile Asia) would suffer
prejudice if compelled to arbitrate its claims. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 On February 6, 1998, the parties entered into a
distributor agreement (the Agreement) whereby
BriteSmile appointed Smile Asia as its exclusive
agent for the sales, use, and distribution of BriteSmile's equipment, reagents, and laser-aided teethwhitening products in Southeast Asia. The Agree-
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ment contained an arbitration clause, which
provided, in relevant part, that “[t]he parties hereby
agree to waive trial by jury or by judge and resolve
any dispute arising between [them] with respect to
matters set forth in this Exclusivity Agreement by
arbitration.”

¶ 7 Smile Asia timely filed an amended complaint.
BriteSmile filed a second motion to dismiss Smile
Asia's fraud claim for failure to plead with particularity. BriteSmile again did not mention the arbitration clause in its motion, memorandum in support,
or reply memorandum.

*656 ¶ 3 On April 23, 2002, Smile Asia filed a
complaint against BriteSmile for, inter alia, breach
of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. On May
30, 2002, BriteSmile answered the complaint and
raised as the eighteenth defense of its nineteen defenses that the dispute is subject to mandatory binding arbitration pursuant to the Agreement and Utah
Code section 78-31a-3. SeeUtah Code Ann. §
78-31a-3 (1998). BriteSmile also moved to dismiss
Smile Asia's claims for fraud and unjust enrichment. In its answer, BriteSmile counterclaimed for
breach of contract and the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. BriteSmile did not mention the arbitration clause in its counterclaim, motion to dismiss, memorandum in support of its motion, or reply memorandum.

¶ 8 On February 19, 2003, the parties jointly filed a
revised case scheduling order. In April 2003, Smile
Asia filed a motion to compel discovery and for
sanctions. The exhibits attached to Smile Asia's
motion included correspondence between the
parties that detailed BriteSmile's failure to respond
to Smile Asia's discovery requests and BriteSmile's
request for additional time to comply. There is
nothing in the correspondence to indicate that
BriteSmile's failure to respond to discovery was
due to a desire to arbitrate.

¶ 4 Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f),
counsel for both parties participated in an attorney
planning meeting in June 2002 and jointly filed the
initial scheduling order with the court on July 16,
2002. The parties exchanged their first requests for
discovery in July 2002. BriteSmile's discovery request consisted of thirty-five interrogatories and
twenty-seven requests for production of documents.
¶ 5 In August 2002, BriteSmile served its answers
to Smile Asia's first set of requests for admission
but did not respond to Smile Asia's interrogatories
and requests for production of documents. In February 2003, Smile Asia responded to BriteSmile's
discovery requests.

¶ 10 On June 11, 2003, the court held a hearing on
BriteSmile's second motion to dismiss and Smile
Asia's motion to compel discovery. The court
denied the motion to dismiss, granted the motion to
compel discovery, and ordered BriteSmile to respond to the request for production within ten days
and to respond to the interrogatories within fourteen days. The court also granted Smile Asia's request for attorney fees incurred in preparing the
motion to compel discovery and ordered that a supplemental affidavit of attorney fees be submitted.
On June 26, 2003, BriteSmile filed a five-page objection to Smile Asia's updated affidavit. In late July, the court awarded $1330.00 in attorney fees to
Smile Asia.

¶ 6 On September 4, 2002, the trial court held a
hearing on BriteSmile's motion to dismiss. The
court denied BriteSmile's motion as to the unjust
enrichment claim but granted its motion as to the
fraud claims. However, the court permitted Smile
Asia thirty days to amend its complaint.

¶ 11 On June 24, 2003, BriteSmile responded in
part to Smile Asia's interrogatories and request for
production of documents. However, on July 12,
2003, both parties participated in a telephone conference with the court, initiated by Smile Asia, to
address BriteSmile's failure to respond in full to

¶ 9 On May 5, 2003, the parties jointly filed a
second revised case scheduling order. On June 10,
2003, BriteSmile submitted amended answers to
Smile Asia's first set of requests for admission.
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Smile Asia's discovery requests. BriteSmile indicated that it was physically unable to produce all of
the documents requested by Smile Asia because it
was in the midst of a warehouse move. The court
granted BriteSmile additional time to produce the
documents.

¶ 17 On March 10, 2004, the parties jointly filed the
final case scheduling order. The order stated that
factual discovery would be completed by August
31, 2004; expert discovery by December 31, 2004;
and the cutoff date for dispositive motions was
January 31, 2005.

¶ 12 On July 11, 2003, the parties again jointly
filed an amended case scheduling order. The parties
then jointly filed a stipulation governing the disclosure of confidential and proprietary information
and an accompanying*657 order, which the court
reviewed and signed on July 21, 2003.

¶ 18 On March 26, 2004, Smile Asia filed a motion
to compel production of electronic documents. On
April 19, 2004, BriteSmile filed a memorandum in
opposition to Smile Asia's motion and a reply
memorandum in support of its motion for a protective order. BriteSmile's filing included twelve pages
of legal argument and thirteen exhibits, which again
detailed the ongoing discovery issues between the
parties. On May 3, 2004, Smile Asia filed its reply
in support of its motion to compel production.
However, before the court ruled on the pending discovery motions, BriteSmile filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay litigation on May 24, 2004.

¶ 13 On July 28, 2003, BriteSmile filed an answer
to Smile Asia's amended complaint and again raised
as the eighteenth defense of its nineteen defenses
that the dispute is subject to mandatory binding arbitration pursuant to the Agreement and Utah Code
section 78-31a-3. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3.
¶ 14 In August 2003, BriteSmile served a second
set of interrogatories and request for production of
documents and a first set of requests for admission
to Smile Asia. BriteSmile then sent a fifteen-page
letter detailing why it believed that Smile Asia's response to BriteSmile's first set of discovery requests was insufficient. In September and October,
Smile Asia again responded to BriteSmile's discovery requests.

¶ 19 On June 14, 2004, the court heard oral argument on the parties' pending discovery motions and
on BriteSmile's motion to compel arbitration. In a
carefully written ruling, the court denied BriteSmile's motion to compel arbitration and stay litigation because it found that BriteSmile had waived its
right to arbitrate. BriteSmile appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 15 On February 4, 2004, the parties filed a joint
motion regarding BriteSmile's production of documents, which the court reviewed and signed. Later
in February and early March, Smile Asia took the
depositions of five witnesses. BriteSmile took four
days of depositions of Smile Asia's principals who
traveled from Singapore to Salt Lake City.
¶ 16 On March 9, 2004, BriteSmile filed a motion
for a protective order requesting protection regarding the production of its accounting information in
digital form. The motion was accompanied by a
five-page memorandum and various exhibits that
detailed the lengthy correspondence between the
parties regarding discovery issues.

[1] ¶ 20 Determining whether a party waived its
contractual right to arbitrate includes mixed questions of law and fact. See Cedar Surgery Ctr.,
L.L.C. v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58, ¶ 6, 96 P.3d 911. In
particular, “whether the trial court employed the
proper standard of waiver presents a legal question
which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions
or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in
nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which we give a district court deference.”
Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ¶ 16, 982 P.2d
572.
ANALYSIS
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[2][3][4][5] ¶ 21 BriteSmile argues the trial court
erred by holding that it waived its right to arbitrate.
In Utah, the law favors arbitration, and as such,
there is a strong presumption against finding that a
party waived its right to arbitration. See Baker v.
Stevens, 2005 UT 32, ¶ 12, 114 P.3d 580; Central
Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ¶
24, 40 P.3d 599. “Consequently, a ‘waiver of the
right to arbitrate must be intentional,’ and may be
inferred ‘only if the facts demonstrate that the party
seeking to enforce arbitration intended to disregard
its right to arbitrate.’ ”Baker, 2005 UT 32 at ¶ 12,
114 P.3d 580 (quoting Central Fla. Invs., 2002 UT
3 at ¶ 24, 40 P.3d 599). Because the issue of
“[w]hether a party has waived the right to arbitrate
is a factually intensive determination,” we “infer
the original intent of *658 the party asking for arbitration on a case-by-case basis.” Central Fla.
Invs., 2002 UT 3 at ¶ 23, 40 P.3d 599; see also
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833
P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992) (stating that because
finding that a party waived its right to arbitrate is a
factual determination, “results vary, depending on
the facts presented in a particular case”).
[6][7] ¶ 22 In Chandler, the Utah Supreme Court
set forth a two-part test for determining whether a
party has waived its contractual right to arbitrate.
Specifically, “the party alleging waiver must
demonstrate (1) that the party seeking arbitration
substantially participated in the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate; and (2) that this participation resulted in prejudice to the opposing party.” Cedar Surgery Ctr.,
2004 UT 58 at ¶ 14, 96 P.3d 911 (discussing and
applying the two-part test from Chandler ). Both
prongs of the Chandler test must be satisfied in order for a court to find that a party waived its right
to arbitrate. See Central Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at ¶
22, 40 P.3d 599.
[8] ¶ 23 BriteSmile asserts that the trial court erred
by holding that it substantially participated in litigation in a manner inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate the underlying dispute. In particular, Brite-
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Smile maintains that the trial court erroneously applied Chandler because it failed to recognize the
subsequent rule announced in Central Florida Investments. We disagree.
¶ 24 In Central Florida Investments, the Utah Supreme Court held that “while [the defendant] participated in litigation, it did so unwillingly, and it did
not convey an intent to disregard its right to arbitrate.” Id. at ¶ 31. The court relied on the following
facts for this conclusion: (1) the defendant sent a
letter to the plaintiff three days after receiving the
complaint to inform the plaintiff that the complaint
was improper in light of the parties' agreement to
arbitrate, see id. at ¶ 3; (2) the defendant also
presented the letter to the trial court in its motion to
dismiss and referenced the letter in its memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss, see id. at
¶ 30; (3) the defendant repeatedly mentioned its desire to arbitrate in its memorandum in support of its
motion to dismiss, see id.; and (4) in the defendant's counterclaim, arbitration was raised in the
fourth cause of action as a reason to find against the
plaintiff, see id. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that “when [the defendant] did participate in
the litigation process, it did so while communicating an intent to arbitrate.” Id. at ¶ 34.
¶ 25 BriteSmile argues that it is like the defendant
in Central Florida Investments because it raised its
right to arbitrate as an affirmative defense and was
reluctant to participate in discovery. We disagree.
The record demonstrates that BriteSmile only
raised this right as the eighteenth defense of its
nineteen defenses in its original answer and again,
over a year later, in its answer to the amended complaint. The amended answer was substantially similar to the original answer and no new defenses
were added. Other than these two occasions, there
is nothing in the record to indicate that BriteSmile
expressed, either to Smile Asia or the trial court,
that it wished to arbitrate, until it filed the motion
to compel arbitration more than two years after the
original complaint was filed.
¶ 26 During those two years, BriteSmile substan-
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tially participated in litigation by (1) filing and arguing two motions to dismiss, (2) filing a counterclaim, (3) filing various memoranda in support of
its motions or in opposition to Smile Asia's motions, (4) filing five joint scheduling orders, (5) filing a joint stipulation governing the disclosure of
confidential documents, (6) filing a motion for a
protective order for its digital accounting information, (7) participating in conference calls with the
court, (8) taking part in attorney planning meetings,
(9) serving several requests for discovery, (10) responding to some discovery requests, (11) taking
and defending depositions of seven witnesses, and
(12) engaging in correspondence with counsel for
Smile Asia regarding ongoing discovery issues. In
addition, there is nothing in the record to indicate
that BriteSmile's reluctance to participate in discovery was due to a desire to arbitrate.
¶ 27 Moreover, unlike the defendant in *659Central
Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates,
2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d 599, who waited only four
months after the complaint was filed before it filed
a motion to compel arbitration, see id. at ¶¶ 2, 9,
BriteSmile waited over two years to file a motion to
compel arbitration. In Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992), the
Utah Supreme Court held that the record supported
a finding that the defendant in that case
“participated in the litigation to a point inconsistent
with arbitration” after only five months of discovery and after filing an answer and cross-claim. The
Chandler court concluded that “[t]hese actions
clearly manifest an intent to proceed to trial.” Id.
Similarly, we agree with the trial court that BriteSmile “did not originally intend to have this matter
arbitrated, but seriously contemplated it only after
two years of litigation.”
¶ 28 Furthermore, our supreme court stated in Central Florida Investments:
Participation in discovery and other aspects of litigation that do not necessarily involve the court are
factors we consider in trying to ascertain a party's
intent or attitude toward its participation in litiga-
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tion. Requests made of the court by the parties,
however, have even greater weight. We consider especially important whether the parties' requests of
the court demonstrate an intent to pursue litigation
or whether they demonstrate an intent to avoid litigation and a desire to be sent to arbitrate. Accordingly, parties seeking to enforce arbitration should
ensure that the court, not just the opposing party, is
informed that arbitration is desired.
2002 UT 3 at ¶ 26, 40 P.3d 599 (emphasis added).
BriteSmile's participation in discovery and the filing of its various motions “demonstrate an intent to
pursue litigation” and do not evidence a desire to
arbitrate. Id. BriteSmile did not “ensure” that the
trial court knew of its desire to arbitrate. Id. In fact,
at the hearing on BriteSmile's motion to compel arbitration, the trial court stated, “Why didn't
[BriteSmile] push this before, or is there something
in the file I've missed that they were pushing for arbitration?”
¶ 29 In addition, since briefing was completed in
this case, our supreme court issued Baker v.
Stevens, 2005 UT 32, 114 P.3d 580. In Baker, after
receiving the complaint from the plaintiff, the defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, which
was denied by the trial court. See id. at ¶ 1. The defendants appealed the denial of that motion and the
parties agreed to participate in discovery while the
appeal was pending. See id. at ¶ 5. While the appeal
was under advisement, one of the defendants filed a
summary judgment motion, which the trial court
granted and dismissed that defendant from the underlying case. See id. at ¶ 6. The plaintiff asserted
that the dismissal rendered the appeal moot, but the
supreme court disagreed and held that because the
time for appealing the summary judgment motion
had not yet run, the judgment was not final. See id.
at ¶ 10. While the trial court had not made any findings regarding Chandler's two-part test, the supreme court stated that remanding for findings was
unnecessary “because the docket ... unequivocally
reveal[s] the very fact that we consider fatal to [the
defendant's] efforts to compel arbitration: [the de-
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fendant] sought summary judgment in the district
court.” Id. at ¶ 14. Accordingly, the supreme court
held, “[w]e have no doubt that filing a motion for
summary judgment ... qualifies as substantial participation ‘in the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.’ ”Id. at ¶ 15
(quoting Cedar Surgery Ctr., L.L.C. v. Bonelli,
2004 UT 58, ¶ 14, 96 P.3d 911).
¶ 30 Similarly, we believe that filing two motions
to dismiss, five joint scheduling orders, and a counterclaim “qualifies as substantial participation ‘in
the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with
the intent to arbitrate,’ ”id.(quoting Cedar Surgery
Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at ¶ 14, 96 P.3d 911), as these
“requests of the court demonstrate an intent to pursue litigation,”Central Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at ¶
26, 40 P.3d 599. Accordingly, under these circumstances, we cannot say that merely raising arbitration as an affirmative defense, without more, is
FN1
enough to preserve the right.
To hold otherwise
would *660 allow a party to raise arbitration as an
affirmative defense and then actively participate in
litigation of the dispute for several years before
bringing a motion to compel arbitration. Thus, we
hold that the first prong of Chandler has been met.
FN1. Other jurisdictions have held that
merely raising arbitration as a defense does
not preclude a finding of waiver. See, e.g.,
Manos v. Geissler, 321 F.Supp.2d 588, 595
(S.D.N.Y.2004) (“The mere fact that defendants included the existence of the Arbitration Clause as an affirmative defense
in their Answer does not require [the court
to grant the motion to compel arbitration].”); Sobremonte v. Superior Court, 61
Cal.App.4th 980, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 43, 54
(1998) (“Mere announcement of the right
to compel arbitration is not enough. To
properly invoke the right to arbitrate, a
party must (1) timely raise the defense and
take affirmative steps to implement the
process, and (2) participate in conduct consistent with the intent to arbitrate the dis-
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pute.”); Davis v. Continental Airlines, 59
Cal.App.4th 205, 216, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 79
(1997) (“[A] defendant may not merely assert failure to arbitrate as an affirmative
defense but must seek a stay and demand
arbitration.”); Board of Educ. Taos Mun.
Sch. v. Architects, 103 N.M. 462, 709 P.2d
184, 187 (1985) (“Mere mention of such a
right [to arbitrate] as an affirmative defense in the answer to a complaint does
suffice to keep the right alive. The right
expires, however, when the party asserting
it takes significant action inconsistent with
the right. Waiver of the right may be inferred from any decision to take advantage
of the judicial system, whether through
discovery or direct invocation of the
court's discretionary power, or both.”); De
Sapio v. Kohlmeyer, 35 N.Y.2d 402, 362
N.Y.S.2d 843, 321 N.E.2d 770, 772-73
(1974) (holding that despite the fact that
the defendant raised the right to arbitration
in his answer, the defendant waived the
right by taking the plaintiff's deposition because “utilization of judicial discovery procedure is ... an affirmative acceptance of
the judicial forum” and “[t]he courtroom
may not be used as a convenient vestibule
to the arbitration hall so as to allow a party
to create his own unique structure combining litigation and arbitration.”).
[9] ¶ 31 BriteSmile also argues that the trial court
erred in finding that prejudice would occur if it
were to compel Smile Asia to participate in arbitration. In particular, BriteSmile asserts that Smile
Asia has failed to offer any evidence of prejudice
and the trial court did not cite to any specific fact to
support its conclusion of prejudice. We disagree.
¶ 32 Three Utah cases have addressed the prejudice
prong of Chandler. See Baker, 2005 UT 32 at ¶ 16,
114 P.3d 580; Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ¶¶
22-23, 982 P.2d 572; Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 360-61 (Utah 1992).
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that while mere
delay in asserting a right to arbitration, without
more, is not enough to demonstrate prejudice, “any
real detriment is sufficient to support a finding of
prejudice.” Chandler, 833 P.2d at 360; see also
Pledger, 1999 UT 54 at ¶ 19, 982 P.2d 572.
¶ 33 In Chandler, the Utah Supreme Court noted
that while there is some disagreement as to what
facts suffice to support a finding of prejudice,
[c]ourts have recognized that prejudice can occur if
a party gains an advantage in arbitration through
participation in pretrial procedures. Courts have
also stated that prejudice exists when the party
seeking arbitration is attempting to forum-shop
after the judicial waters have been tested. In addition, prejudice has been found in situations where
the party seeking arbitration allows the opposing
party to undergo the types of expenses that arbitration is designed to alleviate, such as the expense of
preparing to argue important pretrial motions or the
expense of conducting discovery procedures that
are not available in arbitration.
833 P.2d at 359 (quotations, citations, alterations,
and footnotes omitted). The Chandler court explained that because the defendant was able to participate in extensive discovery and to review discovery that had taken place prior to its entry into
the case, it learned information that “could now be
used in arbitration to the detriment of [the]
plaintiffs.” Id. at 361. In addition, the court noted
that because of the “limited degree of discovery
available in arbitration,” the defendant's five-month
delay in filing a motion to compel arbitration allowed it to learn information regarding a thirdparty's liability. Id.
¶ 34 In Pledger, the plaintiff argued that he was
prejudiced by the delay between the time that the
third-party defendant learned of the dispute and the
time it filed a motion to compel arbitration.
See1999 UT 54 at ¶ 22, 982 P.2d 572. The court
again reiterated that “mere delay is an insufficient
basis for waiver of a right to arbitration,” noting
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that this is especially so where “much of the *661
[third-party defendant's] delay in seeking arbitration resulted from [the plaintiff's]” conduct. Id. The
court concluded that the plaintiff had not demonstrated “he [would] be negatively impacted by arbitrating the dispute” nor had he “established that
he incurred significant expenses in the district court
litigation that would not have been incurred in arbitration.” Id. at ¶ 23, 982 P.2d 572. Pledger is distinguishable because the third-party defendant in
that case did not participate in the underlying litigation and the delay resulted from the plaintiff's conduct. Here, BriteSmile actively participated in litigation prior to filing a motion to compel arbitration
and the delay was not due to Smile Asia's conduct.
¶ 35 In Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, 114 P.3d
580, the supreme court held that because the
plaintiff incurred expenses that she would have
avoided had the defendant “confined his efforts to
arbitration,” she suffered prejudice. Id. at ¶ 16.
Similarly, Smile Asia would suffer prejudice if
compelled to arbitrate its claims after two years of
discovery and numerous motions filed and argued
by both parties. Smile Asia could have avoided incurring expenses associated with two years of active litigation.
¶ 36 Thus, we cannot say that the trial court committed clear error by holding that Smile Asia would
suffer prejudice if forced to arbitrate its claims at
this stage in the litigation. See Pledger, 1999 UT 54
at ¶ 16, 982 P.2d 572. After reviewing the record
that includes the significant and extensive discovery Smile Asia provided to BriteSmile (over 3200
pages) and the various motions filed by BriteSmile
(two motions to dismiss and a motion for a protective order), in conjunction with the “limited degree
of discovery available in arbitration,”Chandler, 833
P.2d at 361, and “the expense of preparing to argue
important pretrial motions,”id. at 359, we conclude
that prejudice is evident.
¶ 37 Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that
the two years of experience that BriteSmile has had
in this case, including significant motion practice,
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has effectively allowed it to test the judicial waters.
See id. BriteSmile (1) was unsuccessful in its two
motions to dismiss, (2) was unsuccessful in resisting Smile Asia's discovery requests, (3) was
ordered to pay Smile Asia's attorney fees incurred
in preparing its motion to compel discovery, (4)
was chastised by the trial court on more than one
occasion for failing to respond to discovery, and (5)
filed a motion for a protective order for their elecFN2
tronic accounting information.
Accordingly, we
hold that granting the motion to compel arbitration
at this late stage, after BriteSmile has tested the judicial waters, would be no different than allowing
BriteSmile to forum-shop.
FN2. In addition, three days before BriteSmile filed its Notice of Appeal, the trial
court had ordered it to produce the electronic accounting information.
CONCLUSION
¶ 38 We hold that the trial court did not err in determining that BriteSmile waived its right to arbitration. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 39 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and CAROLYN B. McHUGH, Judges.
Utah App.,2005.
Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v. BriteSmile Management, Inc.
122 P.3d 654, 534 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2005 UT
App 381
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Armand L. SMITH, individually and as trustee for
the Armand L. Smith, Jr., and Shannon S. Windham
Trusts; and Virginia L. Smith, individually,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Utah corporation, nka Fairfax Realty, Inc.; North Plains
Land Company, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership;
and North Plains Development Company, Ltd., a
Utah limited partnership, Defendants.
State Treasurer Edward T. Alter of the State of
Utah, for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Additional Rule 19 Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20040675.
Dec. 2, 2005.
Background: Limited partners brought breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion
action against general partner, after general partner
transferred ownership of shopping mall to real estate investment trust (REIT). The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Frank G. Noel, J., entered
judgment on jury verdict that awarded compensatory and punitive damages to limited partners. General partner appealed. The Supreme Court, 82 P.3d
1064, affirmed the punitive damages award. On remand, the State was joined as a party and limited
partners challenged split recovery law, which
provided that the State was to share in the punitive
damages. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Frank G. Noel, J., found that the split recovery law was unconstitutional, and State appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Parrish, J., held
that:
(1) split recovery law did not give State an interest
in limited partners' punitive damages judgment, as
the State's interest only arose when the judgment
was actually paid;
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(2) limited partners had a vested interest in such
judgment that was protected by the takings clauses
of the United States and Utah Constitutions; and
(3) split recovery law was unconstitutional, as it effected a taking of limited partners' property without
just compensation.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Judgment 228

181(2)

228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k181 Grounds for Summary Judgment
228k181(2) k. Absence of Issue of Fact.
Most Cited Cases
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c).
[2] Appeal and Error 30

842(2)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(2) k. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Most Cited Cases
District court's interpretation, in breach of fiduciary
action in which limited partners were awarded punitive damages against general partner, of split recovery law, which provided that the State was to
share in punitive damages awards, involved no disputed issues of material fact and thus presented a
question of law, which Supreme Court would review for correctness, granting no deference to the
district court. U.C.A.1953, 78-18-1(3) (1989).
[3] Eminent Domain 148
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148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
148II(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k81 Property and Rights Subject of
Compensation
148k81.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
To recover under the prohibition against the taking
of private property found in the United States and
Utah Constitutions, a claimant must possess a protectable interest in property that is taken or damaged for a public use. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5;
West's U.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[4] Eminent Domain 148

81.1

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
148II(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k81 Property and Rights Subject of
Compensation
148k81.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Rights fixed by judgment are a form of property
protected by the takings clauses of the United
States
and
Utah
Constitutions.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5; West's U.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[5] Statutes 361

181(1)

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k180 Intention of Legislature
361k181 In General
361k181(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
A court's primary objective in interpreting a statute
is to give effect to the legislature's intent.
[6] Statutes 361

188

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
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361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k187 Meaning of Language
361k188 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
When construing a statute, the legislature's intent is
manifested by the language it employed.
[7] Statutes 361

190

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k187 Meaning of Language
361k190 k. Existence of Ambiguity.
Most Cited Cases
Statutes 361

217.2

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
361k217.2 k. Legislative History of
Act. Most Cited Cases
When construing a statute, a court may turn to secondary principles of statutory construction or look
to a provision's legislative history only if the court
finds the provision ambiguous.
[8] Damages 115

87(1)

115 Damages
115V Exemplary Damages
115k87 Nature and Theory of Damages Additional to Compensation
115k87(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Split recovery law, which provided that the State
was to share in punitive damages awards, did not
give the State an interest in judgment that included
punitive damages that district court entered in favor
of limited partners in breach of fiduciary duty action against general partner, instead State's interest
in the punitive damages award only arose when the
judgment was actually paid, and thus the entire interest in the judgment for punitive damages vested
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in the limited partners; statute provided that the
State only had an interest in punitive damages that
were awarded and paid, and did not made the State
a party in limited partners' action or a judgment
creditor in the punitive damages award.
U.C.A.1953, 78-18-1(3) (1989).
[9] Damages 115

87(1)

115 Damages
115V Exemplary Damages
115k87 Nature and Theory of Damages Additional to Compensation
115k87(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Supreme Court would not consider secondary evidence concerning the legislature's intent in passing
the split recovery law, which provided that the
State was to share in punitive damages awards,
when determining whether such statute provided
State with an interest in punitive damages judgment
obtained by limited partners in breach of fiduciary
duty action against general partner, and whether
such statute was constitutional, as statute was unambiguous and stated that State's interest arose only
when the judgment was actually paid. U.C.A.1953,
78-18-1(3) (1989).
[10] Constitutional Law 92

1004

92 Constitutional Law
92VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions
92VI(C) Determination of Constitutional
Questions
92VI(C)3 Presumptions and Construction
as to Constitutionality
92k1001 Doubt
92k1004 k. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k48(3))
Only reasonable doubts can be resolved in favor of
the constitutionality of a statute.
[11] Constitutional Law 92
92 Constitutional Law

1025
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92VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions
92VI(C) Determination of Constitutional
Questions
92VI(C)3 Presumptions and Construction
as to Constitutionality
92k1024 Limitations of Rules and Special Circumstances Affecting Them
92k1025 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k48(8))
Although a court must resolve any reasonable
doubts in favor of a statute's constitutionality, a
court also must adhere to its role as interpreter, not
drafter, of legislation.
[12] Eminent Domain 148

81.1

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
148II(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k81 Property and Rights Subject of
Compensation
148k81.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Limited partners who obtained a punitive damages
judgment against general partner in breach of fiduciary duty action had a vested interest in such judgment that was protected by the takings clauses of
the United States and Utah Constitutions, for purposes of determining whether split recovery law,
which provided that the State was to share in punitive damages awards, constituted an unconstitutional
taking of limited partners' property; under the split
recovery statute the State only had an interest in the
monetary proceeds of the judgment, rather than an
interest in the judgment itself, and the limited partners, not the State, had standing to defend the validity of the judgment and to enforce the judgment.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; West's U.C.A. Const.
Art. 1, § 22; U.C.A.1953, 78-18-1(3) (1989).
[13] Eminent Domain 148

2.40(2)

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
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148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.40 Damages
148k2.40(2) k. Punitive Damages.
Most Cited Cases
Split recovery law, which provided that the State
was to share in punitive damages awards, effected
an unconstitutional taking of property of limited
partners who obtained a punitive damages judgment
against general partner in breach of fiduciary duty
action; statute only provided that State had an interest in the monetary proceeds of the judgment,
rather than an interest in the judgment itself, limited
partners thus had a vested interest in the judgment,
and because the State's taking of limited partners'
money denied them the use of that money, it constituted a taking for which just compensation was
constitutionally required. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
5; West's U.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 22; U.C.A.1953,
78-18-1(3) (1989).
West Codenotes
Prior Version Held UnconstitutionalU.C.A.1953,
78-18-1(3) (1989)
*947 Robert S. Campbell, Jennifer Anderson Whitlock, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
Reed L. Martineau, Rex E. Madsen, James S.
Jardine, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Kevin V. Olsen,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant.
PARRISH, Justice:
¶ 1 Following a jury trial, plaintiffs Armand and
Virginia Smith obtained a substantial punitive damages award against defendant Fairfax Realty, Inc.
The State of Utah claimed a share of the award pursuant to the 1989 version of Utah's split recovery
provision, which gave the State an interest in qualifying punitive damages awards. The Smiths challenged the constitutionality of the provision, and
the district court ruled in their favor, holding that it
effected an unconstitutional taking of the Smiths'
property in violation of article I, section 22 of the
Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. We
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agree and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶ 2 In 2001, the Smiths obtained a jury verdict
FN1
against Fairfax.
The jury awarded the Smiths
$410,000 in compensatory damages, $690,000 in
prejudgment interest, and $5,500,000 in punitive
damages. On appeal, we affirmed each component
of the award except for the prejudgment interest,
which we remitted to $597,221. Smith v. Fairfax
Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ¶ 49, 82 P.3d 1064*948
(“Smith I ”). Fairfax then unsuccessfully petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review. Fairfax Realty, Inc. v. Smith, 541 U.S. 960,
124 S.Ct. 1716, 158 L.Ed.2d 401 (2004).
FN1. For a more complete recital of the
facts underlying the dispute between the
Smiths and Fairfax, see our opinion in
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41,
¶¶ 3-11, 82 P.3d 1064.
¶ 3 Though the Smiths were successful in defending
the punitive damages award on appeal, they stood
to lose a sizeable portion of the award pursuant to
the 1989 version of Utah's split recovery provision,
FN2
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) (Supp.1989).
That provision gave the State the right to half of the
punitive damages in excess of $20,000 in those
cases where punitive damages were awarded and
paid. Id.
FN2. The legislature amended section
78-18-1 in 1991, 2002, and 2004. Both the
Smiths and the State agree that the original, 1989 version of the provision governs
this appeal. We accordingly base our analysis on the 1989 version, and unless otherwise indicated, all references to the split
recovery provision are to that version.
¶ 4 The Smiths asserted that the split recovery provision was unconstitutional and asked the district
court to join the State as a party so that it could defend the constitutionality of the provision. The dis-
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trict court granted the motion to join the State, and
Fairfax paid the Smiths the undisputed portion of
FN3
the award.
The disputed portion was placed in
a mutually agreed-upon, interest-bearing depository.
FN3. That figure included the following
components: the initial $20,000 of the punitive damages award; $2,740,000, which
represented the punitive damages award
reduced by $20,000 and divided in half as
the split recovery provision mandated;
$517,611.40 in attorney fees incurred during trial; and $672,302.38 in postjudgment
interest that had accrued on the undisputed
portion of the award to that date.
¶ 5 The Smiths sought summary judgment, arguing
that they were entitled to the entire punitive award,
including the interest that had accrued thereon.
They asserted that the split recovery provision effected an unconstitutional taking of their property
without just compensation. Alternatively, they argued that the provision violated separation of
powers and equal protection principles.
¶ 6 The State defended the constitutionality of the
provision, arguing that it was merely a manifestation of the State's power to define the availability of
punitive damages. Specifically, the State argued
that its interest in the award arose contemporaneously with the entry of the judgment itself and that
the Smiths consequently lacked any protectable interest in the disputed funds. It asserted that it did
not illegally take the Smiths' property, but rather
merely claimed what it had been awarded in the
first instance.
¶ 7 The district court granted the Smiths' motion for
summary judgment and declared the split recovery
provision unconstitutional. Noting that the provision failed to give the State any interest in either
the underlying cause of action or the judgment
when it was entered, the district court concluded
that the Smiths had a protectable interest in the entire punitive damages award and that the provision
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effected an unconstitutional taking of that interest.
The district court reasoned that accepting the State's
argument “would require [the] Court to read
something into the statute that simply is not there.”
The district court's ruling in favor of the Smiths on
their takings claim obviated the need to reach their
alternative claims.
¶ 8 The district court certified its summary judgment order as final, and the State appealed. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section
78-2-2(3)(j) (2002).
ANALYSIS
[1][2] ¶ 9“Summary judgment is appropriate only
when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT
81, ¶ 15, 57 P.3d 997; seeUtah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Here, because there are no disputed issues of material fact, we need only review the district court's interpretation of section 78-18-1(3). That interpretation “presents a question of law, which we review
for correctness, granting no deference to the
[district] court.” Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12,
¶ 7, 114 P.3d 546.
¶ 10 On appeal, the State argues that the district
court erred in holding the split recovery provision
unconstitutional and that the provision did not effect an illegal taking. *949 Although the district
court did not reach the separation of powers and
equal protection arguments, the State asserts that
the split recovery provision passes constitutional
muster under these provisions as well. Finally, the
State contends that it is entitled to postjudgment interest on the award. We hold that the split recovery
provision effected an unconstitutional taking and
therefore reach neither the separation of powers argument nor the equal protection argument. Consistent with our holding on the takings claim, we further hold that the State is not entitled to any interest
on the disputed portion of the award.
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I. DID SECTION 78-18-1 EFFECT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING?
¶ 11 Both the United States and Utah Constitutions
contain a prohibition against the taking of private
property. Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution states that “[p]rivate property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.” The Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, made applicable to the State
under the Fourteenth Amendment, Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122,
98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), contains a
similar prohibition. U.S. Const. amend. V (stating
that “nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation”).
[3] ¶ 12“To recover under article I, section 22 [of
the Utah Constitution], a claimant must possess a
protectable interest in property that is taken or damaged for a public use.” Bagford v. Ephraim City,
904 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995). The Fifth
Amendment analysis is virtually identical. See
Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216, 233, 123
S.Ct. 1406, 155 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003) (noting that
“[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the
former owner” (internal quotation marks
FN4
omitted)).
FN4. It may be more precise to say that our
physical takings jurisprudence mirrors the
federal system's jurisprudence in that both
require the taking of protected property
without just compensation. Compare Utah
Const. art. I, § 22, with U.S. Const. amend.
V.
¶ 13 We analyze whether the split recovery provision effected an unconstitutional taking in two
steps. We first determine whether the Smiths had a
protectable interest in the disputed portion of the
punitive damages judgment. We then determine
whether the Smiths' interest, if any, was “taken”
within the meaning of article I, section 22 of the
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Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
A. Did the Smiths Have a Protectable Interest in the
Disputed Portion of the Punitive Damages Judgment?
[4] ¶ 14 It has long been recognized that rights
fixed by judgment are a form of property protected
by the takings clause. In the seminal case of McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24, 19
S.Ct. 134, 43 L.Ed. 382 (1898), the United States
Supreme Court recognized:
It is not within the power of a legislature to take
away rights which have been once vested by a judgment. Legislation may act on subsequent proceedings, may abate actions pending, but when those actions have passed into judgment the power of the
legislature to disturb the rights created thereby
ceases.
Id.
¶ 15 The first step in our analysis is therefore to determine whether the Smiths had a vested interest in
the disputed portion of the punitive damages judgment. Though the district court found that they did,
the State argues that the Smiths never acquired any
interest in the disputed portion of the judgment because the split recovery provision vested that portion of the judgment in the State. The Smiths, on
the other hand, argue that the State's interest in the
award arose only when the punitive damages were
actually paid.
[5][6][7] ¶ 16 Our “primary objective” in interpreting the split recovery provision “is to give effect to
the legislature's intent.” Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d
561, 562 (Utah 1996). The legislature's intent is
manifested by the *950 language it employed. See
Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106, ¶
18, 110 P.3d 666. We may turn to secondary principles of statutory construction or look to a provision's legislative history only if we find the provision ambiguous. Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 2003 UT
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21, ¶ 8, 70 P.3d 85; see also Dep't of Natural Res.
v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT
75, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1257 (“Unless a statute is ambiguous, we will not look beyond the plain language of
the statute.”).
¶ 17 Because the first step in statutory construction
is an analysis of the language actually employed by
the legislature, we start with the language of the
provision itself. Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004
UT 102, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d 1242. The 1989 version of
the split recovery provision provides:
In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of the amount of the punitive
damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state
treasurer for deposit into the General Fund.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3). The operative question is whether this language vested the disputed
portion of the judgment in the Smiths or in the
State.
[8] ¶ 18 We conclude that the statutory language
gave the State no interest in the judgment entered
by the district court. Rather, the State's interest in
the disputed portion of the punitive damages award
arose only when the judgment was actually “paid.”
Id. By its terms, the provision does not give the
State an interest in every punitive damages award.
The statutory language directing remittance of punitive damages awards to the State is contingent. It
applies only to that class of cases described thereinthose cases “where punitive damages are awarded
and paid.” Id. In fact, because the specified contingency can be satisfied only when a judgment is
paid, the statute gives the State no interest whatsoever in the underlying judgment. Once a judgment
is paid, it is, by definition, satisfied. Am. Sharecom, Inc. v. LDB Int'l Corp., 553 N.W.2d 433, 434
(Minn.Ct.App.1996) (“Once a judgment is satisfied,
it ceases to exist....”). The State's only interest,
therefore, is one to the proceeds of punitive damages judgments. We accordingly conclude that the
entire interest in the judgment for punitive damages
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vested in the Smiths.
¶ 19 Our conclusion is not only consistent with
what the statutory provision says, it is also consistent with what the statutory provision does not say.
It is significant that the provision contains no language making the State a party to the Smiths' action
or a judgment creditor in the Smiths' punitive damages award. There is no language requiring Fairfax
to pay the State's share of the Smiths' punitive damages award directly to the State, nor is there language requiring the Smiths to hold the State's share
as trustee. The Smiths had dominion and control
over the judgment until it was paid. The only plausible conclusion is that the split recovery provision
gave the State no interest in the judgment itself.
Rather, it gave the State an interest in only the
monetary proceeds of the Smiths' judgment, an interest that first arose when the judgment was satisfied.
[9] ¶ 20 The State suggests that we disregard both
the contingent structure of the provision and the
plain meaning of the term “paid” in order to give
effect to the “reason, spirit and sense of the legislation.” It argues that the word “paid” speaks to the
timing of any remittance to the State, not to the
vesting of the State's interest. To support this construction, the State urges us to consider secondary
evidence of the legislature's intent. Specifically, it
points to the legislative history of the provision, to
the caption of the provision, and to the legislature's
FN5
subsequent amendment of the provision.
While
the *951 State's arguments are plausible in the abstract, they are not grounded in the provision's plain
language. Because there is only one plausible interpretation of the actual statutory language, it is unambiguous, see State v. Willis, 2004 UT 93, ¶ 12,
100 P.3d 1218, and we may not consider the secondary evidence advanced by the State, Funk v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah
1992) (stating that we may rely on captions as interpretative tools only when the statutory text is
ambiguous).
FN5. As noted above, the split recovery
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provision has undergone numerous amendments since 1989. It currently provides:
(a) In any case where punitive damages
are awarded, the judgment shall provide
that 50% of the amount of the punitive
damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after
an allowable deduction for the payment
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted
by the judgment debtor to the state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund.
....
(c) The state shall have all rights due a
judgment creditor until the judgment is
satisfied, and stand on equal footing with
the judgment creditor of the original case
in securing a recovery.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3)(a), (c)
(Supp.2005) (emphasis added). We recognize that the current version of the
split recovery provision requires the
judgment debtor to pay the State's share
directly to the State treasurer and makes
the State a judgment creditor. While we
acknowledge that such attributes, if
present in the 1989 version of the provision, would dramatically affect our analysis, we need not, and do not, opine on
the constitutionality of the current version of the split recovery provision.
[10] ¶ 21 The State also defends the provision by
invoking the mantra that it is our duty to presume
the validity of legislative enactments and therefore
to “resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.” Willis, 2004 UT 93, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d
1218. Only reasonable doubts, however, can be resolved in favor of constitutionality. So while the
State urges us to rewrite the statute under the guise
of statutory “interpretation,” we must resist the urge
to infringe on the legislative domain.
¶ 22 As previously discussed, the 1989 version of
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the split recovery provision limits the State's interest in punitive damages awards to those cases
where “punitive damages are awarded and paid.”
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3). From this language,
the State invites us to hold that it has a vested interest in half the amount of judgment creditors' punitive damages judgments. It asks us to do this in
spite of (1) language explicitly stating that the appropriate amount need be “remitted” only after the
punitive damages are “awarded and paid”; (2) a
complete lack of any language giving the State such
an interest, making the judgment creditor a trustee
of the State's share, or even suggesting that the
State may seek to enforce the judgment or claim the
right to initial payment of such awards; and (3) the
contingent nature of the State's interest.
[11] ¶ 23 The radical change the State prescribes
would undoubtedly make the split recovery provision more constitutionally appealing. But only the
legislature, not this court, can effect such a transformation. Although we must “resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality,” Willis,
2004 UT 93, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 1218, we also must adhere to our role as interpreters, not drafters, of legislation. See Bd. of Educ. v. Salt Lake County,
659 P.2d 1030, 1037 (Utah 1983) (noting that,
while we “will continue to exercise [our] authority
to interpret the law,” we will “refrain from assuming the legislature's task of writing it”). The State
essentially asks us to redraft the provision, inserting
language that the legislature did not and removing
language that the legislature selected, all to arrive at
an interpretation that, in our opinion, says the opposite of the plain language the legislature actually
employed. Our duty to construe statutory provisions
to avoid holding them unconstitutional does not extend this far, and we refuse to engage in the drastic
rehabilitation the State requests.
¶ 24 Although we base our decision in this case on
the plain language of the Utah provision, we pause
to address the parties' arguments with respect to
case precedent from other jurisdictions. We acknowledge that a number of courts in our sister
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states have upheld the constitutionality of split recovery provisions. Unlike the Utah provision at issue here, however, each of those respective provisions gave the state an interest in the underlying
punitive damages judgments. See, e.g., Cheatham
v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind.2003) (requiring
judgment debtors to “pay the punitive damage
award to the clerk of the court where the action is
pending”); Fust v. Att'y Gen., 947 S.W.2d 424, 431
(Mo.1997) (stating that state's portion of punitive
damages award be deemed rendered in favor of the
state); DeMendoza v. Huffman, 334 Or. 425, 51
P.3d 1232, 1235 (2002) (requiring payment of the
state's portion directly*952 to the state and expliFN6
citly giving the state judgment creditor status).
FN6. Alaska's split recovery provision, and
the Alaska Supreme Court's treatment of it,
is admittedly anomalous. In Evans v. State,
56 P.3d 1046, 1057-59 (Alaska 2002), the
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed a trial
court's decision upholding the facial constitutionality of a split recovery provision
that did “not grant the state the right to file
or join a civil action to recover punitive
damages.” Alaska Stat. § 09.17.020(j)
(Michie 1997). Evans is without precedential value because the court was evenly divided, with two justices voting to affirm
the trial court and two voting to reverse. In
Alaska, a split opinion results in an affirmance of the trial court's decision, Thoma v.
Hickel, 947 P.2d 816, 824 (Alaska 1997),
but such affirmances have no precedential
effect, City of Kenai v. Burnett, 860 P.2d
1233, 1239 n. 11 (Alaska 1993).
¶ 25 We find it persuasive that the 1989 version of
Utah's split recovery provision is akin to the provision the Colorado Supreme Court struck down in
Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262
(Colo.1991). The ill-fated provision in Kirk stated:
“One-third of all reasonable damages collected pursuant to this section shall be paid into the state general fund. The remaining two-thirds of such dam-
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ages collected shall be paid to the injured party.
Nothing in this subsection (4) shall be construed to
give the general fund any interest in the claim for
exemplary damages or in the litigation itself at any
time prior to payment becoming due.”
Id. at 266 (quoting Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102(4)
(1987)). The Colorado court noted that the provision, like the provision we address here, gave the
state no “interest in the judgment prior to collection.” Id. at 273. And we see little difference
between the Colorado provision's explicit renunciation of such an interest and the failure of Utah's
split recovery provision to provide for such an interest. Like Utah's 1989 version of the split recovery provision, the Colorado provision gave the state
an “interest ... not in the judgment itself but in the
monies collected on the judgment, and that interest
[arose] only at a point in time after the judgment
creditor's property interest in the judgment has vested by operation of law.” Id. at 272. That fact
made the state's interest more of a “statutory imposition of [a] forced contribution on the person injured by the wrongful conduct,”id. at 273, than a
constitutionally permissible means of prospectively
limiting the availability of punitive damages. In
short, Utah's split recovery provision is, for all intents and purposes, identical to the provision invalidated by the Colorado Supreme Court. We therefore hold that the 1989 version of Utah's split recovery provision did not grant the State any interest
in the Smiths' punitive damages judgment. Rather,
the State's interest was limited to an interest in the
monetary proceeds of that award.
[12] ¶ 26 Our conclusion that the State's interest in
the Smiths' award was limited to an interest in the
monetary proceeds of the judgment, rather than an
interest in the judgment itself, leads to the conclusion that the Smiths owned the entire punitive damages judgment. The Smiths, not the State, had
standing to defend the validity of the judgment and
to enforce it as well. When the judgment was satisfied, the Smiths obtained a “completed, consummated right” to the proceeds. In short, they had a
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vested property interest therein. See Banks v.
Means, 2002 UT 65, ¶ 12 n. 3, 52 P.3d 1190
(noting that a vested interest is one “that has become a completed, consummated right for present
or future enjoyment” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Such vested rights are protectable property interests for purposes of a takings analysis.
See Jones v. Hardesty, 261 Ark. 716, 551 S.W.2d
543, 546 (1977); Cleek v. Va. Gold Mining &
Milling Co., 63 Idaho 445, 122 P.2d 232, 237
(1942).
¶ 27 The State advances two arguments in an attempt to avoid this conclusion. First, it asserts that
because plaintiffs have no vested right to punitive
damages, the legislature was free to prospectively
limit the availability of these damages. Second, it
suggests that the mere existence of the split recovery provision precludes the Smiths from claiming a
protectable interest in the award because it would
be inherently unreasonable for the Smiths to claim
a protectable property interest in something they
knew they would eventually have to forfeit. We
find neither argument persuasive.
¶ 28 With respect to the first argument, we do not
dispute the State's premise that the *953 legislature
may prospectively limit the availability of punitive
damages awards. But that is not what occurred
here. This case requires us to address neither the
nature of punitive damages nor the legislature's
power to abolish them. Instead, it raises the question of whether the State may assert an interest in
the proceeds of the Smiths' punitive damages judgment.
¶ 29 With respect to the second argument, notice
that the State plans to unconstitutionally take an individual's property does not vitiate his interest in
that property. If accepted, such an argument would
improperly elevate the mere existence of the split
recovery provision over its actual language, which,
as we have already concluded, gave the Smiths a
protectable interest in the entire judgment.
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B. Did the Split Recovery Provision Allow the State
to Unconstitutionally Take the Smiths' Property?
[13] ¶ 30 Having concluded that the Smiths had a
protectable property interest in the entire punitive
damages award, we now assess whether the split recovery provision effected an unconstitutional taking
of that interest. Because taking the Smiths' money
denied them the use of that money, it constituted a
taking for which just compensation is constitutionally required. See Bagford, 904 P.2d at 1097;
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 626
(Utah 1990) (noting that “a taking is any substantial
interference with private property which destroys or
materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's
right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial
degree abridged or destroyed” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The split recovery provision is
therefore unconstitutional.
II. IS THE STATE ENTITLED TO POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD?
¶ 31 The State argues that it is entitled to the
postjudgment interest that has accrued on the disputed portion of the punitive damages award. This
argument, however, is premised on the assumption
that the disputed portion of the award belongs to
the State. Our conclusion that the disputed portion
of the award actually belongs to the Smiths vitiates
the State's claim. Because the postjudgment interest
accrued on the Smiths' money, the Smiths are entitled to that interest.
CONCLUSION
¶ 32 The 1989 version of the split recovery provision did not give the State a vested interest in the
Smiths' punitive damages award. Accordingly, it effected an unconstitutional taking of the Smiths'
property because it allowed the State to appropriate
a portion of the Smiths' award without providing
concomitant compensation. Our conclusion on this
point obviates the need for us to consider the
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Smiths' alternative arguments with respect to the
constitutionality of the provision. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
¶ 33 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice
NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISH'S opinion.
Utah,2005.
Smith v. Price Development Co.
125 P.3d 945, 540 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2005 UT 87
END OF DOCUMENT
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STATE v. SOPHER.
Utah 1903.
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE
v.
SOPHER.
Feb. 4, 1903.
Appeal from district court, Salt Lake county; S. W.
Stewart, Judge.
Henry Sopher was convicted of the offense of keeping open a place of business on Sunday, and appeals. Affirmed.
Defendant is charged with the offense of keeping
open a place of business on Sunday. It is alleged
that he did “willfully and unlawfully conduct and
operate a barber shop and keep the same open, and
did then and there unlawfully conduct a general
barber business therein.”Defendant's demurrer to
the complaint was overruled, and he was found
guilty in the justice's court, and also in the district
court, and fined in each court the sum of $15.
From the agreed facts it appears that defendant is a
barber by occupation, and that on Sunday, June 16,
1901, he was in a barber shop in Salt Lake City,
Utah, following his vocation as barber: “that one J.
H. Rothwell (who was a member of the Barbers'
Union, which union was against Sunday labor), the
complaining witness, came into said barber shop,
entering by the side door of the shop, and asked to
be shaved; “that defendant shaved the said Rothwell, who paid said defendant on said day the sum
of 25 cents; that said barber shop was connected
with the Albany Hotel, in said city; and that the
evidence fails to show that any one else was shaved
by defendant on said day. Defendant's motion in arrest of judgment and motion for new trial were
overruled, and defendant appeals to this court, contending that the law under which this prosecution
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was conducted (sections 4234, 4235, Rev. St. 1898)
is unconstitutional and void for the following reasons: (1) As being an undue restraint of personal
liberty, and deprives a person of life, liberty, and
property without due process of law; (2) it is special legislation, based upon an arbitrary classification; (3) the act complained of was an act of necessity, which is allowed to be performed on Sunday;
(4) it is not a proper exercise of the police power of
the state.
Section 4234 prohibits, in general, the keeping open
on Sunday of any place of business for the purpose
of transacting business therein, while section 4235
excepts from the preceding section hotels, boarding
houses, baths, restaurants, taverns, livery stables, or
retail drug stores, for the legitimate business of
each, or such manufacturing establishments as are
usually kept in constant operation. The appellant
does not contend that section 4234 would be unconstitutional if it stood alone, but that it is rendered so
by the exceptions of the section which follows.
West Headnotes
Constitutional Law 92

1079

92 Constitutional Law
92VII Constitutional Rights in General
92VII(B) Particular Constitutional Rights
92k1079 k. Personal Liberty. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k83(1))
Sunday 369

2

369 Sunday
369k2 k. Statutes and Ordinances. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k83(1))
Rev. St. § 4234, prohibiting generally the keeping
open on Sunday of any place of business for the
purpose of transacting business therein, is not as
applied to a barber shop, unconstitutional as being
an undue restraint of personal liberty.
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Constitutional Law 92

4275

92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process
92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applications
92XXVII(G)12 Trade or Business
92k4266 Particular Subjects and Regulations
92k4275 k. Barbers, Beauticians,
and Cosmetologists. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k295(2))
Rev. St. § 4234, prohibiting generally the keeping
open on Sunday of any place of business for the
purpose of transacting business therein, is not, as
applied to a barber shop, unconstitutional, as depriving a person of life, liberty, and property
without due process of law, but is a proper exercise
of police power of the state.
Statutes 361

81

361 Statutes
361II General and Special or Local Laws
361k81 k. Regulation of Occupations and
Employments. Most Cited Cases
Rev. St. § 4234, prohibiting generally the keeping
open on Sunday of any place of business for the
purpose of transacting business therein, is not unconstitutional as special legislation based on an arbitrary classification, by Rev. St. § 4235, excepting
from such prohibition hotels, boarding houses,
baths, restaurants, taverns, livery stables, retail drug
stores, and such manufacturing establishments as
are usually kept in constant operation.
Sunday 369

2

369 Sunday
369k2 k. Statutes and Ordinances. Most Cited
Cases
Statute prohibiting opening of place of business on
Sunday was not unconstitutional as applied to
barber shop (Rev. St. § 4234).
Sunday 369

7
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369 Sunday
369k7 k. Works of Necessity or Charity. Most
Cited Cases
The keeping open for business on Sunday of a
barber's shop connected with a hotel is not a work
of necessity.
*482 Shepard & Shepard, for appellant.
M. A. Breeden, Atty. Gen., and W. R. White, Dep.
Atty. Gen., for the State.
HART, District Judge, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
General laws prohibiting the transaction of business
on the first day of the week, commonly called
Sunday, are so uniformly upheld by the courts as a
legitimate exercise of the police power of the state
that it is unnecessary to cite or discuss authority in
support thereof. It is only upon special statutes, or
special exceptions to general so-called Sunday
laws, that the constitutionality of such enactments
is seriously called in question. 24 Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law (1st Ed.) p. 530.
In Cooley, Const. Lim. 734, the author says on
Sunday laws: “There can no longer be any question,
if there ever was, that such laws may be supported
as regulations of police.”The dissenting opinion of
Judge Field in Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 518, which
afterwards became the opinion of the court (Ex
parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678; Ex parte Burke, 59
Cal. 6, 43 Am. Rep. 231; and Ex *483 parte Koser,
60 Cal. 177), and which has been extensively
quoted and followed by other courts, clearly and
forcibly explains the grounds upon which such laws
safely rest. At page 520 of his opinion, in defense
of a Sunday law, it is said: “In its enactment the legislature has given the sanction of law to a rule of
conduct which the entire civilized world recognizes
as essential to the physical and moral well-being of
society. Upon no subject is there such a concurrence of opinion, among philosophers, moralists,
and statesmen of all nations, as on the necessity of
periodical cessations from labor. One day in seven
is the rule, founded in experience and sustained by
science. There is no nation, possessing any degree
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of civilization, where the rule is not observed,
either from the sanctions of the law or the sanction
of religion. This fact has not escaped the observation of men of science, and distinguished philosophers have not hesitated to pronounce the rule
founded upon a law of our race.”And again: “Labor
is in a great degree dependant upon capital, and unless the exercise of the power which capital affords
is restrained those who are obliged to labor will not
possess the freedom for rest which they would otherwise exercise.*** The law steps in to restrain the
power of capital. Its object is not to protect those
who can rest at their pleasure, but to afford rest to
those who need it, and who, from the conditions of
society, could not otherwise obtain it. Its aim is to
prevent the physical and moral debility which
springs from uninterrupted labor, and in this aspect
it is a beneficent and merciful law.”The same authority quotes with approval the following from the
supreme court of Pennsylvania (Specht v. Com., 8
Pa. 312, 49 Am. Dec. 518):“All agree that to the
well-being of society periods of rest are absolutely
necessary. To be productive of the required advantage, these periods must recur at stated intervals, so
that the mass of which the community is composed
may enjoy a respite from labor at the same time.
They may be established by common consent, or, as
is conceded, the legislative power of the state may,
without impropriety, interfere to fix the time of
their stated return, and enforce obedience to the direction. When this happens some one day must be
selected, and it has been said the round of the week
presents none which, being preferred, might not be
regarded as favoring some one of the numerous religious sects into which mankind are divided. In a
Christian community, where a very large majority
of the people celebrate the first day of the week as
their chosen period of rest from labor, it is not surprising that that day should have received the legislative sanction.*** It is still, essentially, but a civil
regulation, made for the government of man as a
member of society.”
The necessity for Sunday laws is stated by Mr.
Tiedeman as follows: “If the law did not interfere,
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the feverish, intense desire to acquire wealth, so
thoroughly a characteristic of the American nation,
would ultimately prevent, not only the wage-earner,
but likewise the capitalists and employers themselves, from yielding to the warnings of nature, and
obeying the instincts of self-preservation, by resting
periodically from labor, even if the mad pursuit of
wealth should not warp their judgment and destroy
this instinct. Remove the prohibition, and this
wholesome sanitary regulation would cease to be
observed.”Tied. Lim. 181.
It is true there are some cases holding unconstitutional, for various reasons, special Sunday laws directed against some particular vocation, such as
barbering; but the decisions upon such statutes are
not uniform. For instance, California, while
strongly upholding a general law prohibiting the
transaction of general business on Sunday (Ex parte
Andrews, Ex parte Burke, and Ex parte Koser,
supra), has held unconstitutional a law directed
against the open barber shop on Sunday. Ex parte
Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 468, 44 Pac. 803, 32 L. R. A.
664. This case is also followed in City of Tacoma
v. Krech (Wash.) 46 Pac. 255, 34 L. R. A. 68, involving the validity of an ordinance of the plaintiff
city prohibiting barbering on Sunday “while other
laboring people in different characters of employment are allowed to prosecute their work.”
Illinois and Missouri have each held a special law
against Sunday barbering to be unconstitutional,
there being at the time in Illinois a general law
making unlawful “whatever disturbs the peace and
good order of society by labor (works of necessity
and charity excepted),” and in Missouri a general
law broad enough to include barbering, and also a
constitutional provision enacting that “where a general law can be made applicable no local or special
law shall be enacted.”Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296,
43 N. E. 1108, 32 L. R. A. 659, 52 Am. St. Rep.
365;State v. Granneman, 132 Mo. 326, 33 S. W.
784. It may be noted in this connection that Illinois
has held invalid a statute enacting that no female
shall be employed in any factory or workshop more
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than eight hours in any one day, or forty-eight
hours in any one week (Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill.
101, 40 N. E. 454, 29 L. R. A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep.
315), in marked contrast to the decision of this
court in sustaining an eight hour law (State v. Holden, 14 Utah, 71, 46 Pac. 756, 37 L. R. A. 103;Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L.
Ed. 780). Again, the general Sunday law of Illinois,
above referred to, was so construed as to permit
other business of a general nature to be transacted
on the Sabbath. And so it was forcibly argued in the
Eden Case that “if the merchant, grocer, the butcher
and druggist, and other trades and callings, are allowed to open their place of business and carry on
their respective vocations during seven days of the
week, upon *484 what principle can it be that a person who may be engaged in the business of barbering may not do the same thing?”The case of Ragio
v. State, 86 Tenn. 272, 6 S. W. 401, cited by appellant, cannot be considered as lending much support
to this contention, as the law passed upon in that
case was so framed as to permit a hotel keeper, or
any one else except a barber, to keep open a bathroom on Sunday. Besides, the act legislated upon
two subjects, contrary to the state constitution.
But special laws directed exclusively against
Sunday barbering and other vocations, and other
Sunday laws with broader exceptions than in our
own statute, have been strongly upheld by the
greater number of the states and by the supreme
court of the United States. Thus, the case of People
v. Havnor, 149 N. Y. 195, 43 N. E. 541, 31 L. R. A.
689, 52 Am. St. Rep. 707, goes to the extreme of
sustaining a law against Sunday barbering, with an
exception in favor of barbering in the city of New
York and the village of Saratoga Springs until the
hour of 1 o'clock on Sunday afternoon. The decision collects many cases upholding laws which to
some extent interfere with property and liberty, and
the limitation is held to be “that the real object of
the statute must appear upon inspection to have a
reasonable connection with the welfare of the public,” and the conclusion is reached that “when thus
exercised, even if the effect is to interfere to some
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extent with the use of property or the prosecution of
a lawful pursuit, it is not regarded as an appropriation of property or an encroachment upon liberty,
because the preservation of order and the promotion
of the general welfare so essential to organized society of necessity involve some sacrifice of natural
rights.”In the same case it is said: “According to the
common judgment of civilized men, public economy requires for sanitary reasons, a day of general
rest from labor, and the day naturally selected is
that regarded as sacred by the greatest number of
citizens, as this causes the least inconvenience
through interference with business.”
Michigan also holds valid a special law against
Sunday barbering, with an exception in favor of
those who observe the seventh day of the week as a
day of rest.People v. Bellet, 99 Mich. 151, 57 N. W.
1094, 22 L. R. A. 696, 41 Am. St. Rep. 589.
The ordinance approved in Liberman v. State, 26
Neb. 464, 42 N. W. 419, 18 Am. St. Rep. 791, excepts many more vocations from the general prohibition of Sunday labor than does our Utah statute.
Bathrooms, under that ordinance, may be kept open
on Sunday until 12 o'clock noon.
That Sunday labor is constitutionally punishable
under general and special Sunday laws, see Nesbit
v. State (Kan. App.) 54 Pac. 326;Com. v. Dextra
(Mass.) 8 N. E. 756;Com. v. Waldman, 140 Pa. 89,
21 Atl. 248, 11 L. R. A. 563;State v. Frederick, 45
Ark. 347, 55. Am. Rep. 555; Breyer v. State, 102
Tenn. 103, 50 S. W. 769.
The Minnesota statute prohibits on Sunday all labor
except works of necessity or charity, and declares
that keeping open a barber shop shall not be
deemed a work of necessity or charity. The law is
held to be constitutional in the case of State v. Petit
(Minn. 1898) 77 N. W. 225, confirmed in Petit v.
Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164, 20 Sup. Ct. 666, 44 L.
Ed. 716. In the latter case the supreme court of the
United States quoted with approval the following
language from the Minnesota decision: “Courts will
take judicial notice of the fact that, in view of the
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custom to keep barber shops open in the evening as
well as in the day, the employés in them work
more, and during later hours, than those engaged in
most occupations, and that this is especially true on
Saturday afternoons and evenings; also that, owing
to the habit of so many men to postpone getting
shaved until Sunday, if such shops were permitted
to be kept open on Sunday the employés would ordinarily be deprived of rest during half that day. In
view of all these facts, we cannot say that the legislature has exceeded the limits of its legislative police power in declaring that, as a matter of law,
keeping barber shops open on Sunday is not a work
of necessity or charity, while as to all other kinds of
labor they have left that question to be determined
as one of fact.”
In State v. Powell, 58 Ohio St. 324, 50 N. E. 900,
41 L. R. A. 854, the court, in upholding a Sunday
law, as against baseball playing, remarked:
“Liberty, as understood in this country, is not license, but liberty regulated by law. The personal
liberty of every man is subject to such reasonable
regulations as in the wisdom of the legislature are
regarded as necessary to promote, not only the
peace and good order of society, but its well being.”
Likewise, in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5
Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923, involving the validity
of an ordinance of San Francisco prohibiting the
carrying on of public laundries and washhouses
within certain prescribed limits of that city, Judge
Field, for the court, said: “But neither the amendment (fourteenth), broad and comprehensive as it is,
nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere
with the power of the state, sometimes termed its
police power, to prescribe regulations to promote
health, peace, morals, education, and good order of
the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add
to its wealth and prosperity.*** Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others, is
prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a
public purpose, is limited in its application, if with-
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in the sphere of its operation it affects all persons
similarly situated, is not within the amendment.”
And in Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 5
Sup. Ct. 730, 28 L. Ed. 1145, involving *485 a similar ordinance, the same judge said, in addition to
the language quoted in State v. Holden, supra: “All
sorts of restrictions are imposed upon the actions of
men, notwithstanding the liberty which is guarantied to each. It is liberty regulated by just and impartial laws.*** How many hours shall constitute a
day's work in the absence of contract, at what time
shops in our cities shall close at night, are constant
subjects of legislation. Laws setting aside Sunday
as a day of rest are upheld, not from any right of the
government to legislate for the promotion of religious observances, but from its right to protect all
persons from the physical and moral debasement
which comes from uninterrupted labor.”
Many other authorities bearing on the questions
raised in the case at bar are cited and reviewed in
the decisions herein referred to. In view of the consideration and discussion of similar questions in
State v. Holden, supra. we do not deem it necessary
to more particularly consider the objections of appellant that the law in question is an undue restraint
of personal liberty, and deprives a person of liberty,
life, or property without due process of law, or that
the same is not a proper exercise of the police
power of the state Upon the authority of that opinion, and of the cases therein and herein referred to,
we are prepared to hold that said sections of our
Code taken together are not unconstitutional upon
the foregoing grounds, nor for any other reason assigned.
Whether the question be considered one of law or a
conclusion of fact, we are of opinion that the act
complained of was not an act of necessity. While
shaving may be regarded as an act of personal
cleanliness, desirable to be performed upon the first
day as well as upon other days of the week, still the
statute does not prohibit a man from shaving himself or from being shaved by his servant or valet.
The statute is directed simply against the keeping
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open of a shop or place of business for the purpose
of transacting business therein upon Sunday.
Neither can the court say that the classification of
the statute is arbitrary. The exception permitting
baths to be kept open on Sunday approaches nearest
to the act here complained of; but the court is unable to say that there is such similarity between
keeping open a bathhouse and a barber shop that it
was not within the province of the legislature to
make a distinction between the two. Upon reflection, many points of difference in the manner in
which each is conducted in this community are
readily suggested. The court may not rightly assert
a wisdom it would deny to the co-ordinate branch
of government (the legislature), and interfere with
the discretion of that department of government.
All presumptions are in favor of the validity of a
statute, and unless the courts can clearly say that
the legislature has erred the act should stand, and
the prerogatives of the legislature not encroached
upon. Courts may interpret, construe, declare, and
apply the law, but may not usurp the functions of
the lawmaking power by assuming to interfere with
or control the legislative discretion. We cannot say
that the law in question is not adapted in a reasonable degree to promote the health, comfort, safety,
or well-being of society.
It is therefore ordered that the judgment of the
lower court be affirmed.
BASKIN, C. J., and BARTCH. J., concur.
Utah 1903.
State v. Sopher
60 L.R.A. 468, 25 Utah 318, 71 P. 482, 95
Am.St.Rep. 845
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
STRAWBERRY ELECTRIC SERVICE DISTRICT, an Electric Service District of the State of
Utah, and Strawberry Water Users' Association, a
Utah Corporation, Plaintiffs, Appellee, and CrossAppellant,
v.
SPANISH FORK CITY, a Utah Municipal Corporation, Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee.
No. 940317.
June 21, 1996.
Electric service district brought action against city,
arising from city's provision of electric service to
some of consumers in annexed areas previously
served by district, seeking injunction prohibiting
city from serving consumers within annexed area
until district received compensation. City counterclaimed, seeking declarations that it could serve future consumers in annexed areas without paying
district compensation and enumerating its rights
and obligations if it elected to serve all residents
within annexed areas. The Fourth District Court,
Utah County, Ray M. Harding, Sr., J., enjoined city
from providing electric service to residents of annexed areas to extent that district had present capacity to provide service, requiring city to compensate
district for lost projected revenues, and dismissing
city's request for declaration as to its rights and obligations if it determined to provide electric service
to all residents within annexed areas. City appealed,
and district cross-appealed. The Supreme Court,
Russon, J., held that: (1) municipality providing
electric utility service to existing residents must
provide that service to all consumers in annexed
areas; (2) for purposes of proper measure of damages owed by city to district, district was entitled to
profits from customers within annexed areas served
by city during city's noncompliance with statute requiring city's compensation to previously serving
electric utility, district was not entitled to future
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profits from consumers within annexed areas after
city would comply with statute, and, once city
served all consumers within annexed areas, it had to
pay district for its facilities dedicated to service
within annexed areas, and such award would include damages for district's lost and stranded facilities and severance damages; (3) statute of limitations did not bar district's claim for injunction prohibiting city from providing service in annexed area
without compensating district; (4) city could not be
enjoined from providing electric service to annexed
areas if it complied with statute; and (5) trial court
properly refused to consider city's request for declaratory judgment as to its rights and duties if it
decided to provide electric service to all residents
within annexed areas, as issue was not ripe and did
not represent actual conflict.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
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212k74 k. Officers and Official Acts
Which May Be Restrained in General. Most Cited
Cases
When exclusive business is unlawfully invaded, injunction is proper regardless of whether unlawful
invasion is effected by another company or by governing body.
[24] Injunction 212

77(1)

212 Injunction
212II Subjects of Protection and Relief
212II(E) Public Officers and Entities
212k77 Municipalities and Municipal Officers in General
212k77(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Municipal actions may be enjoined when municipality illegally extends its utility service.
[25] Limitation of Actions 241

58(2)

241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241k58 Liabilities Created by Statute

241k58(2) k. Liability of Municipality
or Public Officers. Most Cited Cases
Statute of limitations did not bar electric service
district's claim for injunction prohibiting city from
providing service in its annexed area previously
served by district without compensating district for
value of facilities dedicated to provide service to
annexed area, where city continued to unlawfully
provide such service up to trial. Const. Art. 1, § 22;
U.C.A.1953, 10-2-424.
[26] Electricity 145

8.1(4)

145 Electricity
145k8.1 Franchises and Privileges in General
145k8.1(4) k. Proceedings and Review; Injunction. Most Cited Cases
City could not be enjoined from providing electric
service to its annexed areas if it complied with statute requiring city to reimburse electric service district that was serving annexed areas for value of facilities dedicated to provide service to annexed
areas. U.C.A.1953, 10-2-424.
[27] Declaratory Judgment 118A

209

118A Declaratory Judgment
118AII Subjects of Declaratory Relief
118AII(K) Public Officers and Agencies
118Ak209 k. Counties and Municipalities
and Their Officers. Most Cited Cases
Trial court properly refused to consider annexing
city's request for declaratory judgment as to its
rights and duties if it decided to provide electric
service to all residents within annexed areas, in
electric service district's action against city, arising
from city's provision of electric service to some of
consumers in annexed areas previously served by
district, as issue for which city requested resolution
was not ripe, nor did it represent actual conflict.
U.C.A.1953, 78-33-2, 78-33-6, 78-34-16.
[28] Declaratory Judgment 118A

61

118A Declaratory Judgment
118AI Nature and Grounds in General
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118AI(D) Actual or Justiciable Controversy
118Ak61 k. Necessity. Most Cited Cases
Declaratory Judgment 118A

62

118A Declaratory Judgment
118AI Nature and Grounds in General
118AI(D) Actual or Justiciable Controversy
118Ak62 k. Nature and Elements in General. Most Cited Cases
To sustain declaratory judgment action, there must
exist justiciable controversy based upon accrued set
of facts, actual conflict, adverse parties, legally protectible interest on plaintiff's part, and issue ripe for
judicial resolution. U.C.A.1953, 78-33-2.
[29] Declaratory Judgment 118A

5.1

118A Declaratory Judgment
118AI Nature and Grounds in General
118AI(A) In General
118Ak5 Discretion of Court
118Ak5.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Declaratory Judgment Act provision gives trial
court discretion to either grant or deny party's declaratory judgment action. U.C.A.1953, 78-33-2.
*873 Michael R. Carlston,Reed L. Martineau, Rodney R. Parker, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
Gary A. Dodge, Bentley J. Tolk, Salt Lake City, for
defendant.
John R. Erickson, Brent O. Hatch, Salt Lake City,
and F. Elgin Ward, Sandy, for amicus Deseret Generation & Transmission.
Val R. Antczak, James E. Karkut, Salt Lake City,
for amicus Utah Associated Municipal Power.
RUSSON, Justice:
Spanish Fork City appeals from a decision of the
Fourth District Court enjoining it from providing
electric utility service to residents of its annexed
areas to the extent that the supplier prior to annexation, Strawberry Electric Service District
(Strawberry Electric), had present capacity to
provide service at the time of the trial court's order.

To the extent Strawberry Electric did not have
present capacity to provide service, the trial court's
decision allows Spanish Fork to provide electric
service but only upon compensating Strawberry
Electric for lost projected revenues. Spanish Fork
also appeals the trial court's decision dismissing a
request for a declaration as to Spanish Fork's rights
and obligations if it determined to provide electric
services to all residents within the annexed areas.
Strawberry Electric cross-appeals that portion of
the trial court's decision authorizing Spanish Fork
to serve consumers in the annexed areas to the extent Strawberry Electric did not have present capacity to provide service. We affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Since 1986, Strawberry Electric has been providing
electric utility service to customers in portions of
southern Utah County. It operates under a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by
the Public Service Commission. The certificate recognizes Strawberry Electric as the exclusive distributor of electric power to consumers residing in
its service area.
Adjacent to Strawberry Electric's service area is
Spanish Fork City, which has been experiencing
rapid growth. During the 1980s, Spanish Fork annexed approximately 4,000 acres, partly in response
to changes in the Utah County zoning classifications permitting more development in these areas.
All of the areas annexed by Spanish Fork since the
organization of Strawberry Electric were included
within Strawberry Electric's service area.
Moreover, these areas constitute some of the more
densely populated portions served by Strawberry
Electric. At the time of annexation, Strawberry
Electric provided electric power to approximately
200 consumers in these areas. In addition, Strawberry Electric maintained excess capacity to serve
future customers who would likely be high margin
electric users due to the changed zoning rules.
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After its incorporation of these areas, Spanish Fork
commenced, on a limited basis, to provide electric
utility service within these areas. After disconnecting Strawberry Electric's distribution lines, Spanish
Fork attached its own lines and commenced electric
service to six residential consumers. For the most
part, however, Spanish Fork provided service only
to new consumers to the annexed areas never before
served by Strawberry Electric (hereinafter referred
to as future consumers). Spanish Fork required construction permit applicants to agree, as a condition
to obtaining the permit and other city services, to
accept Spanish Fork electric service and reject
Strawberry Electric's services.*874 By the time trial was held, Spanish Fork had commenced service
to thirty-seven future consumers.
Aside from the six residential consumers, Spanish
Fork elected to serve only future consumers because it claimed that it could not afford to provide
service to all consumers in the annexed areas. Such
an undertaking would have entailed reimbursing
Strawberry Electric for its facilities used in supplying the areas, which, according to Spanish Fork's
studies, was not economically feasible.
In some cases, Spanish Fork's strategy resulted in a
duplication of Strawberry Electric's distribution
system. Spanish Fork constructed distribution lines
into the same areas in which Strawberry Electric
had previously constructed its lines in anticipation
of future growth. For example, Spanish Fork connected a line to a new building located on the property of the Intermountain Farmers Association
(IFA), an existing customer of Strawberry Electric.
Also, Spanish Fork constructed a line approximately one-half mile in length into the annexed area
to serve only one consumer and another line approximately one mile in length to serve only two
consumers. In all of these cases, Strawberry Electric stood ready to serve with distribution lines
either within or immediately adjacent to the consumers' properties.
Strawberry Electric objected pursuant to section
10-2-424 of the Utah Code, which provides:
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Whenever the electric consumers of the area being
annexed are receiving electric utility services from
sources other than the annexing municipality, the
municipality may not, without the consent of the
electric utility, furnish its electric utility services to
the electric consumers until the municipality has reimbursed the electric utility company which previously provided the services for the fair market
value of those facilities dedicated to provide service
to the annexed area. If the annexing municipality
and the electric utility cannot agree on the fair market value, it shall be determined by the state court
having jurisdiction.
Strawberry Electric requested that Spanish Fork
provide service to either all consumers in the annexed area or none of them. Also, Strawberry Electric requested compensation for its lost right to
serve in these areas if Spanish Fork elected to
provide service.
Spanish Fork denied all requests. It insisted that it
need not serve all or none of the consumers in the
annexed area. Also, Spanish Fork believed that it
was not obligated to compensate Strawberry Electric under the statute because it chose to serve only
future consumers, not the existing customers of
Strawberry Electric. Failing to informally resolve
its dispute with Spanish Fork, Strawberry Electric
FN1
initiated this lawsuit.
FN1. In filing suit against Spanish Fork,
Strawberry Electric was joined by Strawberry
Water
Users'
Association
(Strawberry Water), the entity from which
Strawberry Electric obtained its distribution system and service area. Upon Spanish Fork's motion, the trial court dismissed
Strawberry Water as a party to the litigation.
Strawberry Electric sought an injunction to prohibit
Spanish Fork from serving consumers within the
annexed area until it received compensation. The
compensation Strawberry Electric demanded included damages suffered as a result of its lost in-

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

918 P.2d 870
918 P.2d 870, Util. L. Rep. P 26,543
(Cite as: 918 P.2d 870)

vestment in facilities constructed to serve future
growth. Spanish Fork counterclaimed, seeking two
declarations: first, that it may serve future consumers without paying compensation and, second,
enumerating its rights and obligations under section
10-2-424 if it elected to take over service to all residents within the annexed areas.
Strawberry Electric moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Spanish Fork violated section 10-2-424
and urging dismissal of Spanish Fork's second
claim for declaratory relief. Reasoning that the requested declaratory judgment would not “terminate
the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the
proceeding,” the trial court dismissed Spanish
Fork's claim. Also, without identifying a particular
damages formula, the trial court held that Spanish
Fork was obligated to compensate Strawberry Electric for its lost right to provide electric service to
future consumers. In so ruling, the trial judge limited the issues at trial to Strawberry Electric's claim
for an injunction and the compensation due *875 to
Strawberry Electric under section 10-2-424.
During a bench trial, Strawberry Electric proposed
a capitalized income method to assess damages.
That is, it demanded anticipated revenues as damages caused by Spanish Fork's provision of service
to future consumers. In contrast, Spanish Fork
proffered a facilities-based calculation, or a calculation based on the amount by which the value of
specified facilities dedicated to providing service to
the annexed areas was lost.
Following the trial, the court enjoined Spanish Fork
from providing electric utility services in the annexed areas until it complied with section 10-2-424.
Specifically, the injunction prohibited Spanish Fork
from serving the annexed areas until it either obtained Strawberry Electric's consent to provide service or paid Strawberry Electric the fair market
value of those facilities dedicated to providing service to the annexed areas. In the expectation that
Spanish Fork would compensate Strawberry Electric, the trial court enjoined Spanish Fork from
providing service to future consumers who locate in
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the annexed areas after trial to the extent Strawberry Electric had capacity to serve them with its
facilities then in place. The court ruled that Spanish
Fork may provide electric services to future consumers who locate within the annexed areas to the
extent that Strawberry Electric's service to them
would require facilities in addition to meters, drop
FN2
lines, and related items.
FN2. On the basis of a motion filed by
Spanish Fork, this court stayed the trial
court's injunction pending this appeal.
With regard to each future consumer Spanish Fork
was allowed to serve, however, the trial court
ordered Spanish Fork to pay Strawberry Electric
damages. Adopting Strawberry Electric's capitalized income method, the court awarded Strawberry
Electric $1,108.50 for each residential consumer
who would move into the annexed areas and a sum
to be determined by the court for future commercial
consumers. In addition, the trial court, utilizing the
same method, awarded Strawberry Electric
$41,015.50 for consumers who had moved into the
annexed area before trial and who had been served
by Spanish Fork.
On appeal, both parties insist that the trial court
erred. Strawberry Electric contends that the trial
court incorrectly allowed Spanish Fork to serve
only some consumers in the annexed areas. Spanish
Fork argues that the trial court (1) adopted an inappropriate method to calculate damages, (2) improperly enjoined it from providing electric service
within the annexed areas, and (3) improperly refused to declare Spanish Fork's rights and duties
under section 10-2-424 if it determined to provide
service to all residents within the annexed areas.
II. ANALYSIS
[1][2][3] The first issue we address is whether section 10-2-424 of the Utah Code directs a municipality providing electric utility service to serve all consumers in a newly annexed area. When faced with a
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question of statutory construction, we look first to
the plain language of the statute. State v. Larsen,
865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); Schurtz v. BMW
of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991).
If the statute is unclear, we then resort to legislative
history and purpose for guidance. World Peace
Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d
253, 259 (Utah 1994). The proper construction of
section 10-2-424 is a question of law. See Larsen,
865 P.2d at 1357. We will therefore accord no deference to the trial court's ruling but will review it
for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d
757, 759 (Utah 1990); Henretty v. Manti City
Corp., 791 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah 1990).
In pertinent part, section 10-2-424 provides:
Whenever the electric consumers of the area being
annexed are receiving electric utility services from
sources other than the annexing municipality, the
municipality may not, without the consent of the
electric utility, furnish its electric utility services to
the electric consumers until the municipality has reimbursed the electric utility company*876 which
previously provided the services for the fair market
value of those facilities dedicated to provide service
to the annexed area.
The plain language of section 10-2-424 does not reveal whether a municipality may elect to serve only
some consumers in annexed areas. Rather, the statute provides only that whenever “the electric consumers” of an annexed area are receiving services
from a utility, a municipality may not provide services to “the electric consumers” until the utility
consents or the municipality pays. “[T]he electric
consumers” could mean either all consumers, including future consumers, i.e., those in the annexed
areas who have never received services from the
utility, or only the consumers who have actually received service from the utility. To discern the proper construction, we must examine the legislative
history and purpose underlying section 10-2-424.
The legislative policy of the code provisions dealing with expansions of municipalities includes the
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desire that municipalities provide city services to
the residents of newly annexed areas: “Areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with appropriate standards should receive the services
provided by the annexing municipality, subject to
section 10-2-424, as soon as possible following the
annexation....” Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-401(4).
Thus, in enacting the provisions dealing with municipal expansion, the legislature endeavored to secure the benefit of city-offered services for those in
newly annexed areas. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake
County, 827 P.2d 212, 222 (Utah 1992) (“The legislature clearly prefers that cities provide urban services to developing areas and has designated annexation as the means by which those services should
be extended.”).
By serving only some consumers within the annexed areas, however, Spanish Fork acted to the
detriment of the group which the legislature endeavored to benefit. With regard to consumers
within the annexed areas, Spanish Fork contravened
the legislative policy that annexed areas should receive city services as soon as possible. When residents desire to incorporate with a municipality,
seeUtah Code Ann. § 10-2-416, a major reason for
doing so is to receive city services. For the most
part, however, Spanish Fork sought to serve none
of the residents that desired incorporation but only
those consumers who located in the areas after annexation.
[4] We hold, therefore, that under sections 10-2-424
and 10-2-401(4), a municipality providing electric
utility service to existing residents must provide
FN3
that service to consumers in annexed areas.
Although section 10-2-424 is silent as to whether a
city may serve only a portion of the customers in
these areas, the legislative history and policy make
clear that through section 10-2-424, the legislature
sought to prevent the result of such a strategy.
FN3. Nothing in this opinion should be
construed as implying that Spanish Fork
could or could not choose to satisfy its obligation to serve its residents by contract-
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ing with Strawberry Electric or some other
utility to provide electric utility service.
[5][6] The next issue is the proper measure of damages owed by Spanish Fork to Strawberry Electric
as a result of its commencing electric service to
portions of Strawberry Electric's service area. This
issue involves an interpretation and application of
section 10-2-424 and article I, section 22 of the
Utah Constitution. Accordingly, we review the trial
court's ruling for correctness. See Utah Dep't of
Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d
601, 608 (Utah 1983).
Section 10-2-424 provides that a municipality taking over utility service in annexed areas must pay
“the fair market value of those facilities dedicated
to provid[ing] service to the annexed area.” In City
of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697
(Utah 1990), this court established a framework by
which to determine the “fair market value” of a
utility's affected facilities. First, the facilities, both
inside and outside the annexed area, used to provide
service to the annexed area must be identified. Id.
at 700-01.
Next, an article I, section 22
FN4
“takings” analysis with regard to those facilities is *877 necessary. Id. The City of Logan court
held that “fair market value” within the meaning of
section 10-2-424 is equivalent to “just compensation” to the extent that the municipality's actions
constitute a taking of the utility's property. Id. The
City of Logan court, however, provided no guidance on the issue of calculating damages because
the parties had stipulated to damages figures depending on the court's ruling. Id. at 701.
FN4. Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, “Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation.” Utah Const.
art. I, § 22.
[7][8] Prior cases nevertheless provide us with that
guidance. Under article I, section 22, the takings
analysis has two principal steps. First, the claimant
must demonstrate “some protectible interest in
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property.” Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795
P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990). If the claimant possesses a protectible property interest, the claimant
must then show that the interest has been “taken or
damaged” by government action. Id. at 626. A
“taking” is “ ‘any substantial interference with
private property which destroys or materially
lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to
its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree
abridged or destroyed.’ ” Id. (quoting State ex rel.
State Road Comm'n v. District Court, Fourth Judicial Dist., 94 Utah 384, 394, 78 P.2d 502, 506
(1937)).
[9] In this case, the dispute centers on the property
in which Strawberry Electric possessed a protectible property interest. Spanish Fork claims that
Strawberry Electric had a protectible property interest only in its physical facilities. Strawberry
Electric, however, claims that in addition to its facilities, article I, section 22 protects its certificate
of public convenience and necessity and the privileges incident thereto, that is, its right to serve all
consumers within the annexed areas which fall
within its service area, and the earnings it would
have realized from those consumers.
[10][11] This court has stated, “ ‘The kinds of property subject to the [eminent domain] right ... [are]
practically unlimited.’ ” Farmers New World Life
Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244
(Utah 1990) (quoting Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58
Utah 546, 552, 200 P. 510, 512 (1921)). Indeed, article I, section 22 protects all property protected by
FN5
its federal counterpart,
and perhaps even more
so due to its more expansive language. See Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah
1995). Under article I, section 22, “ ‘[e]very species
of property which the public needs may require, ...
[including] legal and equitable rights of every description [is] liable to be thus appropriated.’ ”
Lund, 58 Utah at 552, 200 P. at 512 (quoting
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 646 (6th ed.)).
FN5. The Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, made applicable to the
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states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
provides in part that “private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend.
V.
In contending that Strawberry Electric has a protectible interest only in its facilities, Spanish Fork
points out that such intangible assets as profits and
future business are generally not protected by the
Takings Clause. Thorsen v. Johnson, 745 P.2d
1243, 1246 (Utah 1987); State ex rel. Road
Comm'n v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 445, 491
P.2d 1093, 1095-96 (1971); State ex rel. Road
Comm'n v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 44, 305 P.2d 495,
498 (1957); State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 248, 251,
291 P.2d 1028, 1029-30 (1956); 27 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 285 (1966); 4 Nichols The Law of
Eminent Domain § 12B.09[1] (rev. 3d ed. 1995).
These assets are generally too speculative and uncertain to award. See Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d at
445, 491 P.2d at 1095-96; Noble, 6 Utah 2d at 44,
305 P.2d at 498; Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d at 251, 291
P.2d at 1030.
[12] These authorities, however, do not deal with
the taking of a public utility which enjoys an exclusive right to conduct business within its service
area. The taking of a public utility includes not only
the physical facilities of the utility, but also its exclusive business. 27 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain §
339 (1966). Moreover, this court has held that some
kinds of contractual rights, such as exclusive commercial privileges, may also be “property” that can
be taken for public use. Bagford, 904 P.2d at
1098-99; see also West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,
47 U.S. 507, 533-34, 6 How. 507, 12 L.Ed. 535
(1848) (holding that for Fifth Amendment takings
purposes, a *878 franchise is property subject to
eminent domain).
[13] However, to create a protectable property interest, a contract must establish rights more substantial than a unilateral expectation of continued
privileges. “Absent an exclusive franchise or the
equivalent thereof, no vested, legally enforceable
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interest arises, and consequently, there is no property that can provide the basis for compensation in
an inverse condemnation proceeding.” Bagford,
904 P.2d at 1099.
In this case, Strawberry Electric's commercial privilege is subject to termination by annexing municipalities and therefore is nothing more than a mere
unilateral expectation of a continued right to service customers. While Strawberry Electric operates
pursuant to a certificate of public convenience and
necessity issued by the Public Service Commission,
municipalities are not subject to the regulation and
control of the Commission, Utah Power & Light
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 122 Utah 284, 289,
249 P.2d 951, 953 (1952); Barnes v. Lehi City, 74
Utah 321, 349, 279 P. 878, 888 (1929), and are specifically authorized to regulate the sale and use of
electric power within their boundaries. Utah Code
Ann. § 10-8-21. Moreover, section 10-2-401(4)
provides:
Areas annexed to municipalities ... should receive
the services provided by the annexing municipality,
subject to Section 10-2-424, as soon as possible following the annexation....
This section, and section 10-2-424 by reference,
must be construed as a term of Strawberry Electric's
certificate of public convenience and necessity.
Strawberry Electric was therefore on notice that all
or part of its service area could be annexed and its
exclusive business privilege limited or terminated.
Thus, Strawberry Electric has no protectable property interest in its certificate of public convenience
and necessity where its service area is lawfully invaded by an annexing municipality.
The trial court, without the benefit of Bagford,
failed to appreciate Spanish Fork's right to lawfully
invade Strawberry Electric's service area and ruled
that Strawberry Electric was entitled to lost future
income from consumers in the annexed areas. Apparently, the trial court determined that Strawberry
Electric had an exclusive commercial privilege
even though Utah law confers upon municipalities
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the right to lawfully invade Strawberry Electric's
service area. In this respect, the trial court erred.
We therefore reverse the trial court's damage award
to the extent it was based upon the incorrect
premise that Strawberry Electric had an exclusive
right vis-a-vis lawfully invading municipalities to
serve annexed consumers.

1984 Oldsmobile, 892 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Utah 1995)
(We must assume that “ ‘each term in the statute
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are
read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable.’ ” (quoting Savage Indus.,
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670
(Utah 1991))).

[14][15] Notwithstanding a municipality's right to
commence service within its annexed areas, a utility does have a protectable property interest in its
certificate until its service area is lawfully invaded.
Until an annexing municipality has complied with
section 10-2-424, it has the power to invade the
utility's service area but not the right. City of Logan, 796 P.2d at 700. And since municipal power
cannot be exercised in derogation of specific rights
protected by article I, section 22, id., the utility has
a legally cognizable expectation to exclusively
provide electricity within its service area. In this
case, when Spanish Fork began to serve annexed
residents, Strawberry Electric had a legally cognizable interest in an exclusive privilege to serve within its service area.

Spanish Fork all but concedes that it violated section 10-2-424. Spanish Fork admits that it furnished
electric service to forty-three residents of the annexed areas before either securing Strawberry Electric's consent or reimbursing Strawberry Electric for
its compensable losses. This conduct violates section 10-2-424.

[16] In pertinent part, section 10-2-424 provides
that when an electric utility company has been
serving consumers in an area annexed by a municipality, “the municipality may not, without the
consent of the electric utility, furnish its electric
utility services to the electric consumers until the
municipality has reimbursed the electric utility
company ... for the fair market value of those facilities dedicated to provid[ing] service to the annexed
area.” Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-424 (emphasis added). According to the plain language of this statute, see State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah
1993) (directing that in construing a statute's provisions, courts are bound by its plain language), a
municipality may not commence service within any
portion of an electric utility's service area unless it
has either obtained the utility's consent or reimbursed the utility for its compensable losses. Any
other construction *879 would entail an improper
disregard of the section's terms. See State v. One

Moreover, the effect of Spanish Fork's noncompliance is that Strawberry Electric has an exclusive
right to serve consumers within its service area.
Until Spanish Fork either secures Strawberry Electric's consent or pays Strawberry Electric for the
“fair market value of those facilities dedicated to
provid[ing] service to the annexed area[s],” Strawberry Electric has a legally enforceable interest in
exclusively serving within its service area. This includes its right to serve any customer in the annexed areas until Spanish Fork complies with section 10-2-424. Therefore, under Bagford, Strawberry Electric has a protectible property interest in
serving these customers, and if this interest has
been “taken or damaged,” it must be compensated
accordingly.
Next, we must determine whether Strawberry Electric's protectable property interest has been “taken
or damaged” by Spanish Fork's actions. See Colman, 795 P.2d at 626. Every consumer within the
annexed areas served by Spanish Fork before it ultimately complies with section 10-2-424 represents a
partial taking or damaging of Strawberry Electric's
protectable property interest. As of the time of trial,
Spanish Fork commenced service to forty-three
consumers. If Spanish Fork has since commenced
service to more consumers, it has further damaged
Strawberry Electric's protectable interest. Accordingly, Spanish Fork must compensate Strawberry

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

918 P.2d 870
918 P.2d 870, Util. L. Rep. P 26,543
(Cite as: 918 P.2d 870)

Electric for its inability to serve these customers.
This compensation must include the profits Strawberry Electric would have realized during the time
Spanish Fork failed to comply with section
10-2-424. That is, Strawberry Electric is entitled to
the lost profits from each of the forty-three abovementioned customers, in addition to any other customer that has located in the annexed areas and for
whom Spanish Fork has commenced service, from
the time Spanish Fork initially served the customer
until it complies with section 10-2-424 by compensating the utility.
Spanish Fork objects to an approach which would
award lost profits. First, Spanish Fork contends that
the language of section 10-2-424 precludes such an
award. According to Spanish Fork, a municipality
is required to “reimburse [ ] the electric utility company” only when it supplants a portion of the company's service area and a city can “reimburse” a
company only for expenses already incurred, not
for lost profits. Second, Spanish Fork argues that
section 17A-2-302(1)(a) of the Utah Code precludes an award of lost profits to the extent it
denies electric utility companies the right to
provide service in areas adjacent to the service territory of municipal agencies.
[17][18] Spanish Fork's contentions lack merit. Its
argument that the text of section 10-2-424 precludes an award of lost profits is unpersuasive because it requires an unconstitutional construction of
the statute. Utah courts should “construe statutory
terms to avoid an unconstitutional application of
the statute.” Utah State Road Comm'n v. Friberg,
687 P.2d 821, 831 (Utah 1984). This court has
ruled that “the fair market value reimbursement requirement of section 424 is to be read as congruent
with the ‘just compensation’ requirement of article
I, section 22” of the Utah Constitution. City of Logan, 796 P.2d at 700. And above, we ruled that article I, section 22 protects as an incident of Strawberry Electric's certificate of public convenience
and necessity profits from consumers Spanish Fork
unlawfully served. If we were to interpret section
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10-2-424 in the manner proposed by Spanish Fork,
we would be forced to hold the statute unconstitutional. *880 Therefore, “reimburse” for purposes
of section 10-2-424 means to make whole for any
losses compensable under article I, section 22 of
the Utah Constitution. Accord The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1097
(1980) (defining “reimburse” as “to ... compensate
... for ... losses or damages incurred”).
[19]
The
second
challenge-that
section
17A-2-302(1)(a) of the Utah Code precludes an
award of lost profits-is unripe. This argument was
made for the first time on appeal. “ ‘With limited
exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time
on appeal.’ ” Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave.
Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) (quoting Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ., 797 P.2d 412,
413 (Utah 1990)). We therefore decline to address
this argument.
As discussed above, to lawfully invade Strawberry
Electric's service area, Spanish Fork must commence service to all consumers within the annexed
areas and pay Strawberry Electric “the fair market
value of those facilities dedicated to provid[ing]
service to the annexed area[s].” Utah Code Ann. §
10-2-424. Further discussion of damages is therefore warranted to guide the trial court in calculating
them.
[20] Section 10-2-424 requires that to serve the
consumers within the annexed areas, Spanish Fork
must pay Strawberry Electric the fair market value
of the facilities dedicated to serving within those
areas. Both parties agree that section 10-2-424
therefore requires compensation for the utility's lost
or stranded physical facilities, such as distribution
lines, poles, conduits, and related hardware. In addition, City of Logan suggests that Strawberry Electric is entitled to recover damages for the diminished value of its remaining physical property. City
of Logan directed that damage awards should compensate utilities for facilities damaged outside the
annexed areas, which suggests that utilities are en-
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titled to severance damages. See City of Logan,
796 P.2d at 700-01. Severance damages are awarded for a partial taking, as opposed to a taking of
the entire business, and compensate the owner for
the diminished value of its remaining physical
property. See 4A Julius L. Sackman & Patrick J.
Rohan, Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain §§
14.02[1][a], 15.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1994 & Supp.1995).
Thus, to serve the annexed areas, Spanish Fork
must pay Strawberry Electric the fair market value
of its lost or stranded facilities and severance damages.
In sum, Strawberry Electric is entitled to profits
from customers within the annexed areas served by
Spanish Fork during Spanish Fork's noncompliance
with section 10-2-424. However, Strawberry Electric is not entitled to future profits from consumers
within the annexed areas after Spanish Fork complies with section 10-2-424. In addition, if Spanish
Fork serves all consumers within the annexed areas,
which it must do pursuant to section 10-2-424 of
the Utah Code, it must pay Strawberry Electric for
its facilities dedicated to service within the annexed
areas. Such an award would include damages for
Strawberry Electric's lost and stranded facilities and
severance damages.
The next issue is whether the trial court improperly
enjoined Spanish Fork. The trial court found Spanish Fork in violation of section 10-2-424 for failing
to compensate Strawberry Electric for its losses before it commenced electric service within the annexed areas. The trial court held, “If the City
wishes to provide any services in the areas served
by [Strawberry Electric], it must obtain the consent
of [Strawberry Electric] or it must pay [Strawberry
Electric] for the fair market value of those facilities
dedicated to provid [ing] service to the annexed
area.” The trial court further ordered that even if it
compensates Strawberry Electric, Spanish Fork is
prohibited from serving consumers in the annexed
areas whom Strawberry Electric had present capacity to serve.
[21] Spanish Fork levels three objections to the trial
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court's injunction. First, Spanish Fork argues that a
municipality's authority to furnish utility service to
its residents may not be prohibited and therefore
Strawberry Electric's sole remedy is monetary damages. Second, Spanish Fork maintains that inasmuch as the injunction mandates the termination of
service to six residential consumers *881 that it disconnected from Strawberry Electric's distribution
system and connected to its own, the injunction
contravenes a three-year statute of limitations.
Third, Spanish Fork asserts that the injunction preventing it from serving its residents incorrectly assumes that Strawberry Electric has an exclusive
right vis-a-vis municipalities in compliance with
section 10-2-424 to serve its customers. In considering these arguments, “[w]e will not disturb a trial
court's judgment granting or refusing an injunction
unless the court abused its discretion or the judgment rendered is clearly against the weight of the
evidence.” Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858
P.2d 990, 993 (Utah 1993).
[22] Injunctions are available only upon a showing
of irreparable injury for which there is no adequate
remedy at law. System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669
P.2d 421, 425-27 (Utah 1983). Injunctions are commonly granted where an exclusive business, such as
Strawberry Electric's until a municipality supplants
it in compliance with section 10-2-424, is unlawfully invaded. See Georgia Power Co. v. Altamaha
Elec. Membership Corp., 221 Ga. 521, 145 S.E.2d
691, 695 (1965); Southern Indiana Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Indiana Statewide Rural Elec. Coop., 251
Ind. 459, 242 N.E.2d 361, 368 (1968); MidAmerica Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce
Comm'n, 253 Iowa 1143, 114 N.W.2d 622, 626
(1962); Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc. v. J. & G.
Express, Inc., 244 Miss. 427, 141 So.2d 720, 726
(1962); Missouri Utilities Co. v. Scott-New Madrid-Mississippi Elec. Coop., 475 S.W.2d 25, 28
(Mo.1972) (en banc); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 106
(1978). When invaded, the business bears irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at
law; “[m]onetary damages would be difficult and
perhaps impossible to ascertain, and [the business]
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would be forced to bring continuing and successive
lawsuits for damages.”
Payne v. Jackson City
Lines, Inc., 220 Miss. 180, 70 So.2d 520, 523
(1954).
[23][24] Moreover, an injunction is proper whether
the unlawful invasion is effected by another company or by a governing body. City of Pinellas Park
v. Cross-State Utils. Co., 205 So.2d 704, 706-07
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1968); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v.
City of Trenton, 509 S.W.2d 770, 772
(Mo.Ct.App.1974); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 106
(1978). These authorities countenance enjoining
municipal actions where the municipality illegally
extends its utility service. See Cross-State Utils.
Co., 205 So.2d at 706-07; Missouri Pub. Serv.
Co., 509 S.W.2d at 772. We adopt this rule and will
therefore approve the trial court's injunction if
Spanish Fork exceeded its authority in furnishing
electric service to the annexed areas.
[25] In resolving the previous issue, we held that
Spanish Fork violated section 10-2-424. Spanish
Fork contends, however, that the injunction ignores
the applicable statute of limitations. Spanish Fork
maintains that it connected its lines to the six consumers no later than 1986. Further, Spanish Fork
contends that actions for liability created by section
10-2-424 must be commenced within three years of
connection. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78-12-26. Because Strawberry Electric's action was not commenced within three years of connection, Spanish
Fork argues, Strawberry Electric's claims with respect to these consumers are time-barred. The trial
court rejected the application of this statute, explaining that Spanish Fork “continues to violate
[section 10-2-424] in providing service” to the six
consumers.
To address whether Strawberry Electric's cause of
action is time-barred, we must determine exactly
what acts comprise the cause of action and when
they occurred. Under section 10-2-424, a
“municipality may not, without the consent of the
electric utility, furnish its electric utility services to
the electric consumers until the municipality has re-
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imbursed the electric utility company.” Utah Code
Ann. § 10-2-424. Thus, the action forbidden by section 10-2-424 is the “furnish[ing of] electric utility
services” without the utility's consent or before
compensation is provided.
It is undisputed that Spanish Fork furnished electric
service to at least forty-three consumers. The next
step is to determine when Spanish Fork furnished
those services. From the record, it appears that at
least until trial, Spanish Fork furnished electric
*882 utility services to the specified consumers. At
no time before trial did Spanish Fork cease to
provide service to these residents. Indeed, had
Spanish Fork done so, the injunction, at least as to
these consumers, would have been unnecessary.
Therefore, assuming the applicability of section
FN6
78-12-26 of the Utah Code,
Strawberry Electric's claims were not time-barred because Spanish
Fork violated section 10-2-424 within the time set
forth in section 78-12-26. Thus, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in enjoining Spanish Fork's
electric utility service until it complies with section
10-2-424.
FN6. For the purpose of this discussion,
we need not determine whether this section
prescribes the applicable limitation period.
It is important to note that an action under
section 10-2-424 is, to a large extent, founded upon article I, section 22. City of Logan, 796 P.2d at 701. Thus, section
78-12-26, which prescribes a limitation
period for liability created by statutes, may
not be applicable to the extent liability is
actually created by the Utah Constitution.
See Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah
221, 224, 120 P. 503, 504 (1911).
[26] The trial court's injunction, however, would
prohibit Spanish Fork from serving consumers
within the annexed area whom Strawberry Electric
had present capacity to serve even if Spanish Fork
ultimately complies with section 10-2-424. This
portion of the trial court's injunction was based
upon the now discredited premise that Strawberry
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Electric possessed an exclusive right vis-a-vis municipalities in compliance with section 10-2-424 to
serve consumers within the annexed areas. We
ruled above that it does not. We therefore reverse
that part of the trial court's injunction preventing
Spanish Fork from serving its residents even if it
complies with section 10-2-424.

P.2d 253, 265 (Utah 1994) (Russon, J., dissenting);
cf. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414,
420 (Utah 1989) (holding that use of word “may” in
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 49 indicates grant of
discretion to trial court); accord Boyle v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 595, 598
(Utah.Ct.App.1993).

[27] The final issue on appeal is whether the trial
court properly refused to consider Spanish Fork's
request for a declaratory judgment as to its rights
and duties if it decided to provide electric service to
all residents within the annexed areas. The trial
court dismissed Spanish Fork's request on the
ground that “[s]uch a judgment would not
‘terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving
rise to the proceeding.’ ” (Quoting Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-33-6.) Spanish Fork argues that its action is
justiciable and that Utah law concerning condemnation, specifically section 78-34-16 of the Utah
Code, precludes the dismissal of its action.

In this case, the issue for which Spanish Fork requested resolution was not ripe, nor did it represent
an actual conflict. In its own words, Spanish Fork
“sought a determination of the value of the facilities
dedicated to provid [ing] service to all consumers in
the Annexed Areas and the extent to which title to
affected facilities would pass.” As such, Spanish
Fork's theoretical taking had no specified date, and
therefore, any valuation of Strawberry Electric's
compensable losses would be inaccurate or outmoded. Moreover,*883 the value of Strawberry
Electric's compensable losses as a result of such a
taking was never the source of any actual conflict
among the parties. Indeed, Spanish Fork admitted
that undertaking electric service to all consumers
within the annexed areas would not be economically feasible.

[28][29] Under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act,
[a]ny person ... whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute ... may have determined any question of construction ... arising under the ... statute ... and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2. The Act goes on to
state, however, “The court may refuse to render or
enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such
judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would
not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving
rise to the proceeding.” Id.§ 78-33-6. To sustain a
declaratory judgment action, there must exist “a
justiciable controversy based upon an accrued set of
facts, an actual conflict, adverse parties, a legally
protectible interest on the plaintiff's part, and an issue ripe for judicial resolution.” Barnard v. Utah
State Bar, 857 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 1993). The statute gives a trial court discretion to either grant or
deny a party's declaratory judgment action by virtue
of the statute's use of the word “may.” See World
Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879

Contrary to Spanish Fork's suggestion, section
78-34-16 does not support its claim for declaratory
relief. In relevant part, this statute provides:
Condemnor, whether a public or private body, may,
at any time prior to final payment of compensation
and damages awarded the defendant by the court or
jury, abandon the proceedings and cause the action
to be dismissed without prejudice, provided,
however, that as a condition of dismissal condemnor first compensate condemnee for all damages he
has sustained and also reimburse him in full for all
reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by condemnee because of the filing of the
action by condemner [sic], including attorneys fees.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-16. Spanish Fork contends
that this section supports the view that it may receive a determination of value from a court prior to
determining whether to complete the condemnation.
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Spanish Fork, however, misapprehends the reasons
for the trial court's dismissal. The trial court did not
reject Spanish Fork's request because it did not
commit to assuming electric service throughout the
annexed area. Rather, the trial court denied declaratory relief because Spanish Fork's issue had not
yet accrued; the issue was not ripe, and no actual
conflict existed between the parties. In short, the
trial court properly refused to issue an advisory
opinion. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Spanish Fork's declaratory
FN7
judgment action.
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ZIMMERMAN, C.J., HOWE, J., and PEULER and
THORNE, Judges, concur in RUSSON's, J., opinion.
STEWART, Associate C.J., and DURHAM, J.,
having disqualified themselves, do not participate
herein; PEULER and THORNE, District Judges,
sat.
Utah,1996.
Strawberry Elec. Service Dist. v. Spanish Fork City
918 P.2d 870, Util. L. Rep. P 26,543
END OF DOCUMENT

FN7. We note that our resolution of the
first issue will require the determination of
compensation owed to Strawberry Electric
as a result of Spanish Fork's assumption of
utility service to all residents in the annexed areas. Spanish Fork must provide
service to all of its residents, and Strawberry Electric must be compensated accordingly. However, the trial court's dismissal of Spanish Fork's declaration request was still proper since it lacked the
benefit of this ruling.
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court incorrectly authorized Spanish Fork to serve only select customers in
the annexed areas and incorrectly calculated Strawberry Electric's damages to include projected earnings from consumers whom Spanish Fork may lawfully serve. In addition, the trial court abused its
discretion in enjoining Spanish Fork from serving
annexed residents if it complies with section
10-2-424. The trial court, however, did not abuse
its discretion in enjoining Spanish Fork from
serving annexed residents until it complies with
section 10-2-424 and in dismissing Spanish Fork's
second claim for declaratory relief. We therefore
lift the stay of the permissible part of the trial
court's injunction, reverse in part, affirm in part,
and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 43. PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN ACT
PART 2. OFFICE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN
§ 13-43-201. Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman
(1) There is created an Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman in the Department
of Commerce.
(2) The executive director of the Department of Commerce, with the concurrence of
the Land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board created in Section 13-43- 202,
shall appoint attorneys with background or expertise in takings, eminent domain,
and land use law to fill legal positions within the Office of the Property Rights
Ombudsman.
(3) A person appointed under this section is an exempt employee.
(4) An attorney appointed under this section is an at-will employee who may be
terminated without cause by:
(a) the executive director of the Department of Commerce;

or

(b) an action of the land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board.
Current through 2007 First Special Session including results from the
November 2007 General Election.
Copr © 2007 Thomson Reuters/West
END OF DOCUMENT
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Title 13. Commerce and Trade
Chapter 43. Property Rights Ombudsman Act
Part 1. General Provisions
§ 13-43-101. Title
This chapter is known as the “Property Rights Ombudsman Act.”
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Commerce and Trade
Chapter 43. Property Rights Ombudsman Act
Part 1. General Provisions
§ 13-43-102. Definitions
As used in this chapter:

(1) “Constitutional taking” or “taking” means a governmental action resulting in a taking of real property that
requires compensation to the owner of the property under:
(a) the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; or
(b) Utah Constitution Article I, Section 22.
(2) “Takings and eminent domain law” means the provisions of the federal and state constitutions, the case law
interpreting those provisions, and any relevant statutory provisions that:
(a) involve constitutional issues arising from the use or ownership of real property;
(b) require a governmental unit to compensate a real property owner for a constitutional taking; or
(c) provide for relocation assistance to those persons who are displaced by the use of eminent domain.
CREDIT(S)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 43. PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN ACT
PART 2. OFFICE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN
§ 13-43-202. Land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board--Appointment-Compensation--Duties
(1) There is created the Land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board, within the
Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman, consisting of the following seven members:
(a) one individual representing special service districts, nominated by the Utah
Association of Special Districts;
(b) one individual representing municipal government, nominated by the Utah
League of Cities and Towns;
(c) one individual representing county government, nominated by the Utah Association of Counties;
(d) one individual representing the residential construction industry, nominated
by the Utah Home Builders Association;
(e) one individual representing the real estate industry, nominated by the Utah
Association of Realtors;
(f) one individual representing the land development community, jointly nominated by the Utah Association of Realtors and the Home Builders Association of
Utah; and
(g) one individual who:
(i) is a citizen with experience in land use issues;
(ii) does not hold public office;

and

(iii) is not currently employed, nor has been employed in the previous twelve
months, by any of the entities or industries listed in Subsections (1)(a)
through (f).
(2) After receiving nominations, the governor shall appoint members to the board.
(3) The term of office of each member is four years, except that the governor
shall appoint three of the members of the board to an initial two-year term.
(4) Each mid-term vacancy shall be filled for the unexpired term in the same man-
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ner as an appointment under Subsections (1) and (2).
(5)(a) Board members shall elect a chair from their number and establish rules for
the organization and operation of the board.
(b) Five members of the board constitute a quorum for the conduct of the board's
business.
(c) The affirmative vote of five members is required to constitute the decision
of the board on any matter.
(6)(a) No member may receive compensation or benefits for the member's service on
the board.
(b)(i) A member who is not a government officer or employee may be reimbursed
for reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of the member's official duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance under Sections
63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(ii) A member
expenses from
curred in the
lished by the

who is a government officer or employee and who does not receive
the member's agency may be reimbursed for reasonable expenses inperformance of the member's official duties at the rates estabDivision of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.

(c) A member may decline to be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in
the performance of the member's official duties.
(d) A member need not give a bond for the performance of official duties.
(7) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall provide staff to the board.
(8) The board shall:
(a) receive reports from the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman that are
requested by the board;
(b) establish rules of conduct and performance for the Office of the Property
Rights Ombudsman;
(c) receive donations or contributions from any source for the Office of the
Property Rights Ombudsman's benefit;
(d) subject to any restriction placed on a donation or contribution received under Subsection (8)(c), authorize the expenditure of donations or contributions
for the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman's benefit;
(e) receive budget recommendations from the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman; and
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(f) revise budget recommendations received under Subsection (8)(e).
(9) The board shall maintain a resource list of qualified arbitrators and mediators who may be appointed under Section 13-43-204 and qualified persons who may be
appointed to render advisory opinions under Section 13-43-205.
Current through 2007 First Special Session including results from the
November 2007 General Election.
Copr © 2007 Thomson Reuters/West
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 43. PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN ACT
PART 2. OFFICE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN
§ 13-43-203. Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman--Duties
(1) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall:
(a) develop and maintain expertise in and understanding of takings, eminent domain, and land use law;
(b) assist state agencies and local governments in developing the guidelines required by Title 63, Chapter 90a, Constitutional Taking Issues;
(c) at the request of a state agency or local government, assist the state
agency or local government, in analyzing actions with potential takings implications or other land use issues;
(d) advise real property owners who have a legitimate potential or actual takings claim against a state or local government entity or have questions about
takings, eminent domain, and land use law;
(e) identify state or local government actions that have potential takings implications and, if appropriate, advise those state or local government entities
about those implications; and
(f) provide information to private citizens, civic groups, government entities,
and other interested parties about takings, eminent domain, and land use law and
their rights and responsibilities under the takings, eminent domain, or land use
laws through seminars and publications, and by other appropriate means.
(2) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman may not represent private property
owners, state agencies, or local governments in court or in adjudicative proceedings under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(3) No member of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman nor a neutral third
party rendering an advisory opinion under Section 13-43-205 or 13- 43-206, may be
compelled to testify in a civil action filed concerning the subject matter of any
review, mediation, or arbitration by, or arranged through, the office.
(4)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), evidence of a review by the Office
of the Property Rights Ombudsman and the opinions, writings, findings, and determinations of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman are not admissible as
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evidence in a judicial action.
(b) Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to:
(i) actions brought under authority of Title 78, Chapter 6, Small Claims
Courts;
(ii) a judicial confirmation or review of the arbitration itself as authorized
in Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act;
(iii) actions for de novo review of an arbitration award or issue brought under
the authority of Subsection 13-43-204(3)(a)(i); or
(iv) advisory opinions provided for in Sections 13-43-205 and 13-43-206.
Current through 2007 First Special Session including results from the
November 2007 General Election.
Copr © 2007 Thomson Reuters/West
END OF DOCUMENT
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This document has been updated.

Use KEYCITE.

WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 43. PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN ACT
PART 2. OFFICE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN
§ 13-43-204. Office of Property Rights Ombudsman--Arbitration or mediation
of takings or eminent domain disputes
(1) If requested by the private property owner and otherwise appropriate, the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall mediate, or conduct or arrange arbitration for, disputes between private property owners and government entities that
involve:
(a) takings or eminent domain issues;
(b) actions for eminent domain under Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain;

or

(c) disputes about relocation assistance under Title 57, Chapter 12, Utah Relocation Assistance Act.
(2) If arbitration or mediation is requested by a private property owner under
this section, Section 57-12-14 or 78-34-21, and arranged by the Office of the
Property Rights Ombudsman, the government entity or condemning entity shall participate in the mediation or arbitration as if the matter were ordered to mediation
or arbitration by a court.
(3)(a)(i) In conducting or arranging for arbitration under Subsection (1), the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall follow the procedures and requirements
of Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act.
(ii) In applying Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, the arbitrator and parties shall treat the matter as if:
(A) it were ordered to arbitration by a court;

and

(B) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman or other arbitrator chosen as
provided for in this section was appointed as arbitrator by the court.
(iii) For the purpose of an arbitration conducted under this section, if the
dispute to be arbitrated is not already the subject of legal action, the district court having jurisdiction over the county where the private property involved in the dispute is located is the court referred to in Title 78, Chapter
31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act.
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(iv) An arbitration award under this chapter may not be vacated under the provisions of Subsection 78-31a-124(1)(e) because of the lack of an arbitration
agreement between the parties.
(b) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall issue a written statement
declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator when, in the opinion of the
Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman:
(i) the issues are not ripe for review;
(ii) assuming the alleged facts are true, no cause of action exists under
United States or Utah law;
(iii) all issues raised are beyond the scope of the Office of the Property
Rights Ombudsman's statutory duty to review; or
(iv) the arbitration is otherwise not appropriate.
(c)(i) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall appoint another person
to arbitrate a dispute when:
(A) either party objects to the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman
serving as the arbitrator and agrees to pay for the services of another arbitrator;
(B) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman declines to arbitrate the
dispute for a reason other than those stated in Subsection (3)(b) and one or
both parties are willing to pay for the services of another arbitrator; or
(C) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman determines that it is appropriate to appoint another person to arbitrate the dispute with no charge to
the parties for the services of the appointed arbitrator.
(ii) In appointing another person to arbitrate a dispute, the Office of the
Property Rights Ombudsman shall appoint an arbitrator who is agreeable to:
(A) both parties;

or

(B) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman and the party paying for the
arbitrator.
(iii) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman may, on its own initiative or
upon agreement of both parties, appoint a panel of arbitrators to conduct the
arbitration.
(iv) The Department of Commerce may pay an arbitrator per diem and reimburse
expenses incurred in the performance of the arbitrator's duties at the rates
established by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
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(d) In arbitrating a dispute, the arbitrator shall apply the relevant statutes,
case law, regulations, and rules of Utah and the United States in conducting the
arbitration and in determining the award.
(e) The property owner and government entity may agree in advance of arbitration
that the arbitration is binding and that no de novo review may occur.
(f) Arbitration by or through the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman is not
necessary before bringing legal action to adjudicate any claim.
(g) The lack of arbitration by or through the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman does not constitute, and may not be interpreted as constituting, a failure to exhaust available administrative remedies or as a bar to bringing legal
action.
(h) Arbitration under this section is not subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, or Title 78, Chapter 31b, Alternative Dispute Resolution Act.
(i) Within 30 days after an arbitrator issues a final award, and except as
provided in Subsection (3)(e), any party may submit the award, or any issue upon
which the award is based, to the district court for de novo review.
(4) The filing with the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman of a request for
mediation or arbitration of a constitutional taking issue does not stay any county
or municipal land use decision, including the decision of a board of adjustment.
(5) Members of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman may not be compelled to
testify in a civil action filed concerning the subject matter of any review, mediation, or arbitration by the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman.
Current through 2007 First Special Session including results from the
November 2007 General Election.
Copr © 2007 Thomson Reuters/West
END OF DOCUMENT
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Title/Chapter/Section:

Utah Code
Title 78A Judiciary and Judicial Administration
Chapter 3 Supreme Court
Section 102 Supreme Court jurisdiction.
78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the
United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue all
writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of
Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division of
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies
under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme
Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge
of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the
review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
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Title 78B Judicial Code
Chapter 11 Utah Uniform Arbitration Act
Section 101 Title.
78B-11-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Utah Uniform Arbitration Act."
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Utah Code
Title 78B Judicial Code
Chapter 11 Utah Uniform Arbitration Act
Section 129 Appeals.
78B-11-129. Appeals.
(1) An appeal may be taken from:
(a) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration;
(b) an order granting a motion to stay arbitration;
(c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(d) an order modifying or correcting an award;
(e) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter.
(2) An appeal under this section must be taken as from an order or a judgment in a civil action.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B11_012900.ZIP 1,760 Bytes
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Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
(a) Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for special and important
reasons. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons
that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on
the same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of
supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by the Supreme Court.
(b) After a petition for certiorari has been filed, the panel that issued the opinion of the Court of Appeals may issue a minute entry
recommending that the Supreme Court grant the petition. Parties shall not request such a recommendation by motion or otherwise.
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[1] Certiorari 73
Supreme Court of Utah.
The VIEW CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah condominium association, Plaintiff,
Respondent, and Cross-Petitioner,
v.
MSICO, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
and the Town of Alta, a political subdivision of the
State of Utah, Defendants, Petitioners, and CrossRespondents.
No. 20040369, 20040370.
Dec. 30, 2005.
Background: Condominium owners association
brought action against town and lot owner, seeking
to prevent construction of single family homes on
two nearby lots on basis that construction would violate restrictive covenants and effect an unconstitutional taking. The District Court, Third District,
Salt Lake, Michael K. Burton, J., granted town's
and lot owner's motions for summary judgment. Association appealed, and the Court of Appeals, 90
P.3d. 1042, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Holdings: After grant of cross-petitions for writs
of certiorari, the Supreme Court, Parrish, J., held
that:
(1) declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions unambiguously created a restrictive covenant regarding parking on lot;
(2) amended plat did not eliminate original lot
which was subject to restrictive covenant and use
land from other lots to create a new lot devoid of
any use restrictions; and
(3) city's adoption of revised snow storage agreement which eliminated lot as designation for association's snow storage was not an unconstitutional
taking.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
West Headnotes

64(1)

73 Certiorari
73II Proceedings and Determination
73k63 Review
73k64 Scope and Extent in General
73k64(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
When reviewing a case on certiorari, the Supreme
Court reviews the Court of Appeals' decision for
correctness; the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision turns on whether that court correctly
reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review.
[2] Covenants 108

20

108 Covenants
108I Requisites and Validity
108I(B) Implied Covenants
108k20 k. Restrictions on Use of Property. Most Cited Cases
A servitude, such as a restrictive covenant, is created if the owner of the property to be burdened
conveys a lot or unit in a general-plan development
or common-interest community subject to a recorded declaration of servitudes for the development
or community. Restatement (Third) Property
(Servitudes) § 2.1.
[3] Covenants 108

69(1)

108 Covenants
108II Construction and Operation
108II(D) Covenants Running with the Land
108k69 Covenants as to Use of Property
108k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Master declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions unambiguously created a restrictive parking covenant that came into effect when original
developer conveyed lot to new developer; declaration stated that the covenants, servitudes, and restrictions “shall constitute covenants to run with the
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land,” that the declaration itself “shall run with the
land, and shall continue in full force and effect for a
period of fifty (50) years,” that lot “shall be reserved for and improved with a parking facility” for
other owners, and that restrictive covenants expressly applied to lots as shown on plat map “as the
same may be amended from time to time.”
[4] Covenants 108

69(1)

108 Covenants
108II Construction and Operation
108II(D) Covenants Running with the Land
108k69 Covenants as to Use of Property
108k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Amended plat did not eliminate original lot, which
was subject to covenant which restricted use of lot's
surface area to parking, and use land from other lots
to create a new lot devoid of any use restrictions;
declaration of covenants specified that the restrictive covenants applied by their terms to any
amended plats, and amended plat was not inconsistent with use of the lot's surface area for parking
while air space was used for other purposes.
[5] Covenants 108

72.1

108 Covenants
108II Construction and Operation
108II(D) Covenants Running with the Land
108k72 Release or Discharge from Liability on Real Covenants
108k72.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Provisions in declaration of covenants which vested
the developer with the unilateral authority to amend
the declaration and the plat in order to alter the configuration, size, or location of the developer's own
lots did not allow developer to unilaterally terminate restrictive covenants through a plat amendment
alone.
[6] Eminent Domain 148
148 Eminent Domain

2.10(1)
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148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
148k2.10(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
City's adoption of revised snow storage agreement
which removed lot in planned unit development as
condominium owners association's designated location for snow storage and allowed snow to be stored
in other locations in and around development, due
to developer's desire to develop lot, did not substantially abridge or destroy association's right to enjoy
its neighboring lot during winter or materially
lessen the value of that right and thus was not an
unconstitutional taking of association's property interest in neighboring lot. West's U.C.A. Const. Art.
1, § 22.
[7] Eminent Domain 148

2.1

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Eminent Domain 148

81.1

148 Eminent Domain
148II Compensation
148II(B) Taking or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k81 Property and Rights Subject of
Compensation
148k81.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
A takings claimant first must demonstrate some
protectable interest in property; if the claimant possesses a protectable property interest, the claimant
must then show that the interest has been taken or
damaged by government action. West's U.C.A.
Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[8] Eminent Domain 148
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148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
A “taking” is any substantial interference with
private property which destroys or materially
lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to
its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree
abridged or destroyed. West's U.C.A. Const. Art. 1,
§ 22.
[9] Eminent Domain 148

2.1

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
A “physical taking” occurs when there is either a
condemnation or a physical appropriation of property. West's U.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[10] Eminent Domain 148

2.1

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
A “regulatory taking” transpires when some significant restriction is placed upon an owner's use of
his property for which justice and fairness require
that compensation be given. West's U.C.A. Const.
Art. 1, § 22.
[11] Eminent Domain 148

2.1

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Pursuant to their police power, state and local governments may enact regulations that do not constitute an unlawful taking. West's U.C.A. Const. Art.
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1, § 22.
[12] Eminent Domain 148

2.1

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
A “taking” is not merely any interference with
private property, but is a substantial interference
with private property which destroys or materially
lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to
its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree
abridged or destroyed. West's U.C.A. Const. Art. 1,
§ 22.
[13] Eminent Domain 148

2.1

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The police power allows government, without compensation, to regulate and restrain the use of private
property when the health, safety, morals, or welfare
of the public requires or demands it; regulations
promulgated under that power are not considered as
appropriating private property for a public use, but
simply as regulating its use and enjoyment. West's
U.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
[14] Eminent Domain 148

2.1

148 Eminent Domain
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Mere damage to a landowner caused by a municipal
regulation does not rise to the level of a “taking.”
West's U.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
*699 Robert E. Mansfield, Stephen Christiansen,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Merrill F. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
PARRISH, Justice:
¶ 1 The View Condominium Owners Association
(“The View”) sued the Town of Alta and MSICO,
L.L.C. (“MSI”), seeking to prevent construction of
single family homes on lots 5 and 9 of the Sugarplum Planned Unit Development (“Sugarplum”),
both of which are owned by MSI and located in
Alta. With respect to lot 5, The View argued that
restrictive covenants governing Sugarplum designated lot 5 as a parking area and that a subsequent
amendment to the Sugarplum plat map did not alter
that designation. With respect to lot 9, The View
argued that Alta effectuated an unconstitutional taking of its property without just compensation when
it amended a plan designating lot 9 for snow storage. The district court entered summary judgment
against The View on both issues. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment on the parking issue, but concluded that disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the
snow storage issue. The parties cross-petitioned this
court for writs of certiorari, which we granted. We
hold that the restrictive covenants were not abrogated by the recording of the amended plat and accordingly reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the
parking issue. We similarly reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the snow storage issue, concluding
that The View cannot establish the elements necessary to succeed on its claim of regulatory taking.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶ 2 The Sugarplum Planned Unit Development
comprises approximately twenty-five acres in Alta,
Utah. On August 12, 1983, Sorenson Resources
Company (“Sorenson”), the developer of Sugarplum, simultaneously recorded two documents with
the Salt Lake County Recorder. The first was a
Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions (the “Declaration”) governing Sugarplum. The second was a plat map (“original plat”)
defining the location and dimensions of the individual Sugarplum lots and specifying their anticip-
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ated dwelling densities.
¶ 3 As originally envisioned, Sugarplum was divided into nine individual lots with common areas
for roads and other shared uses. Under the Declaration, a planned road running roughly north and
south provided access to lots 4 through 9. Lot 4
abutted the road's eastern edge, while lot 5 abutted
the road's western edge. Lots 8 and 9 were also located west of the road, but they were offset so that
access to them was available only by passing
through lot 5.
¶ 4 The Declaration designated lot 5 as a parking
area for the benefit of the units to be constructed on
lot 4 and on lots 6 through 9. Sorenson retained the
airspace rights above lot 5, to be developed as it
saw fit; potential uses included “commercial, retail,
residential, recreational.”
¶ 5 The original plat also anticipated the use of lot 5
for parking. It contained a table entitled
“Anticipated Dwelling Density,” which listed the
estimated number of residential units to be constructed on each of the nine lots. All lots, except lot
5, were assigned a tentative number of units. Lot 5
*700 was assigned no units. Rather, the entry for
lot 5 stated “Parking and Commercial Development
of Air Space.”
¶ 6 Before selling any of the lots, Sorenson recorded an amended plat map, which significantly
altered the configuration, size, and spatial relationships of the nine lots. The amended plat moved lot
5 across the street so that it occupied land that previously had been part of lot 4. Lots 8 and 9 were
shifted toward the road into the space previously
occupied by lot 5 so that these two lots then abutted
the planned road.
¶ 7 The amended plat also included changes to the
table. The designation of lot 5 for “Parking and
Commercial Development of Airspace” found on
the original plat was eliminated, and lots 4 and 5
were listed together, with sixty-five units allocated
between them. Sorenson, however, failed to make
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corresponding amendments to the Declaration,
which designated lot 5 for parking and the development of airspace.
¶ 8 On January 4, 1985, The View's predecessor in
interest purchased lot 8 as described in the amended
plat. Despite the restrictive covenants contained in
the Declaration, the parties did not contemplate a
parking right on lot 5. Walter Plumb, Sorenson's
corporate secretary, testified that the amended plat
reflected plans to eliminate lot 5 as a parking structure and that Sorenson never intended to convey a
parking right in that lot. Russell Watts, president of
The View's predecessor in interest, who was directly involved in the purchase of lot 8 from Sorenson, testified that he neither bargained for nor intended to acquire a parking interest in lot 5.
¶ 9 After acquiring lot 8, The View's predecessor in
interest sought a building permit from Alta. Because of the heavy annual snowfall in the Alta area,
Alta required an acceptable plan for storing the
snow on lot 8 as a condition of the permit. To facilitate the application process, Plumb wrote a letter to
Alta dated February 27, 1985, in which he sought to
clarify Sorenson's intent with regard to snow storage at Sugarplum. The letter stated that, during the
development of lots 6 and 8, snow would be stored
in the appropriate designated areas and that if there
should “be any excess snow, it may be stored on lot
9 as recorded.” It also stated that areas designated
for snow storage were subject to change and that
any such changes would be submitted to Alta for
approval when Sorenson applied for additional development in Sugarplum.
¶ 10 The Alta Planning Commission approved The
View's application for a building permit on lot 8,
contingent on its understanding that substantial
snow storage had been planned for lot 9. On April
27, 1985, on the basis of the Commission's recommendation, Alta approved an official snow removal
plan for The View that designated lot 9 for overflow snow storage, and The View began using lot 9
for that purpose.
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¶ 11 On December 31, 1988, Sorenson deeded lots
4, 5, and 9 to MSI. Thereafter, various disputes
arose between MSI and Alta regarding development
of the three lots, culminating in MSI's filing a lawsuit against Alta in September 1996. One of the disputes related to Alta's refusal to allow MSI to develop lot 9 while that lot was designated as a snow
storage area for use by The View. As part of that
dispute, Alta sent The View a letter indicating that,
if The View were to lose its ability to store snow on
lot 9, Alta “would have little choice but to take legal action to protect the public safety and welfare,”
as “[s]now storage is a life-safety issue in Alta.”
The letter stated that “protect[ing] the public safety
and welfare” would necessitate “an injunction precluding the occupancy of The View of lot 8 or portions thereof during snow periods.”
¶ 12 MSI and Alta settled the suit in November
2000. As part of the settlement, Alta approved an
alternate snow storage plan for lots 4, 5, 8, and 9.
The alternate plan removed lot 9 as the designated
location for snow storage for The View and allowed
snow from lots 4, 5, 8, and 9 to be stored on five
separate locations in and around Sugarplum. Under
the settlement agreement, Alta also approved a development plan authorizing construction of ten
single family homes on lots 4, 5, and 9.
¶ 13 In December 2000, The View sued MSI and
Alta seeking to prevent construction*701 on lots 5
and 9. The View sought to prevent construction on
lot 9 under various legal theories, all of which were
designed to establish that The View had a permanent right to store snow on that lot. Specifically, it
argued that MSI and Alta breached a contract allowing it to use lot 9 as overflow snow storage and
that MSI and Alta also breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that inhered in the
contract. The View alternatively argued it had an
easement to store snow on lot 9 and that the doctrine of estoppel prevented MSI and Alta from
denying its right to store snow there. Finally, The
View claimed that Alta's adoption of the revised
snow storage plan constituted an unconstitutional

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

127 P.3d 697
127 P.3d 697, 542 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2005 UT 91
(Cite as: 127 P.3d 697)

taking
of
its
FN1
compensation.

property

without

just

FN1. MSI counterclaimed, arguing that
The View had improperly used lot 9 to
store snow without MSI's permission and
without paying MSI appropriate compensation. MSI requested payment for the reasonable value of The View's use of lot 9 and
an order requiring that The View cease using lot 9 for snow storage. The district
court held that MSI's counterclaim was
mooted by its grant of summary judgment
in favor of MSI on The View's takings
claim. Because we affirm the summary
judgment in favor of MSI on that issue,
and because neither party disputes the conclusion that summary judgment in favor of
MSI on The View's takings claim rendered
MSI's counterclaim moot, we do not address MSI's counterclaim further.
¶ 14 Following discovery, The View, MSI, and Alta
all moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied The View's motion for summary judgment
on the parking and the snow removal issues and
granted MSI/Alta's motion for summary judgment
on both issues.
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denying summary judgment in its favor on The
View's claims of implied easement, estoppel, and a
constitutional taking. The View cross-petitioned,
alleging that the court of appeals erred in affirming
summary judgment in favor of MSI on its claim to a
parking right on lot 5. We granted certiorari to conFN2
sider only two issues.
First, did the court of
appeals err in holding that the restrictive parking
covenant for lot 5 was terminated by the plat
amendment? Second, did the court of appeals err in
holding that Alta's termination of the snow storage
designation for lot 9 gave rise to a constitutional
takings claim? We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(a). Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).
FN2. Neither The View's claim of an implied easement to store snow on lot 9 nor
its claim that Alta and MSI are estopped
from denying it permission to store snow
on lot 9 was encompassed within our order
granting certiorari review. Disposition of
those issues is therefore governed by the
court of appeals' opinion, which directed
that they be remanded to the district court
for further consideration.
ANALYSIS

¶ 15 The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's entry of summary judgment against The
View with respect to its claim for parking on lot 5
and its contractual claims to store snow on lot 9.
The View Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C.,
2004 UT App 104, ¶ 38, 90 P.3d 1042. But it reversed the summary judgment entered against The
View on its other claims relating to the snow storage issue. Id. Specifically, it found that disputed issues of material fact made summary judgment inappropriate on The View's claims of implied easement, estoppel, and taking without just compensation and remanded those claims to the district court
for further proceedings. Id.
¶ 16 MSI and Alta jointly petitioned for a writ of
certiorari, arguing that the court of appeals erred in

[1] ¶ 17 When reviewing a case on certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness.
State v. Peterson, 2005 UT 17, ¶ 8, 110 P.3d 699;
State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, ¶ 10, 114 P.3d 569.
“The correctness of the court of appeals' decision
turns on whether that court correctly reviewed the
trial court's decision under the appropriate standard
of review.” State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 7, 95
P.3d 276. When reviewing the trial court's interpretation of the Declaration, which presents a legal
question, the court of appeals was obligated to apply a correctness standard. Cf. Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004 UT
54, ¶ 6, 94 P.3d 292. In reviewing a grant or denial
of summary judgment, the court of appeals was obligated to “view the facts and all reasonable infer-
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ences drawn therefrom in the *702 light most favorable to the nonmoving party” and to review the
district court's legal conclusions, as well as the
grant of summary judgment as a whole, for correctness. Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85,
¶¶ 2, 10, 100 P.3d 1200 (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. ¶
10; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
¶ 18 The View contends that the court of appeals
erroneously affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of MSI on the lot 5
parking issue. Alta argues that the court of appeals
erred in reversing summary judgment in its favor
on the lot 9 takings claim. We address each contention in turn.
I. THE VIEW'S RIGHT TO USE LOT 5 FOR
PARKING
¶ 19 We first consider whether the court of appeals
erred in holding that the plat amendment terminated
the restrictive parking covenant applicable to lot 5.
The court of appeals approached this issue by analyzing whether the lot 5 parking covenant qualified
as a covenant “running with the land.” The View
Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 2004 UT
App 104, ¶¶ 16-29, 90 P.3d 1042. The court concluded that the covenant did not run with the land
because the covenanting parties did not intend it to
do so. Id. ¶ 18. In reaching this conclusion, the
court of appeals began with the proposition that the
relevant time for determining intent was that point
when Sorenson first conveyed a parcel subject to
the Declaration. Id. ¶¶ 16-18. The court of appeals
then examined the language of the Declaration in
light of the amended plat, found that it was ambiguous, and therefore looked to extrinsic evidence of
intent. Id. ¶¶ 20-26. From the extrinsic evidence,
the court of appeals concluded that the parties did
not intend the parking covenant to run with the
land. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. It therefore upheld the district
court's summary judgment in favor of MSI. Id.
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¶ 20 The View argues that the court of appeals
erred when it considered extrinsic evidence. It asserts that the Declaration unambiguously demonstrates the parties' intent to create a restrictive covenant burdening lot 5 and that it is entitled to enforce the Declaration according to its terms. At the
heart of The View's argument is the notion that the
amendment to the plat map, which reconfigured the
sizes and locations of the Sugarplum lots, did not
effectuate an amendment to the corresponding Declaration. We agree.
[2] ¶ 21 A servitude, such as a restrictive covenant,
“is created ... if the owner of the property to be
burdened ... conveys a lot or unit in a general-plan
development or common-interest community subject to a recorded declaration of servitudes for the
development or community.” Restatement (Third)
of Property: Servitudes § 2.1 (2000). We interpret
the provisions of the Declaration as we would a
contract. Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, ¶ 11,
998 P.2d 807. If the Declaration is not ambiguous,
we interpret it according to its plain language.
Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, ¶ 11, 94 P.3d 292. We may
resort to extrinsic evidence as an aid to construction
only where there is an ambiguity. See Swenson,
2000 UT 16, ¶¶ 10-11, 998 P.2d 807. An ambiguity
exists if the Declaration is “capable of more than
one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain
meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies.” Fairbourn Commercial, 2004 UT
54, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 292 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
[3] ¶ 22 The Declaration's initial recitals plainly
state that the covenants, servitudes, and restrictions
contained in the Declaration “shall constitute covenants to run with the land.” Article 12.12 of the
Declaration similarly provides that the “Declaration
shall run with the land, and shall continue in full
force and effect for a period of fifty (50) years.”
Article 3.1 of the Declaration states: “Lot 5 shall be
reserved for and improved with a parking facility
for the owners of Lot 4 and Lots 6-9 and the Units
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constructed thereon, subject to Declarant's reservation of the air space rights to Lot 5....” Finally, the
restrictive covenants of the Declaration expressly
apply to lots 1 through 9 “as shown on that [plat
map] ... as the same may be *703 amended from
time to time.”We conclude that this language unambiguously creates a restrictive covenant that came
into effect when Sorenson conveyed lot 5 to
FN3
MSI.
FN3. We note that the court of appeals' focus on whether the parking covenant was
one “running with the land” is extraneous
to the resolution of this issue. The question
of whether a restrictive covenant “runs”
with its appurtenant land arises only when
a landowner seeks to convey the burdened
land to another. See, e.g., Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776
P.2d 618, 620-23 (Utah 1989). In that circumstance, the restrictive covenant that encumbers the land is already in force. Here,
however, while lot 5 was subject to article
3.1 of the Declaration, it was not encumbered until Sorenson actually conveyed it to MSI, thereby creating the servitude. SeeRestatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.1 cmt. c.
[4] ¶ 23 In urging us to conclude otherwise, MSI relies on the plat amendment. While it concedes that
the Declaration and original plat contemplated the
use of lot 5 for parking, it argues that the amended
plat eliminated the original lot 5, redrew the boundaries of the several lots, and used land from other
lots to create a new lot 5 devoid of any use restrictions. Because the Declaration incorporates the
FN4
amended plat by reference,
MSI argues that the
plat amendment effected an amendment to the Declaration as well, a result that is consistent with the
intent of the parties at the time Sorenson conveyed
lot 8.
FN4. The Declaration defines “Map” to
mean the recorded plat, “as the same may
be amended from time to time, and which
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is incorporated herein by this reference.”
¶ 24 While we agree with MSI's core contention
that the Declaration must be construed together
with the amended plat, see Rowley v. Marrcrest
Homeowners' Ass'n, 656 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah
1982), we disagree with the way in which MSI attempts to apply that principle here. First, MSI's argument ignores the language of the Declaration
specifying that the restrictive covenants apply by
their terms to any amended plats. Second, the argument presumes that the terms of the Declaration are
in conflict with the amended plat. But they are not.
¶ 25 Nothing in the amended plat is inconsistent
with use of the lot 5 surface area for parking. The
table on the amended plat does not require that any
units be constructed on lot 5. It specifies only that a
maximum of sixty-five units may be distributed
between lots 4 and 5. Moreover, the Declaration reserves the air space above lot 5 to Sorenson. Article
2.1.3 provides:
[Sorenson] hereby reserves unto itself, its successors and assigns, the exclusive right to develop,
build upon, lease, sell and otherwise use the air
space above Lot 5.... [Sorenson] and/or transferee
of the Air Space shall have the right to construct
any improvements therein for commercial, residential, retail, recreational or any other use permitted
by applicable state and local law. No owner of Lot
5 or any part thereof shall impair or restrict development of the Air Space, but shall cooperate fully
with such development and execute any such further documents or agreements deemed necessary by
[Sorenson] for the development of such space.
(Emphasis added.) Article 2.1.3 also provides for
an easement over lot 5 for ingress and egress “by
any other owners, lessees, guests, employees, contractors, invitees or customers of [Sorenson] or any
subsequent owner(s) of the Air Space or any improvements constructed thereon” (emphasis added).
In other words, the Declaration did not contemplate
that lot 5 would be used exclusively for parking.
Rather, it bifurcated lot 5 into two horizontal levels.
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While the bottom level was to be used for parking,
the upper level could be used for any purpose selected by Sorenson or its successors in interest. In
short, under the Declaration, parking and development on lot 5 are not mutually exclusive. Because
the amended plat is not inconsistent with the restrictive parking covenant contained in the Declaration, we must reject MSI's claim that the plat
amendment modified the Declaration, thereby eliminating its designation of lot 5 as a parking area.
[5] ¶ 26 As additional support for its amendment by
implication theory, MSI points to provisions in the
Declaration allowing the developer to unilaterally
amend the Declaration and the plat “for the purpose
of *704 allocating density to Lots owned by the
[developer] or changing the configuration, size or
location of [such lots].” Relying on those provisions, MSI argues that the Declaration could be
modified simply by amending the plat. We reject
this argument as well. The fact that the Declaration
vested the developer with the unilateral authority to
amend the Declaration and the plat in order to alter
the configuration, size, or location of the developer's own lots does not suggest that the developer could unilaterally terminate restrictive covenants through a plat amendment alone. Nor does it
suggest that amendments to the plat would constitute de facto amendments to the Declaration itselfparticularly where, as here, the amended plat is not
inconsistent with the Declaration. While Sorenson
may have had the right to unilaterally amend the
Declaration prior to the sale of lot 8, the undisputed
fact is that it never did so. And under the explicit
terms of the Declaration, amending the Declaration
subsequent to the sale of the first lot requires “the
vote or written assent of a majority of the total voting power of the Master Association.”
¶ 27 MSI also argues that the plat amendment
demonstrates the intent and understanding of both
The View and MSI that lot 5 not be subject to a restrictive parking covenant. Intent, however, is irrelevant because we conclude that the Declaration and
the amended plat, when construed together, are sub-
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ject to only one plausible meaning, namely, that the
amended plat's reference to building units refers to
development of lot 5's air space rather than to a revocation of the restrictive parking covenant. Wellsettled law precludes us from considering extrinsic
evidence to vary the terms of an unambiguous written agreement. The policy behind such law is particularly compelling here, where the written agreement, which concerns real property, has been recorded in the public records. Parties should be able to
rely on documents of record without fear that their
unambiguous provisions may be set aside on the
basis of contrary extrinsic evidence of intent. See
Fairbourn Commercial, 2004 UT 54, ¶¶ 10-11, 94
P.3d 292. We accordingly hold that there are no
disputed issues of material fact and that The View,
not MSI, is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
with respect to the existence of the lot 5 parking
covenant. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
¶ 28 Notwithstanding the existence of the parking
covenant, MSI suggests that we affirm the result
reached by the court of appeals on the alternative
basis that the parking covenant has been abandoned. Because both the district court and the court
of appeals ruled in favor of MSI on the parking
claim, neither court reached MSI's alternative abandonment defense, and we decline to consider it in
the first instance on certiorari review. MSI may,
however, present it on remand.
II. THE VIEW'S RIGHT TO STORE SNOW ON
LOT 9
[6] ¶ 29 We now turn to The View's constitutional
takings claim against Alta. The View alleged that
Alta's approval of the revised snow storage plan
constituted a taking of The View's property without
just compensation in violation of article I, section
FN5
22 of the Utah Constitution.
Utah Const. art. I,
§ 22. The court of appeals ruled in favor of The
View on this issue, holding that the trial court erred
in entering summary judgment in favor of Alta. In
doing so, the court of appeals erred.
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FN5. In supporting their respective positions on the takings claim, The View and
Alta rely solely on our takings jurisprudence under article I, section 22 of the
Utah Constitution. Neither party relies on
the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, made applicable to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 241, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed.
979 (1897). Similarly, neither attempts to
delineate whether the Utah Constitution
provides any more protection against a regulatory taking than does the United States
Constitution. Consequently, we analyze the
issue solely under our article I, section 22
jurisprudence. See Bernat v. Allphin,
2005 UT 1, ¶ 38, 106 P.3d 707 (refusing to
address an issue inadequately briefed by
the appellant).
[7][8] ¶ 30 A takings claim presents two distinct inquiries:
First, the claimant must demonstrate some
[protectable] interest in property. If the claimant
possesses a [protectable] property interest, the
claimant must then show that *705 the interest has
been taken or damaged by government action. A
taking is any substantial interference with private
property which destroys or materially lessens its
value, or by which the owner's right to its use and
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or
destroyed.
Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City,
918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
[9][10] ¶ 31 Constitutional takings claims fall into
two categories: physical takings and regulatory takings. A “physical taking occurs ... when there is
[either] a condemnation or a physical appropriation
of property.” Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d
24, 33 (1st Cir.2002). In contrast, “[a] regulatory
taking transpires when some significant restriction
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is placed upon an owner's use of his property for
which ‘justice and fairness' require that compensation be given.” Id. The View's claim falls into the
latter category inasmuch as it argues that Alta's
modification of the snow removal plan hampered
FN6
its enjoyment of its property interest in lot 8.
FN6. In analyzing the takings issue, we focus solely on The View's claim that Alta's
adoption of the revised snow storage plan
damaged its right to the use and enjoyment
of lot 8. While The View also asserts a
protectable property interest in lot 9, The
View's ability to establish such an interest
is dependent upon the outcome of its easement and estoppel claims, which await further development in the district court. In
any event, The View's claim that Alta engaged in an unconstitutional taking of its
interest in lot 9 was not an issue encompassed within the scope of our certiorari
review. See Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998)
(review on certiorari is circumscribed by
the issues raised in the petitions).
[11][12][13] ¶ 32 Pursuant to their police power,
state and local governments may enact regulations
that do not constitute an unlawful taking. In Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah
1990), we recognized:
Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a property owner can do with and on the owner's property.
Those regulations may have a significant impact on
the utility or value of property, yet they generally
do not require compensation under article I, section
22. Only when governmental action rises to the
level of a taking or damage under article I, section
22 is the State required to pay compensation.
Id. at 627. In other words, a taking is not merely
any interference with private property, but is a
“substantial interference with private property
which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by
which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is
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in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed.”
Id. at 626 (citation omitted). Indeed, the police
power allows government, “without compensation,”
to “regulate and restrain the use of private property
when the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the
public requires or demands it.” Id. at 627. Regulations promulgated under that power “are not considered as appropriating private property for a public use, but simply as regulating its use and enjoyment.” Id.
¶ 33 In light of these principles, we conclude that
the court of appeals erred when it reversed the trial
court's summary judgment in favor of Alta on The
View's takings claim. While The View unquestionably has a protectable property interest in lot 8,
there was no evidence that Alta's adoption of the revised snow storage plan substantially abridged or
destroyed that right.
¶ 34 In reversing the summary judgment, the court
of appeals relied on the possibility that Alta might
initiate litigation seeking to enjoin The View from
occupying lot 8 during snow periods. The View,
2004 UT App 104, ¶ 36, 90 P.3d 1042. But the possibility of such litigation was premised on The
View's inability to obtain suitable alternative snow
storage. The November 2000 settlement between
Alta and MSI provided for such storage, thereby
eliminating any basis for interfering with The
View's use and enjoyment of lot 8 during winter
months.
[14] ¶ 35 The court of appeals also found
“conflicting evidence as to the validity and costimpact of the revised snow storage plan” approved
as part of the settlement between Alta and MSI. Id.
The court of appeals therefore found itself
“obligated to conclude that The View would be
damaged by the removal of the Lot 9 snow storage
designation.” Id. Mere “damage” to a landowner
caused by a *706 municipal regulation, however,
does not rise to the level of a taking. An increase in
cost caused by revision of the snow removal plan
does not make the revision a compensable taking,
as it does not substantially interfere with lot 8 or
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destroy or materially lessen its value. Colman, 795
P.2d at 627.
¶ 36 In summary, the revised snow storage plan and
its attendant cost do not prevent The View from engaging in any and all permissible uses of lot 8. Accordingly, even when viewed in the light most favorable to The View, the facts are insufficient to establish a regulatory taking. Alta was consequently
“entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,”Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c), and the court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise.
CONCLUSION
¶ 37 The court of appeals erroneously concluded
that the plat amendment modified the provisions of
the Declaration. In fact, the Declaration and
amended plat are consistent with one another and
recognize The View's right to park on lot 5. The
court of appeals also erroneously concluded that issues of material fact precluded summary judgment
in favor of Alta on The View's takings claim. Even
when viewed in the light most favorable to The
View, the facts are insufficient to establish a taking,
as Alta was acting squarely within its police powers
when it modified the snow storage plan. We therefore reverse the court of appeals on both issues and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Specifically, we remand for entry
of judgment in favor of Alta on the constitutional
takings claim and in favor of The View on the lot 5
parking claim, subject only to MSI's abandonment
defense. The View's claims of easement and estoppel on the parking issue, which were not encompassed in our grant of certiorari, are remanded for
consideration on their merits in accordance with the
opinion of the court of appeals.
¶ 38 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice
DURRANT, and Justice NEHRING concur in
Justice PARRISH's opinion.
¶ 39 Having disqualified herself, Chief Justice
DURHAM does not participate herein.
Utah,2005.
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dicial Proceedings, § 3-2A-01 et seq.] for claims
against a health care provider for medical injury in
excess of $5,000.

Wyndham v. Haines
Md.,1986.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Paul H. WYNDHAM et ux.
v.
John Summer HAINES et al.
No. 40, Sept. Term, 1985.
Jan. 31, 1986.
Medical malpractice claimants filed an action to
nullify an adverse health claims arbitration award
and filed a petition to vacate the award on the basis
of alleged partiality of arbitration panel chairman.
The Circuit Court, Baltimore City, Joseph H.H. Kaplan, J., dismissed the action and denied the petition to vacate, and claimants appealed. Prior to consideration of their appeal by the Court of Special
Appeals, claimants received a writ of certiorari.
The Court of Appeals, Couch, J., held that: (1)
claimants were not required to present prima facie
case of liability to arbitration panel before appeal to
circuit court could be had, but (2) refusal to vacate
arbitration award on basis of alleged partiality of
panel chairman was proper.
Judgment reversed in part and affirmed in part; case
remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Pretrial Procedure 307A
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307A Pretrial Procedure
307AIII Dismissal
307AIII(B) Involuntary Dismissal
307AIII(B)2 Grounds in General
307Ak551 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
In certain circumstances, dismissal of complaint is
appropriate sanction for a party's failure to comply
with prescribed statutory arbitration procedure of
Health Care Malpractice Act [Code, Courts and Ju-

[2] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T
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25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(H) Review, Conclusiveness, and Enforcement of Award
25Tk366 Appeal or Other Proceedings for
Review
25Tk371 k. Presentation and Reservation of Grounds of Review. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k73.3 Arbitration)
Medical malpractice claimants were not required to
present prima facie case of liability to health claims
arbitration panel before appeal to circuit court
could be had. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 3-2A-06(a).
[3] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T

151

25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(B) Agreements to Arbitrate
25Tk150 Operation and Effect
25Tk151 k. In General. Most Cited
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(Formerly 33k10.15, 33k7.9 Arbitration)
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and Judicial Proceedings, § 3-2A-01 et seq.], all
screening of medical malpractice claims is to be
done at arbitration level, not trial level.
[5] Appeal and Error 30
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30X Record
30X(J) Defects, Objections, Amendments,
and Corrections
30k639.1 k. Errors in Abstracts. Most
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(Formerly 30k639(1))
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(Formerly 30k639(1))
Appellants' failure to include petition to vacate
health claims arbitration award and appellee's response in record extract was not so egregious as to
warrant dismissal of appeal. Md.Rule 828, subds. b,
i, par. 2.
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Refusal to vacate health claims arbitration award on
basis of alleged partiality of arbitration panel chairman, who was an attorney for two different medical
malpractice plaintiffs in unrelated cases in which
opposing counsel was also counsel to defendant
doctor in instant case, was proper, where petition to
vacate was unsupported by affidavit in furtherance
of petition's allegations. Md.Rule 2-311(d); Code,
Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 3-224(b).
[8] Alternative Dispute Resolution 25T
363(8)
25T Alternative Dispute Resolution
25TII Arbitration
25TII(H) Review, Conclusiveness, and Enforcement of Award
25Tk360 Impeachment or Vacation
25Tk363 Motion to Set Aside or Vacate
25Tk363(8) k. Affidavits, Evidence, or Record. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 33k77(6) Arbitration)
Under Health Care Malpractice Act [Code, Courts
and Judicial Proceedings, § 3-224(b)], establishment of “evident partiality” by arbitrator in order to
have health claims arbitration award vacated requires more than speculation and bald allegations of
bias; moving party must prove facts sufficient to
permit inference that there was indeed partiality by
arbitrators; disapproving Hartman v. Cooper, 59
Md.App. 154, 474 A.2d 959.
**720 *271 David B. Ginsburg, Baltimore (Cynthia
E. Young, Annapolis, on brief), for appellant.
Angus R. Everton (M. Wayne Munday, P.A., on
brief), Towson, for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH,
ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and
McAULIFFE, JJ.
**721 COUCH, Judge.
Paul Harrison Wyndham and his wife Rosalie
Wyndham seek review by this Court of an order of
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Kaplan, J.)
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dismissing their appeal from an adverse Health
Claims Arbitration (HCA) award. The order also
denied their petition to vacate the award.
The award was rendered by an arbitration panel following a day long hearing on the merits. At the
conclusion of the claimants' evidence, the health
care provider, Dr. Haines, moved to dismiss the
claim. Finding that the claimants had failed to establish a prima facie case of either of their causes
of action, the panel unanimously agreed to grant
FN1
Dr. Haines' motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, an
award of no liability was entered in favor of Dr.
Haines.
FN1. Appellants' lack of success before the
arbitration panel was not due to any deliberate refusal to comply with the Health
Care Malpractice Act. The panel chairman
stated in an affidavit that the plaintiffs
made a good faith effort to establish their
case.
*272 Within the prescribed time limits, the
Wyndhams properly rejected the award in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City by filing a notice of
rejection with the Health Claims Arbitration Office
FN2
(HCAO).
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, they filed an action to nullify, a declaration
and a prayer for a jury trial. The claimants also
filed a petition to vacate the award alleging that
“the Panel Chairman failed to act in a neutral and
impartial manner.” In response to these pleadings,
the health care provider filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds that plaintiffs' failure to establish a
prima facie case of liability at the arbitration level
was tantamount to a refusal to properly submit their
claim to arbitration.
FN2. Section 3-2A-06(a) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl. Vol.) requires
a notice of rejection to be filed with the
Director and the arbitration panel and
served on the other parties or their counsel
within 30 days after the award is served on
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the rejecting party. Section 3-2A-06(b) requires the rejecting party to file an action
in court to nullify the award and to file a
copy of the action to nullify with the Director at or before the time for filing and
serving the notice of rejection. See also
Md.Rule BY2 a. Maryland Rule BY4 a 1
requires that the plaintiff in the action to
nullify file and serve a declaration within
30 days after filing the notice of action.
For a discussion of what a party aggrieved
at the award must do to invoke judicial review see Tranen v. Aziz, 304 Md. 605, 500
A.2d 636 (1985).
Prior to trial, a hearing was held concerning the
pending motions. Based solely on the arguments of
counsel, the pleadings in the trial court, an affidavit
of the panel chairman, the motion to dismiss and
the opposition thereto, the trial court ordered disFN3
missal of the action.
In a written Memorandum
and Opinion Order, the court found “that Plaintiffs
failed to properly submit their claim to Health *273
Claims Arbitration because they failed to produce
enough testimony at the arbitration hearing to establish a prima facie case of liability.”
FN3. Neither party provided the trial court
with a transcript of the arbitration proceedings. However, the defendant attached the
panel chairman's attorney data sheet, a letter to the panel chairman from HCAO, the
arbitration panel determination, and its explanation as exhibits to an affidavit of the
panel chairman. The affidavit alluded to at
note 1 attesting to the plaintiffs' good faith
was not before the court at the time of its
decision to dismiss the action. It was later
filed by plaintiffs in an attempt to persuade
the circuit court to revise its judgment.
Plaintiffs also received an adverse ruling on their
petition to vacate. The trial court held that there
was “no basis for concluding that the Panel Chairman for the arbitration ... was biased or prejudiced
to justify vacating the arbitration award under Sec-
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tion 3-224(b)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” Consequently, the petition to vacate
was denied.
Appellants appealed these rulings to the Court of
Special Appeals. Prior to consideration by that
court, appellants sought and received a writ of certiorari from this Court. Because we find no statutory basis for the trial court's ruling on the motion
to dismiss, we reverse the dismissal of the **722
action. However, we affirm the trial court's denial
of the petition to vacate.
I
Motion to Dismiss
[1] The Health Care Malpractice Act (the Act) requires all claims against a health care provider for
medical injury in excess of five thousand dollars to
be submitted to mandatory arbitration prior to the
FN4
institution of traditional court action.
Maryland
Code (1974, 1984 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial
FN5
Proceedings Article, § 3-2A-02(a)
. See Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57
(1978), appeal dismissed,439 U.S. 805, 99 S.Ct. 60,
58 L.Ed.2d 97 (1978). In certain circumstances, dismissal of a party's complaint is an appropriate sanction for failure to comply *274 with the prescribed
statutory arbitration procedure. Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 91, 447 A.2d 860, 865 (1982);
Schwartz v. Lilly, 53 Md.App. 318, 324, 452 A.2d
1302, 1305 (1982). But see Mitcherling v. Rosselli,
304 Md. 363, 499 A.2d 476 (1985).
FN4. The compulsory arbitration system
implemented by the Act has been held constitutionally sound. Attorney General v.
Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57
(1978), appeal dismissed,439 U.S. 805, 99
S.Ct. 60, 58 L.Ed.2d 97 (1978).
FN5. All references to Code Sections are
to the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art-
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icle unless otherwise indicated.
Thus, in resolving the first issue presented by this
appeal, our task is to determine whether the
Wyndhams' presentation of their claim to the panel
constituted compliance with the statutory guidelines
mandated by the General Assembly. If so, the
plaintiffs have satisfied the condition precedent to
court suit, and dismissal of their action was inappropriate. If, however, the conduct of their arbitration falls short of the legislative requirements, dismissal may have been proper.
The primary duty imposed upon a health care
claimant by the Act is that he initially “file his
claim” with the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office. § 3-2A-04(a). In Bailey v. Woel,
302 Md. 38, 485 A.2d 265 (1984), we determined
that the mere physical filing of the statement of
claim without the presentation of any evidence at
the arbitration hearing will not suffice to satisfy the
condition precedent. This holding was premised in
part on our determination in Attorney General v.
Johnson that one of the goals of the General Assembly in enacting the Health Claims Arbitration
Act was to reduce the number of medical malpractice court suits. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57. Additionally, we found support in § 3-2A-05 of the Act
which requires the panel to “first determine the issue of liability with respect to a claim.” The panel's
proper performance of this function obviously requires the presentation and evaluation of evidence.
Finally, we noted that in light of the elaborate mandatory arbitration scheme implemented by the legislature, the adoption of a construction making
compliance optional would be illogical and therefore should be avoided. See Kindley v. Governor of
Maryland, 289 Md. 620, 426 A.2d 908 (1981). The
totality of these factors convinced us to hold:
*275 “[U]nder the Maryland statute, a plaintiff who
presents no evidence before a medical malpractice
arbitration panel has not satisfied the condition precedent of submitting his claim to arbitration prior to
instituting court action. The proper action for a circuit court to take when such a claim is filed is to
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dismiss the claim.”
Bailey, 302 Md. at 45, 485 A.2d at 268. In so doing,
we acknowledged that other states with similar
compulsory arbitration statutes had reached contrary results. Id. at 44, 485 A.2d at 267-68.
[2] Appellee would have us now carry this holding
substantially further and require all medical malpractice plaintiffs to present a prima facie case of
liability to the arbitration panel before appeal to the
circuit court can be had. After a thorough **723 examination of the Act and its supplemental rules and
regulations, we find no authority for doing so. Such
a requirement is simply not provided for in the statutory scheme.
Quite to the contrary, § 3-2A-06(a) permits a party
to reject an award “for any reason” provided certain
notice and filing requirements are timely fulfilled.
The parties do not dispute that the appellants fulfilled the procedural requirements of § 3-2A-06(a).
Here, the controversy centers around whether they
were substantively entitled to further pursue their
claim. Without independent review of the evidence
presented to the arbitration panel, the trial court accepted the panel's determination that a prima facie
case of liability had not been presented. Equating
this evidentiary shortcoming to a failure to arbitrate, the trial judge dismissed the case. Bailey was
cited as his authority for doing so.
[3] In our view, the trial judge misapplied the principles set forth in Bailey, and the dismissal denied
plaintiffs their day in court as preserved by §
3-2A-06. It cannot be overemphasized that the Act
does not abridge or preclude a medical malpractice
claimant's right to a common law tort action. As
Judge Digges stated in Attorney General v. *276
Johnson,“Nowhere does the Act preclude the
parties in the trial of the case from presenting
whatever evidence and making whatever arguments
on the merits of the claim they might have made
had there been no pretrial arbitration.” 282 Md. at
296, 385 A.2d at 70. The dismissal by the trial
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court did precisely that; on the basis of the panel's
determination, it prohibited the plaintiffs from
presenting their arguments at trial.
In effect, the trial court's ruling imposed an additional condition precedent to the maintenance of the
traditional court action. This requirement is not to
be found in the Act and we are hesitant to apply
such a rule in the absence of a legislative directive.
It is an established rule of statutory construction
that “a court may not insert or omit words to make
a statute express an intention not evidenced in its
original form.” City of Baltimore v. Hackley, 300
Md. 277, 283, 477 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1984).
[4] Appellee asserts that by refusing to imply this
additional condition precedent, the judiciary is
thwarting the legislature's goal of “screening out”
non-meritorious claims. We do not question that the
legislators had such a purpose in mind. However, as
has been pointed out by Chief Judge Gilbert of the
Court of Special Appeals, all screening is to be
done at the arbitration level not the trial level. Specifically, Judge Gilbert stated:
“[T]he statute is strictly construed so as to effectuate the legislative purpose of screening malpractice
claims before they reach the courts. Upon completion of the arbitration process and the filing of the
correct and timely notice of rejection with the
parties and court, the statutory screening process is
terminated. All further proceedings are conducted
in court and regulated, as are all other civil cases,
by the Maryland Rules. Although judicial review of
the HCAO actions might be regarded as a continuation of the arbitration proceeding, it is not. Rather,
it is a new, separate, and distinct proceeding. It is
litigation.”
*277 Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 62 Md.App. 519,
525, 490 A.2d 720, 723 (1985),cert. denied,304
Md. 163, 497 A.2d 1163 (1985). Thus, it is not the
function of the trial court to further screen malpracFN6
tice claims.
By doing so, the trial court exceeded its powers and denied plaintiffs their day in
court. We therefore reverse the dismissal **724 and
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remand the action to the circuit court for proceedings in accordance with the Maryland Rules.
FN6. Of course, a trial judge may still dispose of the claim through any means
provided by the Maryland Rules, e.g., a
motion to dismiss made pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322 or a motion for judgment
made pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-519(a).
The Health Care Malpractice Act expressly
requires that the Maryland Rules govern
the court action to nullify the award. §
3-2A-06(b).
II
Petition to Vacate
[5][6] We now address the second issue raised by
this appeal-whether the trial court properly refused
to vacate the panel's award on the basis of the alFN7
leged partiality of the panel chairman.
This
query is significant since a finding that vacatur was
warranted will result in exclusion of evidence of the
award at trial. § 3-2A-06(d). Otherwise, the award
will be admissible as evidence in the judicial proceeding. Id.
FN7. Appellee urges the Court to refuse to
consider this issue on the basis of Maryland Rule 828 b which requires a printed
extract to contain all parts of the record as
may reasonably be necessary to decide the
appeal. Appellee contends that appellants'
failure to include the petition to vacate and
the appellee's response in the record extract violates this rule and precludes our
addressing this issue. However, appellee
fails to note that the sanctions for violation
of Rule 828 b as provided by Rule 828 i 2
are discretionary. Bergen v. State, 234 Md.
394, 199 A.2d 381 (1964); DeHart v.
State, 227 Md. 239, 176 A.2d 353 (1961).
In the instant case the omission was not so
egregious as to warrant dismissal.
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Appellants allege that nearly a month before the arbitration hearing, their counsel inadvertently
learned of possible bias on the part of the panel
chairman. Subsequent to his appointment as panel
chairman, the attorney member of the *278 panel
was retained as counsel to two different medical
malpractice plaintiffs in unrelated cases. More importantly, it was discovered that the panel chairman's opposing counsel in the two unrelated matters was also counsel to Dr. Haines in the instant
case. Appellants feared that the panel chairman's
desire to maintain good rapport with defense counsel in the negotiation and settlement of his unrelated cases might subconsciously influence his decisionmaking in the case sub judice. To eliminate
this possibility, however remote, appellants' counsel sought disqualification of the chairman.
Although the regulatory scheme contains detailed
procedures for disqualifying a potentially biased
panel candidate, seeCOMAR 01.03.01.07D(2), it
does not give any guidance when the grounds for an
allegation of possible bias do not arise until after
the candidate has been impaneled and the arbitral
process has commenced. In the instant case, the
HCAO Clerk's Memorandum and the record indicate that appellants' counsel communicated his concern on several occasions, the first of which occurred approximately a month before the hearing
FN8
date.
Counsel's attempts at disqualification culminated in the filing of a “Motion to Recuse Panel
Chairman.” This motion was never ruled on. The
hearing proceeded as scheduled, and a unanimous
award in favor of the health care provider was
rendered.
FN8. The manner in which these early
communications were made is not known.
The documents, if there were any, are not
in the record or record extract. The only indicia of these communications are the
entries on the HCAO Clerk's Memorandum.
In the circuit court, the award was the subject of
plaintiffs' petition to vacate. The governing Code
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provision, section 3-224(b), states in pertinent part:
“(b) Grounds.-The court shall vacate an award if:
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption in any arbitrator, or
misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party.”
*279 The trial court denied the petition to vacate,
finding “no basis for concluding that [the panel
chairman] was biased or could not render a fair and
impartial decision.”
[7][8] This ruling by the trial judge was proper. Appellants failed to adduce the required proof of
“evident partiality.” The establishment of “evident
partiality” requires more than speculation and bald
FN9
allegations**725 of bias.
The moving party
must prove facts sufficient to permit an inference
that there was indeed partiality by an arbitrator.
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tained in the record or papers on file in
the proceeding shall be supported by affidavit and accompanied by any papers
on which it is based.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED IN PART AND
AFFIRMED IN PART; CASE TO BE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEES.
Md.,1986.
Wyndham v. Haines
305 Md. 269, 503 A.2d 719
END OF DOCUMENT

FN9. In reaching this conclusion we are
aware of Hartman v. Cooper, 59 Md.App.
154, 168, 474 A.2d 959, 967 (1984), cert.
denied,301 Md. 41, 481 A.2d 801 (1984).
To the extent that Hartman v. Cooper is inconsistent with this opinion, it is disapproved.
Here, appellants offered no proof in furtherance of
FN10
their allegations.
Their petition to vacate was
unsupported by affidavit despite the mandate of
FN11
Md.Rule 2-311(d).
In light of the absence of
evidence of “evident partiality,” the trial court was
correct in its denial of the petition to vacate.
FN10. Although a hearing was held on this
matter, neither party has provided the
Court with a transcript of these proceedings. It is not known whether a court reporter was present.
FN11. Md. Rule 2-311(d) states:
(d) Affidavit.-A motion or a response to a
motion that is based on facts not con-
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Title 78B Judicial Code
Chapter 11 Utah Uniform Arbitration Act
Section 129 Appeals.
78B-11-129. Appeals.
(1) An appeal may be taken from:
(a) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration;
(b) an order granting a motion to stay arbitration;
(c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(d) an order modifying or correcting an award;
(e) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter.
(2) An appeal under this section must be taken as from an order or a judgment in a civil action.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Title/Chapter/Section:

Utah Code
Title 78A Judiciary and Judicial Administration
Chapter 3 Supreme Court
Section 102 Supreme Court jurisdiction.
78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the
United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue all
writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of
Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division of
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies
under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme
Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge
of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the
review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
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(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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Chapter 41 Agriculture and Industrial Protection Areas
Section 101 Definitions.
17-41-101. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Advisory board" means:
(a) for an agriculture protection area, the agriculture protection area advisory board created as provided in
Section 17-41-201; and
(b) for an industrial protection area, the industrial protection area advisory board created as provided in
Section 17-41-201.
(2) (a) "Agriculture production" means production for commercial purposes of crops, livestock, and
livestock products.
(b) "Agriculture production" includes the processing or retail marketing of any crops, livestock, and
livestock products when more than 50% of the processed or merchandised products are produced by the farm
operator.
(3) "Agriculture protection area" means a geographic area created under the authority of this chapter that is
granted the specific legal protections contained in this chapter.
(4) "Applicable legislative body" means:
(a) with respect to a proposed agriculture protection area or industrial protection area:
(i) the legislative body of the county in which the land proposed to be included in an agriculture protection
area or industrial protection area is located, if the land is within the unincorporated part of the county; or
(ii) the legislative body of the city or town in which the land proposed to be included in an agriculture
protection area or industrial protection area is located; and
(b) with respect to an existing agriculture protection area or industrial protection area:
(i) the legislative body of the county in which the agriculture protection area or industrial protection area is
located, if the agriculture protection area or industrial protection area is within the unincorporated part of the
county; or
(ii) the legislative body of the city or town in which the agriculture protection area or industrial protection
area is located.
(5) "Board" means the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining created in Section 40-6-4.
(6) "Crops, livestock, and livestock products" includes:
(a) land devoted to the raising of useful plants and animals with a reasonable expectation of profit, including:
(i) forages and sod crops;
(ii) grains and feed crops;
(iii) livestock as defined in Subsection 59-2-102(27)(d);
(iv) trees and fruits; or
(v) vegetables, nursery, floral, and ornamental stock; or
(b) land devoted to and meeting the requirements and qualifications for payments or other compensation
under a crop-land retirement program with an agency of the state or federal government.
(7) "Division" means the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining created in Section 40-6-15.
(8) "Industrial protection area" means a geographic area created under the authority of this chapter that is
granted the specific legal protections contained in this chapter.
(9) "Mine operator" means a natural person, corporation, association, partnership, receiver, trustee, executor,
administrator, guardian, fiduciary, agent, or other organization or representative, either public or private,
including a successor, assign, affiliate, subsidiary, and
related parent company, that, as of January 1, 2009:

(a) owns, controls, or manages a mining use under a large mine permit issued by the division or the board;
and
(b) has produced commercial quantities of a mineral deposit from the mining use.
(10) "Mineral deposit" has the same meaning as defined in Section 40-8-4, but excludes:
(a) building stone, decorative rock, and landscaping rock; and
(b) consolidated rock that:
(i) is not associated with another deposit of minerals;
(ii) is or may be extracted from land; and
(iii) is put to uses similar to the uses of sand, gravel, and other aggregates.
(11) "Mining protection area" means land where a vested mining use occurs, including each surface or
subsurface land or mineral estate that a mine operator with a vested mining use owns or controls.
(12) "Mining use":
(a) means:
(i) the full range of activities, from prospecting and exploration to reclamation and closure, associated with
the exploitation of a mineral deposit; and
(ii) the use of the surface and subsurface and groundwater and surface water of an area in connection with
the activities described in Subsection (12)(a)(i) that have been, are being, or will be conducted; and
(b) includes, whether conducted on-site or off-site:
(i) any sampling, staking, surveying, exploration, or development activity;
(ii) any drilling, blasting, excavating, or tunneling;
(iii) the removal, transport, treatment, deposition, and reclamation of overburden, development rock, tailings,
and other waste material;
(iv) any removal, transportation, extraction, beneficiation, or processing of ore;
(v) any smelting, refining, autoclaving, or other primary or secondary processing operation;
(vi) the recovery of any mineral left in residue from a previous extraction or processing operation;
(vii) a mining activity that is identified in a work plan or permitting document;
(viii) the use, operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, or alteration of a building, structure, facility,
equipment, machine, tool, or other material or property that results from or is used in a surface or subsurface
mining operation or activity;
(ix) any accessory, incidental, or ancillary activity or use, both active and passive, including a utility, private
way or road, pipeline, land excavation, working, embankment, pond, gravel excavation, mining waste,
conveyor, power line, trackage, storage, reserve, passive use area, buffer zone, and power production facility;
(x) the construction of a storage, factory, processing, or maintenance facility; and
(xi) any activity described in Subsection 40-8-4(14)(a).
(13) (a) "Municipal" means of or relating to a city or town.
(b) "Municipality" means a city or town.
(14) "New land" means surface or subsurface land or mineral estate that a mine operator gains ownership or
control of, whether or not that land or mineral estate is included in the mine operator's large mine permit.
(15) "Off-site" has the same meaning as provided in Section 40-8-4.
(16) "On-site" has the same meaning as provided in Section 40-8-4.
(17) "Planning commission" means:
(a) a countywide planning commission if the land proposed to be included in the agriculture protection area
or industrial protection area is within the unincorporated part of the county and not within a township;
(b) a township planning commission if the land proposed to be included in the agriculture protection area or
industrial protection area is within a township; or
(c) a planning commission of a city or town if the land proposed to be included in the agriculture protection
area or industrial protection area is within a city or town.
(18) "Political subdivision" means a county, city, town, school district, local district, or special service
district.
(19) "Proposal sponsors" means the owners of land in agricultural production or industrial use who are
sponsoring the proposal for creating an agriculture protection area or industrial protection area, respectively.
(20) "State agency" means each department, commission, board, council, agency, institution, officer,
corporation, fund, division, office, committee, authority, laboratory, library, unit, bureau, panel, or other

administrative unit of the state.
(21) "Unincorporated" means not within a city or town.
(22) "Vested mining use" means a mining use:
(a) by a mine operator; and
(b) that existed or was conducted or otherwise engaged in before a political subdivision prohibits, restricts,
or otherwise limits a mining use.
Amended by Chapter 376, 2009 General Session
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Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
Concerning the Application for Water Rights of the Mount Emmons Mining Company, an affiliate of Climax
Molybdenum Company, in the Slate River, Carbon Creek, and Elk Creek, All Tributaries to the Gunnison River,
in Gunnison County.
MOUNT EMMONS MINING COMPANY, Applicant-Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF CRESTED BUTTE; Western Slope Environmental Council; High Country Citizens' Alliance; Board
of County Commissioners of Gunnison County, Colorado; Rosalie C. Munis; Albert W. Sanderson; William S.
Sanderson; A.B. Herndon, Jr. and June G. Herndon; John Evans and Betty Evans; the Ranches at Ohio Creek,
LLC; Cheri-Colleen Campbell-Raferty; Mary J. Turner; The Colorado Water Conservation Board; Dr. B. Henry
Estess; Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc.; Castle Creek Cattle Corp.; Castleton Ranch Company; Eagle Ridge
Ranch Homeowners Association; Bert A. Guerrieri; Richard E. Guerrieri and Phyllis C. Guerrieri; Wallace A.
Jones and Marry M. Jones; The Ochs Brothers Partnership; Harrison F. Russell and Patricia E. Russell; E. Allan
Stockton and Barbara V. Stockton; John L. Walsh and Agnes Ann Walsh; The City of Gunnison; E.J. Maurer;
The Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County; The United States (Bureau of Land Management and
United States Forest Service); Crested Butte Land Trust; Earl Partch; Francis Partch; Carl E. Silka; Dan Rundell;
Phyllis Rundell; Debe Hancock; Star Mountain Ranch Association, Inc.; and Scott Rennck, Opposers-Appellees,
and
Wayne I. Schieldt, Division Engineer, Water Division No. 4., Appellee pursuant to C.A.R. 1(e).
No. 99SA354.
Jan. 28, 2002.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 2002.
Mining company applied for a conditional water right to a portion of the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance to
which the United States' interest was subordinated in the Gunnison River basin. The District Court, Water Division 4, J. Stephen Patrick, J., denied the application. Company appealed. The Supreme Court, Kourlis, J., held
that the company did not need a contract with the United States' Bureau of Reclamation (BUREC) in order to
show availability and qualify for a conditional decree.
Reversed and remanded.
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405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k140 k. Priorities. Most Cited Cases
A conditional water right serves to hold the place of the appropriator in a “first in time, first in right” system.
West's C.R.S.A. § 37-92-103(6).
[2] Waters and Water Courses 405
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405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
Waters and Water Courses 405
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405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k140 k. Priorities. Most Cited Cases
If the appropriator diligently puts the water to beneficial use, the conditional right can mature into an absolute
water right, with a priority that dates back to the initiation of the conditional right.
[3] Waters and Water Courses 405

135

405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
To establish a conditional water right, an applicant must show in general that a first step toward the appropriation of a certain amount of water has been taken, that the applicant's intent to appropriate is not based upon the
speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights, and that there is a substantial probability that the applicant can and will complete the appropriation with diligence. West's C.R.S.A. § 37-92-305(9)(b).
[4] Waters and Water Courses 405
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405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
As a prerequisite to receiving a conditional decree, applicants must show water is available that can be diverted.
West's C.R.S.A. § 37-92-305(9)(b).
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405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
An up-stream, junior, in-basin appropriator did not need a contract with the United States' Bureau of Reclamation (BUREC) in order to show availability and qualify for a conditional decree; the appropriator was invoking
the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance to which the United States' interest was subordinated.
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405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k140 k. Priorities. Most Cited Cases
Water within the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance to which the United States' interest is subordinated is
available to an applicant for the purposes of a conditional decree, provided only that other qualified appropriators have not otherwise exhausted the depletion allowance.
[7] Waters and Water Courses 405

135

405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
Typically, to satisfy the “can and will” test for a conditional right, new appropriators must convince the water
court that their diversion will cause no harm to senior appropriators, i.e., that water is available. West's C.R.S.A.
§ 37-92-305(9)(b).
[8] Waters and Water Courses 405

135

405 Waters and Water Courses
405VI Appropriation and Prescription
405k135 k. Diligence in Completion of Works or Application of Water to Use. Most Cited Cases
In the Gunnison River basin, to satisfy the water availability test for a conditional decree, a new, in-basin appropriator must only convince the water court that a portion of the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance, to which
the United States' interest is subordinated, remains unused.
*1256 Friedlob Sanderson Paulson & Tourtillott, LLC, Brian M. Nazarenus, Carolyn F. Burr, Denver, CO, Attorneys for Applicant-Appellant.
Laura L. Magner, Crested Butte, CO, Frascona, Joiner, Goodman, and Greenstein, P.C., Joseph Adams Cope,
Boulder, CO, Attorneys for Opposer-Appellee Town of Crested Butte.
Land and Water Fund of the Rockies, Bruce C. Driver, Bart P. Miller, Boulder, CO, Attorneys for OpposersAppellees Western Slope Environmental Resource Council and High Country Citizens' Alliance.
David Baumgarten, Gunnison, CO, Attorney for Opposer-Appellee Board of County Commissioners of Gunnison County, CO.
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Steven O. Sims, First Assistant Attorney General, Linda J. Bassi, Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources and Environment Section, Denver, CO, Attorneys for State and Division Engineer.
No appearance by or on behalf of Rosalie C. Munis; Albert W. Sanderson; William S. Sanderson; A.B. Herndon,
Jr. and June G. Herndon; John Evans and Betty Evans; The Ranches At Ohio Creek, LLC; Cheri-Colleen Campbell-Raferty; Mary J. Turner; The Colorado Water Conservation Board; Dr. B. Henry Estess; Crested Butte
Mountain Resort, Inc.; Castle Creek Cattle Corp.; Castleton Ranch Company; Eagle Ridge Ranch Homeowners
Association; Bert A. Guerrieri; Richard E. Guerrieri and Phyllis C. Guerrieri; Wallace A. Jones and Marry M.
Jones; The Ochs Brothers Partnership; Harrison F. Russell and Patricia E. Russell; E. Allan Stockton and Barbara V. Stockton; John L. Walsh and Agnes Ann Walsh; The City Of Gunnison; E.J. Maurer; The Board Of

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 4
40 P.3d 1255
(Cite as: 40 P.3d 1255)

County Commissioners Of Arapahoe County; The United States (Bureau Of Land Management And United
States Forest Service); Crested ButteLand Trust; Earl Partch; Francis Partch; Carl E. Silka; Dan Rundell; Phyllis
Rundell; Debe Hancock; Star Mountain Ranch Association, Inc.; and Scott Rennck.
Justice KOURLIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Mount Emmons Mining Company (Applicant) applied for a conditional water right to operate a molybdenum
mine in Gunnison *1257 County. The water court denied the application, finding that Applicant failed to establish sufficient water availability to support a conditional decree. The water court based its denial upon an earlier
ruling out of the same Water Division that affected the Gunnison River basin. The earlier order found 60,000
acre-feet of water available for in-basin users such as Applicant, but also found that a contract was necessary to
access that water. We now hold that such a user-specific contract is not necessary for Applicant to make the requisite showing of water availability to support the issuance of a conditional decree. Accordingly, we reverse the
water court ruling and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
In 1998, Applicant filed a conditional water right application in connection with its proposed molybdenum mine
near Crested Butte, Colorado. The application contemplated consumptive use of 1,500 acre-feet of water per
year, taken from the Slate River and Carbon Creek, both tributaries of the Gunnison River above the Aspinall
Unit (Unit).
The Unit, originally called the Curecanti Unit, is a series of three Colorado River Storage Project Act reservoirs
located on the main stem of the Gunnison River. The reservoirs, Blue Mesa, Morrow Point, and Crystal, are together capable of storing 1,090,000 acre-feet of water. The decrees for the Unit were made absolute in 1980,
FN1
with 1957 priority dates.
FN1. For a thorough discussion of the Unit, the 1922 Colorado River Compact, and their effect on conditional water rights applications in the Gunnison Basin, see Board of County Commissioners v. Crystal
Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325 (Colo.2000).
The United States Government (acting through the Bureau of Reclamation, “BUREC”) is the holder of the water
rights in the Unit, having received them by grant from the Colorado River Water Conservation District (River
District).
The Aspinall Unit water rights are generally subject to Colorado law and are further specifically subject to a
subordination obligation. The River District assigned the state adjudicated water rights for the Unit to the BUREC on the condition that in-basin projects on the Gunnison and its tributaries above the Unit could deplete at
least 60,000 acre-feet of water. This obligation was an outgrowth of negotiations between the River District, local interests, the United States, and the Colorado Water Conservation Board to accommodate development of water resources in the natural basin of the Gunnison River. The water court has found, and this court has confirmed, that such understanding resulted in a binding, enforceable agreement. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crystal
Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325, 340-41, 346 (Colo.2000) (Arapahoe II ). The effect of the subordination
is to make water available for appropriation that BUREC could otherwise call for the Unit in the exercise of its
absolute water rights.
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Thus, the question before us today is simply whether a junior, up-stream, in-basin appropriator must have a contract with BUREC in order to take advantage of the subordination policy. The water court agreed with the Objectors in this case that, in order to meet the required showing of water availability for issuance of a conditional
decree, Applicant must produce a contract with BUREC that permits Applicant to take advantage of the subordination policy. We disagree.
II.
Colorado cherishes its water as a scarce and valuable resource. State Eng'r v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d
496, 505 (Colo.1993). The State strives to distribute the resource in ways that respect historical uses without
thwarting growth or entrepreneurial development. One of the cornerstones of this state's water policy is that the
resource be administered to maximize its beneficial uses. See § 37-92-102, 10 C.R.S. (2001).
[1][2] An applicant may commence the process of developing a beneficial use by filing for a conditional right,
defined by statute as “a right to perfect a water right with a certain priority upon the completion with reasonable
diligence of the appropriation.” *1258 § 37-92-103(6), 10 C.R.S. (2001). A conditional right is a right that
serves to hold the place of the appropriator in the “first in time, first in right” system in effect in Colorado. If the
appropriator diligently puts the water to beneficial use, the conditional right can mature into an “absolute” water
right, with a priority that dates back to the initiation of the conditional right. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. United
States, 891 P.2d 952, 970 (Colo.1995) (Arapahoe I ).
[3] The elements required to establish a conditional right are:
[A]n applicant must show in general that a “first step” toward the appropriation of a certain amount of water has
been taken, that the applicant's intent to appropriate is not based upon the speculative sale or transfer of the
appropriative rights, and that there is a substantial probability that the applicant can and will complete the appropriation with diligence.
City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 31 (Colo.1996) (emphasis added). The “can and will” reference above is from a 1979 addition to section 37-92-305(9)(b), 10 C.R.S. (2001) (“No claim for a conditional
water right may be recognized ... except to the extent that it is established that the waters can be and will be diverted, stored, or otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled and will be beneficially used....”).
[4] In In re Water Rights of Hines Highlands Ltd. Partnership, 929 P.2d 718 (Colo.1996), the applicant sought a
conditional decree for water rights for a ski area development plan. Id. at 721. The objectors argued that there
was insufficient water available in Maroon Creek to permit the diversions under the proposed junior conditional
rights. Id. at 723. We held that:
Under the can and will statute, the applicant must make a threshold showing of reasonable availability of water to prove that the applicant “can” complete the appropriation....
... The applicant need only prove that there is a substantial probability that the appropriation can and will be
completed, based upon necessarily imperfect predictions of future conditions. This approach to obtaining a
conditional water right decree promotes the development and maximum utilization of Colorado's scarce water
resources.
Id. at 723-24 (citation omitted). Thus, as a prerequisite to receiving a conditional decree, applicants must show
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water is available that can be diverted. See also Arapahoe II, 14 P.3d at 333 (“[A]pplicant must prove ... that the
river contains sufficient unappropriated water for the applicant to complete the appropriation diligently and in a
timely manner.”).
III.
[5] With that precedent in mind, we now turn to the question of whether water is available in the Gunnison River
basin for purposes of Applicant's conditional water right application. All parties agree that Applicant is invoking
the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance. All parties also agree that Applicant is an up-stream, junior, in-basin
appropriator who qualifies under the subordination agreement in which the River District conveyed its rights for
the Unit to the United States. However, the Objectors take the position that Applicant needs a specific contract
with BUREC identifying it as a beneficiary of the subordination agreement.
In order to analyze the respective rights and obligations of the parties to this controversy, we must first define
the nature of the subordination agreement and the depletion allowance. “Subordination” is a real estate concept
defined as “[t]he act or process by which a person's rights or claims are ranked below those of others.” Black's
Law Dictionary 1426 (7th ed.1999). It is most often used in the context of one lien or mortgage holder agreeing
to subordinate its senior interest to the rights of a junior lien or mortgage holder. Subordination, as other courts
have noted, is essentially a matter of status between parties. See Brown v. Boren, 74 Cal.App.4th 1303, 88
Cal.Rptr.2d 758, 765 (1999); see generally In re Am. Sweeteners, Inc., 248 B.R. 271 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.2000). It
establishes priorities between those parties by some means other than the automatic or statutory scheme. Brown,
88 Cal.Rptr.2d at 765.
*1259 We have held previously that BUREC must subordinate its senior rights to at least 60,000 acre-feet of upstream, junior, in-basin depletions for beneficial use, and that there is an agreement to that effect that supercedes
the Unit's water rights. Arapahoe II, 14 P.3d at 340-41. Thus, the agreement establishing the priorities and creating the depletion allowance is the umbrella agreement that was a part of the transfer of the water rights to BUREC.
FN2
Depletion allowance is something of an inapposite term, if given its traditional meaning;
however, here it
clearly refers to the amount of water available for use by upstream, in-basin users who would otherwise be subject to the Unit's call for administration and curtailment. Therefore, the depletion allowance represents the total
amount of water that BUREC agreed could supercede the exercise of its senior rights through the subordination.
FN2. A depletion allowance in the natural resources mineral industry is “[t]he process by which the cost
or other basis of a natural resource (e.g., an oil and gas interest) is recovered upon extraction and sale of
the resource.” Black's Law Dictionary 437 (7th ed.1999).
In the case before us, Judge Steven Patrick relied on Judge Robert Brown's findings in Arapahoe II when he
concluded that potential appropriators, like Applicant, may access the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance for
purposes of a conditional decree only if they possess a contract with BUREC. Because Applicant possessed no
such contract, Judge Patrick denied the application based upon a failure to demonstrate water availability. We
observe, however, that Judge Brown's factual conclusions in Arapahoe II addressed the issue of whether the
Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County could access the depletion allowance for purposes of
showing water availability for the Union Park Project trans-mountain diversion. Judge Brown concluded that Arapahoe County could not make use of the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance for a trans-mountain diversion
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project, and such a limitation on the subordination was not an impermissible selective subordination. We upheld
this conclusion. Arapahoe II, 14 P.3d at 345-46. Judge Brown also concluded that Arapahoe County needed, but
did not have, an agreement with BUREC for its proposed water use and decreed that the depletion allowance did
not make water available for Arapahoe's use in the Union Park project. Although we affirmed Judge Brown's
primary ruling in Arapahoe II, we did not opine on the method of implementation or administration of the
60,000 acre-feet, because the issue was not before us in that case given our ruling on Arapahoe County's legal
impediment as a trans-basin diverter.
In rendering his conclusion, Judge Brown cited extensively from witness testimony of several members of BUREC, the Water Districts involved, as well as the State Engineer's office. He detailed development of the subordination policy. Ultimately, he concluded that it was the intent of the parties (the River District and BUREC) to
condition the grant of water rights for the Unit upon the creation of a 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance, but
that “to implement the subordination (depletion) policy,” the parties contemplated contracts. Thus, according to
Judge Brown in Arapahoe II, the parties intended that contracts be in place to effectuate the depletion. This illustrates one of the problems in using factual findings generated in one case as dispositive in another case. Judge
Brown based his finding that user-specific contracts were necessary primarily on the testimony of Carol DeAngelis. However, Wayne Cook, also from BUREC, refuted her testimony on the necessity of a contract. Both individuals were “knowledgeable BUREC officials.” Judge Brown chose not to give as much credence to Mr.
Cook's testimony because Cook not only testified that no contract was necessary, but also that trans-basin diverters could make use of the depletion allowance-a conclusion Judge Brown found to be refuted by the weight of
the evidence. Thus, although Judge Brown did find that a user-specific contract was necessary, his finding was
in the context of a case involving a trans-basin diverter, where the real issue focused on the in-basin limitations
of the subordination agreement.
[6] In this regard, we disapprove of the use of Judge Brown's findings as determinative*1260 in this case because, here, the conditional water right applicant is an in-basin appropriator. The existence of the subordination
agreement has been firmly recognized in our case law, and this appropriator is within the group of individuals
and entities for whom the depletion was intended from the outset of the Unit's development by the United States.
Our prior cases clearly hold that at least 60,000 acre-feet of water is available for appropriation to in-basin beneFN3
ficiaries such as Applicant.
See Arapahoe II, 14 P.3d at 346. Water within the depletion allowance is, therefore, as a matter of law, available to this applicant for the purposes of a conditional decree-provided only that
other qualified appropriators have not otherwise exhausted the depletion allowance.
FN3. We express no opinion on whether BUREC may require a master agreement that, among other
provisions, might contemplate accounting and reporting requirements relevant to Unit operations and
State Engineer administration in the event Applicant puts the water to beneficial use.
[7][8] Typically, to satisfy the “can and will” test, new appropriators must convince the water court that their diversion will cause no harm to senior appropriators: i.e., that water is available. See Southeastern Colo. Water
Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo.1984); Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d
1139, 1147-49 (Colo.2001). In the Gunnison basin, however, to satisfy the water availability test, a new, inbasin appropriator must only convince the water court that a portion of the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance
remains unused. Because we have already determined that this amount was made available for in-basin users,
the remaining question for the water court is only what amount, if any, of the 60,000 acre-feet remains. This in
turn depends on the exercise of absolute decrees for in-basin, junior uses above the Unit. Arapahoe I, 891 P.2d
at 962. We hold that the absence of a contract between Applicant and BUREC does not preclude satisfaction of
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Title 17 Counties
Chapter 41 Agriculture and Industrial Protection Areas
Section 101 Definitions.
17-41-101. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Advisory board" means:
(a) for an agriculture protection area, the agriculture protection area advisory board created as provided in
Section 17-41-201; and
(b) for an industrial protection area, the industrial protection area advisory board created as provided in
Section 17-41-201.
(2) (a) "Agriculture production" means production for commercial purposes of crops, livestock, and
livestock products.
(b) "Agriculture production" includes the processing or retail marketing of any crops, livestock, and
livestock products when more than 50% of the processed or merchandised products are produced by the farm
operator.
(3) "Agriculture protection area" means a geographic area created under the authority of this chapter that is
granted the specific legal protections contained in this chapter.
(4) "Applicable legislative body" means:
(a) with respect to a proposed agriculture protection area or industrial protection area:
(i) the legislative body of the county in which the land proposed to be included in an agriculture protection
area or industrial protection area is located, if the land is within the unincorporated part of the county; or
(ii) the legislative body of the city or town in which the land proposed to be included in an agriculture
protection area or industrial protection area is located; and
(b) with respect to an existing agriculture protection area or industrial protection area:
(i) the legislative body of the county in which the agriculture protection area or industrial protection area is
located, if the agriculture protection area or industrial protection area is within the unincorporated part of the
county; or
(ii) the legislative body of the city or town in which the agriculture protection area or industrial protection
area is located.
(5) "Board" means the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining created in Section 40-6-4.
(6) "Crops, livestock, and livestock products" includes:
(a) land devoted to the raising of useful plants and animals with a reasonable expectation of profit, including:
(i) forages and sod crops;
(ii) grains and feed crops;
(iii) livestock as defined in Subsection 59-2-102(27)(d);
(iv) trees and fruits; or
(v) vegetables, nursery, floral, and ornamental stock; or
(b) land devoted to and meeting the requirements and qualifications for payments or other compensation
under a crop-land retirement program with an agency of the state or federal government.
(7) "Division" means the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining created in Section 40-6-15.
(8) "Industrial protection area" means a geographic area created under the authority of this chapter that is
granted the specific legal protections contained in this chapter.
(9) "Mine operator" means a natural person, corporation, association, partnership, receiver, trustee, executor,
administrator, guardian, fiduciary, agent, or other organization or representative, either public or private,
including a successor, assign, affiliate, subsidiary, and
related parent company, that, as of January 1, 2009:
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U.C.A. 1953 § 13-43-102

Page 1

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Commerce and Trade
Chapter 43. Property Rights Ombudsman Act
Part 1. General Provisions
§ 13-43-102. Definitions
As used in this chapter:

(1) “Constitutional taking” or “taking” means a governmental action resulting in a taking of real property that
requires compensation to the owner of the property under:
(a) the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; or
(b) Utah Constitution Article I, Section 22.
(2) “Takings and eminent domain law” means the provisions of the federal and state constitutions, the case law
interpreting those provisions, and any relevant statutory provisions that:
(a) involve constitutional issues arising from the use or ownership of real property;
(b) require a governmental unit to compensate a real property owner for a constitutional taking; or
(c) provide for relocation assistance to those persons who are displaced by the use of eminent domain.
CREDIT(S)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Technically renumbered from 13-42-102 by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel to avoid
duplication of section number also enacted in S.B. 69 [Laws 2006, c. 343], S.B. 71 [Laws 2006, c. 344] and S.B.
79 [Laws 2006, c. 154].

Prior Laws:
Laws 1997, c. 293, § 1.
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78B-11-129. Appeals.
(1) An appeal may be taken from:
(a) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration;
(b) an order granting a motion to stay arbitration;
(c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(d) an order modifying or correcting an award;
(e) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter.
(2) An appeal under this section must be taken as from an order or a judgment in a civil action.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B11_012900.ZIP 1,760 Bytes
<< Previous Section (78B-11-128)

Next Section (78B-11-130) >>

Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy

12/3/2009 8:40 AM

(a) owns, controls, or manages a mining use under a large mine permit issued by the division or the board;
and
(b) has produced commercial quantities of a mineral deposit from the mining use.
(10) "Mineral deposit" has the same meaning as defined in Section 40-8-4, but excludes:
(a) building stone, decorative rock, and landscaping rock; and
(b) consolidated rock that:
(i) is not associated with another deposit of minerals;
(ii) is or may be extracted from land; and
(iii) is put to uses similar to the uses of sand, gravel, and other aggregates.
(11) "Mining protection area" means land where a vested mining use occurs, including each surface or
subsurface land or mineral estate that a mine operator with a vested mining use owns or controls.
(12) "Mining use":
(a) means:
(i) the full range of activities, from prospecting and exploration to reclamation and closure, associated with
the exploitation of a mineral deposit; and
(ii) the use of the surface and subsurface and groundwater and surface water of an area in connection with
the activities described in Subsection (12)(a)(i) that have been, are being, or will be conducted; and
(b) includes, whether conducted on-site or off-site:
(i) any sampling, staking, surveying, exploration, or development activity;
(ii) any drilling, blasting, excavating, or tunneling;
(iii) the removal, transport, treatment, deposition, and reclamation of overburden, development rock, tailings,
and other waste material;
(iv) any removal, transportation, extraction, beneficiation, or processing of ore;
(v) any smelting, refining, autoclaving, or other primary or secondary processing operation;
(vi) the recovery of any mineral left in residue from a previous extraction or processing operation;
(vii) a mining activity that is identified in a work plan or permitting document;
(viii) the use, operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, or alteration of a building, structure, facility,
equipment, machine, tool, or other material or property that results from or is used in a surface or subsurface
mining operation or activity;
(ix) any accessory, incidental, or ancillary activity or use, both active and passive, including a utility, private
way or road, pipeline, land excavation, working, embankment, pond, gravel excavation, mining waste,
conveyor, power line, trackage, storage, reserve, passive use area, buffer zone, and power production facility;
(x) the construction of a storage, factory, processing, or maintenance facility; and
(xi) any activity described in Subsection 40-8-4(14)(a).
(13) (a) "Municipal" means of or relating to a city or town.
(b) "Municipality" means a city or town.
(14) "New land" means surface or subsurface land or mineral estate that a mine operator gains ownership or
control of, whether or not that land or mineral estate is included in the mine operator's large mine permit.
(15) "Off-site" has the same meaning as provided in Section 40-8-4.
(16) "On-site" has the same meaning as provided in Section 40-8-4.
(17) "Planning commission" means:
(a) a countywide planning commission if the land proposed to be included in the agriculture protection area
or industrial protection area is within the unincorporated part of the county and not within a township;
(b) a township planning commission if the land proposed to be included in the agriculture protection area or
industrial protection area is within a township; or
(c) a planning commission of a city or town if the land proposed to be included in the agriculture protection
area or industrial protection area is within a city or town.
(18) "Political subdivision" means a county, city, town, school district, local district, or special service
district.
(19) "Proposal sponsors" means the owners of land in agricultural production or industrial use who are
sponsoring the proposal for creating an agriculture protection area or industrial protection area, respectively.
(20) "State agency" means each department, commission, board, council, agency, institution, officer,
corporation, fund, division, office, committee, authority, laboratory, library, unit, bureau, panel, or other

administrative unit of the state.
(21) "Unincorporated" means not within a city or town.
(22) "Vested mining use" means a mining use:
(a) by a mine operator; and
(b) that existed or was conducted or otherwise engaged in before a political subdivision prohibits, restricts,
or otherwise limits a mining use.
Amended by Chapter 376, 2009 General Session
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Title/Chapter/Section:

Utah Code
Title 78A Judiciary and Judicial Administration
Chapter 3 Supreme Court
Section 102 Supreme Court jurisdiction.
78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the
United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue all
writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of
Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division of
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies
under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme
Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge
of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the
review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
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(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Amended by Chapter 344, 2009 General Session
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Title 78B Judicial Code
Chapter 11 Utah Uniform Arbitration Act
Section 101 Title.
78B-11-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Utah Uniform Arbitration Act."
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Title/Chapter/Section:

Utah Code
Title 13 Commerce and Trade
Chapter 43 Property Rights Ombudsman Act
Section 201 Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman.
13-43-201. Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman.
(1) There is created an Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman in the Department of Commerce.
(2) The executive director of the Department of Commerce, with the concurrence of the Land Use and
Eminent Domain Advisory Board created in Section 13-43-202, shall appoint attorneys with background or
expertise in takings, eminent domain, and land use law to fill legal positions within the Office of the Property
Rights Ombudsman.
(3) A person appointed under this section is an exempt employee.
(4) An attorney appointed under this section is an at-will employee who may be terminated without cause
by:
(a) the executive director of the Department of Commerce; or
(b) an action of the land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board.
Enacted by Chapter 258, 2006 General Session
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Supreme Court of Utah.
CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, INC., Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and Beaver Creek Associates, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 20000558.
Jan. 11, 2002.
Prospective purchaser of land brought action against vendor for breach of contract and breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, seeking specific performance and damages, and recorded notice of lis pendens. The
Third District Court, Coalville Department, Robert K. Hilder, J., granted vendor's motion to dismiss the specific
performance claim and to release the lis pendens, but denied vendor's subsequent motion to compel arbitration.
Vendor appealed. The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that: (1) the real estate purchase contract required arbitration of the dispute, and (2) vendor's participation in the litigation did not constitute waiver of contractual right
to arbitrate.
Reversed.
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not bring motion to compel arbitration before filing successful motion to dismiss specific performance claim,
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(Formerly 33k23.3(2) Arbitration)
Participation in discovery and other aspects of litigation that do not necessarily involve the court are factors the
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greater weight.
*601 Robert W. Payne, Todd M. Shaughnessy, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Mark R. Gaylord, Craig H. Howe, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
WILKINS, Justice.
¶ 1 The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to compel arbitration. *602 We conclude that
the parties agreed to arbitrate and that Parkwest Associates and Beaver Creek Associates did not waive their
right to arbitrate. The order of the trial court is reversed.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 The following facts are undisputed. In June 1998 Central Florida Investments, Inc. (“CFI”) entered into a
real estate purchase contract with Parkwest Associates and Beaver Creek Associates (collectively, “PWA”). CFI
agreed to buy approximately twenty acres of land in Summit County from PWA for $15,000,000, contingent
upon, among other things, Summit County's approval of a final master plan, and the deal closing on or before
December 31, 1998. The deal fell apart, allegedly because the contingencies were not satisfied by PWA. Subsequently, CFI filed an action against PWA in the district court on November 9, 1999, claiming breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and seeking specific performance and damages.
CFI also recorded a notice of lis pendens against seventy-five acres of PWA property.
¶ 3 On November 12, 1999, three days after CFI filed its complaint, counsel for PWA sent counsel for CFI a letter, indicating that PWA “has consistently taken the position that the Purchase Contract terminated on December
31, 1998, due to the fact that several special contingencies ... were not satisfied....” The letter then notified CFI
“that the Purchase Contract is canceled by the Buyer” because the special contingencies in the contract were not
satisfied. The letter also expressed that “Paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1 expressly provides that ‘any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller,’ ” and
then declared that CFI's filing of the complaint and recording of the lis pendens were improper and constituted
breach of contract. In the letter, PWA also declared its position that paragraph 12 of the addendum superseded
other sections of the contract.
¶ 4 The Real Estate Purchase Agreement contains more than one provision addressing dispute resolution. Sections 15 and 16, found in the pre-printed portion of the contract, read:
[15.] DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including
but not limited to the disposition of the Earnest [Mon]ey Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller [Med]iation
Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. Any
agreement signed by the parties [purs]uant to the mediation shall be binding. If mediation fails, the procedures
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applicable and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this [Sect]ion shall prohibit the
Buyer from seeking specific performance by the seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on the
seller by means of [Sum]mons or as otherwise permitted by law, and recording a lis pendens with regard to the
action provided that the Buyer permits the Seller to refrain from [answ]ering the complaint pending mediation.
Also the parties may agree in writing to waive mediation.
[16.] DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated
damages or to return the Earnest Money Deposit [and] sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights. If Seller defaults,
in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from Seller as
[liquid]ated damages a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit or sue seller for specific performance and/or
damages. If Buyer elects to accept the liqui[date]d damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to
buyer upon demand. Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy, the parties [ ]nd that the
remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under common law.
The parties also agreed to Addendum 1, which reads, in relevant part:
12. Any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both Buyer
and Seller. *603 If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration process
Buyer shall receive its money back and this agreement shall be null and void.
¶ 5 In response to CFI's complaint, on December 13, 1999, after PWA sent the November 12, 1999 letter to CFI,
PWA filed an answer and counterclaim. The answer portion of this single document does not raise as a defense
or mention arbitration. The counterclaim portion, however, raises the issue of arbitration, declaring that the addendum modified the real estate purchase contract and provides that any disagreement over terms would be arbitrated. In the background section of the counterclaim, PWA states, “Addendum No. 1 further modified the
Purchase Contract by providing that any disagreement over its terms ‘shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon
by both Buyer and Seller. If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning of the arbitration
process Buyer shall receive its money back and this agreement shall be null and void.’ ” In the background section of the counterclaim PWA further asserts that “CFI's actions [of filing the complaint and recording the lis
pendens ] are expressly barred by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1 [the arbitration provision].” Then, in the
first cause of action raised in the counterclaim, PWA mentions the November 12 letter and asserts that “PWA
further notified CFI that the filing of the Complaint was not permitted by the Purchase Contract in that section
15 was superseded by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1, which provides that ‘any disagreement over the terms
of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller’ ”; and that “the recording
of the lis pendens was wrongful.” PWA reincorporates these previous assertions by reference in the other causes
of action, and further expressly states, “CFI, by and through its principals, promised, agreed and represented,
among other things, that in the event a disagreement arose the parties would submit the matter to arbitration....”
In alleging breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, PWA alleges that by recording a lis pendens
and filing a complaint, CFI breached the purchase agreement “in direct violation of section 12 of Addendum No.
1....”
¶ 6 On the same day it filed its answer and counterclaim, PWA filed a motion to dismiss and requested a release
of the notice of lis pendens. The memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss also raises the issue of arbitration. In the second paragraph of the introduction section of the memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, PWA states that the recording of the lis pendens was improper because the purchase contract terminated
on its own terms and because “Section 15 was superseded by Addendum No. 1, whereby the parties agreed to arbitrate any disagreement over the terms of the agreement without the threat of an action being filed or lis pen-
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dens being recorded.” While the focus of PWA's motion to dismiss is the assertion that the purchase contract expired on its terms because the contingencies were not met, PWA raises the arbitration provision as a reason to
dismiss CFI's complaint. In the recitation of the facts, PWA declares that CFI's complaint and lis pendens were
“expressly barred by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1” and that “the parties agreed to arbitrate any disagreement over the terms of the agreement without the threat of an action being filed or lis pendens being recorded.”
PWA also attached a copy of the November 12, 1999 letter to its memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, and it referenced the letter in the body.
¶ 7 Because PWA's motion to dismiss was accompanied by numerous affidavits, the trial court considered it as a
motion for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)-(c). In a minute entry the trial court indicated that it
would grant summary judgment for PWA on the claim for specific performance, but the claim for damages for
breach of contract would remain. On February 28, 2000, the court entered its order, dismissing CFI's claim for
specific performance and ordering the release of the lis pendens, but not dismissing the claim for damages based
on the breach of contract claim.
¶ 8 Before the February 28 order was entered, but after the parties were informed that the damages claim would
not be dismissed, the parties participated in discovery. *604 The parties held a rule 26(f) scheduling conference
and submitted a scheduling order to the court on the same day. PWA provided initial disclosures to CFI on
March 3.
¶ 9 On March 9, 2000, ten days after the February 28 order was issued, PWA filed a motion to compel arbitration. The parties argued the motion on May 17, and on May 25, the trial court denied the motion. While the trial
court's written order does not provide any reasoning for the denial of the motion, the transcript of the May 17
hearing indicates that the trial judge determined that the motion should be denied because arbitration was not a
FN1
meaningful option since there was no remedy for the breach of contract claims.
PWA appeals the order
FN2
denying the motion to compel arbitration.
FN1. The trial judge stated:
I think there is a policy and it's continuing to evolve to favor arbitration agreements, and I think the
Courts where they can, do compel arbitration. I think because one, it's a more rapid remedy; [two], it's
agreed upon by the parties; and perhaps-I hope that's not my motivation-is because it relieves the
Court's docket somewhat. Nevertheless, people have a right to their day in court, unless there is a
clear arbitration alternative.
Now, the waiver argument, there [are] certainly actions by the defendant that were inconsistent with
the arbitration. On the other hand, there were actions that were consistent. I am not persuaded that
waiver applies in this case, but that doesn't resolve the issue for me, because before a court should order arbitration, I think it needs to be persuaded that arbitration is a bona fide option.
As I look at this case as carefully as I can, I look at the arbitration provision. I think it was appropriately used by the defendants and relied upon by the court to some extent in ruling on the lis pendens
and the other issues in January to determine that in fact there was any-it was evidence of the intent of
the parties [not to] impede the project. I think that's clear, but the more I look at that provision, I think
it's not even an arbitration provision.
In any event, if I [were] to refer this matter or compel arbitration, I think I would be compelling
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plaintiffs to go into a forum where they are almost doomed to no remedy, nothing more than to be
back where they were before, and I don't think that's an appropriate use of the arbitration mechanism.
I'm denying the motion to compel.
FN2. PWA moved the trial court to stay all proceedings on July 7, 2000, but this motion was denied by
the trial court on September 5, 2000. As a result, PWA moved this court for a stay pending resolution of
the appeal on September 12, 2000, which this court granted on October 17, 2000.
ANALYSIS
[1][2] ¶ 10 As a general rule, whether a trial court correctly decided a motion to compel arbitration is a question
of law which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial judge. E.g., Docutel Olivetti Corp. v.
Dick Brady Sys., Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986); see also Reed v. Davis County Sch. Dist., 892 P.2d 1063,
1064 (Utah Ct.App.1995). Because “[a]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit
to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit,” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960), whether the motion to compel arbitration was erroneously denied is first a matter of contract interpretation. See Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796,
799 (Utah 1998). Therefore, we must initially determine whether the parties bargained for arbitration as a method of resolving their disagreements regarding the real estate purchase contract. Then, if the parties agreed to arbitrate, we address whether the right to arbitrate was waived.
I. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
¶ 11 PWA argues the parties agreed to arbitrate any disputes relating to the real estate purchase contract. PWA
claims the plain language of the agreement indicates that the parties bargained for arbitration. PWA also maintains that the contractual provisions, when harmonized to give effect to all terms, indicate the parties agreed to
arbitrate. PWA asserts that addendum 1, paragraph 12, the provision containing the arbitration provision, superseded any conflicting provisions in the pre-printed portion of the contract, particularly sections 15 and 16 that
address mediation and default. PWA also advocates, however, that if the provisions cannot be harmonized, the
addendum controls; and the first sentence of paragraph 12 of the addendum mandates that any disagreements
shall be arbitrated. CFI, on the other hand, argues the arbitration clause is *605 invalid because the arbitration
option provided for by the contract is not meaningful, and it does not provide for a remedy for the breach of contract claims. According to CFI, placing the parties back in the positions they were in before entering into the
deal is not a remedy; CFI claims it should be placed in as good of a position as if the contract had been performed, and the return of earnest money does not put CFI in the position of the contract being performed. CFI
further asserts that this dispute does not fall within the arbitration provision because addendum 1, paragraph 12
only applies when there is a disagreement over the terms of the contract, and breach of contract and specific performance claims are not disagreements over contractual terms. Moreover, CFI claims the dispute resolution provisions do not limit the right to pursue litigation.
[3][4][5][6][7][8] ¶ 12 In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling. Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, ¶ 13, 987 P.2d 48 (quotation omitted). “[W]e first look to the four corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties.” Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385
(Utah 1989); see also Reed v. Davis Co. Sch. Dist., 892 P.2d 1063, 1064-1065 (Utah Ct.App.1995). If the lan-
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guage within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law. Dixon, 1999
UT 89 at ¶ 14, 987 P.2d 48 (citing Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770
(Utah 1995)). If the language within the four corners of the contract is ambiguous, however, extrinsic evidence
must be looked to in order to determine the intentions of the parties. Id. In evaluating whether the plain language
is ambiguous, we attempt to harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all of its terms. Id.; see also Buehner
Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). “An ambiguity exists where the language ‘is reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense.’ ” Dixon, 1999 UT 89 at ¶ 14, 987 P.2d 48 (quoting R
& R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997) (further quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we first look to the plain language within the four corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties, and we attempt to harmonize the provisions in the pre-printed and addendum portions of the
agreement.
[9] ¶ 13 The parties agreed that if the contractual provisions conflicted, the terms of the addendum would control. The addendum provides for arbitration. At the end of the addendum is the language, “[To] the extent the
terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the [Real Estate Purchase Contract], including all prior addenda and counteroffers, these [ter]ms shall control.” In the body of the addendum is the following language: “Any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon
by both Buyer and Seller. If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration
process Buyer shall receive its money back and this agreement shall be null and void.” Because the addendum
unambiguously declares that the parties bargained for arbitration as the method of dispute resolution if the terms
of the pre-printed portion of the contract and addendum conflict, we turn to whether the dispute resolution terms
conflict, or whether they can be harmonized.
¶ 14 On their face, the dispute resolution provisions conflict, and they cannot reasonably be harmonized. The
agreement sets forth two different provisions regarding the resolution of disputes: section 15 of the pre-printed
FN3
portion of the agreement and paragraph 12 of the addendum portion of the agreement.
Section 15 directs
that “any *606 dispute or claim relating to [the] Contract ... shall first be submitted to mediation.” Paragraph 12
of the Addendum directs otherwise, that “[a]ny disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated
by parties agreed on by both Buyer and Seller.” A harmonization of the dispute resolution provisions would necessarily include a process that includes both mediation and arbitration, for example, that the parties bargained
to mediate first, then arbitrate. However, the language of the competing dispute resolution provisions and other
provisions of the agreement do not support this interpretation. Both the mediation provision and the arbitration
provision indicate that any and all disputes relating to the contract or its terms would be resolved either through
mediation or arbitration, not both. Moreover, the fact that the contract indicates that provisions may conflict, and
that when they conflict the addendum controls, gives credence to the conclusion that arbitration trumps mediation as the agreed upon dispute resolution process.
FN3. The addendum is part of the original agreement, not an additional or superseding agreement
entered into at a later date. The pre-printed portion and the addendum are both signed and dated June
12, 1998. The language in the pre-printed portion of the agreement also evidences that the addendum is
part of the original agreement. Section 1, the section describing the property, references the Addendum.
Section 3, the section regarding closing, also incorporates the Addendum: “CLOSING. This transaction
shall be closed on or before Addendum.” Further, Section 14 reads, “14. COMPLETE CONTRACT.
This instrument (together with its Addenda, any attached Exhibits, and Seller Disclosures) constitutes
the entire Contract [betw]een the parties and supersedes all prior dea[lings] [b]etween the parties.”
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¶ 15 Two further provisions mention additional possible procedures to be followed for resolving disputes outside
of mediation or arbitration. They also conflict. The second-to-last sentence of Section 15 in the pre-printed portion indicates that “[n]othing in this [Sect]ion shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific performance by the
seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on the seller by means of [Sum]mons or as otherwise permitted by law, and recording a lis pendens with regard to the action provided that the Buyer permits the Seller to
refrain from [answ]ering the complaint pending mediation.” Paragraph 12 of the addendum portion of the agreement, however, conflicts. Paragraph 12 indicates that “Any disagreement over the terms of the agreement shall
be arbitrated ... [and][i]f agreement cannot be reached within 60 days ... the Buyer shall receive its money back
and this agreement shall be null and void.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the provision in the pre-printed portion of
the agreement contemplates the filing of a complaint, while the addendum contemplates that a complaint would
never be filed but that any disagreements would be arbitrated, and if arbitration failed, the parties would be returned to their respective positions before the contract was entered into. The filing of a complaint and lis pendens conflicts with the addendum instructions that any disagreement must be arbitrated. As a result, the addendum again controls.
[10] ¶ 16 Moreover, if there is any question as to whether the parties agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration or litigation, i.e., through the filing of a complaint and recording of a lis pendens, we interpret the
agreement keeping in mind our policy of encouraging arbitration. “It is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret
contracts in favor of arbitration, ‘in keeping with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes
when the parties have agreed not to litigate.’ ” Reed v. Davis County Sch. Dist., 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah
Ct.App.1995) (quoting Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Sys., Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986)); see also
McCoy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2001 UT 31, ¶ 14, 20 P.3d 901 (“It is our policy to interpret arbitration
clauses in a manner that favors arbitration.” (quoting Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 479)); Chandler v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992) (stating “this court has also recognized the strong public policy in
favor of arbitration ‘as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion.’ ”).
[11] ¶ 17 Finally, we are not persuaded by CFI's assertion that this dispute does not fall within the arbitration
provision because it is a dispute over the enforcement of the agreement, as opposed to a dispute over the terms
of the agreement. CFI claims that addendum 1, paragraph 12 applies only to disagreements over the terms of the
contract, and that claims for breach of contract and specific performance are not disagreements over contractual
terms. In this instance, to distinguish between the terms themselves and enforcement of the terms *607 would be
meaningless-a distinction without a difference.
[12] ¶ 18 To interpret the agreement in this way would, in effect, nullify the agreement to arbitrate. Put otherwise, an agreement to arbitrate only terms of an agreement is of no effect if the parties can simply bring suit to
enforce their interpretation of the terms of the agreement. For example, arbitration of whether zoning approval
must be provided (a dispute over “terms”) would be meaningless if one of the disputing parties could simply
proceed to court and claim specific performance of the disputed guaranteed zoning based on a favorable interpretation of the “term.” The language of the addendum indicates an intent to arbitrate. If the exception advocated
by CFI, litigation to enforce the agreement, were permitted, it would swallow the bargain that “any disagreement
over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated.” Moreover, CFI's proposed interpretation would be contrary
to the parties' intent, apparent from the four corners of the agreement, to avoid litigation and resolve any disFN4
putes through arbitration.
FN4. As the trial court observed, the arbitration provision agreed upon by the parties provides for an ex-
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tremely narrow range of options: The parties must agree to a solution within 60 days, or the contract is
cancelled, and CFI gets its earnest money back. While in retrospect this may not include all of the options CFI now desires, the provision is completely consistent with the parties' intent at the outset to
bring a prompt and sure resolution to disputes that arose. While CFI now argues, in effect, that such a
narrow choice of remedies is so foolish as to be no remedy at all, it is the bargain they struck with
PWA, and it is not for the courts to save them from it.
¶ 19 Accordingly, we conclude that the plain language of the agreement provides that the parties agreed to arbitrate any and all disputes pertaining to the agreement. The agreement declares that the terms of the addendum
control if the provisions in the addendum conflict with the provisions in the pre-printed portion. The dispute resolution language in the pre-printed portion and the dispute resolution language in the addendum conflict and
cannot be harmonized. Because these provisions conflict, the dispute resolution provision of the addendum,
which unambiguously indicates an agreement to arbitrate, controls.
II. WAIVER
[13][14] ¶ 20 Because we conclude that the parties agreed to resolve their disagreements regarding the real estate purchase contract through arbitration, we address whether this contractual right to arbitrate was waived.
“[W]hether a contractual right of arbitration has been waived presents mixed questions of law and fact: whether
the trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which we give a district court deference.” Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ¶ 16, 982 P.2d
572 (citing Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992)).
¶ 21 PWA argues it did not waive its right to arbitrate. PWA claims that under the standard of Chandler v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), there is a presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate, that
it did not participate in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and that CFI was not prejudiced by PWA's actions. PWA contends that filing its motions to dismiss and to quiet title does not constitute
participation in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate because they were necessary to obtaining relief from the lis pendens or required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and PWA notes it offered
arbitration as an alternative argument to dismissal. Moreover, PWA asserts that CFI was not prejudiced because
PWA did not delay in asserting the right to arbitrate, and the motion to dismiss, motion to quiet title, and the answer and counterclaim all referenced the arbitration clause. CFI counters that PWA waived its right to arbitrate
under Chandler. CFI contends that PWA participated in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate by answering the complaint, bringing a counterclaim, participating in scheduling, and by exchanging initial
disclosures, thereby invoking the power of the courts and availing itself of the benefits of litigation. CFI also
claims it *608 has been prejudiced because PWA gained an advantage by having the specific performance claim
dismissed, and now there is no practical way to allow all of the claims to proceed to arbitration. CFI also claims
the costs incurred in participating in discovery and in responding to the motion to dismiss and quiet title constitute prejudice.
[15] ¶ 22 The trial court was correct to apply Chandler. In Chandler, this court set forth the standard for determining whether a party has waived a contractual right of arbitration. Waiver of a right to arbitration occurs when:
[1] the party seeking arbitration substantially participates in litigation, to a point inconsistent with the intent to
arbitrate, and [2] this participation results in prejudice to the opposing party. Chandler, 833 P.2d at 358, 360.
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Both parts of the Chandler test must be met in order to find waiver.
[16] ¶ 23 Whether a party has waived the right to arbitrate is a factually intensive determination; the court must
infer the original intent of the party asking for arbitration on a case-by-case basis. Chandler, 833 P.2d at 358 n.
8; see also Bd. of Educ. Taos Mun. Sch. v. Architects, 103 N.M. 462, 709 P.2d 184, 185 (1985) (stating that
whether a party has waived the right to arbitrate “depends on the facts of each case, from which the court must
infer the original intent of the party now asking for arbitration”). See generally, Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Defendant's Participation in Action as Waiver of Right to Arbitration of Dispute Involved Therein, 98 A.L.R.3d.
767 (1980 & Supp.2001) (surveying cases which demonstrate that waiver cases are highly fact dependent, and,
as a result, outcomes of both waiver and no waiver vary widely based on the specific facts of each case).
[17][18][19] ¶ 24 Furthermore, given the strong policy of the law in Utah in favor of arbitration, see, e. g.,
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992), Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Sys.,
Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986), there is also a strong presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate.
See Chandler, 833 P.2d at 358-60. Cf. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25,
103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (explaining the federal policy favoring arbitration for agreements that fall
within the United States Arbitration Act, indicating that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”); Creative Solutions Group, Inc.
v. Pentzer Corp., 252 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir.2001) (indicating that waiver is disfavored); County of Clark v. Blanchard Const. Co., 98 Nev. 488, 653 P.2d 1217, 1219 (1982) (noting that because of Nevada's policy strongly favoring arbitration, “waiver should ‘not be lightly inferred’ ” (citation omitted)); EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934
S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.1996) (citing Moses H. Cone for the proposition that “[t]he [federal arbitration act] disfavors
waiver, and there is a strong presumption against waiver”). Because of our strong presumption against waiver in
Utah, waiver of the right to arbitrate must be intentional, and inferring waiver from a party's actions is appropriate only if the facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce arbitration intended to disregard its right to arbitrate. See EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.1996). In determining whether a party disregarded, or waived, its right to arbitrate, we look to whether the party substantially participated in litigation to a
point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and if so, whether that participation resulted in prejudice to the opposing party. Chandler, 833 P.2d at 358, 360; EZ Pawn Corp., 934 S.W.2d at 89. The party claiming waiver has
the burden of establishing substantial participation and prejudice. Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359; Tenneco Resins,
Inc. v. Davy Int'l, AG, 770 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that under the federal arbitration act “[t]he burden on one seeking to prove a waiver of arbitration is a heavy one”) (citation omitted).
A. Whether the Party Seeking Arbitration Substantially Participated in Litigation to a Point Inconsistent with
the Intent to Arbitrate
[20] ¶ 25 Because we determined that the parties agreed to arbitration, we consider *609 whether this contractual right to arbitrate was waived. In so doing, we apply the Chandler test, analyzing first whether PWA, the party
seeking arbitration, substantially participated in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. We
conclude that PWA did not.
[21] ¶ 26 This first part of the Chandler test looks at the actions of the party seeking arbitration, and whether
those actions evidence an intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation.
Participation in discovery and other aspects of litigation that do not necessarily involve the court are factors we
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consider in trying to ascertain a party's intent or attitude toward its participation in litigation. Requests made of
the court by the parties, however, have even greater weight. We consider especially important whether the
parties' requests of the court demonstrate an intent to pursue litigation or whether they demonstrate an intent to
avoid litigation and a desire to be sent to arbitrate. Accordingly, parties seeking to enforce arbitration should ensure that the court, not just the opposing party, is informed that arbitration is desired. In doing so, judicial resources will be appropriately conserved.
¶ 27 We agree with the trial court that, although a close call, waiver did not occur in this case. See supra, n. 1.
PWA did not substantially participate in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate; PWA's actions do not demonstrate it intended to disregard its right to arbitrate. Ideally, PWA would have raised arbitration in its answer and counterclaim and then brought a motion to compel arbitration before filing any other pretrial motions, such as the motion to dismiss. While this did not occur, the particular facts of this case evidence
the intent of PWA to arbitrate.
¶ 28 On one hand, we recognize that PWA's actions constitute participation in litigation. PWA filed an answer
and counterclaim, and it filed a motion to dismiss before it filed its motion to compel arbitration. PWA's answer
did not mention arbitration, and the motion to dismiss raised four arguments, none of which expressly articulated arbitration as a reason for dismissing the action. Plus, PWA invoked the authority of the court by filing
these pleadings before filing the motion to compel arbitration, particularly the motion to dismiss.
¶ 29 Nevertheless, PWA did not participate in litigation to such an extent that it acted inconsistently with the intent to arbitrate. PWA's actions do not demonstrate that it intended to disregard or waive its right to arbitrate. To
the contrary, PWA's actions demonstrate reluctant, unwilling participation in litigation and an intent to arbitrate.
¶ 30 First, PWA's November 12, 1999 letter clearly evidences PWA's position that arbitration of any dispute relating to the purchase agreement was required under the agreement and that litigation was improper. In the letter
PWA notified CFI of its intent to avoid litigation and arbitrate just days after CFI filed its complaint. This letter
was presented to the trial court in the memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss and referenced in the argument. Second, the memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss also evidences PWA's intent to arbitrate
and reluctant participation in litigation. The second paragraph in PWA's memorandum in support of the motion
to dismiss states, “Section 15 was superseded by Addendum No. 1, whereby the parties agreed to arbitrate any
disagreement over the terms of the agreement without the threat of an action being filed or lis pendens being recorded.” The memorandum later states again, albeit in the factual background section, that “the filing of this action and the recording of [the] lis pendens are expressly barred by paragraph 12 of Addendum No.1 [the arbitration section].” Third, even though the answer portion of PWA's answer and counterclaim does not explicitly
mention arbitration, the fourth cause of action in the counterclaim presents the existence of the arbitration agreement as a reason to find for PWA. The heading, “Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,” does not
expressly mention arbitration, but the substance of the charge is that CFI's filing of a complaint and lis pendens
violated the agreement to arbitrate. The counterclaim reads, “CFI's breaches of the Purchase Contract, including
*610 but not limited to its recording of a lis pendens and asserting other claims against the Property in direct violation of section 12 of Addendum No. 1 and in breaching its many agreements with PWA that it would cooperate with PWA to achieve the closing and that it would not claim an interest in the Property, constitute a breach
of CFI's obligations of good faith and fair dealing implied in all Utah contracts.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 31 Thus, while PWA participated in litigation, it did so unwillingly, and it did not convey an intent to disregard its right to arbitrate. The fact that it sent the November 12 letter to CFI, and the fact that the letter was
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presented to the trial court as part of the memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, combined with the
raising of the arbitration clause in the counterclaim as a reason to find against CFI, evidences an intent to arbitrate. Through the letter, counterclaim, and the motion to dismiss which included and referenced the November
12 letter, PWA apprised both CFI and the court of its position that litigation of the matter was improper, of its
reluctance to litigate, and of its intent to arbitrate.
¶ 32 Moreover, while PWA certainly could have more clearly indicated that it was litigating under protest and
that it wanted to arbitrate, PWA participated in the litigation process unwillingly. PWA was, to a certain extent,
compelled to file these pleadings to comply with the rules of civil procedure. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
imposed requirements and deadlines on PWA to participate as it did in pretrial discovery and in the filing of pretrial motions. If we were to hold that PWA's participation in the litigation process, particularly discovery, regardless of its intent regarding arbitration or the extent of its participation in litigation, the result would be that
in subsequent cases parties would arguably always waive arbitration in complying with deadlines imposed by
the rules governing litigation in the courts.
¶ 33 Furthermore, we must factor in the strong policy of the law in Utah in favor of arbitration, the strong presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate, and the burden of establishing substantial participation on the
party claiming waiver. If participation in discovery and pretrial motions, standing alone, irrespective of the
parties' intentions, were to constitute waiver of the right to arbitrate, the strong policy favoring arbitration would
be damaged. This court has long “recognized the strong public policy in favor of arbitration ‘as an approved,
practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion.’ ” Chandler v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992) (quoting Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846
(Utah 1983), and citing Lindon City v. Eng'rs Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981), and Giannopulos v.
Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 15 P.2d 353, 356 (1932)). Because participation in litigation brought by the opposing
party is required by the rules of procedure, limited participation does not conclusively establish an intent to litigate.
¶ 34 In sum, although PWA participated in the litigation process in this case, it did so reluctantly, demonstrating
a sufficient intent to arbitrate. PWA communicated to CFI and the district court that its participation in litigation
was reluctant and that it wished to arbitrate. PWA clearly expressed to CFI in the November 12, 1999 letter that
it wished to arbitrate, and PWA also conveyed to the court, albeit not as clearly as it could have, that it wished to
arbitrate in its counterclaim, and memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss. Significantly, the litigation
machinery was not invoked by PWA, and when it did participate in the litigation process, it did so while communicating an intent to arbitrate. Because PWA conveyed its intent to arbitrate to the court (in its pleadings) and
to CFI (in both a letter and in its pleadings), PWA's participation in litigation, while not minimal, did not
demonstrate an intent to no longer arbitrate.
B. Whether the Party Opposing Arbitration was Prejudiced
¶ 35 Because PWA did not participate in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, we need
not consider whether CFI, the party opposing arbitration, was prejudiced due to PWA's participation in the litigation process. Under Chandler, both parts of the test must be met. *611Chandler, 833 P.2d at 358, 360. Since
FN5
that is not the case here, we conclude that PWA did not waive its right to arbitrate the dispute with CFI.
FN5. Arguably CFI was prejudiced in a sense, in that PWA gained an advantage by having CFI's complaint for specific performance dismissed. Under the agreement, however, CFI had no right to file the
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complaint for specific performance with its accompanying lis pendens. The parties should have been
sent to arbitration, with neither party presenting anything before the district court for consideration and
decision. Thus, where CFI actually was not entitled to bring the complaint, having it dismissed, along
with the lis pendens, is not a legal detriment in this case. Moreover, CFI's claim that it has been prejudiced by the time and expense of discovery is not compelling given the fact that PWA indicated a desire
to arbitrate in the November 12 letter before discovery commenced.
CONCLUSION
¶ 36 We conclude that the parties agreed to arbitrate. We also conclude that PWA did not waive its right to arbitrate because PWA did not participate in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.
¶ 37 Accordingly, the trial court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration is reversed.
¶ 38 Associate Chief Justice RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, Judge GREENWOOD, and Judge THORNE concur
in Justice WILKINS' opinion.
¶ 39 Having disqualified himself, Chief Justice HOWE does not participate herein. Court of Appeals Judge
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD sat.
¶ 40 Having disqualified himself, Justice DURRANT does not participate herein. Court of Appeals Judge WILLIAM A. THORNE sat.
Utah,2002.
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